DTIC ADA619262: Operations Assessment in Afghanistan is Broken: What Is to Be Done?

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OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
IS BROKEN
What Is to Be Done?
Stephen Downes-Martin
I
n the absence of a credible numbers-based theory of counterinsurgency there
can be no objective, numbers-based assessment for Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM.TheU.S.militarynonethelesshasattemptedtoconductanumbers-
basedassessmentprocess.Thus,whenanewcommanderandstafftakeoverdu-
ties as a regional command in Afghanistan,they inherit an operations assess-
mentprocessriddledwithhighlyvisibleflawsthatemanatefromtheimproper
useofnumbersandflawedlogic.Whilenoassessmentprocesscanbeperfector
free of any criticism, the flaws the author observed during a six-week stint
in-countryaresufficientlyegregiousthattheyseriouslyreducethevaluethose
assessments provide to commanders’ decision sup-
Dr.StephenDownes-Martin,researchprofessoratthe
NavalWarCollege,hasoverthirtyyearsofexperience port. In addition, the visibility of these flaws means
indevelopingandapplyingwargaming,gametheory,
thatmilitaryassessments,andbyassociationthemili-
decisionanalysis,andsystemsthinkingtotactical,oper-
ational,andstrategicdecisionsupport.HehasaPhDin tary commanders,are rightfully distrusted by higher
physicsfromKing’sCollege,UniversityofLondon,was civilian authority and by other organizations within
amilitaryintelligenceofficerintheBritishArmy,andis
the theater. It is therefore imperative that incoming
nowaU.S.citizen.ThecommanderofIMarineExpedi-
tionary Force (Forward) invited him to be his assess- commandersandstaffstakingoverresponsibilitiesfor
mentsadviserforthespringof2010,duringwhichtime regional commands address these flaws to improve
heworkedwith,observed,andinterviewedofficers,senior
decisionmakingandtoearnthetrustofhighercivil-
noncommissionedofficers,andciviliansatavarietyof
assessments-relatedstaffsatregionalcommands,provin- ianauthorityandorganizationswithwhomtheyhave
cialreconstructionteams,theInternationalSecurityAs-
towork.
sistance Force Headquarters, and the International
StaffsandcommandersinAfghanistancreatedop-
SecurityAssistanceForceJointCommandHeadquarters.
Thisarticleisaproductofthatworkandofdiscussions erations assessment processes under extraordinarily
withofficersandanalystsduringtheyearsincehisvisit.
difficult circumstances while fighting, and it is ex-
traordinary how well they have done given those
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circumstances.Nevertheless,it is necessary to identify and fix the flaws in the
present operations assessment process to strengthen decision support and the
validityoftheassessments,withoutapportioningblameorcriticism.Inthisar-
ticleIavoididentifyingindividualsororganizationsasmuchaspossibleindis-
cussing flaws in the assessments processes that I have observed. Instead, I
addresstheproliferationof “junkarithmetic”andflawedlogicwithinthecur-
rently used assessment processes and discuss why regional commanders and
theirstaffsshouldcareabouttheseproblems,bydescribingthedamagetocom-
manders’credibilityanddecisionsupportcreatedbyflawedprocesses.Finally,I
propose an approach to operations assessment that regional commanders can
immediatelyputintoplace.Idonotdiscussorcommentonstrategy,operations,
or the broader arguments concerning counterinsurgency versus counter-
terrorism.Ifocussolelyontheoperationsassessmentprocess.
Dr. Jonathan Schroden convincingly argues (in an accompanying article)
concerningoperationsassessmentthat“thereisanentirefailurecycleatwork,
and until its associated issues are rectified,the theoretical promises of opera-
tionsassessmentwillcontinuetogounrealized.”Regionalcommandersdonot
havetowaitforhighercommandtodealwiththesekeyissues,norshouldthey;
they have the authority and capability to deal with them within their own re-
gional commands. The assessment approach I propose in this article meshes
withtherequestsforinformationfromhighercommandandfitswithintheop-
erationalplanningprocessoftheregionalcommand.Itusesmilitaryandcivil-
ianprofessionaljudgmentappliedtotheappropriatecombinationofobjective
andsubjectivedata,backedupwithvalidarithmeticandsoundlogic.
WHAT IS OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT?
Jointdoctrinedescribesassessmentas“aprocessthatmeasuresprogressofthe
1
joint force toward mission accomplishment.” Joint doctrine also makes clear
thatsimplymeasuringprogressisinsufficient,thattheassessmentprocessmust
“help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine
whentoexecutebranchesandsequels,andmakeothercriticaldecisionstoen-
surecurrentandfutureoperationsremainalignedwiththemissionandmilitary
2
endstate.”
ImplicationsoftheDoctrinalDefinitionofOperationsAssessment
Howexactlydoesonemeasureprogresstowardaccomplishingamission?Un-
lessonehasalreadyaccomplishedthemission,missionaccomplishmentorfail-
urewilloccurinthefuture,butonedoesassessmentinthepresent,usingpresent
andpastinformation.Therefore,bydefinition,operationsassessmentisanat-
3
tempttoforecastfuturesuccessbasedoncurrentandpastexperience. Itattempts
DOWNES-MARTIN 105
toprovideinsightintohowwellthecommandisachievingitsoperationalobjec-
tives(occurringinthefuture)usinginformationfromtheenvironment(describ-
ingthepresentandthepast).Assessmentshouldincludeameasureof thegap
betweenthecurrentsituationandthefuturedesiredendstate,therateofclosure
(orwidening)ofthatgapandaforecastofitsfuturerateofclosure(orwiden-
ing),and an assessment of the risk to the endurance of the end state after the
achievementofobjectivesandterminationofmilitaryaction.
Therefore,inordertoprovidedecisionsupporttothecommanderwithinthe
guidelineslaiddownbyjointdoctrine,operationsassessmentmustanswerwhat
Icall“theassessmentquestion,”whichingeneralhastheform:“Whatisthelike-
lihoodof,andwhataretherisksto,theconditionsforthespecifiedendstates
occurringorremainingstableifmilitaryoperationsareterminatedonthespec-
ifieddate?”
InthecontextofAfghanistan,Iproposethattheassessmentprocessatthere-
gional command level must answer the more specific question: “What is the
likelihoodof,andwhataretherisksto,theconditionsforthespecifiedendstates
occurringorremainingstableif theregiontransitionsfromcoalitionforcesto
fullGovernmentoftheIslamicRepublicofAfghanistan(GIRoA)controlonthe
4
specifieddate?”
Iftheoperationsassessmentcellanswersthisquestion,thecommanderand
staffwillbeinabetterpositiontoreportprogresstowardtheobjective,iden-
tify risks to achieving the objective,and propose reallocation of resources to
5
minimizeormitigatetherisks. Assessinganyindividuallineof operationor
objectiveisamatterofansweringtheassessmentquestioninthecontextofthe
likelihood that the end states specified for the objectives remain stable after
6
transitionandwhattherisksaretothoseendstatesshouldtransitionoccur.
Inmyopinion,linesof operationorobjectivesinAfghanistanareonlyof in-
teresttotheextentthattheyenableatransitionofpowertoGIRoAbythespec-
ifieddatewiththespecifiedendstatesremainingstable.
Forecastinghasalonganddubioushistory,fullofpseudoscience,junkarith-
7
metic,andflawedlogic,practicedbywitchesandlistenedtobykings. Forecast-
ing should be done using a combination of subjective professional judgment,
8
objective logic,(social) science,and mathematics. However,for many people
the differences between pseudoscience and real science are hard to spot. Fur-
thermore,approachesthatarevalidinonecontextcanbecomeinvalidinothers,
evenifthedifferencesinthecontextsarenotobvious.Soalthoughmostofficers
would subscribe to the notion of using valid logic, mathematics, and science
(everyone believes that they themselves are rational and logical),it is difficult
for those not explicitly educated and trained in science, analysis, and critical
106 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
thinkingtoidentifywhetheranapproachislogicallyorscientificallyvalid.This
difficultyistherootcauseofmanyoftheflawsIhaveobservedinoperationsas-
9
sessmentaspracticedinAfghanistan.
RequirementsforOperationsAssessment
Iclaimthatfourprimaryrequirementsmustbemetifanoperationsassessment
processistoprovidegooddecisionsupporttoaregionalcommander.
Assessments at the different levels of warfare (tactical, operational, strategic)
andacrosstheinstrumentsofnationalpowermustbelinked.Linkage“up”thelev-
elsofwarfaremeansthattheassessmentsforalldistrictsinaregionshouldplay
majorpartsintheregionalassessmentandthattheassessmentsforallregions
shouldplaymajorpartsinthenationalassessment.Therewillbeemergentef-
fects at each level that are not described by combining the assessments from
lowerlevels,butanyassessmentshouldprovidelogicalreasonsforthem,based
ontheinputs.Linkage“across”theinstrumentsof nationalpowerprovidesan
integrated assessment combining the separate diplomatic, information, mili-
tary,andeconomicsassessmentsfromcivilianandmilitarybranchesofthein-
volvedcoalitiongovernments.
Metricsandoperationalendstatesmustbelogicallyconnected.Theremustbea
logicalconnectionbetweentheprocessedmetricsdataandaforecastoftheen-
duranceoftheendstatesiftransitionweretooccur—thatis,credibleandlogical
reasonswhythe(qualitativeandquantitative)valuesofthemetricsforecastthe
stability(orinstability)oftheendstates,shouldtransitionoccur.Satisfyingthis
requirement provides a mechanism for addressing the risks to the end states,
whichiscriticaltosupportingthecommander’sdecisionsabouttheallocations
ofresourcesneededtodealwiththoserisks.Inaddition,thisrequirementhelps
determinewhatmetricsarerequired.
The appropriate metrics must be identified and the data to process them col-
lected.Therearethreepossiblefailuremodeshere:collectingirrelevantmetrics,
not collecting necessary metrics,and not knowing which of the previous two
failuresarepresent.
Themetricsdatamustbeprocessedusingvalidlogic,arithmetic,andscience.In
theabsenceofanobjective,numerictheoryofcounterinsurgency,itisespecially
necessary that assessment staffs creatively apply subjective, professional judg-
menttotheobjectiveandsubjectivemetricdatainordertoanswertheassess-
10
mentquestion. Itiscriticalthatsuchcreativitynotviolateestablishedrulesof
logic, mathematics, or science, lest staffs generate unidentified errors when
makinganassessmentanddamageanydecisionthatusestheassessment.
IarguethatthemilitaryassessmentsIhaveobservedinAfghanistanclearly
donotsatisfythesefourrequirements.
DOWNES-MARTIN 107
FLAWS IN ASSESSMENT AS CURRENTLY PRACTICED
Ihaveidentifiedbydirectobservationsixmajorflawstocredibleandqualityoper-
ationsassessments.Theserenderassessmentsunfitforprovidingdecisionsupport
tothecommander,therebycastingdoubtonthecredibilityoftheassessmentsand
upon the credibility ofthe commands and commanders that use them.
Overoptimism
An officer must be prepared and able to wear two very different hats.One of
theseisthe“plannerandanalyst”hatwornwhen,amongotheroccasions,doing
assessments.Theotheristhe“leader”hat,wornwhenleadingsubordinatesin
the execution of plans. The first requires a pessimist mind-set (“the glass is
half-empty”) and focuses on critical thinking and the application of logic to
identifyingandovercomingwhatcangowrong,inordertoidentifyandmitigate
risk and, in turn, to ensure mission success. The second requires an optimist
mind-set(“theglassishalf-full”)andafocusoninspiringsubordinates,politi-
11
cians,andcivilianstoachieveobjectivesdespitetherisks. Thetwomind-sets
(pessimismandoptimism)areverydifferent,buttheformeriscriticaltoassess-
ment,forthefollowingreasons.
Operationsassessmentrequiresanalysisusinglogicandelementsofthesci-
entificmethod.Acriticalcomponentofthescientificmethodistheconceptof
“falsifiability”—thatahypothesismustbecapableofbeingdisprovedinorderto
beworthwhile.Onedoesnotprovesomehypothesistobetrue;insteadthebest
12
onecandoisfailtodisproveit. Similarly,inapplyingevidentialreasoningto
distinguishbetweenalternative explanationsusing“analysisof competinghy-
potheses,”onedoesnotcomparethestrengthsofsupportingevidenceforvari-
ous alternatives; instead one compares the weaknesses of evidence against
13 14
them. Underlying these concepts is the fact that knowledge is contingent.
Thesenotionsarecounterintuitive,buttheyarewellestablished,andtheyun-
derlie the last three hundred years of successful Western science and the last
15
2,400yearsofWesternphilosophicalandlogicalthought.
Officerswhoweartheirleaderhatswhenanalyzingorassessingriskproduc-
ingpooranalysesorassessments,andofficerswhoweartheiranalysthatswhile
leadingplaceexecutionatrisk.Inadditionanofficermustbeverycarefulifde-
liberatelydecidingtoweara“glasshalf-full”hatwhenreportinganassessment,
whetherupthechainofcommand(includingtohighercivilianauthority)or
to external organizations, such as the media. The risk here is inappropriate
optimism.
Inadditiontothenecessarycriticalattitudeforassessment,anofficerwhois
requiredtobringcreativesubjectiveassessmenttobearmustbecapableofap-
plying inductive logic, which requires a divergent mind-set capable of
108 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
recognizingpatternsfrompartialinformation.Thedangerhereisthathuman-
ityhasevolvedmostlytoerronthesideoffalsepositiveswhenlookingforpat-
terns(“bettersafethansorry”),whichinthecaseofanaturallypositiveattitude
willleadtoclaimingoptimisticpatternsinthedata.
Althoughmilitarycommandersandtheirstaffsworkhardatavoidingover-
optimism,theytendtobringtheirleadership(“wecandoit”/“glasshalf-full”)
characteristics to bear during analysis and assessment,and there is an institu-
tionaldrivetoproduce“good-newsstories.”Thislatterdriveispartiallyinre-
sponsetothe“bad-newsstories”reportedinthepress,andpartiallyinresponse
totheimperativetoshowprogressintimetoservetheendsofvariouspolitical
timetables.Itisextremelydifficult,tothepointofimpossibility,foranindivid-
ualtoachievethecorrectpositiveandnegativebalance,butanorganizationcan,
anditbestachievesthisbalancebydeliberatelysettingupanadversarialprocess,
usingdevil’sadvocacy.Thegoalofthisprocessistoidentifyandexamineallthe
waysinwhichthingscangowrong,inordertoinstitutionalizethecritical“glass
half-empty”attitudeandensurethatthenaturaldesireforgoodnewstopasson
upthechainofcommanddoesnotdominateassessmentorreporting.
MetricsCollection
Ihaveobservedtwomajortypesofmetricscollectionproblems.Thefirstprob-
lem,promiscuousmetricscollection,breaksdownintotwoparts,self-inflicted
andinflictedfromabove.Someassessmentscellsandteamstoldmetheycollect
asmuchinformationandasmanymetricsastheycanthinkof,“justincase.”In
thesecases,thestatedgoalwastobeableto“changewhatweanalyzeasobjec-
tivesorrequestsforinformationchangewithouthavingtochangewhatweare
collecting.”Thisresultsinahighlikelihoodthatmanyof thecollectedmetrics
arenotrelevanttothesituationbeingassessed.
In addition, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the ISAF
JointCommand(IJC),andsomeregionalcommandshaveissued“fragmentary
orders”(FRAGOs,orFRAGORDs),requiringthecollectionoflargenumbersof
numericmetrics(see,forexample,theRegionalOperationalDesignEffectsAs-
sessment[RODEA]structureusedforawhilebyRegionalCommand[South],
16
describedin figure 1). Itisbeyondthe capacityof mostforcesin the fieldto
collectonthelargenumbersofdemandedmetricsandproduceacredibleprod-
uct.Frequentattemptsbysubject-matterexpertstoreducethenumberofmet-
rics by brainstorming are unlikely to help, for two reasons. First, there is no
guarantee that the original lists of metrics contained all those required, so
anyreducedlistmaymissnecessaryones;second,itwasmostlybrainstormingin
the absence of an analytic framework that gave rise to the problem of metrics
DOWNES-MARTIN 109
FIGURE1 “bloat” in the first place. Trying to
REGIONAL OPERATIONAL DESIGN EFFECTS ASSESS-
correctaproblembydoingthesame
MENT(RODEA)STRUCTURE
thing that created it is unlikely to
succeed.
The second problem, blinkered
metricscollection,attemptstoavoid
the first problem but introduces
worse consequences. Some assess-
ments cells told me that they try to
identify up front which metrics are
hard or impossible to collect, and
then set these aside.The problem is
thatthereisnoanalysisastowhether
theseignoredmetricsshouldbecol-
lected, and therefore there is a risk
that critical metrics will be neither
collected nor considered. What is
worse, commanders are not in-
formedthattheassessmentisignor-
ing metrics whose importance has not been determined.This jeopardizes the
accuracyoftheassessmentandhidesfromthecommanderandfromlaterasses-
sorstheoriginaldecisiontoignorehard-orimpossible-to-collectmetrics.Since
theassessmentmayverywellbepoor,thecredibilityofthecommanderisulti-
matelyplacedatrisk.
JunkArithmetic
Usingarithmeticonnumericmetricsisoptional,buttherulesofarithmeticare
17
notoptional. ThefollowingexamplesofjunkarithmeticIencounteredsuffice
todemonstratethebroaderproblem.
Manyof theassessmentsprocesses Iobservedin-theatertake qualitative and
quantitativedata,rankorderthem,andaveragetherank-ordernumbers.Forex-
ample,in the RODEA process,assessors coded answers to questions on a point
scaleofonethroughfive,similartothe“ratingdefinitionlevels”usedbyISAFand
IJC.Thesecodesarenotratio-scalenumbers,andtherefore,bythelawsofarith-
metic,functionssuchas“averaging”cannotbeperformedonthem—itwouldbe
18
meaningless. Toputthisintoafamiliarcontext,officerpaygradesarerankor-
deredby“Onumber”—thatis,paygradesO-1(secondlieutenant)throughO-10
(four-stargeneral).Butnoonebelievesthatabrigadiergeneral(O-7)isthesame
as a major (O-4) paired with a captain (O-3) just because four plus three is
110 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
19
seven. Averagingordinalnumbers,suchasrankorders,withinanassessment
processisjustasnonsensical,andthiskindofobviouserrorsubjectsthecredi-
bilityoftheassessment,andthecommandpromotingit,tojustifiablesuspicion.
Valuesformanymetricsareobtainedusingpolls.InAfghanistan,thesepolls
haveclaimedmarginsoferrorofapproximatelyplusorminus3percentforna-
20
tionwide surveys,5 percent for regions,and 10 percent for districts. Given a
plus-or-minus 10 percent margin of error, a district metric would have to
change by approximately 20 percent before one could claim a trend. When a
changeislessthanapproximatelydoublethemarginoferror,thesoundestcon-
clusionthatcanbedrawnis“Wedonotknowwhethertherehasbeenachange
ornot.”UnfortunatelyinmostassessmentsIobservedin-theaterthesemargins
oferrorwereignored,andinasignificantnumberofinstancesofficersclaimed
unjustifiedtrendsonsmallchangesof data.An“assessmentsdashboard”Iob-
served did not even have a symbol for “trend unknown,”just check-boxes for
“trendimproving,”“static,”and“declining”;itwasimpossibletoreportthatit
wasnotknownwhetherthereevenwasatrend.WhenIaskedaboutthis,theof-
ficerinchargereplied,“Themilitarydoesnotliketoadmitwedonotknow,so
wereportoneof thedashboardoptionsandthencaveatthereport.”Toreport
“Weknowthatthismeasureisnotchanging”isobviouslynotthesameastore-
port“Wedonotknowifthismeasureischanging”;thetwosituationshavevery
different implications for the commander’s decision making. It is doubtful
whetheranyonerememberscaveatsafteratrendreporthasbeendelivered.
Anotherobservedexampleofjunkarithmetic(thistimeleadingtoanoverly
optimistic claim) was an Afghan National Police assessment claiming that the
organization was “nearly 100 percent filled.” Examination of the underlying
datashowedthatpatrolmenwereovermannedwhileofficersandnoncommis-
sionedofficerswereundermanned,bysignificantamounts.Whetherornotthe
assessmentreportedtheunderlyingdataalongwiththeconclusion,thefactre-
mainsthat“nearly100percentfilled”simplydidnotfaithfullysummarizethe
situationinthiscase.The“nearly100percentfilled”summaryhadbeenderived
byapplyingjunkarithmetictotheunderlyingdata,andalltoooftentheunder-
lyingdatathatwouldrevealthetruesituationdonotmakeitintothereports.
Theuseofanyarithmeticonnumericmetricsincounterinsurgencyissubject
tosuspicion,themoresowhenoneattemptstorollupthenumbersintosome
grandscoreofhowwellwearedoing.EveninacountryasstableastheUnited
States,withalltheeconomicdataandinformationonecouldconceivablyaskfor
andnoonetryingtokillyouasyouaskforit,westilldonothavecredibleeco-
nomicforecastmodelsthatcanavoidnear-catastrophiceconomicmeltdowns.
Wherethenisthecrediblenumbers-basedmodelforgovernance,development,
and security in Afghanistan during an insurgency? Certainly, a professional,
DOWNES-MARTIN 111
subjective,qualitativeassessmentofprogresswillmakeuseofcertainnumbers,
butnotbyrunningarithmeticfunctionsoverthem.
SimplisticColorCoding
Seniorcommanders’timeisapreciousandnonrenewableresource;staffsright-
fully guard it jealously.The most common approach in-theater to providing
seniorcommanderswiththeconclusionsof assessmentsistoproduceacolor-
codedmap,eachdistrictshowninoneoffivecolorsindicatingthelevelofsuc-
21
cessthere(seefigure2). Butashasbeenpointedoutandpersuasivelyarguedto
aworkinggroupofseniorofficers,includinggenerals,atIJC,“Thecolor-coded
map dilutes transparency and accuracy and offers a simplistic and misleading
22
representationofthebattlespace.”
I have observed that most senior commanders demand narrative explana-
tionsfromsubordinatesduringbriefingsandforwardnarrativeassessmentsup
thechain.However,staffsdonotusuallycollect,document,orstorethesenarra-
tivesinadatabaseformsuitableforlateranalysis.Sincetheseseniorcommanders
FIGURE2
EXAMPLEOVERALLDISTRICTASSESSMENTS,COLORCODEDBYLEVELOFSUCCESS
ShayrKhanBandar
Hairatan
TorahGhundey
IslamQal'eh
TorKham
GhulumKhan
Zaranj
Wesh(Chaman)
BahramChah
ISAFJointCommandMetricsWorkshop,Washington,D.C.,17–18March2010,unclassifiedhandout.