NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS) 19930015501: Political and institutional factors affecting systems engineering

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by  NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS OF SE
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POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING /sBs
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by John F. Yardley
Most systems engineering courses and text- regarding the space program. All of these
books discuss only the engineering aspects of methods influence both the executive and
the subject and are silent about the non- legislative branches of our government.
technical world's influence on the planned The President and his staff are very im-
project. This approach, although entirely portant to NASA's programs. They must
satisfactory for many engineering programs, make a positive decision to include money for
including smaller NASA programs, leaves specific NASA programs in the budget re-
out a significant element affecting large quest before it is even considered by Con-
NASA programs. Some traditionalists be- gress. In these times of large government
lieve these nontechnical aspects should not deficits, which makes starting new programs
even be considered in the systems engineer- very difficult, NASA is pressured to cut back
ing process. However, if we take the broad requirements and save money. This pressure
view that systems engineering should take even results in the stretch-out and cancella-
into account all significant requirements in tion of some ongoing projects. Sometimes in
order to produce the proper end-product, negotiations with the Office of Management
then it should include consideration of those and Budget, NASA is asked to choose be-
outside non-technical parties who can levy tween programs.
requirements on NASA programs. This pa- The Congress is one of the most signifi-
per identifies these elements, discusses their cant groups that has a major impact on
viewpoints and probable influence, and re- NASA's requirements. In addition to repre-
views some past case histories as illustra- senting their constituents' opinions, mem-
tions of these problems. It also presents some bers feel it is their duty to closely watch the
suggestions for working with these non- details of NASA's large programs. In the last
technical groups, which ma3 better achieve several decades, they have acquired the tech-
overall optimum systems engineering and nical staff needed to exercise this detailed
integration (SE&I) solutions. oversight. As a result, they are in a position
to demand program requirement changes,_
THE NON-TECHNICAL GROUPS and they have the appropriation muscle to
back up their demands.
There are many outside parties that provide The Department of Defense (DoD) and
inputs to NASA program requirements. other national security agencies often get
The public at large can have a profound involved in NASA's programs because they
influence on whether large sums are appro- have agreed to participate in a joint develop-
priated for NASA's major programs. They ment or because they plan to use the end-
respond to NASA triumphs and disasters product. They are involved in monitoring
and are sensitive to NASA's role in projec- NASA's projects from a national security
ting the American image around the world. viewpoint, and they sometimes require
Their influence is exercised by letters to changes in NASA programs if they see
Congress and the White House, by public potential security problems. DoD is always
appearances (interviews and speeches, for included as a major player in any high-level
example), and through public opinion polls White House space study or committee.
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Some NASA partisans feel that certain DoD EXAMPLES FROM THE PAST
offices take a biased view and try to reduce
the NASA program so DoD can play a larger History provides examples of political and
role in space study. institutional influences that illustrate how
Other executive departments substan- these factors affect NASA's programs. After
tially involved in NASA program matters the first Sputnik launch, the basic thrust to
include the State Department, the Com- start the space agency, as well as to initiate
merce Department, the Transportation the Mercury Program, came mostly from
Department, and the Office of Management Congress, with lukewarm support from the
and Budget. Eisenhower administration. NASA's foun-
Government agencies and national com- ding organizations, the National Advisory
missions that fact-find, study and advise the Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), was
executive and legislative branches upon re- used as a technical staff; decisive actions
quest include the General Accounting Office, were primarily political in nature.
the Office of Technology Assessment, the During the sixties, the Kennedy Admin-
National Academy of Sciences, the National istration's decision to land astronauts on the
Academy of Engineering, the National Moon and return them safely was political;
Research Council, the National Commission namely, to catch up with the Russians and
on the Challenger Accident, the Advisory get back U.S. world technological leadership.
Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space NASA provided a large part of the technical
Program, and a number of other ad hoc com- staff work, which consisted of preliminary
mittees. analyses and estimated success probabil-
International cooperation agreements ities.
often involve political considerations, and In the case of the Space Shuttle start deci-
the foreign parties usually desire a part of sion, interaction increased between systems
the job that interfaces with many of the engineering and the non-technical world.
mainstream elements. If these agreements Richard Nixon had become President in ear-
are not structured with the interface prob- ly 1969, just a few months before the lunar
lems in mind, they can have major effects on landing. He requested the National Space
systems engineering. Council to study and report on the options for
Scientific specialist groups feel they could the next phase of space flight and the long-
more wisely spend the money appropriated term future. NASA was heavily involved in
for the large NASA manned space programs this year-long study. The report recommend-
on their own research or on unmanned scien- ed that development of a Space Station and a
tific space programs. This group sometimes fully reusable Space Shuttle be undertaken
works through "associations" seeking to in parallel as the next step in manned space
plead their case in the media. flight and as the precursor of later lunar
Local communities near NASA centers colonies and manned Mars expeditions. At
often inject themselves into the process of this point, a political decision was made to
dividing the program work between Centers. continue study of the Space Shuttle but to
The actual division of work can have a sub- defer the Space Station. Work then proceed-
stantial effect on the efficiency of the collec- ed on the Shuttle with Phase A contracts and
tive NASA effort and can make the systems then Phase B contracts. It soon became
engineering effort much more difficult than apparent that the Shuttle development cost
a distribution based on technical merits. The was more than double the original prelimi-
political realities usually result in a "techni- nary estimates used in earlier decision
cally non-optimum" work split. making. Much interaction ensued between
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POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS OF SE
NASA, the Office of Management and Bud- tem is probably workable, it certainly is not
get, and Congress, with NASA trying to get considered optimum from a technical or effi-
the added funding commitment. When this ciency viewpoint.
was not forthcoming, the program manage-
ment exhorted the projects to reduce cost MINIMIZING DISRUPTION FROM
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES
without changing the basic concept.
After more work confirmed that the cost
We have identified many of the outside
ceiling could not be achieved with the two-
stage fully reusable Shuttle, it was finally sources of SE&I requirements and have
decided by NASA management that the given some examples to illustrate how im-
concept had to be changed in order to stay portant these inputs can be. Although most
within funding limitations imposed by the of these examples involve major program
Administration. Phase B contracts were changes, many smaller requirements are
extended, a major realignment of contractor questioned and changed. Now we will discuss
teams was required, and the current Space methods of dealing with these inputs effi-
Shuttle configuration (solid first stage, ciently, minimizing disruption and avoiding
adversarial relationships with these outside
parallel burn) emerged. After the Apollo
program and its blank check atmosphere, organizations.
NASA was not used to this limited funding Good two-way communication between
NASA and these outside groups is one of the
approach.
This process left much to be desired from major keys to negotiating proper agreements
on these external requirements. In order to
many points of view. It delayed the program,
caused a lot of wasted effort, and contractors properly deal with these outside inputs, we
formed teams and wasted a lot of their dis- need to know what new requirements they
cretionary funds (estimated at $100 million). are considering before these requirements
No one is to blame for this, since everyone are placed on NASA as irreversible de-
was feeling their way in a new environment. mands. If we wait until then, it is very
A better process, however, would have been probable that we will develop adversarial re-
very worthwhile. lationships with the requester who has "gone
In contrast to the Shuttle, the Space Sta- public" and will be embarrassed to lose the
tion did have strong support from President argument. This will make the requestor very
Reagan. This support was not for short-term difficult to deal with during subsequent
political gain but rather because President negotiations.
This means NASA must be organized and
Reagan believed it was in the best long-term
interest of the country, despite the fact that managed in a manner that facilitates com-
most of the President's cabinet members and munication of both internal and external
his close advisors were against starting the pertinent information.
space station (Hans Mark's book). Most of these outside inputs are discussed
The fragmented nature of the final Space at lower levels during interface or coordina-
Station hardware split between Centers tion meetings as "what ifs." They rarely first
resulted from an intense tug of war for surface at the NASA decision level in the
appropriate shares of the program between program office or the SE&I management.
the NASA Centers and their supporting This means that the lower-level NASA peo-
political communities. Some NASA Centers ple interfacing with outside organizations
felt that much of this struggle was for their must be trained to recognize these potential
very survival. Others in NASA felt this type inputs at the beginning, and the overall
of work distribution was necessary for broad NASA organization must have good commu-
nications at all levels so these issues can get
Congressional support. While the final sys-
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to the appropriate level early, a strategy can or additions, and to develop rapport. While
be developed, special analyses can be per- doing these things, it is very important for
formed, and contacts to discuss the issues NASA individuals to come across as open,
can be planned. forthright, and on top of their jobs. If the out-
When preparing the material for discus- side participants sense ulterior motives that
sion with the requester, NASA must be very are not discussed, or evasiveness and bluff-
careful to consider the requestor's point of ing, trust cannot develop. In fact, many of
view objectively and not just from the NASA these groups currently have a "corporate
parochial viewpoint of pure engineering memory," which includes perceptions of
ease, i.e., the "invented here" syndrome or many NASA Center biases. These must be
the "bad for the Center" rationale. NASA overcome by careful and fair negotiations,
must remember it is not the user or the own- bending over backward to diffuse any biased
er but rather the implementor of someone reputation.
else's requirements. When presenting the NASA Centers have tended to think of
material, NASA must be careful to avoid many of these non-technical meetings as
patronizing the requester. If the requestor NASA Headquarters' responsibility (and a
senses a patronizing attitude, the relation- big, time-wasting nuisance), believing the
ship rapidly becomes adversarial. Center's only role should be the engineering
It is also important for NASA to advise and management of the program. For NASA
and sell the appropriate outside groups on to do the most efficient and effective job, this
any requirement changes they feel are neces- concept must be changed. Whereas NASA
sary before the action has been taken beyond Headquarters should participate in many of
the point of reasonable return. This is par- these contacts, the Center people who best
ticularly true when NASA wants to relax know the subject and have prepared the
requirements that were important to outside material should present it. This is also an
groups once the program was begun. Many excellent training mechanism. The younger
examples exist where Congress finds out Center people will rapidly develop a much
after the fact that the program can no longer broader view of the outside world from inter-
meet the planned launch rate or some other acting with NASA. Working with the
fundamental requirement, and the original centers in this manner, Headquarters also
"NASA promise" must be broken. This has a facilitates better internal communications.
very negative effect on rapport with Con- Interfacing with Congress presents some
gress, the scientific community or any other special problems, particularly when NASA
major stakeholder. It is therefore important is trying to sell them a new program. There
to level with these outside groups as quickly are laws prohibiting government employees
as possible after deciding to revise a basic from lobbying, and the line between lobbying
requirement. and briefing on the merits of a new program
NASA must also develop harmonious re- is somewhat blurred. NASA must use its leg-
lationships with the pertinent outside groups islative and legal offices to help the program
and individuals. This can be done, among people properly interpret the law. In all
other ways, using a network of committees or probability, NASA will not be able to com-
scheduled small meetings among selected municate with Congress on critical subjects
individuals. The important thing is to plan in the manner and with the frequency they
for relationships and have the meetings reg- desire.
ularly. These meetings should be used to An alternative to direct NASA communi-
bring the groups up to date, to permit them cation with Congress is for NASA to work
to ask questions and critique the activity, to with its contractors and keep them informed.
smoke out impending requirements, changes The contractors are not bound by any laws
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POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS OF SE
against lobbying and can communicate more Middle East, and the bail-out of the savings
freely with Congress. The contractors will and loan industry, such an ambitious plan
contact the appropriate Representatives and will be difficult to accomplish.
their staffs with their own messages, in any
case. It is not necessary for NASA to direct SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
them to lobby (this being illegal), but NASA
should inform them of its position so that if External groups have a significant impact on
the contractors do contact Congress, they NASA's programs. Ten groups affecting
have the correct information. NASA are identified, and examples are
On some past programs, all of the prime given for some of the them. Methods of deal-
contractors informally worked together to ing with these external inputs are discussed,
keep Congress informed. One technique that the most important being good and open two-
has been popular with Congress is an "Infor- way communications and an objective atti-
mation Notebook" on a given NASA pro- tude on the part of the NASA participants.
gram. This notebook is kept in the Congres- The importance of planning ahead, of devel-
sional member's office for easy reference and oping rapport with these groups, and of effec-
is updated monthly, providing a useful tive use of NASA contractors is covered. The
monthly resource for informal discussions. need for an overall strategic plan for the U.S.
space program is stressed.
NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR In order to obtain the broadest range of
SPACE opinions on the political and institutional
factors that affect systems engineering, the
After the Apollo program and President writer requested thoughts from a number of
Kennedy's clear mandate to land astronauts senior individuals who have been involved in
on the Moon and return in the sixties, the the interfaces between NASA and the out-
U.S. space program suffered from a lack of side world.
clear national goals and a strategic plan to In any subject as complex as this one,
achieve them. In the Apollo era, all of the there are always some differences of opinion.
diverse forces involved coalesced behind The viewpoints expressed above are those of
President Kennedy because they wanted to the writer and sometimes agree with the
beat our superpower adversary, the U.S.S.R., majority, and at other times do not. To pro-
in the technological war. Since that time, we vide the reader with another viewpoint, an
have been unable to generate such a unify- additional paper by David Wensley is repro-
ing environment. If this could be done, and a duced in its entirety in the appendix to this
framework for future space activity could be chapter. Mr. Wensley examines the subject
agreed on in the form of a strategic plan, the through the eyes of a prime Space Station
problems of interfacing with the outside contractor executive.
groups would be much easier. The author concludes that NASA does not
As of this writing, the Bush administra- pay sufficient attention to the impact of
tion has outlined a long-range plan for explo- political and institutional factors in con-
ration that includes colonizing the Moon a ducting its business and is being hurt by this
and a manned exploration of Mars, which attitude. NASA should therefore focus on
could form the framework for a good strate- working with these outside groups, adjust
gic plan. However, it must be accepted by NASA policies and organizations to
these outside parties and backed with appro- facilitate interfacing with them, and train
priations by Congress before any plan can NASA personnel to conduct themselves ap-
realistically be made. During this period of a propriately in this environment.
growing national deficit, tensions in the
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POLITICAL ANDINSTITUTIONALFACTORSAFFECTING SE
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING: AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE
by David Wensley
The "nominal" or "idealized" systems engi- • Funding constraints used as a mechanism
neering process must take into consideration of technical and political control.
the political and institutional factors that
have become prevalent in the government An effective project management and
funded and, to a certain extent, the privately systems engineering process must deal con-
funded civil space activity. Attempts to ig- structively with these influences. They may
nore these influences may result in delay and affect program content, allocation of respon-
frustration of the systems engineering pro- sibilities, schedules, interface definitions,
cess. optimization and trade-off criteria, and tech-
NASA programs are currently growing nical decisions. They may even affect mission
larger in scope, longer in duration and fewer definition, and they most certainly will affect
in number. The increasing number of partici- funding availability versus time. Effective
pants includes NASA Centers, other U.S. management must provide for flexibility to
agencies, international agencies and contrac- react to these influences without undue pen-
tors. NASA programs are also characterized alties on performance, cost or schedule. A
by higher public visibility, and are more cost- constructive and cooperative relationship
ly and more politically sensitive. between the legislators and program man-
In this environment, the Congressional agement can minimize the impact of these
committees that appropriate and authorize interactions on planned efforts.
budgets will demand more justification for Many examples of the influences noted
expenditures, more political return from the above can be cited in the Space Station Free-
investments and more oversight of ongoing dom program, including:
activities.
• Legislated use of a Flight Telerobotic
POLITICAL FACTORS Servicer to advance U.S. robotic technol-
ogy.
Space projects have always been an instru- • Allocation of responsibilities to interna-
ment of domestic politics and a tool of politi- tional partners.
cal influence in international relations. As • Political influence on the work distribu-
the scope and importance of these projects tion between NASA Centers.
increases, we can expect more political influ- • Increased complexity of interfaces and
ence on the systems engineering process. management processes resulting from
The political influence may take any of distributed responsibilities.
several forms: • Funding constraints (fencing) in budget
authorization bills.
• Geographical distribution of funds to gain • Oversight committees and hearings to
political support. critique technical progress and to influ-
• Creation of international partnerships. ence resolution of technical issues.
• Insertion of technical requirements to
satisfy strategic national goals. The systems engineering process must
• Increased Congressional and Administra- stand the tests of external review and cri-
tion involvement in the technical tique. The assumption that technical man-
decision- making processes. agement and decision making is part of an
PRE_DING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
READINGS IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
immune internal process is, unfortunately, planned strategy for deferral of less critical
unrealistic. Techniques for effectively elements, retaining the systems engineering
managing the external factors include: effort to establish interface requirements
and essential design definitions, can mini-
• Open communication between project mize such effects.
management and stakeholders to under-
stand needs and develop trust. INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
• Realistic planning to support schedule
and cost commitments. Numerous institutional factors will affect
• Disciplined control of requirements to the systems engineering process, principally
avoid unwarranted cost and schedule those inherent in NASA and the participat-
growth. ing Centers. Examples include:
• Effective use of risk management tech-
niques to minimize iterations on design • Accepted standards, design criteria, and
and testing. specifications.
• Cost-effectiveness and life-cycle cost ana- • Design, management and operational
lysis to substantiate trade decisions. preferences of the Center functional divi-
• Early emphasis on operations, mainten- sions.
ance and logistical support to avoid un- • Availability and preference for use of
predicted support costs. Center test facilities.
• Early constructive resolution of responsi- • The organization and management struc-
bility conflicts between NASA Centers ture adopted for the program.
and between NASA and international • Traditional practices such as use of com-
partners. mittees, panels, boards, documentation
formats and integration processes.
These features are characteristic of tradi- • Use of support contractors to supplement
tional management and represent the expec- NASA staff.
tations of legislators and budget authorities. • NASA and Center policies and priorities
Deviations from these norms, especially if that may influence, for example, technol-
uncovered through Congressional or media ogy selections, responsibility issues and
probing, can be disruptive and potentially requirements decisions.
dangerous to the stability and continuity of a
program. The systems engineering process The above considerations can have a
can significantly reduce these risks by stay- major impact on systems engineering
ing on track and by making summary data requirements derivations, trade studies, ar-
available to project managers to use in open chitecture and design selections, test plans
dialogue with legislators. and operational concepts. They will also af-
Program changes are unavoidable, and fect the schedule and effort required to
systems engineering and project manage- evolve the design baseline, to resolve inte-
ment must be equipped with the analytical gration issues and to establish interface
tools to respond effectively to these changes. agreements. The potential magnitude of
The ability to re-prioritize and reschedule ac- these effects dictates early planning for their
tivities rapidly and with reasonable accuracy accommodation in the systems engineering
is essential, especially in response to funding process. It is virtually pointless to embark on
adjustments emanating from the annual a systems engineering process that ignores
budgetary process. More often than not, these considerations. The institutional char-
these events are unanticipated and result in acteristics have evolved over time and are
traumatic and costly adjustments. A pre- the product of many successes and failures. It
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POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING SE
is unlikely that personnel assigned to new and contractors must be measured as ele-
projects will adopt practices that violate ments of a closed-loop process that affects the
tradition. Contractor personnel should be efficiency and quality of our space activities.
prepared to adapt to customer preferences, The identification of improvement candi-
but customer (NASA) personnel should be dates should focus on the inanimate process,
prepared to consider new alternatives as part not on the organizations or people. This
of a continuous improvement process. allows the people to conduct constructive
problem identification and resolution with-
THE SEARCH FOR IMPROVEMENT out personal implications.
Increased budget pressures and heightened CONCLUSION
concern for foreign competition create a
demand for NASA to seek new methods of NASA stands at a crossroads. The opportuni-
achieving quality and reducing costs. Indus- ties for space exploration and the exploita-
try is similarly under pressure in these areas tion of space attributes and resources have
and is rapidly adopting techniques such as never been better. Public acceptance of space
Total Quality Management (TQM) princi- projects and reliance on space technology as
ples. NASA is beginning to apply TQM crite- a means to resolve worldwide environmental
ria in new procurements and has started to and resource issues have never been higher.
look for TQM opportunities within its organi- Yet NASA lacks credibility with the legisla-
zational structure. Conversion to these prin- tors of this country who are eager to voice
ciples represents a major cultural change criticism of NASA's planning and implemen-
and, in many respects, is contrary to recent tation of space projects. Their depth of pene-
trends within NASA. TQM teachings empha- tration into NASA's technical activities is
size reduction in top-down management di- increasing. Not only is the continuity of
rection, preferring increased delegation and NASA funding at risk, the scope of NASA's
empowerment of the lower tier personnel. responsibilities is also threatened. Transfer
Since the Challenger accident, the tendency of responsibilities to other agencies and even
within NASA has been to increase manage- the creation of new agencies is topical con-
ment and technical oversight. In the Space versation. Resolution of this dilemma
Station Freedom program, for example, requires more than a willingness to commu-
many layers of management and technical nicate and to negotiate differences; it re-
oversight exist within the Level II and Level quires a change in the NASA management
III organizations above the prime contractors culture that recognizes the degree of matur-
and their subcontractor teams. Although ity of the space industry. The mystery of
contractors are generally committed to cost discovery and the complexity of space tech-
and schedule objectives, their progress is of- nology is no longer an adequate defense for
ten controlled by the efficiency and speed of cost or schedule overruns. Critics demand
the NASA management and systems engi- performance that meets expectations. NASA
neering processes and integration. If the in- has the opportunity to lead the family of
volved participants agree that improvement federal agencies in demonstrating fiscal
is essential to create an environment of responsibility combined with technical
credibility and trust at the political level, achievements. Systems engineering will be a
recognition of these relationships can lead to major contributor to this success by provid-
constructive changes. ing the guidance for timely decisions leading
Measurement of performance is essential to effective project management.
in the search for improvement. Both NASA
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