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JournalofDevelopmentEconomics111(2014)132–149
ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect
Journal of Development Economics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/devec
Can cultural norms reduce conflicts? Confucianism and peasant
☆
rebellions in Qing China
JamesKai-singKunga,b,⁎,ChichengMac
aDivisionofSocialScience,TheHongKongUniversityofScienceandTechnology,ClearWaterBay,Kowloon,HongKong
bInstituteforAdvancedStudy,TheHongKongUniversityofScienceandTechnology,ClearWaterBay,Kowloon,HongKong
cSchoolofEconomics,ShandongUniversity,27ShandaNanlu,Jinan,ShandongProvince,China
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Articlehistory: Canculturemitigateconflictstriggeredbyeconomicshocks?InlightoftheextraordinaryemphasisthatConfu-
Received3January2014 cianismplacesonsubordinationandpacifism,weexamineitsroleinpossiblyattenuatingpeasantrebellionwith-
Receivedinrevisedform25August2014 inthehistoricalcontextofChina(circa1651–1910).Ouranalysisfindsthat,whilecropfailuretriggerspeasant
Accepted28August2014 rebellion,itseffectissignificantlysmallerincountiescharacterizedbystrongerConfuciannormsasproxiedby
Availableonline6September2014
Confuciantemplesandchastewomen.Thisresultremainsrobustaftercontrollingforalonglistofcovariates
andinstrumentingConfuciannormsusingancientConfuciansages(500B.C.–A.D.550)toaddressconcernsof
Keywords:
measurementerrorandreversecausality.
Culturalnorms
Confucianism ©2014ElsevierB.V.Allrightsreserved.
Economicshocks
Conflicts
Peasantrebellions
1.Introduction havehadthebenigneffectofreducingsocialconflictstriggeredby
economicshocks.
Thereisnowmoreorlessaconsensusthateconomic (climate) We predicate ouranalysis on a specific form of social conflict—
shockstendtotriggersocialconflicts(BaiandKung,2011;Besleyand peasantrebellions—andexaminewhethertheculturalnormsassociated
Persson,2011;BrucknerandCiccone,2010;CollierandHoeffler,1998, withConfucianismservedtoattenuatetheeffectofeconomicshocksin
2004;Migueletal.,2004;amongothers).Butmuchlessisknown,at triggeringpeasantrebellionsinthelast267yearsofChina'sdynastic
least empirically, about the potential attenuating effect of cultural rule(theQingdynasty,circa1644–1911).Peasantrebellionsarethe
normsonconflicts,despitethetheoreticalclaimthatsuchaneffect principalformofsocialconflictinagrariansocieties.Inthesesocieties,
exists(Funk,2004;Posner,2000;Putnam,2000;Rasmusen,1996).1 peasantslivesoclosetosubsistencethatperiodicfoodshortagescaused
Byemployingauniquedataset,weexaminewhetherasetofcultural bythevagariesofweathereasilygiverisetowhatJamesScott(1976)
(Confucian)normsthathavepersistedforatleastseveralmillennia termed“subsistenceethic”—anideologythatjustifiestheoccasional
robbingandplunderingforthesakeofsurvival.Thetieswithwhich
thepeasantrebelshavehadwiththeirvillagecommunitiesrender
☆ Wethanktheeditor,NathanNunn,andtwoanonymousreviewerswhosesuggestions themneitherfull-timemilitarynorcriminals,onlysomeoneforcedto
havehelpedimprovethisarticlesubstantially.WealsothankYingBai,MarkusBruckner,
switch from farm work to robbery in times of economic hardship
QiangChen,LiHan,RuixueJia,WolfgangKeller,Yi-minLin,DebinMa,Tuan-HweeSng,
andparticipantsattheEconomicHistoryAssociation's2010AnnualMeeting,the2012 (Hobsbawm,1972;Scott,1976).This“two-faced”natureofpeasants
AsianHistoricalEconomicsConference,andvariousotherseminarsforhelpfulcomments renders peasant rebellion a uniquely interesting form of conflict
andsuggestions.JamesKungacknowledgesthefinancialsupportoftheHongKong whoseoccurrencemayoccasionallybesparkedbyeconomicshocks.
ResearchGrantsCouncil(grantno.642711)andYanAiFoundation(grantno.R8008). Tosuppressthis“subsistenceethic”,China'semperorshadtirelessly
Chicheng Ma acknowledges the financial support of the National Natural Science
inculcatedinthepopulaceConfuciannormsthroughoutthecountry's
FoundationofChina(grantno.71303135).Wearesolelyresponsibleforanyremaining
errors. long history (circa206 B.C.to A.D. 1911).2By inducingshameand
⁎ Correspondingauthorat:DivisionofSocialScience,TheHongKongUniversityof moraldistressinthosewhofailtoabidebytheprinciplestaught,Confu-
ScienceandTechnology,ClearWaterBay,Kowloon,HongKong. cianismstressestheimportanceof“subordination”—ofasubjecttothe
E-mailaddresses:[email protected](J.K.Kung),[email protected](C.Ma).
1 Anotableexampleisshamingpunishments,whichinvolvedeliberatepublichumilia-
tionandmoraldistressoftheoffender,asanalternativetotheformalcriminaljusticesys- 2 ItiseasytounderstandwhytheChineseemperorswereconcernedaboutpeasantup-
tem(Posner,2000).RecentendeavorsoftheUnitedNationsandotherinternational risings.Throughoutthecountry'slonghistory,peasantrebellionshaddirectlyoverthrown
communitiesinimplementinga“peaceeducationprogram”inthoseareasofAfricarife Qin(221–207B.C.),Han(202B.C.–A.D.220),Sui(581–618),Yuan(1271–1368),andthe
withcivilconflictsarepremisedonthisprinciple(Blattmanetal.,2011;UNICEF,2009). Mingdynasties(1368–1643)(Wakeman,1975).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.08.006
0304-3878/©2014ElsevierB.V.Allrightsreserved.
J.K.Kung,C.Ma/JournalofDevelopmentEconomics111(2014)132–149 133
ruler,ofasontohisfather,andofawifetoherhusband;theintended incivilserviceexaminations,whosesyllabialsodrewheavilyonthe
resultwasconflictavoidance.Tofosterthisethos,theChineseemperors memorizationofConfucianclassics.ToruleoutthepossibilitythatCon-
builttemplestohonorConfuciusandhisfollowers,praisedtheso-called fuciannormsmayaffectpeasantrebellionsviathechannelofsocialmo-
chastewomen(lienv)forthesacrificetheyallegedlymadebyremaining bility(i.e.,thosewhofailedtheexambecamearebel),weemploythe
aswidowsorevencommittedsuicideupontheirhusbands'deaths,3 number of county/prefectural level degree holders (shengyuan) to
developedaneducationandcivilserviceexaminationsystembased proxyforsocialmobility,assuchadegreeisthetickettothegentry
almostexclusivelyonthememorizationofConfucianclassicsandrote classandfacilitatedupwardmobility.
learning,4andsoforth.WhiletheConfucianethoswasundoubtedly Thenthereistheissueofstatecapacity,whichislikelytoreduce
underminedduringthetumultuoustimesoftheCommunistrulein conflictsbutmayalsosimultaneouslyaffectthediffusionofConfucian
thetwentiethcentury,ithasbeenrevivedandpersistseventothis norms.Toreducethispossibility,weexpandourlistofcontrolvariables
day.5Indeed,fewcivilizationshaveseenthepersistenceofcultural toincludealsothenumberofimperialsoldiersstationedinacounty,a
normsforsuchalongperiodoftime,whichpresentsanidealsituation county'sfaminereliefcapacity(granaries)andfiscalcapacity(land
fortestingthepossibleeffectofcultureonconflictreduction. tax),andacounty'spoliticalstatus(ofbeingaprefecturalcapital).
Todothis,weconstructapaneldatasetof107countiesinShandong TaoismandBuddhism—tworeligious-cum-philosophicalbeliefs—
Provincethatcovers260years(1651–1910),aperiodthatbasically similarlyadvocateharmony,andsowecontrolforthembyenumerat-
overlapswiththeQingdynasty.Afterseveralmillenniaofdiffusion, ingtheirtemples.Bythesametoken,wealsocontrolforthepossibleef-
ConfucianismhadbytheQingdynastybeenfirmlyestablishedasthe fectofWesterninfluenceinthelateQingperiodbyemployingtheyears
cornerstoneofmoralityintheChinesesociety,permeatingthoroughly ofopeninguptotheWest(usingthedurationoftreatyportsasproxy)
to even the bottom rung of the social hierarchy (Ho, 1962; Yang, andtheyearsof(Christian)missionarypresence.Inordertodisentangle
1961).AsforchoosingShandongProvince,thereasonsaretwo-fold. thehypothesizedmitigatingeffectofConfuciannormsfromtheabove
ForemostisthatQufuCountyofShandongProvinceisthebirthplace listofcontrols,weinteractthesecontrolswithcropfailure.
ofConfucius;choosingShandongProvincethusallowsustoexamine Ourempiricalanalysisfindsthat,whileeconomicshocksasmea-
the purest effect of Confucian culture in reducing social conflicts.6 suredbycropfailuredohavetheexpectedpositiveeffectonthenumber
Shandongisalsoidealforstudyingpeasantrebellionsbecausehistori- ofpeasantrebellions,theeffectissignificantlysmallerincountieswith
cally,certainpartsoftheprovincehadbeenpronetobothdroughts strongerConfuciannorms.Whilewecannotruleouteveryconceivable
andfloodsandhadturnedouttobetheheartlandofpeasantrebellions factorthatmightbecorrelatedwithbothConfuciannormsandpeasant
inChina. rebellions,theevidencegatheredissufficientlyrobustinsubstantiating
Empiricallymeasuringthestrengthormorespecificallythepopular- theclaimthatConfuciannormsorculturehavehadamitigatingeffect
ityofConfucianism,however,ischallenging.Inlightoftheimportance oneconomicshocksandaccordinglypeasantrebellions.
thattheChineseemperorsaccordedtothe“religion”andthepraises Giventhattemplesmaybedestroyedduringcivilconflicts,reverse
theyshoweredonlocalConfucianexemplars,weemploythenumbers causalitycannotberuledout.Arelatedconcernispossiblemeasure-
ofConfuciantemplesandchastewomentoproxyforthestrengthof menterrorarisingfromthecrudenessofourproxiesforConfucian
Confucianism.Giventhatculturalnormstendtoevolveveryslowly norms.Toaddresstheseissuesweadoptaninstrumentalvariableap-
overtime,ourtwomeasuresofConfucianismshouldbefairlystable proachinwhichweemploythenumberofancientConfuciansages
throughouttheQingdynasty. thateverlivedpriortotheQingdynasty(from500B.C.toA.D.550)to
ToempiricallyassessifConfuciannormsplayanysignificantrole instrumentforthestrengthofConfuciannormsduringQingtimes.
inmitigatingtheeffectofeconomicshocksonpeasantrebellions,we OurchoiceispremisedonthereasoningthatthestrengthofConfucian
relyontheresultsoftheinteractionbetweenyearlyincidenceofcrop normsasithaddevelopedoverthepast2000yearswouldlikelyhave
failureineachcountyandConfuciannormswithintheframeworkofa continuedintotheQingdynastyandthusbestronglycorrelatedwith
generalizeddifference-in-differencesapproach.Thisallowsustouse it.ConsistentwiththeOLSfindings,theinstrumentedresultsreaffirm
county-andyear-fixedeffects tocontrol forall the county-specific thattheeffectofeconomicshocksonpeasantrebellionsissignificantly
factorsandthecommontrendfacedbyallthecountiesalikethatmay reducedbystrongConfuciannorms.
bearuponbothpeasantrebellionsandConfuciannorms. Ourstudycontributestoanemergingliteraturethatexaminesthe
Buttheeffectofculturecouldstillbeconfoundedbyotherunob- mediatingeffectsofpoliticalinstitutions,culture,andtechnologyon
servedsocioeconomiccharacteristicscorrelatedwithbothConfucian conflicts.Forexample,BesleyandPersson(2011)findthattheeffect
normsandpeasantrebellions.Anotablecaseinpointiseconomicpros- ofeconomicshocksonpoliticalviolenceexistsonlywherepoliticalin-
perity,whichislikelycorrelatedwiththenumbersoftemples,onthe stitutionsarenon-cohesive.Similarly,Jia(2014)observesthatthetrig-
onehand,andpeasantrebellionson theother.We control forthis geringeffectofdroughtsonpeasantrevoltsinhistoricalChinacouldbe
possibleomissionbyemployingtwoproxies—thesuitabilityofland mitigatedbytheintroductionofNewWorldcrops—specificallythe
forplantingthemajorcropsatthetimeandthelevelofurbanization. sweetpotatoes.Likewise,Fetzer(2013)reportsthatinIndiaasocialin-
AsConfucianclassicsmadeupthecorecurriculuminschools,our surance scheme known as the “Indian National Rural Employment
measuresofConfucianismlikelyalsocapturetheeffectofeducation Guarantee”hashadthevirtuouseffectofmitigatinginsurgencyviolence
onpeasantrebellions.TodisentangletheeffectofConfucianculture triggeredbyincomeshocks.
fromthatofeducation,wecontrolforthenumberofschoolsineach Ourstudyalsocontributestoasmallbutgrowingliteraturethatex-
countytoproxyforeducation.Arelatedpossibleomissionissocial aminesthedirecteffectofculturalnormsonconflicts,violenceand
mobility.InlateimperialChina,socialmobilitywasachievedviasuccess crime.Forexample,VoigtlanderandVoth(2012)findthatmedieval
anti-SemitismcanexplaintheviolenceagainsttheJewsinthe1920s.
Similarly,FismanandMiguel(2007)findthatdiplomatsfromcountries
3 ThesewomenallegedlyexemplifiedtheimportantvirtuesofConfucianism,namely withseverecorruptionproclivitieshaveatendencytocommitparking
subordination,loyaltyandpurity.
4 Establishedinthetenthcentury,thecivilserviceexaminationwasdesignedtoselect violationsintheUnitedNations.Ofcourse,notallculturalnormshave
qualifiedcandidatestoserveinthestate'sbureaucracy. anegativeimpactonsocialbehavior.Weaimtodemonstratehow,in
5 AfterbeingdenouncedduringtheCommunistera,Confucianismwasrecentlyem- thecontextofChina'slonghistoryofcivilization,thestablecultural
braced,albeitcautiouslybytheChineseCommunistPartyonceagainasthemoralcorner- normsofConfucianismhadtheeffectofmitigatingsocialconflictstrig-
stoneonwhichto“re-establish”socialmoralityandmaintainaharmonioussociety.The
geredbyeconomicshocks.Inthisrespect,ourworkcoincideswiththat
Economist,April28,2011.
6 WewouldhavelikedtotestthehypothesisonChinaasawhole,buttheamountof ofMacCullochandPezzini(2010),whofindthatChristianbeliefshave
timeandeffortrequiredtocollectthenecessarydatawouldbeprohibitivelyarduous. thebenigneffectofreducingthetasteforrevolts,andisinlinewith
134 J.K.Kung,C.Ma/JournalofDevelopmentEconomics111(2014)132–149
Buonannoetal.'s(2009)findingthatafearofsocialstigmatizationand 2.2.Confucianism
ostracismcansimilarlydetercriminalbehaviors.
Theremainderofthisarticleproceedsasfollows.Thenextsection Moralsuasion,especiallywhenappliedviathesubtleindoctrinatingin-
(Section2)providesahistoricalbackgroundonpeasantrebellionsand fluence of cultural norms, can be an effective means of governance.
ConfucianisminlateimperialChina.Section3describesoursample Throughoutvariousdynasties,China'simperialauthoritieshadindeed
andtheconstructionofourvariables.Theeffectsofeconomicshocks appealedtothevirtuesofsubordinationandpacifism—thetwinpillarsof
andConfucianismonpeasantrebellionsareexaminedinSection4. Confucianism—insuppressingthe“subsistenceethic”.11Thefoundingem-
Section5checkstherobustnessofourestimationsbyaddingawide peroroftheMingdynasty(1368–1643),ZhuYuanzhang,wasconvinced
arrayofcontrols,whereasSection6discussestherationaleandresults that“indoctrinationisthekeytogovernacountry”.Asamatteroffact,
oftheinstrumentalvariableestimations.Section7providesabrief mostemperorsinChinesehistoryhadreligiouslyadheredtothefollowing
conclusiontothestudy. creedfromConfucius:“Leadthepeoplewithgovernmentalmeasuresand
regulatethembylawandpunishment,andtheywillavoidwrongdoing
butwillhavenosenseofhonorandshame.Leadthemwithvirtueandreg-
2.Historicalbackground ulatethembytherulesofpropriety,andtheywillhaveasenseofshame
and,moreover,setthemselvesright”(Confucius,1993).
2.1.EconomicshocksandpeasantrebellionsinhistoricalChina Indeed, Confucianism had been actively promoted by various
Chineseemperorsasorthodoxideology(statereligion)forovertwo
ByandlargepeasantrebellionshadafflictedtheentireimperialChina thousandyears(throughoutalmosttheentiredynastic regime) on
(221B.C.–A.D.1911),whichforthousandsofyearshadremainedapre- groundsofthepowerfulconvictionthatits“pacifist”doctrinesarecapa-
dominantlyagrarianeconomysubjecttothevicissitudesofweather.7In bleofdiscouragingconflictsandviolence.Asacomplexsystemofethics,
this“landoffamine”,toborrowMallory's(1926) term,therepeatedrav- Confucianismhaspersistedtenaciouslyforseveralmillenniasincesixth
agesofweathershocks,periodicfoodshortages(andfaminesinthemore centuryB.C.whenConfucius(551–479B.C.)firstbeganteaching.Ina
extremeinstances)andaccordinglypeasantrebellionswereindeedare- nutshell,Confucianismpreachesthepursuanceofharmonioushuman
currentfeatureofruralChina'seconomicandsocialreality.8 relationsthroughthecultivationor(moreappropriately)indoctrination
Theperiodicfoodshortagescausedbythevagariesofweathereasily ofthetwinvirtuesofsubordinationandpacifism.12Embodiedinthe
gaverisetowhatScott(1976)termed“subsistenceethic”—onethatjus- ThreeGuidingPrinciples(sangang),whichhadbeenactivelypromoted
tifiestheoccasionalrobbingandplunderingbypeasantswhentheir throughoutvariousimperialregimes,theConfucianethicsadvocate
subsistence is threatened (see also Hobsbawm, 1972). Wakeman's specificallythesubordinationofasubjecttotheruler(withadistinct
(1975,p.6)depictionoftheChinesepeasant–rebelassomeonewho emphasisonloyaltytowardtheemperor—theso-called“Mandateof
“constitutedtheeconomicfoundationoftraditionalChinesesociety” Heaven”),ofasontohisfatherandofawifetoherhusband.Bydistinct-
(bydevotingtheirlivestolaboriousfarmwork),butalso“steppedout lyemphasizingfilialpietyandsubordinationwithinthefamily,the
ofthisroleandmomentarilyattachedthemselvesjustasfirmlytoam- lattertwoprinciplesconstitutethemicro-basisjustifyingsubordination
bitiousbanditsattheheadofrebelarmies”wheneconomicresources totherulers—thefirstandoverridingprinciple(Yao,2000).
werescarce,isanexcellentexampleofthe“subsistenceethic”atplay. WhiletheThreeGuidingPrincipleslaydownaclearsubordinating
Indeed,thispatternof“timeallocation”betweenfarmingandbanditry relationshipbetweenactorswithinboththesocietyandfamily,theFive
isconsistentwiththerecordsofQingChina'sBoardofPunishments, ConstantRegulations(wuchang)stressanumberofsocialnorms(compas-
whichfoundthatbanditrywas“usuallyaseasonalactivitycloselytied sion,righteousness,propriety,wisdom,andfaithfulness),theviolationof
totheagriculturalcalendar”.Inparticularthe“primetimeforbandits” whichwouldleadtoseverepenaltyintheformofstigmatizationandos-
coincided with the slack farming seasons in the winter months of tracismwithinone'scommunityandfamily.Fearofsuchpunishments,it
NorthChinawhentherewaslittleifanyworktobedone,withbanditry isbelieved,wouldhelpsuppressviolenceandreduceconflicts(Yao,2000).
fallingoffremarkably“afterenteringthebusyagriculturalseasonof
Spring”(Esherick,1987,pp.22–3).9
Thus,notwithstandingthefactthatsomewell-knownpeasantrebel- 2.3.ThediffusionofConfucianism
lionsinthecourseofChinesehistoryhadresultedindynasticdecline,
thevastmajorityoftheserevoltsweremerelylocalunrestsinvolving From(asearlyas)theWestHandynasty(206B.C.–A.D.9)onwards,the
the plundering of resource-rich and powerful officials by no more imperialauthoritieshadconsciouslyandpersistentlypromotedtheConfu-
thanseveralhundredpeasantsintimesofeconomichardship.Yang cianvirtuesthroughthefollowing:1)theerectionoftemplesforworship-
(1975)offersevidenceofthisinhisstudyofsocialunreststhatoccurred pingandhonoringConfuciusandthoseadheringreligiouslytohiscardinal
duringthesecondhalfofChina'sQingdynasty(1796–1911),wherehe principles,and2)honoringbehaviorthatemphasizedtheseprinciples.
foundthatlessthan4.7%ofthepeasantrebellionsenumeratedinvolved TheerectionofConfuciantempleswithinwhichtheassociatedrit-
over10,000participants.10 ualscouldbepracticedrepresentedanimportantmeansofpromoting
Confucianism(Chow,1994;Ho,1962;Yang,1961).Specifically,local
governmentswererequiredtobuildtemplesandtoperformsacrificial
ritestoworshiptheConfuciansageslikeConfuciusandMenciusand
theirfollowers(theConfucianscholars).13Meanwhile,localofficials
7 Infact,Chinaremainedanagrarianeconomyuntiltheearlytwentiethcentury,with
roughly95%ofthepopulationstillclassifiedaspeasantsthen(Zhang,1931). 11 AccordingtohistoriansofChina,theuseofmoralsuasionforsocialcontrolwasalsoa
8 Evidencebasedonthepastseveralthousandyearsshowsthatdroughtshadoccurred consequenceofthefollowing:a)thesheerareaofthecountryandsizeofitspopulation,
attherateofroughlyonceeverysevenyearsinthenorthernandcentralprovinces,but andb)thelackofamodern,sophisticatedbureaucraticsystem(Hsiao,1960;Wakeman,
aboutonceeveryfouryearsintheotherprovinces(Mallory,1926).Moreover,thelack 1975).
ofirrigationinfrastructureinmostplacessuggeststhatcropyieldswereatthemercyof 12 FromtheConfucianperspective,thecausesofconflictlieinone'sownheart;people
theweather(Sun,1957). willnaturallyhavepeacewhentheheartisatpeace;itisnotrichesorpower,butvirtuous
9 ThisfeatureofpeasantrebellionswasfoundespeciallypervasiveontheNorthChina mannersthatconstituteharmonioushumanrelations.Incontrast,anuncultivatedcharac-
plainduringthenineteenthcentury,wherean“aggressivesurvivalstyle”—articulatedin tercausesonetobeunhappyandpronetocomplaints,triggeringconflictsandviolence
theformsofbanditry,organizedfeuds,andlocalmilitarization—sawthepeasantsalternat- (Yao,2000,pp.179–80).
ingbetweenfarmingandbanditryconditionalonthevagariesofweather(Perry,1980). 13 EmperorYongzheng(1722to1735)oftheQingdynastydecreedthatcountiesshould
10 Wolf(1969),Chesneaux(1973),Feuerwerker(1975),Tong(1991),andRowe(2009) buildtemplesinwhichmen(andwomen)whoexcelledinfilialpietyandloyaltyshould
paintasimilarpictureofpeasantrebellionsinhistoricalChina. bedulyhonored.
J.K.Kung,C.Ma/JournalofDevelopmentEconomics111(2014)132–149 135
andgentry,whoweredeeplyschooledinethicalConfucianismthem- venerationoftheConfuciansagesislikenedtotheChristians'worship
selves,putagreatdealofeffortintopopularizingConfucianismbyper- ofJesusChristandtheMuslims'reverencefortheirprophetMohammed
suading peasants of the importance of the moral principles (Carus,1918,p.155).
underpinning the Confucian values (Chang, 1955; Fairbank and The effective diffusion of Confucian values and norms can also
Reischauer,1989;Wakeman,1975). begleanedfromthefactthattheoverridinggoalofsuppressingthe
Confuciannormswerealsodiffusedthroughpubliclypraisinglocal TaipingRebellion(1850–1864)wasnotsomuchtoprotecttheManchu
examplesoflaudablebehaviorandconduct.AnotableConfucianexem- regimeastoupholdConfucianismagainstadistortedinterpretationof
plarwas“chastewomen”orlienv,whowerebasicallywidowswhohad Christianity—the Society of God Worshippers, or Bai Shangdi Hui
vowednottoremarryor,attheextreme,evencommittedsuicideafter (FairbankandGoldman,1992).17Likewise,thepatrioticBoxersofthe
theirhusbands'deaths,inordertodemonstratetheirunshakendeter- latenineteenthcenturywhoendedupkillingmanyWesternmissionar-
minationtopreservefidelityandloyaltytotheir(deceased)husbands iesandChinesecommunicantsdidsotopreservetheConfucianvalues
until death.14 Reflecting the Confucian ethics of subordination and (Spence,1990).18Lastbutnotleast,thatConfuciannormshadfirmly
loyalty(whichserveasthefoundationofsubordinationtotheruler), established itself in the Chinese society was also borne out by the
chastewomenwereheldinthehighestregardbytheimperialauthori- New Cultural Movement (1915–1921)—the Chinese “Renaissance”
tiesandgreatlyhonoredintheirownlocalcommunitiesfromasearlyas thatoccurredshortlyafterthecollapseoftheQingdynasty,wherein
theZhoudynasty(1046–256B.C.).DuringtheMingandQingdynasties, theConfucianculturewasthoroughlycondemnedasbeingthekey
theimperialauthoritiespromotedthisvirtuetoanunprecedentedlevel. contributing factor to China's failure to develop the economy and
Notonlywereasetofsophisticatedlawsestablishedforthesakeofcan- democracy(Schwartz,1983).
onizingthechastewomen,butalsoritualsweredevelopedforhonoring Thecrux,forourpurpose,iswhetherthediffusionofConfucianethics
them(Chow,1994;Mann,1997).Forexample,aftergettingnominated playedaroleinreducingsocialconflictsorspecificallypeasantrebellions.
bythelocalgentry,candidatesweresubjectedtostrictscrutinybyvar- Anecdotalevidencesuggestsitdid.Forexample,theprevailingpopularex-
iouslevelsofgovernmentauthoritiesbeforetheir“purity”wascertified pression“beapeacefuldog[ratherthan]arebel”clearlyopinedthatone
andthecovetedhonorofachastewomanwaseventuallyconferredon shouldstrivetobecomea“courteousgentleman”ratherthana“martial
thembythecourt.Afterreceivingthehonor,memorialarchwayswould knight”.EventhepeasantrebelarmyheadLiZicheng(1606–1645)and
beconstructedintheirhometownstobroadcastthesevirtues. manyothersocialbandits,whowereforced(byadversecircumstances)
Notunexpectedly,thenumberofchastewomenincreasedbyleaps intosuchroles,maintainedareverenceforConfucius,totheextentthat
andboundsinlateimperialtimes.Indeed,historicalrecordsindicate theConfuciusfamilymansionandtemplesinthehometownofConfucius
that,whenmeasuredonadecadalbasisonlyonechastewomanhad wereeffectivelysparedfromtheirplundering(Zeng,1876).19Wethusex-
been identified in every one million of the population in the Yuan pectthatthediffusionofConfucianvaluesandnormsinChinahaveplayed
dynasty(1271–1368),butthatnumberincreasedsharplyto13and16 asignificantlypositiveroleinreducingpeasantrebellions.
duringtheMingandQingdynastiesrespectively.15Thissurgesuggests
thegrowingimportancethattheimperialauthoritieshadplacedupon
3.Data
theConfucianethicsandnormsasthelastChinesedynastyapproached
itseventualdecline.
3.1.Thesample
Aconfoundingfactoriseducationandinconnectiontoitsocial
mobility.AlthoughConfucianclassicsandrotelearningwerealmostex-
To examine the effect of Confucianism on peasant rebellions,
clusivelytaughtinschools(Elman,2000;Weber,1922)andassuch
we construct a panel dataset that covers the 107 counties of
wouldverylikelybearuponthediffusionofConfucianism,thelatter's
ShandongProvincethroughoutthe267yearsofChina'sQingdynasty
effect may well have come through the channel of social mobility. (1644–1911).TherearegoodreasonsforchoosingShandongonthe
Afterall,socialmobility,whichinthehistoricalChinesecontextmeant
NorthChinaPlainforexaminingthepossibleeffectofConfucianism
that those from a (“commoner”) background without an educated
onpeasantrebellions(AppendixFig.A1).Foremostisthat,beingthe
literatusorgentryscholarasfamilymemberwereabletostudyConfu-
birthplaceofConfucius(QufuCountytobeprecise)andmanyother
cianism,couldonlybeachievedviapassingtheimperialcivilservice
greatConfuciansages,ShandongProvincewastheoriginoftheortho-
examinations(Ho,1962;Rawski,1979).16Itisagainstthisreasoning doxConfucianculture.20Itssacrosanctimportancewasreinforcedin
thatweprefertotreateducationandsocialmobilitynotasameasure
lateimperial(Qing)timesassomeemperors,mostnotablyKangxi
ofConfucianismbutratherashavinganindependenteffectonthe andQianlong,chosetoperformsacrificialceremoniesandbuiltmore
dependentvariableofinterest.
templesthere,andgrantedfeudalnobilitytodescendantsofthegreat
Aftertwothousandyears,Confucianideologyhadarguablyperme-
Confuciansageswhocontinuedtolivethere(Elliott,2009).Whilethe
atedtheentiresocialstrataandestablisheditselfasthepredominant
socialnormsamongtheChinesepopulace(FairbankandReischauer,
17 WiththemostprofounddemographicconsequencesinChinesehistory(thenumber
1989;Ho,1962;Yang,1961).Thismaybeevidenced,atleastinpart,
ofcasualtieswasestimatedtorangebetween50(Perkins,1969)and73million(Cao,
bythefactthateverytownshipinQingChinahadatemplebuiltto 2000)),theTaipingRebellionmayberegardedasa“holywar”wagedonConfucianism.
honorandvenerateConfuciusandhisfollowers,tothedegreethat ItaroseoutofadisdainfuldenunciationofConfucianismandtheQingrule,andwassup-
pressedbytwoarmygeneralswhowereConfucianscholars—ZengGuofanwasajinshiand
ZuoZongtangwasajuren(FairbankandGoldman,1992).
14 Thedeedsofchastewomenwererecordedindetailinthelocalgazetteersduringthe 18 ChinawasforcedtoopenuptotheWestafteritsdefeatintheFirstOpiumWar
MingandQingdynasties.AnexampleisJingShi,anativeofLichengCounty,Shandong (1839–1842)andthesigningofaseriesofso-called“unequaltreaties”,particularlythe
Province,whowasconferredthehonorofachastewomanforherdeterminationtocon- TianjinTreatyof1860,whichresultedinamorethoroughpenetrationbytheforeigners.
tinuelookingafterherparents-in-lawafterherhusbandpassedawaywhenshewasonly Agroupofspontaneouslyformed,patrioticanti-imperialistsin1900knownasthe
28(LichengGazetteer,1926). “Boxers”attackedtheforeignmissionariesandcommunicantsfortheallegedsuperiority
15 ThedataonchastewomenareobtainedfromtheGujintushujicheng(GreatCollection thelatterimposedupontheChinese,whichessentiallywasunderpinnedbyaclashof
ofAncientandModernBooks)(1726)(Chen,1985). valuesbetweenConfucianismandChristianity(Esherick,1987).
16 ConfucianclassicsrefertotheFourBooksofGreatLearning,DoctrineoftheMean, 19 LiZichengwasafamouspeasantrebelleaderwhooverthrewtheMingdynasty.
Analects,andMencius,andtheFiveClassicsofBookofChanges,ClassicofPoetry,Classicof 20 BothConfuciusandthemajorityofhisdisciplescamefromQufuCountyoritsnearby
Rites,ClassicofHistory,andSpringandAutumnAnnals(seeNylan,2001fordetails).Stu- regions.Hisdisciples,manyofwhomsubsequentlybecamegreatConfuciansagesor
dentsbegantheirstudiesasyoungchildrenbylearningbasicChinesecharactersand scholarsthemselves,continuedtospreadConfucius'doctrinesbackintheirhometowns
memorizingthethousandsofcharacterscomposingtheConfucianclassics.Theythen orotherplacesnearQufu(Esherick,1987;Legge,1991).ThatwaswhyQufuwaspromot-
wentontomasterandmemorizetheFourBooksandtheFiveClassics,andtopracticetheir edasthe“holyland”ofConfucianismbyvariousimperialauthoritiesfromtheHandynasty
compositionskillsoftheeight-leggedessaysthatwererequiredintheexaminations. (206B.C.–A.D.220)onwards(Forsyth,1912).
136 J.K.Kung,C.Ma/JournalofDevelopmentEconomics111(2014)132–149
countyofQufuanditsneighboringregionsallowustoexaminethe dynasty.Indeed,Yang(1975)checkedtheaccuracyoftheentrieson
effectofConfucianismonpeasantrebellions,therewereregionswithin peasantrebellionsbycomparingthoselistedintheQingShiluagainst
theprovincethatweredistinctlyweakintheConfuciantradition.This thoseenumeratedin40countygazetteersofsixprovinces,andfound
sharp contrast within Shandong Province thus provides us with a thattheQingShiludidadequatelycovervirtuallyallthereportedsocial
suitablesettingforexaminingtheeffectofConfucianismonpeasant unrests(specifically thelocationandtimeofoccurrence).Fig.1(a)
rebellions(moreonthisbelow). showsthestrikingcontrastinthenumberofpeasantrebellionsacross
Second,historicallythewesternplainofShandongProvincewasfre- thecountieswithinShandongProvince.Forexample,whereasthose
quentlystruckbynaturalcalamities.Whiledroughtswereacommon countiesinthesouthandsouthwesternregionswereheavilyafflicted,
occurrence,theYellowRiver—thesecondlargestriverinChinathat theotherpartsoftheprovinceweredecidedlymorepeaceful.
runs from western Shandong to the sea—occasionally breached its Beingarain-fedagrarianeconomy,Chinawassusceptibletoeco-
levees to flood the western plain. By contrast, the eastern part of nomicshocks,whichoftentimesresultedincropfailure.Tomeasure
Shandong(thepeninsula)enjoyedaplentifulsupplyofrainfallandwas suchshocks,weemployadummyvariabletoindicatewhetheracounty
farawayfromthefloodingareasoftheYellowRiver.Bythemid-to-late hadexperiencedcropfailure.Inaddition,wealsolagthisvariableby
nineteenthcenturytheYellowRiverhadshifteditscourserepeatedly oneyear,ascropsinnorthChinaaretypicallyharvestedinsummer
(1852–1887),leadingtoaseriesoffloodsandconsequentlywidespread andautumn,hence,peasantrebellionsinducedbyharvestfailuresare
crop failures. Even more unfortunate was that such mishaps were morelikelytooccurinthefollowingyear.AccordingtotheQingShilu,
followedoncloseheelsbythegreatdroughtof1896–1897,resultingin thedocumentedcropfailureswereinvariablycausedbysuchnatural
alarge-scalefamineinShandongandotherpartsofNorthChina. disastersasdroughts,waterloggedland,floods,locustplagues,and
Accordingly,certainpocketsinwestShandongwerealsohometo earthquakes—inshortbyexogenousweathershocks.23Fig.1(b)shows
thesocialbanditsandpopularunrestsinhistoricalChina(Esherick, thatcountiesinthewesternregionswerepronetocropfailure,but
1987).OneofthefourclassicChinesenovels,theWaterMargin(also theotherpartsoftheprovincewererelativelyimmunetoit.
knownasOutlawsoftheMarsh),whichtellsataleofhowagroupof Forrobustness,we also employ theunusual levels of rainfall in
108 outlaws gathered at Mount Liang (or Liangshan Marsh) and droughtandwaterloggingepisodes(hereafter“extremerainfall”)as
amassedasizablearmytoresistthegovernment,wassetinsouthwest alternativemeasuresofeconomicshocks.Therainfalldataareobtained
Shandongintheearlytwelfthcentury(theSongdynasty).Bythelate fromZhongguojinwubainianhanlaofenbutuji(AtlasontheSpatial
nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,Westernmissionariessaw DistributionofDroughtandWaterloginChinafortheRecentFiveHundred
southwesternShandongastheplacewherethe“classicEldoradoof Years),compliedbytheChinaMeteorologicalAdministration(1981).
bandits”weregathered(Stenz,1897).21 Therainfalllevelisdifferentiatedonascaleof0to2,with0indicating
Itisalsoworthmentioningthat,withalandareaapproximately20% normalweatherconditions,1indicatingslightdroughtorwaterlogging,
largerthanthatofEngland,andwithmorethanahundredcounties and2indicatingseveredroughtorwaterlogging.24Butsinceinpeasant
(107)havingsufficientvariationsinculture,weatherconditions,and societiesextremerainfallisnotasdirectameasureofincomeshockas
peasantrebellions(seeSubsections3.2and3.3fordetails),Shandong cropfailure—nottomentionthatrainfalldataareavailableonlyatthe
Provinceisuniquelysuitedforconductingastudyofthisnature.Focus- prefecture(ratherthancounty)level,wecontinuetousecropfailure
ingonasingleprovinceenablesthisstudytoavoidtheunobservedhet- asourkeymeasureofeconomicshockandemployextremerainfallto
erogeneitiesthattypicallyafflictotherstudiesinvolvingcross-country checkitsrobustness.
comparisons.
WechoosetheQingdynasty(1644–1911)tobeoursampleperiod
because,aswehavepointedoutinSubsection2.3,Confucianismhad 3.3.MeasuresofConfuciannorms
bythenbecomedeeplyingrainedintheChinesesocietyafterseveral
millenniaofpromotionbysuccessiveemperors.Webeginouranalysis Ourmainchallengeliesinconstructingavalidmeasuretoproxyfor
from1651onwardstoexcludethosesocialunrestscarriedoverfrom thestrengthofConfucianism.Unlikeotherreligions(suchasChristianity),
theMingdynasty.Similarly,weendouranalysisin1910simplyto whosestrengthcanbemeasuredby,forinstance,theshareofcommuni-
avoidthecomplicatedpoliticalcircumstancesthatcloudedthefinal cantsinapopulation(e.g.,BaiandKung,2014;BeckerandWoessmann,
yearoftheQingdynasty(1911). 2009),Confucianismresemblesmoreofasetofsocialnorms,andthere-
forelacksaclear-cutstandardwithwhichtoidentifythetruebelievers.
3.2.Measuresofpeasantrebellionsandeconomicshocks Aftercarefuldeliberations,wecameupwithsomereasonableproxies
forthestrengthofConfuciannorms.
The dependent variable, peasant rebellions, is measured by the OurfirstmeasureofConfuciannormsisthenumberofConfucian
numberofuprisingsthatreportedlyoccurredinacountyonayearly templesthatacountyhadestablished.Ourchoiceispremisedonthe
basis.Thedetailedrecordsontheplaceandtimeofeachpeasantrebel- reasoning that stronger Confucian norms would likely give rise to
lionweremeticulouslycompiledbytheQingcourtintheQingShilu more Confucian temples being built, which would in turn deepen
(Veritable Records of the Qing Emperors).22 According to Chinese thosenorms(Ho,1962).AccordingtotheQingcourt,Confuciantemples
historians,theQingShiluisthemostcompleteandsystematicsource weredifferentiatedbasedonwhethertheywerespecificallyerectedfor
oforiginalinformationonsocialunreststhatoccurredduringtheQing honoringConfucius(e.g.,wenmiao),forhonoringthenotableofficials
andlocalvirtuousConfucians(e.g.,minghuanxiangxianci),orforhonor-
21 InhisbookTheOriginsoftheBoxerUprising,historianJosephEsherick(1987)finds ingthelocalloyalandfilialmen(e.g.,zhongxiaojieyici)(Yao,2000).
thatConfucianism'slackofpopularityinsouthwesternShandong(especiallyCaozhou
Prefecture)wasanimportantreasonbehindthedominanceofheterodoxsects,which
orchestratedendemiccrime,banditry,andrevoltsintimesofeconomichardship. 23 TheQingShilucontainsthemostsystematicinformationoncropfailuresthatoccurred
22 TheQingShiluistheofficialrecordofimperialedictsandofficialmemorialsabout intheQingdynasty.Forexample,“TheeighthyearofTongzhiemperor(1869):Dueto
eventsofnationalsignificance.Unfortunately,itcontainednosystematicinformationon waterlogging,drought,andlocustplagues,thecountiesofLicheng,Shouzhang,Fan,
thesizeandcausesoftherebellions—theywerealluniformlyreferredtoas“feiluan” Dong-e,Jining,Zouping,Changshan,Qihe…ofShandongProvinceareexemptedfromtax-
(banditunrests).Weprovidebelowtwoexamplesofrebellionsastheyweredocumented ationuntilfurthernotice.”
intheQingShilu.Case1:“ThetwelfthyearofTongzhiemperor(1873):stationedinGuan 24 TheoriginalvaluesintheAtlasrangedfrom1to5,with1indicatingseveredrought,2
County,agroupofbanditsplunderedaround.CountymagistrateLiYuwasordered(bythe slight drought,3normalweatherconditions, 4slight waterlogging, and 5severe
court)toleadthelocalconstablestosuppressthem…”Case2:“ThethirdyearofXianfeng waterlogging.Tocombinethetwomeasuresinthesamedirection,weconvert3(normal
emperor(1852),March:thegrandcouncilorofstatewasinstructedtoquellthethousands weatherconditions)to0,2and4to1(slightdroughtorwaterlogging),and1and5to2
ofbanditsheadedbyHuangFuinWeishanLake,whoplunderedfrequently.” (severedroughtorwaterlogging).
J.K.Kung,C.Ma/JournalofDevelopmentEconomics111(2014)132–149 137
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig.1.Distributionof(a)numberofpeasantrebellions,(b)numberofcropfailures,(c)numberofConfuciantemples,and(d)numberofchastewomeninShandongProvinceduring
theQingPeriod(bycounty).Notes:ThenumbersofpeasantrebellionsandcropfailuresarebasedontheQingShilu(VeritableRecordsoftheQingEmperors).ThenumbersofConfucian
templesandchastewomenarebasedontheShandongTongzhi(ProvincialGazetteerofShandong),andarenormalizedbyacounty'slandarea(in1000km2).
Our second measure is the number of chaste women officially thatculturesarelikelytoremainstableoveralongperiodoftime
electedbytheQingcourt.Duetodatalimitations,wecanonlycover (e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011;
theperiod1644–1890—abouttwodecadesbeforetheQingdynasty Putnam, 1993; Tabellini, 2010; Voigtlander and Voth, 2012).
cametoanend.WeconsiderchastewomenavalidproxyforConfucian AppendixFig.A2,whichshowsthenumberofnewly-establishedCon-
normsbecause,asdiscussedinSubsection2.3,thedeedsofthechaste fuciantemplesbythereignofemperor(andthecorrespondingdynas-
women were considered an ultimate expression of the Confucian ty) from 206 B.C. to A.D. 1911, suggests that Confucianism had
virtues pertaining to purity, loyalty, and subordination, and thus cumulativelydevelopedfromChina'slonghistoricalpastandmust
representedacodeofconductthattheQinggovernmentwaseagerto have become firmly established as the orthodox religious-cum-
promote.Moreover,unliketemples,itislesslikelyforchastewomen cultural ideology in China by the Qing dynasty (Fairbank and
tobecorrelatedwitheconomicprosperity. Reischauer,1989).Toaccountforthepossibleeffectofcountysizeon
Aswiththeotherimportantsocialandeconomicaffairsofthetime ourindependentvariables,wenormalizethemprimarilybylandarea
theQinggovernmentkeptsystematicrecordsofthesetemplesand (per1000km2).26Toreduceskewnessinourtwomeasures,weexpress
chaste women in the Shandong Tongzhi (Provincial Gazetteer of themintermsofnaturallogarithm.PanelscanddofFig.1,whichre-
Shandong),acompendiumcompiledsincethe1890sandpublishedin spectivelyshowthenumbersofConfuciantemplesandchastewomen
1934.Morethan96%oftheConfuciantempleshadalreadybeenbuilt (per1000km2)atthecountylevelinShandongProvince,indeedreveal
beforetheQingdynasty(AppendixFig.A2).25Informationisavailable apositiverelationshipamongthetwomeasures(atthe1%levelofsig-
on when a temple was constructed (specifically by reign of the nificanceandwithacoefficientgreaterthan0.54).Moreover,thegeo-
emperor-cum-dynasty)forabout58%ofthosetemples.Asforchaste graphicdistributionofeachofthesemeasuresapparentlysupports
women,theShandongTongzhidoesnotprovidespecificinformation theideathatConfuciannormsweredistinctlystrongerinthe“holy
regardingwhentheywereconferred;itonlyliststhetotalnumberof land”ofConfucianism.Forinstance,Fig.1canddshowsthatthere
chastewomenbetween1644and1890. were indeed more temples and chaste women in the Confucian
Since the Shandong Tongzhi does not provide temporal “Mecca”ofQufuanditssurroundingcounties,aswellasinthenorth-
variations in the numbers of Confucian temples and chaste westernpartoftheprovince,thanelsewhereintheprovince.
women,wearetreatingthestrengthofConfuciannormsduringthe OneyardstickbywhichtoascertainwhetherConfuciantemplesand
Qingdynastyastime-invariant.Thisisalsoconsistentwiththefact chastewomenaresoundproxiesforConfuciancultureistoexaminethe
extenttowhichtheymaybecorrelatedwithConfuciancultureorthe
25 ItispossiblethattheShandongTongzhimayhaveexcludedthosetemplesthathad
beendestroyedinuprisings,yetitremainsthemostreliablesourceforthenumberoftem- 26 SincesystematicpopulationdataareunavailableatthecountylevelduringtheQing
plesthatexistedintheQingdynasty. dynasty,werelyonthenormalizationusingacounty'slandarea.
138 J.K.Kung,C.Ma/JournalofDevelopmentEconomics111(2014)132–149
Table1
Sourcesanddescriptivestatisticsofthevariables.
Variable Source Levelofvariation Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Peasantrebellions QingShilu(VeritableRecordsoftheQingEmperors) County-year 0.03 0.20 0 7
Cropfailure QingShilu(VeritableRecordsoftheQingEmperors) County-year 0.28 0.45 0 1
Drought ChinaMeteorologicalAdministration(1981) Prefecture-year 0.38 0.66 0 2
Waterlog ChinaMeteorologicalAdministration(1981) Prefecture-year 0.52 0.72 0 2
Temples ShandongTongzhi(ProvincialGazetteersofShandong) County 12.73 4.72 7 39
Chastewomen ShandongTongzhi(ProvincialGazetteersofShandong) County 1224.66 1142.03 116 6622
Landsuitability FAO(2012) County 37.81 9.85 20.94 59.67
Urbanization1770s Cao(2000) County 0.27 0.73 0 4
Schools ShandongTongzhi(ProvincialGazetteersofShandong) County 2.59 1.49 1 8
Shengyuan ShandongTongzhi(ProvincialGazetteersofShandong) County 34.6 15.97 16 80
Imperialsoldiers ShandongTongzhi(ProvincialGazetteersofShandong) County-year 284.57 716.43 0 6780
Granary(in10,000shi) ShandongTongzhi(ProvincialGazetteersofShandong) County 2.21 2.87 0 19.86
Landtax(insilverliangpermu) ShandongTongzhi(ProvincialGazetteersofShandong) County 0.04 0.02 0.002 0.09
Prefectureseat ShandongTongzhi(ProvincialGazetteersofShandong) County 0.12 0.33 0 1
Treatyports(years) Yan(1955) County-year 0.05 1.19 0 48
Missionarypresence(years) Stauffer(1922) County-year 0.99 4.61 0 51
TaoistandBuddhisttemples ShandongTongzhi(ProvincialGazetteersofShandong) County 5.16 2.84 1 21
Terrainruggedness Jarvisetal.(2008) County 0.35 0.34 0.04 2.02
Sages ShandongTongzhi(ProvincialGazetteersofShandong) County 3.28 4.72 0 23
Notes:Refertothetextforvariablesdefinition.
localfolkcustomssuchas“respectingConfucianism”(zunru),“observ- Details on the descriptive statistics of peasant rebellions, crop
ingpropriety”(lirang),“observingintegrity”(mingjieorzhengqi),and failures,andConfucianismareprovidedinTable1.
“observingloyalty”(zhongyiorshoufa)thatprevailedintheQingdynas-
ty.27AseachcountywasevaluatedindependentlybytheTongzhiasto
whethertheyexhibitedanyoftheabovecharacteristics,itallowsusto 3.4.Descriptiveevidence
converteachoftheabovedimensionsoflocalcultureintoadummyvar-
iable—with1indicatingthatacountyhasexhibitedsuchfolkcustoms, Fig.2showsthecloseassociationbetweenthenumberofpeasantre-
and0otherwise.Moreover,byaggregatingthefourdummyvariables bellionsandthenumberofcropfailuresinShandongProvincefrom
intoasingleindex,weareabletoconstructanoverallindexofConfu- 1651to1910onadecadalbasis.Wheretherewerefewcropfailures,
ciancustomsonascaleof0to4—with4indicatingthestrongestConfu- aswasthecasebefore1800,therewerecorrespondinglyfewrebellions.
ciancustoms.28WefindthatthenumbersofbothConfuciantemples But as the number of crop failures climbed rapidly after 1800 and
andchastewomenaresignificantlyandpositivelycorrelatedwiththe peakedin1850–1870s,sotoodidthenumberofpeasantrebellions.
variousmeasuresoflocalConfuciancultureasidentifiedintheTongzhi The trend that crop failures and accordingly peasant rebellions
(AppendixTableA1),lendingfurtherconfidencetothevalidityofour before1800werefewerthanafter1800raisesaconcernaboutdata
measuresofConfucianculture. reliability.Fortunately,thereismountingevidencefromclimatologists
Additionally,contemporarysurveyevidencefurthersupportsthe tosuggestthatthegrowingincidenceofcropfailuresafter1800was
claimthatchastewomenareareliablemeasureofConfuciannorms. largelyduetoharvestfailurescausedbyacolderclimate;theresult
Conductedin28Chineseprovincesin2005,theChinaGeneralSocial wasaspikeinwarsandrebellions.30Concernaboutdatareliability
Survey (CGSS) finds that, in spite of the fact that women in rural shouldalsobeamelioratedbythefactthattheQinggovernmenthad,
Chinaweregiventhesamerightsasmentovotefortheirrepresenta- sincetheseventeenthcentury,systematicallycollecteddataonrainfall
tives,systematicallyfewerofthemvotedinvillageswithstrongclan atthecountylevel(Wilkinson,1969).
organization.29 Although this finding concerns specifically political Fig.3showsthedecadaldifferenceinthenumberofpeasantrebel-
participation,itcarriesthestrongimplicationthattheConfucianvalues lionsamongcountiesinwhichConfucianismhaddiffusedtovarying
ofsubjugatingwomentomenhavemostlikelypersistedtothisday. degrees.Forsimplicity,weclassifythosecountieswiththenumberof
Confuciantemplesper1000km2above(below)themedianof11.89
ashavingstrong(weak)Confuciannorms.Wefindthat,whencrop
27 Thesecustomswereexplicitlylistedinthe“fengsu(customs)”volume(orjuan)ofthe failureoccurs,therearefewerpeasantrebellionsincountieswithstrong
ShandongTongzhi.ComparedtoourtwoproxiesofConfucianismthesemeasuresaread-
ConfuciannormsthanincountieswithweakConfuciannorms.Onaver-
mittedlycruder,andtheyreliedonthesubjectiveinterpretationoftheeditorsofthe
Tongzhiregardingwhetherornottheypossessedanyofthefourcharacteristicsin age,thenumberofpeasantrebellions(percountyperyear)is0.044in
question. the former instance and 0.07 in the latter. When evaluated at the
28 TakeJiyangCountyofJinanPrefectureforexample.Forthiscounty,“observinginteg- meanof0.055,thisdifferenceaccountsfor47%oftheaveragenumber
rity”and“observingloyalty”werementioned,soweassignthevalueof1tothesetwofolk ofpeasantrebellions(percountyperyear)intimesofcropfailure.
customsaccordingly.Conversely,theothertwoaspects—“respectingConfucianism”and
“observingpropriety”—werenotmentioned,soweassignavalueof0tothem(referto Together,Figs.2and3provideintuitivesupporttothehypothesesre-
theShandongTongzhi,volume40,p.1500,fordetails).Accordingly,theoverallindexof gardingtherolecropfailureplayedintriggeringpeasantrebellions
ConfuciancustomsforJiyangCountyis2. andspecificallythemitigatingeffectsofConfucianism,ofwhichwe
29 PrevailingsincetheSongdynasty(A.D.960–1279),clansarelineagegroupsthatput willexamineinSection4.
strongemphasisonConfucianmoralobligations—especiallyfilialpiety,loyaltyand
subordination—amongthekin.Withintheclans,theprevailingethosisforwomentosub-
jugatetotheirhusbands(Weber,1922).Covering410villagesand3991ruralresidents,
theCGSSof2005directlyaskedthevillagerswhethertherewasanancestralhallorclan-
nishactivitiesorganizedonthebasisof(same)surnamesintheirvillages.Accordingtothe 30 Byrelyingonevidencefromawiderangeofstudiesincludingthoseontreerings,
surveyresults,invillageswithdistinctclannishpresence,only19%ofthewomenvotedin corals,ice-cores,boreholesandhistoricaldocuments,Zhangetal.(2006)findthatChina
themostrecentvillageelections,comparedto30%inthecaseofmen.Thenegativeeffect inadvertentlyexperiencedanunusuallycoldphaseduring1806–1912,withtheaverage
ofclansonwomen'sbutnotmen'svotingbehaviorisconfirmedbyregressionanalysis temperature(of−0.456°C)being10.4%lowerthannormal(e.g.,in1718–1805,theaver-
thatcontrolsforasetofindividualandvillagecharacteristics(notreported). agetemperaturewas−0.413°C).
J.K.Kung,C.Ma/JournalofDevelopmentEconomics111(2014)132–149 139
800
Number of peasant rebellions
700
Number of crop failures
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fig.2.NumberofpeasantrebellionsandcropfailuresinShandongProvince(bydecade).
4.Empiricalresults significancereinforcesourintuitionthatinanagrariansocietyextreme
rainfallisnotasdirectameasureofincomeshockascropfailure.
4.1.Theeffectofeconomicshocksonpeasantrebellions
4.2.TheeffectofConfuciannormsonpeasantrebellions
BeforeexaminingtheeffectofConfuciannormsonpeasantrebel-
lions,wefirstexaminewhethereconomicshockswereindeedaprimary NowweturntoexaminewhetherConfuciannormsareabletomit-
sourceofpeasantrebellionsusingthefollowingOLSspecification: igatetheeffectofcropfailureonpeasantrebellions.Weemploythe
specificationinEq.(2):
Rebellionit¼β1shockit−1þcountyiþyeartþεit ð1Þ Rebellionit¼β2shockit−1þβ3shockit−1(cid:2)Confucianismiþcountyi
þyear þε ð2Þ
t it
whereRebellion denotesthenumberofpeasantrebellionsincountyiin
it
yeart,shockit−1denotesthevariationsineconomicshocksasmeasured whereConfucianismidenotesthetime-invariantstrengthoftheConfu-
bythecropfailuredummyinthepreviousyear,countyireferstocounty ciannormsasmeasuredbyConfuciantemplesandchastewomen.The
fixed-effectsthatcapturethetime-invariantandcounty-specificfactors, interactionterm,shockit−1×Confucianismi,isourkeyvariableofinter-
whereasyeartindicatesyearfixed-effects,whichcapturethecommon estandisincludedtoestimatethepossibleeffectofConfuciannorms.
trendfacedbyallthecounties.31εitistheerrorterm. Specifically,weexpecttheeffectofeconomicshockstobesmallerin
WereporttheOLSestimateofthelaggedcropfailurevariableincol- countieswithastrongerdiffusionofConfuciannorms.Shouldthatbe
umns1and2ofTable2.Toprovideabaseline,wedonotincludethe thecase,thesignofthecoefficientβ shouldbesignificantlynegative.
3
county-andyearfixed-effectsinitially(column1).Tocontrolforserial BeforeexaminingthepossiblemitigatingeffectofConfucianism,we
correlationweclusterthestandarderrorsatthecountylevel.Theresult firstexaminewhetherornotConfucianismhasanydirecteffectonpeas-
showsthateconomicshockshaveasignificantandpositiveeffecton antrebellions.SincethevariablesofConfucianismdonotvarywithtime,
peasantrebellionsacrossalltheestimations.Intermsofmagnitude, wearerestrictedtoemployingtherandom-effectregressions.Theperti-
thecoefficientincolumn2indicatesthatthenumberofpeasantrebel- nentresults,reportedincolumns1–4ofAppendixTableA2,confirmthe
lions is about 0.00973 higher in counties with crop failure than in significanteffectofConfucianisminreducingpeasantrebellions.To
countieswithoutcropfailure.Evaluatedatthemean(0.03),thisdiffer- checktheirrobustness,weconvertthepaneldataintocross-sectional
enceaccountsforone-thirdoftheaveragenumberofpeasantrebellions. dataandruntheregressionsagain.Reportedincolumns5–8,theresults
Incolumn3weexaminewhethercontemporaneouscropfailure(crop reaffirmtheearlierfindings.
failuret)andcropfailurelaggedbytwoyears(i.e.,cropfailuret−2) InTable3,weexaminewhetherConfuciannormsareabletomitigate
alsobearonpeasantrebellions.Theresultsshowthattheyhavenosig- theeffectofcropfailureonpeasantrebellionsbasedonthespecification
nificanteffect;onlycropfailureinthepreviousyear(cropfailuret−1) ofEq.(2).Columns1and2ofTable3reporttheOLSestimatesofthe
does.Thisreinforcesourconfidenceinusinglaggedcropfailureasthe numberofConfuciantemplesnormalizedbycountyarea(in1000km2)
pertinentmeasureofeconomicshocks. and expressed in terms of natural logarithm, i.e., ln(temples/area),
Tochecktherobustnessofourresultsweemployextremerainfall whereascolumns3and4reporttheestimatesusingthenumberof
(drought and waterlogging) as alternative measures in column 4 chastewomenasthepertinentmeasure.32Acrossallregressionsthe
of Table 2. Consistent with the historical observation that peasant countyandyearfixed-effectsarefullycontrolledfor.Giventhatouranal-
rebellionsinShandongProvinceweretriggeredmainlybydroughts ysisspansalengthyperiodofmorethan260years,somecounty-specific
(Esherick,1987),weindeedfindthatonlydroughtbutnotwaterlogging factorsmayimpactdifferentiallyonpeasantrebellionsovertime.Toad-
has a significantly positive effect on peasant rebellions. The fact dressthisconcernwethuscontrolalsoforthecounty-specificlineartime
that crop failure has both a larger coefficient and a higher level of
32 TocheckrobustnesswealsoemploythesheernumberofConfuciantemplesand
31 Anotableexampleofthiscommontrendischangingstatecapacityovertime,which chastewomen—similarlynormalizedbylandsize,andthesheernumberofConfucian
historicallywasstrongeratthebeginning(andinthemiddle)ofadynastybutdeclined templesandchastewomen.Theresultsaresimilar(hencenotreportedbutareavailable
towardtheend(Goldstone,1991;Sng,2014). uponrequest).
140 J.K.Kung,C.Ma/JournalofDevelopmentEconomics111(2014)132–149
0.45
Coun(cid:2)eswithstrongConfuciannorms
0.4 Coun(cid:2)eswithweakConfuciannorms
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fig.3.Numberofpeasantrebellionsincountieswithcropfailure(bydecade):weakandstrongConfuciannormscompared.Notes:Weenumerateonlypeasantrebellionsonadecadal
basisincountieswithreportedcropfailure.ForsimplicityweclassifycountieswiththenumberofConfuciantemplesper1000km2above(below)themedianof11.89asbeingstrongly
(weakly)steepedinConfuciantraditions.Theaveragenumberofpeasantrebellions(percountyperyear)is0.044incountieswithstrongConfuciannormsand0.07incountieswithweak
Confuciannorms.
trendsbyinteractingthecountydummieswithalineartimetrendin andConditionalLogitestimations—thelatterbyconvertingthedepen-
columns2and4. dentvariableintoadummy,with1indicatingtheoccurrenceofpeasant
Theresultsshowthat,whiletheeffectofcropfailureissignificant rebellions,and0otherwise.36Finally,toaddresstheconcernthatcrop
andpositive,itsinteractingeffectwithConfuciantempleshasasignifi- failuresmayhavebeeninconsistentlyrecordedovertime(especially
cantandnegativeimpactonpeasantrebellionsacrossestimations.33The before1800),wedropthatpartofourdataandruntheregressions
magnitudeoftheeffectofConfuciantemplesonpeasantrebellionsisfar againusingonlytheshorterwindowof1800–1910.Theresultsofthe
fromtrivial.Forinstance,a10%increaseinthenumberoftemplesper Tobit,ConditionalLogit,andrestrictedsample(1800–1910)estimations
1000km2hastheeffectofreducingthenumberofpeasantrebellions areallconsistentwiththoseoftheOLSestimatesinvolvingthefullsam-
triggeredbycropfailureby3.8%.34Theresultsofusingchastewomen ple(1651–1910),andhencearenotreportedseparately(butareavail-
insteadofConfuciantemplestoproxyforConfuciannormsarestriking- ableuponrequest).
lysimilar:whiletheeffectofcropfailureissignificantlypositive,its
interactingeffectwithchastewomenhasasignificantandnegative
impactonpeasantrebellionsacrossestimations. 5.Omittedvariablebiasandadditionalcontrols
Inadditiontoclusteringtherobuststandarderrorsatthecounty
level,wealsotryseveralotherwaysofclusteringandreporttheresults Inexaminingtherelationshipbetweencultureandconflict,aformi-
incolumns1and2ofAppendixTableA3.Forinstance,toallaythecon- dabletaskistodisentangletheeffectsofculturefromthoseofothervar-
cernaboutspatialcorrelationpossiblycausedbytheeasewithwhich iables, most notably institutional environment and its attendant
peasantrebellionscanspreadfromonecountytoanother,weemploy socioeconomicconditions(FismanandMiguel,2007;Miguel,Saiegh
theConleystandarderrorsadjustedfortwo-dimensionalspatialauto- andSatyanath,2011).ThisisespeciallythecaseintheChinesecontext
correlation (Conley,1999,2008).35Moreover,in ordertoallowfor becauseConfucianism,asstateorthodoxy,wasmorethanjustaculture
timevariations(whileallayingtheconcernaboutspatialcorrelations asithadlongbeenpromotedandembeddedinstateinstitutionsand
within the same prefecture), we cluster the standard errors (two- theeducationsystem,affectingbothgovernanceandsocialmobility
way) at both the county and year ×prefecture level. Last, but not (seebelow),nottomentionitspossible(morally)constrainingeffects
least,toruleouttheunlikely(thoughnotimpossible)eventthatall amongthepopulace.Againstthisbackground,onemightwonderif
countieswithinShandongProvincemaybespatiallycorrelated,we theeffectofConfuciannormscameinsteadfromotheromittedfactors
cluster the two-way standard errors at the county and year level. correlatedwithbothConfuciannormsandpeasantrebellions.Toad-
While doing so gives rise to a larger standard error, the effect of dressthisconcern,weaddavectorofcontrolsbasedonthepertinent
Confuciannormsremainssignificantintheseestimations. literatureandthespecifichistoricalcontextofChina.Also,inorderto
Giventhatpeasantrebellionwasarareoccurrence,ourdependent allowthesecontrolstodifferentially affecttheimpactofeconomic
variableintheOLSestimationcontainsalargefraction(97.8%)ofzero shocksonpeasantrebellions,weinteracteachofthemwithcropfailure.
values.Toreducethe“over-zero”problem,weemployboththeTobit Detailsonthesourceanddescriptivestatisticsofthecontrolvariables
areprovidedinTable1.
33 Anexceptioniscolumn1.
34 Thecalculationisbasedoncolumn2ofTable3:[(0.1×0.00872)/0.02313]×100=3.8.
35 WeuseHsiang's(2010)StatacodestocalculatethepanelversionofConleystandard
errors.TheConleystandarderrorsareconstructedassumingawindowwithweightsequal 36 Whenthenumberofpeasantrebellionsis0(or1)forallobservationsforacounty(or
to1forobservationslessthan100kmapartand0forobservationsfurtherapart.Given ayear),thiscounty(oryear)'scontributiontothelog-likelihoodiszero,andhenceis
thatthemeanofcountylandareais1451km2,using100kmasthecutoffpointcovers droppedautomaticallyintheLogitestimation.Doingsoremovesatotalof18,443obser-
anaverageofapproximatelyonecontiguous(bordered)counties.Wealsotryvariousoth- vations(allwithzerovalues).Moreover,theConditionalLogitestimationallowsusto
ercutoffpoints(e.g.,200ormorekilometers)andobtainsimilarresults(notreported). minimizetheproblemcausedbyoutliers(somecounties,forinstance,hadupto6or7re-
Wethankananonymousreviewerforthissuggestion. bellionsayear).
J.K.Kung,C.Ma/JournalofDevelopmentEconomics111(2014)132–149 141
Table2 refertoAppendixTableA5).39Theregressionresultsaftercontrolling
Economicshocksandpeasantrebellions. forthevariousmeasuresofeconomicprosperityarereportedincol-
Dependentvariableisnumberofpeasantrebellions umns1and2ofTable4.ThemitigatingeffectofbothConfuciantemples
andchastewomenonpeasantrebellionsremainssignificant.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cropfailuret −0.00054 5.2.Educationandsocialmobility
(0.00462)
⁎⁎⁎ ⁎⁎ ⁎⁎⁎
Cropfailuret−1 0.04541 0.00973 0.00979
(0.00570) (0.00395) (0.00358) AsConfucianclassicsmadeupthecoreoftheschoolcurriculum,our
Cropfailuret−2 0.00022 measuresofConfucianismlikelycapturealsotheeffectofeducationon
(0.00452) peasantrebellions.Todisentanglethesetwoeffects,wecontrolforthe
⁎
Droughtt−1 0.00697 numberofschools(innaturallogarithm)ineachcounty.Therewere
(0.00355)
Waterlogt−1 −0.00190 primarilytwokindsofschoolsatthecountylevel.Theofficialschools,
(0.00178) fuxueandxianxue,werefinancedandadministeredbytheprefectural
Yearfixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes andcountygovernments,whereastheacademies,shuyuan,wererun
Countyfixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes bythelocalliteratiandgentry.40TheShandongTongzhilistsallthe
R-squared 0.01 0.18 0.18 0.18
schoolsthatexistedintheQingperiodbycounty.Sinceitdoesnotpro-
Numberofobservations 27,713 27,713 27,606 27,713
videanytemporalvariations,wehavetotreatthisvariableastime-
Notes:OLSresults.Robuststandarderrorsclusteredatthecountylevelarereportedin
invariant.
parentheses.
⁎ Significantat10%. Itisalsonecessarytocontrolforsocialmobilityasitislikelycorrelat-
⁎⁎ Significantat5%. edwithbothConfucianismandpeasantrebellions.Forinstance,we
⁎⁎⁎ Significantat1%. knowthatsocialmobilityinQingChinawasintimatelytiedtoConfu-
cianism,giventhattheimperialexaminationdrewheavilyonthemem-
orizationoftheConfucianclassicsandrotelearning(Elman,2000;Ho,
5.1.Economicprosperity 1962).Likewise,socialmobility(orratherthelackthereof)isalsolikely
apartialcorrelateofsocialconflict.Forexample,inareasofhigh(low)
Economicprosperityisapossibleomissionthatmaybecorrelated socialmobilitypeoplewerelikelymore(less)willingtoinvestincivil
withbothConfuciancultureandpeasantrebellions.Ontheonehand, examinationthantoengageinunlawfulbehavior.41Giventhepossible
the economically prosperous counties were in a better position to intricate relationships between social mobility, Confucianism and
alleviatetheincomeshocksassociatedwithcropfailure;ontheother peasantrebellions,wecontrolforsocialmobilityusingthenumberof
hand, they were better able to promote the Confucian culture by shengyuandegreeholderswhopassedtheimperialexamsatthesub-
erectingmoreConfuciantemples. provincial—prefecturalandcounty—levels.42
GiventhatQingChinawaspredominantlyanagrariansociety(with Theshengyuandegreewasarguablythefirstandalsomostimpor-
northChina,withoutirrigation,beingprimarilyarain-fedeconomy), tantstepbywhichcommonerscouldachieveupwardsocialmobility,
economicprosperitymustbeintimatelytiedtoagriculturaloutput. asitqualifiedthemtositforupperlevelexamsandattainthehigherde-
Unfortunatelysuchdataarenotavailable.Toproxyforthiseffect,we greesofjurenandjinshi,whichinthosedaysrepresentedapassportfor
controlforthesuitabilityofacounty'slandforplantingtheregion's appointment in the government. Even without these subsequent
maincrops(wheat,maize,broomcorn,millet,andpotatoes),whichis achievements,theshengyuanscholarsautomaticallyacquiredthesocial
measured in terms of climate, soil, and slope characteristics [FAO, statusofalocalgentryandearnedtheprivilegesofhavingcor'veelabor
2012GlobalAgro-EcologicalZones(GAEZ)database].TheGAEZdata- andcorporalpunishmentwaived(Chang,1955).Foreachcountythe
baseprovidesanindexthatrangesfrom0(veryunsuitable)to100 stateallocatedafixedquotaofshengyuan,which,saveforthepost-
(very suitable) for all the major staple crops grown in Shandong TaipingRebellionperiodhadremainedbasicallystablethroughoutthe
ProvinceduringtheQingdynastyasoutlinedabove.Bymatchingthe Qingdynasty(Chang,1955).43ObtainedfromtheShandongTongzhi,
landsuitability mapwiththemapof thecounty-boundaryof Qing wethustreatshengyuanastime-invariant,anduseitsnumberbefore
Shandong,wetaketheaverageoftheindicesofeachofthesixmajor the Taiping rebellion (1850) as the pertinent measure.44 The
staplecropsoutlinedabovetobeourmeasureoflandsuitabilityfor regressionresultsaftercontrollingforschoolsandsocialmobilityare
thesecrops.Whilethismeasureisnotthesameasactualagricultural reportedincolumns3and4ofTable4.Theeffectofthetwomeasures
output, it is a reasonableproxy, considering thatland suitability is ofConfuciannormsremainssignificant.
positivelycorrelatedwiththeactualoutputofthesesamecropsinthe
1930s(atthe5%levelofsignificanceandwithacoefficientgreater 39 Forrobustnesswealsocontrolforpopulationdensityin1776asanadditionalmea-
than0.23,seeAppendixTableA5).37 sureofeconomicprosperity,althoughsystematicdataonChina'spopulationareavailable
onlyattheprefecturelevel(anadministrativeunitbetweentheprovinceandthecounty
Toensurethatourmeasureofeconomicprosperityisrobust,wealso
inQingChina)(Cao,2000).Theresultsaresimilarandhencenotreportedseparately
controlforthevaryingdegreesofurbanizationacrossthecountiesin (butareavailableuponrequest).
Shandong.Drawingonthepopulationrecordsofprefecturalandcounty 40 Inafewcountiesthelocalliteratiandgentryalsoranthecommunityschoolsshexue
gazetteers,Cao(2000)providesestimatesofthelevelofurbanization andyixue,butthereweresofewofthemthatwedonotenumeratethemaspartofour
forallthecountiesofShandongProvinceinthe1770s.38Theestimates schoolmeasure.
41 Esherick(1987)alsofindsthatthelowersocialmobilityrateinsouthwestern
arecloselycorrelatedwithStauffer's(1922)moreaccuratesurveyed
ShandongduringtheQingperiodwasapotentialsourceofpopularunrests.
dataontheshareofurbanpopulationinthesamesetsofcountiesin 42 Thecivilserviceexaminationismadeupofthreelevelsofdegrees.Thelowestlevel,
1920s(atthe1%levelofsignificanceandwithacoefficientof0.65, theshengyuan(analogoustoabachelor'sdegree),wastakenatthecountyandprefecture
levels.Thenextlevelup,thejuren(equivalenttoamaster'sdegree),wastakenatthepro-
vinciallevel.Thehighestdegree,thejinshi(equivalenttoadoctoraldegree),wastakenat
37 Dataonagriculturaloutputinthe1930sareobtainedfromZhongguoShiyezhi themetropolitan(palace)level(Chang,1955;Ho,1962).
(GazetteerofChinaIndustries),compiledbytheMinistryofEconomicAffairs(1933), 43 Asanincentive,theQingauthoritiesallocatedadditionalquotasasarewardtothose
RepublicofChina. provinces(andbelow)thatprovidedfinancialand/ormilitarysupporttosuppressthe
38 Cao'sclassificationsarebasedonacounty'spopulation.Smalltownswerethosewith TaipingRebellion.
only2000inhabitants,ordinarycountiesormid-sizedtownswerethosewith5000, 44 Theresultsarerobusttoothermeasuresofsocialmobility.Forexample,socialmobil-
countieswith12,000areconsideredlarge,whereasthosewith25,000werelargemunic- ityisalsomeasuredbydividingthenumberofshengyuanintothepre-and-postTaiping
ipalities,andthosewith50,000orabovewereprovince-levelmunicipalities-cum- period,andbynormalizingthenumberofshengyuanbycountyarea,etc.Theresultsare
commercialcities(Cao,2000,p.732). similarandhencenotreportedseparately.