Risk Propagation Assessment for Network Security: Application to Airport Communication Network Design

127 Pages·2013·4.005 MB·English

by  Mohamed Slim Ben Mahmoud, Nicolas Larrieu, Aliain Pirovano

Risk Propagation Assessment for Network Security
FOCUS SERIES IN NETWORKS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Series Editor Marcelo Dias de Amorim
Risk Propagation
Assessment for Network
Security
Application to Airport Communication
Network Design
Mohamed Slim Ben Mahmoud
Nicolas Larrieu
Alain Pirovano
Firstpublished2013 inGreatBritainandtheUnitedStatesbyISTELtdandJohnWiley&Sons,Inc.
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Contents
LISTOFFIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
LISTOFTABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
PART1.NETWORKSECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER1.INTRODUCTIONTOINFORMATIONSYSTEM
SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENTPROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.Ontheimportanceofnetworksecurityfornetwork
designers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.Ontheimpactofriskassessment
inthedecision-makingprocessfornetwork
securitydesigners. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.Quantitativeversusqualitativerisk
assessmentapproaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4.Networksecurityriskpropagationconcept . . . . . . . 10
1.4.1.Impactofnodecorrelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4.2.Networksecurityrisktransitivity . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.3.Networksecurityriskpropagation
illustrativecase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
vi RiskPropagationAssessmentforNetworkSecurity
CHAPTER2.SECURITYRISKMANAGEMENT
BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.Qualitativesecurityriskmanagementmethods . . . . . 18
2.1.1.CRAMM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.2.OCTAVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.3.EBIOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.4.MEHARI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.5.CORAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1.6.Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.Quantitativesecurityriskassessmentapproaches . . . . 20
2.3.Towardaquantitativepropagation-basedrisk
assessmentmethodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
CHAPTER3.AQUANTITATIVENETWORK
RISK ASSESSMENTMETHODOLOGYBASED
ONRISK PROPAGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1.Quantifyingmethodologyparameters . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1.1.Networkriskdecomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1.2.Nodevalue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1.3.Enhancednodevalue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.4.Impactofthreats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.5.Likelihoodofthreats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.Networksecurityriskassessmentprocess . . . . . . . . 36
3.3.Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
PART2.APPLICATIONTOAIRPORTCOMMUNICATION
NETWORKDESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
CHAPTER4.THEAEROMACSCOMMUNICATION SYSTEMIN
THESESARPROJECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1.OverviewoftheEuropeanSESARproject. . . . . . . . 43
4.2.Overviewofaeronauticalcommunicationsoperating
conceptandrequirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.3.IntroductiontotheAeroMACScommunication
system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Contents vii
4.3.1.AeroMACSprotocolstack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3.2.AeroMACSreferencenetworkarchitecture . . . . . 50
4.3.3.AeroMACSsecurityconsiderations . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3.3.1. AnalysisofAeroMACSsecurity
weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3.4.AeroMACSreferencenetworktopology . . . . . . . 55
4.3.4.1. IsolatedAeroMACSnetworkarchitecture . . 55
4.3.4.2. End-to-endAeroMACSnetworkarchitecture 56
CHAPTER5.AERONAUTICALNETWORKCASE STUDY . . . . . 59
5.1.Experimentalparameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.1.1.Testbedinfrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.1.2.Aeronauticalnodevaluesinstantiation . . . . . . . . 61
5.1.3.Aeronauticalservicesinstantiation . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.1.4.Isolatedvs.end-to-endemulationscenarios . . . . . 63
5.2.AeroMACScasestudy:experimentalresults . . . . . . 63
5.2.1.Maininputsforemulationscenarios . . . . . . . . . 63
5.2.2.IsolatedAeroMACSscenario:preliminaryresults . 63
5.2.2.1. Individualrisks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.2.2.2. Propagatedrisks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.2.2.3. Nodeandnetworkrisks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.2.3.IsolatedAeroMACSscenario:EAPvs.RSA
sub-scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2.4.PreliminaryAeroMACSsecurityenhancement
guidance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.2.5.AeroMACSimplementationimprovements:isolated
scenariowithoutoperationalservervulnerabilities . 77
5.2.5.1. Experimentalinputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2.5.2. Networktopology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2.5.3. Vulnerabilitystatistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.2.5.4. Individualriskresults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.2.5.5. Propagatedriskresults . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.2.5.6. Networkriskresults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.2.6.AeroMACStopologicalimprovements:isolated
scenariowithtwoASNgateways . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.2.6.1. Experimentalinputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
viii RiskPropagationAssessmentforNetworkSecurity
5.2.6.2. Networktopology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.2.6.3. Vulnerabilitystatistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.2.6.4. Individualriskresults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.2.6.5. Propagationriskresults . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2.6.6. Networkriskresults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.2.7.Scenariowithend-to-endAeroMACStopology . . 91
5.2.7.1. Experimentalinputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.2.7.2. Networktopology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2.7.3. Vulnerabilitystatistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2.7.4. Individualriskresults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2.7.5. Propagatedriskresults . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2.7.6. Networkriskresults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.3.ImprovingAeroMACSnetworksecurity . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3.1.DHCPsecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3.2.MobileIPsecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
List of Figures
1.1 Generalinformationsystemsecurityrisk
managementprocess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Risktransitivitybetweencorrelatednodes . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Networksecurityriskpropagationexample . . . . . . . . 14
4.1 COCRphases1and2conceptevolutionovertime . . . . 45
4.2 Generalairspacedecomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3 Cleveland-HopkinsairportAeroMACStestbed . . . . . . 48
4.4 AeroMACSprotocolstack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.5 AeroMACSnetworkreferencearchitecture . . . . . . . . 51
4.6 IsolatedAeroMACSnetworktopologyscenario . . . . . . 55
4.7 IntegratedAeroMACSnetworktopology . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.1 RiskassessmentframeworkusingMARIONNET . . . . . 60
5.2 Individualrisksforallnetworknodes . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
x RiskPropagationAssessmentforNetworkSecurity
5.3 Individualriskevolutionasafunctionof
vulnerabilitiesforallnodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.4 VulnerabilityCVSSstatistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.5 Propagatedriskevolutionasfunctionofconnected
nodesforallnetworknodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.6 Percentageofnetworkriskpernoderisk . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.7 ASNgatewaypropagatedriskcontribution
perconnectednode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.8 VulnerabilityCVSSscoredistribution
forEAPandRSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.9 Individualrisksforbasestations
andtheASNgateway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.10 Propagatedrisksforallnodes(EAPvs.RSA) . . . . . . . 75
5.11 Percentageofnetworkriskpernoderisk
(EAPvs.RSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.12 AeroMACSnetworktopology:
extendedisolatedscenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.13 ComparisonofCVSSscoredistribution(with
andwithoutoperationalservervulnerabilities) . . . . . . . 80
5.14 Comparisonofpropagatedrisksasafunctionofthe
numberofconnectednodes(withandwithout
operationalservervulnerabilities) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.15 Comparisonofthepercentageofnetworkrisk
pernoderisk(withandwithoutoperational
servervulnerabilities) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
ListofFigures xi
5.16 ThenewisolatednetworktopologyusingtwoASN
gateways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.17 Comparisonofnetworkriskvalues . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.18 WiMAXforumNWGend-to-endnetworkmodel . . . . . 93
5.19 FinalcomparisonofCVSSscoresdistribution . . . . . . . 94
5.20 Finalcomparisonoftotalnumberofvulnerabilities . . . . 94
5.21 FinalcomparisonofaverageCVSSscore . . . . . . . . . 95
5.22 Finalcomparisonofnetworkriskvalues . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.23 Finalcomparisonofthepercentage
ofnetworkriskpernoderisk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.24 DHCPkeymanagementusingaDHCPrelay . . . . . . . 102
5.25 MobileIPregistration–PMIPcase . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.26 MobileIPkeymanagement–PMIPcase . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.27 MobileIPregistration–CMIPcase . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107