The Logics of Preference: A Study of Prohairetic Logics in Twentieth Century Philosophy

286 Pages·1987·5.196 MB·English

by  Nicholas J. Moutafakis (auth.)

THE LOGICS OF PREFERENCE
EPISTEME
A SERIES IN THE FOUNDATIONAL,
METHODOLOGICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL,
SOCIOLOGICAL, AND POLITICAL ASPECTS
OF THE SCIENCES, PURE AND APPLIED
Editor: MARIO BUNGE
Foundations and Philosophy oj Science Unit, McGill University
Advisory Editorial Board:
RUTHERFORD ARIS, Chemistry, University of Minnesota
HUBERT M. BLALOCK, Sociology, University of Washington
GEORGE BUGLIARELLO, Engineering, Polytechnic Institute of New York
NOAM CHOMSKY, Linguistics, MIT
KARL W. DEUTSCH, Political Science, Harvard University
BRUNO FRITSCH, Economics, E. T.H. Zurich
ERWIN HIEBERT, History of Science, Harvard University
ARISTID LINDENMAY ER, Biology, University of Utrecht
JOHN MYHILL, Mathematics, SUNY at Buffalo
JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, Biology, University of Sussex
RAIMO TUOMELA, Philosophy, University of Helsinki
VOLUME 14
NICHOLAS J. MOUTAFAKIS
Cleveland State University
THE LOGICS
OF PREFERENCE
A Study of Prohairetic Logics
in Twentieth Century Philosophy
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP
DORDRECHT/BOSTON/LANCASTER/TOKYO
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publcation Data
Moutafakis, Nicholas J., 1941-
The logics of preference: a study of prohairetic logics in twentieth century
philosophy / by Nicholas J. Moutafakis.
p. cm-{Episteme: v. 14)
Bibliography: p.
1. Deontic logic. 2. Philosophy, Modern-20th century. I. Title.
II. Series: Episteme (D. Reidel); v. 14.
BCI45.M68 1987
121' .8-dc 19 87-19710
CIP
ISBN-13: 978-94-010-8263-1 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-3975-2
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-3975-2
Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company,
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland.
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© 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner
Richard M. Martin
"In memoriam"
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
PART ONE
The ObjectiYist Approach Toward the Fonnalization of Preferences
Chapter 1. Prototheoretic Attempts Toward a Logic of Preference....... 13
Chapter 2. Aristotelean Reflections in Richard M. Martin's
Extensionalized Pragmatics of Preference ...................... 57
Chapter 3. Rescher's Logic of Preference and Linguistic Analysis ... ..... 89
Chapter 4. Richard C. Jeffrey's Logic of First and Higher-Order
Preferences............................................................ 119
PART TWO
The SUbjectirist Approach Toward the Fonnalization of Preferences
Chapter 5. Soren Hallden's "Puristic" Logic of the Better and Same.... 167
Chapter 6. The Many Modal Interpretations of Prohairetic Logic:
Aqvist, Chisholm, Sosa and Hansson ........................... 191
Chapter 7. Von Wright's Logic of
Propositions Expressing Preferences ........................... 221
Chapter 8. Hochberg on the Logic of
"Extrinsic Epistemic Preferability" ............................. 257
Postcript ................................................................................... 269
Selected Bibliography.................................................................. 279
Name Index............................................................................... 285
Subject Index............................................................................. 287
Introduction
With characteristic incisiveness Georg Henrik von Wright identifies pro
haireticIogic (i. e. the logic of preference) as the core of a general theory of value
concepts. Essentially, this nucleus involves the logical study of acts from the point
of view of their preferability. (italics added) Though the term prohairesis is found
1
in Plato, as well as in Aristotle's treatment of the relations of preference, it is
von Wright who introduces this word into contemporary analytical philoso
phy, and succinctly specifies the philosophical dimensions it encompasses.
The above emphasis upon the philosophical study of the formalization of
preferences is a matter of utmost importance for understanding the type of in
quiry this investigation attempts to initiate. Over the past one hundred years
the literature on general theories of subjective utility has become massive,
where one considers the work done in psychometrics, econometrics, statistical
theories, probability theories, etc., etc. Histories in these areas are strong in
tracing various evolutions in the development of the concept of preference in
decision-making. However, what has not been investigated with sustained at
tention are the fundamentally philosophical inquiries into the formalization of
preference-relations.
In surveying the purely philosophical explorations in this area, it is often
impossible to separate the purported philosophical implications of these in
quiries from the relevance this work has in other areas. For example, Ramsey's
contribution is often seen as a stunning innovation in the area of subjective
utility theory. As such, it is usually taken as a reaction to the at the time popu
lar Keynesian rendition of probability theory.
Yet this is a much too restricted view on what Ramsey had to say from a
philosophical standpoint. The latter's views on partial belief and risk are intro
duced into the philosophical literature by Davidson, who recognizes their im
portance as a basis for further inquiry into the logic of preference. Thus an ex
egesis of Ramsey's contribution, as it will be undertaken in the opening
chapter of this book, demands an in-depth account of what had occurred in
1 Von Wright, Georg Henrik "The Logic of Action -A Sketch," in The Logic of Decision and
Action, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967, pp. 135-136.
2 INfRODUCTION
the evolution of the concept of preference in the general study of decision the
ory. A delicate balance must be struck therefore between what is needed for
purposes of explication from other disciplines, while retaining the primary
emphasis upon the philosophical import of this and other attempts, as they
evolve in this unique body of literature.
All of this indicates that the aim of the investigation which follows is not
to account for a general theory of subjective cardinal utility, but to present a
detailed discussion of the fundamentally philosophical inquiries into the for
malization of preference-relations, as the core of a theory of valuation.
A progressively more accented concentration upon the manner by
which preferences are conveyed in ordinary discourse becomes the single
most distinctive feature in the analyses to be discussed, and serves to sharply
demarcate the philosophical interest in the formalization of preferences from
the analysis of preference in other areas, e.g., decision theory and economet
rics. In every philosophical investigation to be considered, one finds varying
levels of concern expressed as to how well their attempts capture the "sense"
of preference-relations as manifested in some linguistic context, whether that
of everyday discourse or of some more circumspect sort. Indeed, one may ar
gue that this difference underlies Nicholas Rescher's broad differentiation be
tween the "logico-philosophical" attempts at a logic of preference, and the
"mathematico-economic" ones.
Whereas the cleavage between the philosophical interest in the concept
of preference is readily discernible in contrast to how preference is handled in
other disciplines, the account of how logics of preference differ amongst each
other within philosophy itself demands that attention be directed upon details
of approach in every case. Surely, Ramsey's aim in formalizing preferences in
"Truth and Probability" is very different from what von Wright attempted to
accomplish in The Logic of Preference. Even in comparing Ramsey's work in con
junction with Richard C. Jeffrey'S, where the latter is normally seen as a refine
ment of what the former had achieved, there is a noticeable difference between
the two. For Ramsey's concern is with the analysis of partial belief under con
ditions of risk, whereas Jeffrey is concerned with presenting a formalization of
deliberation.2 These kinds of differences are supremely important where one
endeavors to present a cogent account of the evolutionary phases in this partic
ular area of philosophical inquiry.
Vickers, John M., Belief and Probability, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht
2
Holland/Boston-U.S.A., 1976, pp. 59-60.
INTRODUCfION 3
So as to manage the wide diversity of opinion within this body of philo
sophicalliterature, two broad lines of inquiry will be identified as helpful in
classifying the writings to be discussed. In the first grouping, beginning with
Ramsey's work, one encounters a highly descriptive approach to the formal
ization of what one could do under varying conditions influencing belief and
risk; couched in terms of some logico-mathematical model. Generally, this "ex
tensional approach" is further manifested in Davidson's early work, as well as in
the contribution provided by Herbert Bohnert. What changes in each case,
however, is a refinement of the notion of accurate empirical measurement, as
applied to the characterization of choice. Thus, Davidson cites the need to in
troduce an improvement in the methodology of numerical attribution, one
which allows for "logical consistency", while also improving upon Ramsey's
reliance upon the interval scale in determining valuation. By contrast,
Bohnert's attempt concentrates upon disowning the use of frequency proba
bility as employed in the von Neumann-Morgenstern analysis of choice, and
favored by Davidson and his associates early on. Rather, Bohnert elected to
pursue the formalization of preference expressions along the lines of Carnap's
theory of logical probability, i.e., Carnap's "probability!". Moreover, these re
finements are presented within a context of the overriding concern with lin
guistic usage mentioned earlier; which is in essence the interest in the degree
of "fit" these descriptions have with respect to how preferences are conveyed
in discourse about the "real world."
A similar analytical attitude is operating in the manner by which R.M.
Martin endeavors to articulate the formalization of preference-relations within
a specialized setting of testing and experimentation. Martin's investigation is
perhaps even more sensitive than any other of its time to the nuance of dis
course pertaining to the expression of preferences, specifically within the
mode of an extensionalized pragmatics. His use of the basics of propositional
logic to characterize the hierarchies such relations exhibit within this context
leans heavily toward a dependence upon the sense of scientific discourse,
which is more restrictive than that of natural language. In this respect, there
fore, one may say of his attempt that it is less pervasive in intent than Ramsey's
or Davidson's.
Nicholas Rescher's effort is also part of this grouping, because of his use
of numerical attribution to describe the value of preferential states of affairs.
Rescher operates on the assumption that one can devise a logic of preference
which exhibits a fundamental mathematical rigor, one which can be said to un
derlie the necessity preference-relations convey in ordinary discourse. Apart
4 INTRODUCTION
from what is said on his success in this direction of inquiry, Rescher's work is
unique in that he attempts to apply techniques developed in econometrics to a
special area of philosophical analysis, i.e., that which pertains to the clarifica
tion of discourse involving choice.
Jeffrey is within this grouping as well, since he directs his work on the
formalization of preference expressions as a progression beyond what Ramsey
had accomplished. The former insists that both evaluative preference and cog
nitive preference must be handled within a "unified" mathematical theory,
one which has propositions as its objects, to which both subjective probabili
ties and desirabilities could be ascribed.
The second grouping is not radically different from the first, with respect
to the fact that it also contains work which exhibits an interest in the logical
analysis of expressions of preference. What does distinguish it from the at
tempts of authors already mentioned is that here preference is seen in terms of
its intrinsic meaning, i.e., in the sense where one prefers something in and of
itself, under conditions of ceteris paribus. Noticeably absent in this collection of
writings is any consideration regarding extensional factors, such as risk, and
the attempted application of probability theory. Along these lines one also
finds a pronounced concern with the evaluative aspect of preference with ref
erence to ordinary discourse made only as a way of noting the comparative
strength in the expressive power of the logics which are evolved. This consti
tutes a further idiosyncrasy which is characteristic of this latter grouping,
namely the allusion to ordinary discourse is made so as to underscore the ad
vantage of the logics which emerge, rather than to show that these logics are in
some way to be taken as embodied in ordinary discourse, or as descriptive of it
in some sense.
First in the second grouping is Soren Hallden who in The Logic of 'Better'
employs propositional logic to formalize a "puristic" logic of better, one which
becomes in its own right a model for all subsequent logics of preference, deal
ing with the intrinsically preferable. Authors included in this grouping are acu
tely sensitive to the goal Hallden is the first to envision, namely to develop a
logic which is unencumbered by the vagaries often encountered where an eva
luative term such as 'better' is conveyed within ordinary language.
Extrapolating from Hallden's approach is the formalized account of pref
erence expressions proposed by Lennart Aqvist. The latter's innovation is to
introduce a calculus of preference which is an extension of a deontic logic.
Aqvist's allusion to the obligatory, the forbidden, and the value-indifferent, as
a means of securing the formal properties of preference-relations in the inten-