A Theory of Feelings

253 Pages·1979·5.776 MB·English

by  Ágnes Heller

This book is the second of a series in which the author tries to build up a
consistent Marxist social anthropology. Its fundamental thesis is that the
false contrast of feeling versus reason should be abolished, that even the
relative functional independency of feeling cannot be understood in abso­
lute opposition to reason. The first part of the book: "The phenomenology
of feelings" begins with a definition of feeling. It proceeds from this to the
principles with the help of which feelings could be divided into classes,
criticizes other divisions and gives its own, and makes an attempt at the
complete system of division of feelings. The next chapter deals with the
"learning process" of feelings from which the book turns to the problem of
feelings and values, the problem of the evaluation of feelings and - as a
conclusion of the first part - to the so-called "particular" versus "in­
dividual" feelings. The second part is a contribution to the sociology of the
feelings, and the author emphasizes that it is only a contribution, not a
complete historical sociology of the problem. First of all it tries to establish
the general "historical dynamics" of the bourgeois world of feelings, it
analyzes the "feeling household" in some detail, deals further on with the
problem called the "abstraction" of bourgeois feelings and gives a short
analysis of the present historical developments.
The book is to be recommended both for professional readers such as
psychologists, philosophers, sociologists and the general public.
Agnes Heller, born in Budapest, Hungary in 1929, wrote her PhD thesis
under the supervision of Georg Lukacs, in whose department she worked
from 1955-1958. From 1963-1973 she was active as senior research fellow
in the Sociological Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In 1977
she left Hungary for Australia, where she is now reader in sociology at La
Trobe University at Melbourne.
The aim of the series Dialectic and Society, is to publish books in the human
and social sciences which will take up their subject matter objectively,
non-speculatively, and in this sense dialectically.
Whereas a great portion of current writings'in these sciences deals with the
exposition of facts, a sort of positivism has in consequence come to
dominance among them. On the other hand, a like amount of work in the
human and social sciences is of a speculative character. Our series is
committed to the negation of both these states of affairs. Given that it is
radical to go to the root of things, the series is conceived as being radical
The root of the human being is in society, the quest after any root is a piece
of metaphysical speculation, evoking the phantasmagorical image of
Robinson Crusoe on his deserted isle.
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ISBN 90 232 1699 7
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A THEORY OF FEELINGS
DIALECTIC AND SOCIETY
Lawrence Kräder, Editor
Board of Editors
Agnes Heller, Budapest
Cyril Levitt (Assistant Editor), Hamilton, Canada
Angel Palerm, Mexico D.F.
Peter Stadler, Zürich
Editorial Consultants:
Herman Bianchi, Amsterdam David McLellan, Kent
Alessandro Casiccia, Turin Claude Meillassoux, Paris
Stanley Diamond, New York Ikenna Nzimiro, Nsukka
Margrit Eichler, Toronto J. M. Ripalda, Madrid
Ernest Gellner, London Earl Smith, Connecticut
Maurice Godelier, Paris Jacob Tauber, Berlin
Manfred Hinz, Bremen Charles B. Timmer, Amsterdam
Marlis Krueger, Bremen Bianca Valota-Lavalotti, Milan
J. R. Llobeia, London Bärbel Wallisch-Prinz, New York
Guido Martinotti, Milan
1. Lawrence Kräder, THE ASIATIC MODE OF PRODUCTION:
Sources, Development and Critique in the Writings of Karl Marx
2. Lawrence Kräder, DIALECTIC OF CIVIL SOCIETY
3. José Maria Ripalda, THE DIVIDED NATION.
The Roots of a Bourgeois Thinker: G. W. F. Hegel
4. Lawrence Kräder, A TREATISE OF SOCIAL LABOR
5. Agnes Heller, A THEORY OF FEELINGS
A THEORY OF FEELINGS
AGNES HELLER
VAN GORCUM ASSEN, THE NETHERLANDS 1979
© 1979 Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V., P. O. Box 43, 9400 AA Assen, The Netherlands
No parts of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any
other means without written permission from the publishers.
Translated from the Hungarian by Dr. Mario D. Fenyö. Original title: Az érzelmek elmélete
ISBN 90 232 1699 7
Printed in The Netherlands by Van Gorcum, Assen
CONTENTS:
Introduction ......................................................................................... 1
Part I The Phenomenology of Feelings ............................... 5
Chapter I What does it mean to feel? ........................................ 7
A. I am involved in something ................................ 7
B. Human being as a whole ...................................... 18
C. Feeling and homoeostasis...................................... 34
D. Motivation and information, expression and
communication ......................................................... 46
Chapter II The classification of feelings from the anthropological
point of view ............................................................. 59
Part II Contribution to the sociology of feeling................... 175
Introduction to part II ............................................. 177
Chapter I About the historical dynamics of the bourgeois world
of feeling in general.................................................... 183
Chapter II The housekeeping of feelings ..................................... 199
Chapter III The "abstraction” of bourgeois feelings, and what’s
beyond ....................................................................... 215
Epilogue ............................................................................................. 243
On Human Suffering ......................................................................... 243

INTRODUCTION
Ever since there has been theoretical thinking, there has been a theory of
feelings. Numerous great themes of anthropology (instincts, needs, per­
sonality) had not even appeared on the horizon of philosophy, when the
world of men’s feeling, the nature of feelings, the relation to feelings were
problems everyone who took the trouble to reflect about the nature and
tasks of man had to take into account.
The standpoint whence feelings became a topic has varied to a consid­
erable extent from one historical period to another, and even within the
same period. In antiquity feeling was primarily an ethical issue; and the
analysis of feelings had always been subordinated to the analysis of virtues.
If different virtues were ascribed to different strata of society - as Plato had
done - then also different feelings were ascribed to them. If the most
virtuous man is the good citizen - as Aristotle argued - then feelings
must be measured by the standard of the good citizen. If a life directed at
pleasure is regarded as the supreme Good - as in hedonism - then the
emphasis is on the development of the capacity to enjoy, etc. The questions
asked by medieval Christianity were also primarily ethical; but its standard
of virtue was the good Christian. In the dualism of body and soul only the
feelings of the soul (of the spirit) may refer to the Good; feelings
pertaining to the body were placed at the negative pole, and they had to be
repressed if possible, or at least controlled.
The reference of feelings to morality does not disappear even in the
bourgeois era (see, for instance, the Scottish school), but it is crossed by
completely different theoretical and value considerations. Even the theory
of feelings approached from the point of view of morality has to confront
new (hitherto unknown) problems. Until then the existence of morality
had been taken for granted. But now the question arose: what holds the
world of atoms together? Morality exists - but how is it possible?
Although the actual formulation of the problem originated only with
Kant, in practice this was how the problem was formulated in the
bourgeois era from the beginning.
One of the roads for the establishment of possibilities is to start from
the feelings. I cannot analyse its innumerable forms. But they have one
aspect in common: reductionism. The world of feelings (and conse­
quently, the world of moral action) will be built on basic feelings, or
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