DTIC ADA516746: Information Technology and China's Naval Modernization

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

USS Chancellorsville leads PLAN Shenzhen into
Apra Harbor, Guam, for naval port call
Borgren II)
S.
Information Technology and Navy (Christopher
S.
U.
China’s Naval Modernization
By anDReW S. eRiC KSo n and MiCh ael S. Ch aSe
I
n recent years, the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
has become a high priority for senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders
and high-ranking military officers. For instance, CCP General Secretary, Presi-
dent, and Central Military Commission Chairman Hu Jintao in a December
2006 speech to PLAN officers underscored the need “to build a powerful People’s
navy that can adapt to its historical mission during a new century and a new period.”1
Similarly, PLAN Commander Wu Shengli and Political Commissar Hu Yanlin pro-
moted naval modernization in an authoritative CCP journal. According to Wu and
Hu, “Since the reform and open door policy, along with the consistent increase of
overall national strength, the oceanic awareness and national defense awareness of the
Chinese people have been raised and the desire to build a powerful navy, strengthen
modern national defense and realize the great revitalization of China has become
stronger than at any other time.”2 Moreover, Wu and Hu contend, “To build a power-
ful navy is the practical need for maintaining the safety of national sovereignty and
maritime rights.”3 Such statements emphasize the importance that China’s civilian and
military leaders attach to PLAN modernization.
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ERICKSON and CHASE
This growing urgency about mod- This guidance applies with particular force to Combatant Academy, “in the information
ernization is focused largely, but by no the modernization of the PLAN. According to age, information has become one of the main
means exclusively, on a possible conflict one recent article, for example, “Informatized sources of combat power.”9
over Taiwan. At the same time, Wu and Hu warfare is the mainstream trend in the devel-
point out that the navy must be prepared opment of future maritime wars.”6 C4ISR Systems
for a wider range of missions, including the Given the Chinese military’s C4ISR
protection of maritime resources and energy PLAN “Informatization” shortcomings in the 1980s and 1990s, the
security issues. These missions drive PLAN The PLAN is undergoing an impressive PLAN’s informatization drive started from a
requirements, not only for the new platforms transformation from what was essentially a relatively weak position. For years, the entire
China is putting into service with the navy, coastal defense force to a more offensively PLA, including the navy, faced major short-
but also for command, control, communica- oriented force capable of executing a variety comings in its C4ISR capabilities. Despite
tions, computers, intelligence, surveillance, of regional missions in support of China’s these modest beginnings, C4ISR moderniza-
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. national security interests. As part of this tion has been under way since the late 1990s,
Within this context, enhancing modernization program, a number of new when the PLA embarked on a massive effort
PLAN information technology and com- surface ships and submarines have entered to modernize, upgrade, and expand its com-
munications capabilities is seen as critical service. New surface ships include Russian- munications infrastructure. This ambitious
to China’s overall naval modernization built Sovremennyy guided missile destroyers; project was bolstered by the rapid develop-
program. According to one recent article, indigenously developed Luzhou and Luyang ment of the civilian IT and telecommunica-
“The informatization of shipboard weapons I and II guided missile destroyers; Jiangkai tions industries. One of the key results of the
and equipment is the core of maritime joint I and II guided missile frigates; and the upgrade was the construction of a national
combat. . . . [T]he Chinese Navy should Houbei-class missile-armed, wave-piercing fiber optics network that provided the PLA
vigorously build data links for maritime catamarans. Among the new submarines are with much greater communications capacity,
military actions and fundamentally change Kilo-class diesels acquired from Russia and reliability, and security. Beijing also intensi-
the way to carry out tasks in the future,” the domestically developed Shang nuclear- fied its efforts to improve its space-based
ultimately creating a “networked fleet.”4 powered and Song and Yuan conventional C4ISR capabilities. Indeed, China began an
Reaching this goal hinges on narrowing the attack submarines. With the addition of
gap between the PLAN and the world’s most these platforms, the navy is improving its the PLAN appears poised
advanced navies through the development, surface warfare, undersea warfare, and air
to become an increasingly
acquisition, and integration of advanced defense capabilities.
important part of China’s
information technology. The PLAN also appears poised to
nuclear deterrence posture
This emphasis on “informatization” become an increasingly important part of
derives from the expectation that the People’s China’s nuclear deterrence posture with the
Liberation Army (PLA) must prepare for addition of several Type 094 fleet ballistic ambitious manned space program, started
local wars under informatized conditions, a missile submarines (SSBNs), which will be participating in a variety of international
theme that was underscored at the 17th CCP armed with JL–2 submarine-launched bal- partnerships, and moved forward with
Congress in October 2007. Specifically, Hu’s listic missiles. According to the 2006 Defense several military space programs.
report to the Party Congress declared: White Paper, the PLAN “aims at gradual Space-based C4ISR developments are
extension of the strategic depth for offshore particularly crucial for naval informatiza-
To attain the strategic objective of building defensive operations and enhancing its capa- tion, especially given the PLAN’s evolving
computerized armed forces and winning IT bilities in integrated maritime operations missions. According to the 2007 Department
[information technology]–based warfare, and nuclear counterattacks.”7 of Defense (DOD) report on Chinese mili-
we will accelerate composite development of China’s leaders perceive their nation tary power, “China seeks to become a world
mechanization and computerization, carry to be confronting a strategic environment leader in space development and maintain a
out military training under IT-based condi- in which “military competition based on leading role in space launch activity.”10 Navi-
tions, modernize every aspect of logistics, informatization is intensifying.”8 This view gation and positioning have been other areas
intensify our efforts to train a new type of both highlights the growing importance of of emphasis with implications for military
high-caliber military personnel in large information technology in military mod- modernization and navy informatization.
numbers and change the mode of generating ernization and places a heavy premium on In addition to using the Global Position-
combat capabilities.5 striving for information dominance in any ing System and Global Navigation Satellite
future conflict, especially one with a techno- System and working with the European
logically advanced adversary. Some analysts Union on the Galileo navigation satellite
write about the role of information in a system, China has deployed its own Beidou
style reminiscent of U.S. publications that navigation satellites. Chinese developments
Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is an Assistant Professor in
the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval emphasize information superiority and extol in small satellites and maritime observation
War College. Dr. Michael S. Chase is an Assistant the virtues of “network-centric warfare.” satellites are also of particular interest from
Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at For example, according to three researchers the perspective of naval informatization.
the Naval War College. affiliated with the PLAN’s Dalian Naval
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 25
FORUM | Information Technology and China’s Naval Modernization
Beyond these improvements in space- Improving military computer net- Beijing is already developing the capabil-
based ISR capabilities, the PLA is also making works and making them available to more ity to target U.S. ships with ballistic missiles,
major strides in the construction of its com- units have been particular priorities as the such as the medium-range DF–21.16 “China
munications networks. Indeed, the expan- PLA expands its communications networks, is equipping theater ballistic missiles with
sion of military communications networks another key “informatization” development maneuvering reentry vehicles . . . with radar
is a noteworthy aspect of Chinese military that has major implications for the PLAN. or [infrared] seekers to provide the accuracy
modernization and one that has major impli- Recent reports indicate that all navy units necessary to attack a ship at sea,” according
cations for PLAN informatization. The PLA at the division level and above are now to the Office of Naval Intelligence.17 If sup-
reportedly has accelerated the development of connected to military computer networks plied with accurate real-time target data from
its nationwide communications capabilities, and that current plans focus on extending China’s growing constellation of ISR satellites
devoting particular attention to diversifying coverage to lower-level units.14 In addition, or other sources, terminal seekers and maneu-
the means of communication and enhanc- the navy is improving the capabilities of vering warheads could threaten targets such as
ing security and antijamming capabilities.11 its ocean survey and reconnaissance ships, airbases and aircraft carriers.18
According to one source: which are responsible for such tasks as sur- Chinese researchers emphasize the
veying, gathering meteorological and hydro- importance of linking platforms into an
in the coastal military commands, a gigantic graphic information, laying and repairing integrated whole, suggesting that this will
optic-cable communication network has been undersea cables, and intelligence collection. remain a focus of defense research and
set up, which guarantees the optic-cable commu- development programs. This is considered
nication among the headquarters of each mili- Trends in Research and Development particularly important for the PLAN.
tary command. Meanwhile, satellite commu- Further technical improvements are likely According to one article, “A platform-centric
nication has been applied more widely, which over the next decade. According to the 2007 navy cannot bring into full play the potentials
ensures smooth communication between the top DOD report on Chinese military capabilities: of its sensors and weapons,” but “effective
commanding organ and the headquarters at dif- networks formed with multiple platforms and
ferent levels of the military commands.12 To prevent deployment of naval forces into multiple sensors can enable the resources of
western Pacific waters, PLA planners are military strength to grow steadily.” Moreover,
Chinese research institutes have also focused on targeting surface ships at long ranges “resource sharing among various platforms
“developed a VSAT [Very Small Aperture Ter- . . . . One area of apparent investment emphasis and coordinated allocation of the resources of
minal] communication system consisting of involves a combination of medium-range bal- all operational forces can enable the currently
mobile vehicle-borne components” as well as listic missiles, C4ISR for geo-location of targets, available resources of military strength to be
microwave and troposcatter communication and onboard guidance systems for terminal fully utilized.”19 According to another article,
systems, and China is also upgrading some of homing to strike surface ships on the high seas “In order to effectively fuse all C4ISR system
its traditional communications systems.13 or their onshore support infrastructure.15 elements and achieve a seamless connection
People’s Liberation Army Navy Luhu-class
all navy units at the division
destroyer Qingdao departing Pearl Harbor, 2006
level and above are now
connected to military
computer networks
from sensors to shooters it is necessary to
solve the problems of data integration.”20 Such
statements suggest that networked sensors
and data fusion are also likely to enjoy high
priority in the next few years.
Unmanned reconnaissance systems
appear to be another area of emphasis in
Chinese C4ISR-related research. Indeed,
recent technical articles indicate that scientists
and engineers are conducting research on
various types of unmanned aircraft systems.21
Researchers are also working on unmanned
underwater vehicles. For example, PLAN
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Navy (Ja cmoaurlidti mhaev ew aaprfpalricea mtioisnssio inn aISreRa sa.nd other
S.
U.
26 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu
ERICKSON and CHASE
Informatized War at Sea expected to play a prominent role in a variety out, “Although the PLA has devoted consid-
Planners realize that rapid improve- of campaigns in which the navy might be erable effort to developing joint capabilities,
ments in the PLAN’s hardware will not called on to participate. A major PLA doc- it faces a persistent lack of inter-service
be fully effective without corresponding trinal publication, for instance, emphasizes cooperation and a lack of actual experience
increases in the ability of its personnel to the need to achieve objectives rapidly in in joint operations.”31 In short, the PLAN
operate new systems under combat condi- a complex battle environment by jointly will likely encounter a variety of challenges
tions. This requires the navy to make com- implementing an air, maritime, and infor- as it moves forward with the development of
mensurate improvements in training. In mation blockade.27 The last entails “actively joint operations capabilities. Nevertheless, it
keeping with recent PLA-wide guidance destroy[ing] the enemy’s important ground has already made considerable progress and
from the General Staff Department that information installations, disrupt[ing] is clearly determined to further enhance its
stresses making training more realistic and the enemy’s satellite and radio channels, ability to conduct joint operations.
challenging, the PLAN has emphasized cut[ting] off the enemy’s submarine cables In addition to informatization’s effect
training that simulates the actual battlefield and cable channels . . . [and] smashing the on the navy’s ability to conduct joint opera-
environment as much as possible. Official enemy’s information warfare capability.”28 tions, the introduction and integration of
sources indicate considerable progress in Joint campaigns require joint campaign advanced information technology are also
making training more rigorous. command structures, which are responsible likely to influence its approach to command
Chinese sources frequently highlight for coordinating service activities in pursuit and control. The Chinese military has a tra-
the importance of conducting training under of the overall campaign objectives. Accord- dition of highly centralized command that
“complex electromagnetic conditions,” so ing to another major PLA doctrinal publica- derives from a variety of sources, including
forces will be prepared to conduct opera- tion, the command and communications the political system, institutional culture,
tions in an environment characterized by systems of troops under the same command and organizational structure. Indeed,
jamming, electronic attacks, reconnaissance, or participating in coordinated operations Chinese scholars argue that the PLA’s general
and electronic deception. A June 2007 North must be interoperable.29 Technical interoper- staff organizational structure is conducive to
Sea Fleet exercise reportedly incorporated ability of C4ISR assets is a necessary, though centralized command and control.32 More-
several of these challenges.23 The PLAN is insufficient, condition for the development over, for the PLA, unity of command histori-
also conducting opposing forces training of joint operational capabilities. cally has meant centralization of command.
featuring Blue Force detachments playing the This tradition appears to have considerable
role of enemy units and is making extensive staying power. According to Major Gener-
some joint exercises have
use of modeling and simulation as part of its als Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, for
focused specifically on
drive to improve training for future informa- example, “All the decision-making power
communications capabilities
tized conflicts. and command authority on issues concern-
Another area of emphasis reflects the ing the overall war situation should be cen-
conclusion that the military will have to fight The PLA still faces a variety of tralized to the strategic commander and the
jointly in future conflicts. According to the problems, many of them bureaucratic and strategic commanding authorities.”33
PLAN’s official newspaper, “As profound institutional. Perhaps the most important Given the PLA’s long tradition of
changes take place in the form of war, future is a highly centralized and hierarchical centralized command, China could choose
warfare will be integrated joint operations command structure and organizational to use its improved C4ISR capabilities to
under informatized conditions. Training culture that is averse to delegating decision- make centralized command function more
is the rehearsal for war, and what kind of a making to lower levels, much less junior efficiently and effectively. Chinese authors
war we fight determines what kind of train- and noncommissioned officers. Another have certainly recognized the potential of
ing we should conduct.”24 Numerous recent potential roadblock is institutional resistance enhanced communications capabilities to
articles highlight the PLAN’s joint training and bureaucratic opposition resulting from enable higher-echelon decisionmakers to
activities.25 Some of these joint exercises have the likely tendency of joint campaigns to function more effectively. High-bandwidth
focused specifically on communications emphasize the importance of the PLAN, secure communications, for instance, allow
capabilities.26 the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, strategic leaders to transmit plans and other
and the Second Artillery Corps, through operational documents electronically in
Implications for Jointness which supreme headquarters exercises direct real time and hold videoconferences with
Successful informatization will have command and control over strategic missile subordinates instead of traveling to the front
major implications for the PLAN’s ability to forces, and thereby erode the traditional for face-to-face meetings. According to Peng
conduct joint operations and for the future dominance of the army. and Yao:
development of its command and control Still another challenge is the PLA’s lack
system. PLAN publications consistently of real experience conducting joint opera- Under high-tech conditions and with the aid
emphasize the growing importance of joint tions. The only historical example is the of the strategic command automation system,
operations, which many authors connect to relatively small-scale Yijiangshan campaign the form of assigning strategic tasks orally,
the challenges of informatized operations in in 1955; the rest of the PLA’s warfighting realized only face to face in the past, can now
a complex battlefield environment. Indeed, experiences were at most combined arms be actualized between different places, and
joint operations and informatization are campaigns.30 As the 2006 DOD report points assigning strategic tasks in the past by written
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 27
FORUM | Information Technology and China’s Naval Modernization
operations documents can now be completed the total sum of strategic information has participating forces belong to different services
through computer networks in real time.34 greatly increased.” and branches, and carrying out operational
More broadly, PLA analysts appear to be tasks will require temporary partnerships,
There are also strong incentives to engaging in a debate about the advantages and making organization difficult. Consequently,
consider decentralizing authority, at least disadvantages of centralized and decentral- there must be centralized control of all service
to some extent. Notwithstanding the strong ized command systems. Some authors claim and branch firepower strike forces to assure
emphasis on the role of the strategic com- that conducting complex joint firepower the timeliness, continuity, and coordination of
mander and the centralized command strikes requires centralized command. They firepower strike operations.35
system, PLA writers suggest that strategic argue that there must be centralized and Other PLA writers appear to favor a
decisionmakers should not attempt to unified planning, organization, control, and command and control system that gives
micromanage activities at the tactical and coordination to conduct high-efficiency inte- greater autonomy to junior leaders on a more
operational levels. For one thing, having grated firepower strikes. They point out that routine basis, not just under emergency con-
more information at higher echelons is not command relationships are complex because ditions that impede communications with
necessarily better; huge amounts of data higher-level commanders. Indeed, the infor-
may simply overwhelm strategic command- having more information matization of the PLAN, especially advances
ers. As Peng and Yao argue, “Under the in ISR and communications capabilities,
at higher echelons is not
high-tech conditions, the glut and overload may offer China the opportunity to employ
necessarily better; huge
of strategic information have increased to a a more flexible and responsive command
amounts of data may
large extent the difficulties of strategic judg- and control system that relies on “directive
ment. . . . [I]t’s not an easy job to retrieve and simply overwhelm strategic control” and “mission type orders” to meet
pick out valuable strategic information when commanders the challenges of joint operations in high-
tech regional wars.
Secretary Gates meets with Chinese
defense minister in Beijing
DOD (Cherie Thurlby)
28 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu
ERICKSON and CHASE
Although adopting such an approach forces through the Second Artillery Corps.36 militaries, which Chinese writers suggest
would appear to offer significant operational Presumably, the supreme headquarters will take decades to overcome. But it also
advantages and complement the PLA’s evolv- would also exercise direct command and raises the issue of distinguishing between the
ing doctrine, a number of obstacles threaten control over deployed SSBNs through “ideal” capability the Chinese military seeks
such a dramatic transformation. The most the General Staff Department or PLAN for the long term and a “good enough” capa-
important of these obstacles are the PLA headquarters. bility for the relatively near term.
tradition of highly centralized command and The navy has been working to achieve For the most part, Chinese analysts
control and an organizational culture that secure, reliable SSBN communications tend to overestimate U.S. and Western capa-
does not appear to encourage junior officers for more than two decades. However, the bilities and portray themselves as backward
to take the initiative. If these hurdles could extent to which centralized SSBN command, in comparison. Certainly, many Western
be overcome, successful implementation of a control, and communications is possible for observers continue to denigrate PLA capabil-
more flexible command and control system China across the range of nuclear scenarios ities and note that even some of the Chinese
would require the training and development remains unclear. This underscores another military’s recent achievements are relatively
of junior leaders capable of taking the initia- critical problem for the PLAN: ensuring simplistic by American standards. But one
tive and seizing fleeting opportunities on the the ability to communicate with SSBNs in should ask whether a relatively simple system
battlefield. an environment in which its command and of deconfliction by time or geographic area
How this debate will be resolved control system has been degraded. with disparate platforms might actually be
remains an open question. To be sure, sufficient for the PLA to achieve its objectives
modern commanders have not always used Important Questions under most circumstances. The need for an
advances in technology to support the Clearly, the PLAN is serious about the exquisite C4ISR system should not be over-
delegation of authority to lower echelons. hardware aspects of naval informatization, stated. In short, if the PLAN has a different
On the contrary, in many cases, they have but at least three broader questions remain metric for integrated C4ISR than that of the
sought to use technology to improve the unanswered. U.S. Navy, it might achieve an employable
efficiency and effectiveness of centralized Are Chinese conceptions of informati- capability with surprising rapidity, especially
command and control. It is entirely plausible zation unique? The first question is whether if it pursues one that is relatively crude by
that the PLA will pursue this well-trodden there is anything in the Chinese concept of U.S. standards but that is nonetheless suffi-
path instead of exploiting technological informatization that is radically different cient to meet China’s operational objectives.
advances to implement a directive control from Western characterizations of the role
or mission-type orders system, especially of information in modern warfare. It is not of critical concern would be
given its institutional predispositions. It evident from Chinese sources that there is asymmetric approaches to
remains to be seen how the PLA will adapt anything unique about how Chinese strate-
information dominance that
its command style to changes in doctrine gists view the importance of information
could offer China presently
and improvements in information and com- and information superiority. Some writings
unforeseen and potentially
munications technology. Enhanced IT and are undoubtedly attempts to assimilate
C4ISR capabilities could permit the PLA to and repackage ideas that are familiar to disruptive military capabilities
delegate greater decisionmaking authority to readers of Western writings on “network-
lower-level commanders. At the same time, centric warfare,” information dominance, How will the PLAN resolve two critical
the modernization of the communications and related concepts. Nonetheless, it will informatization-related debates? Perhaps
infrastructure could just as easily reinforce be important to watch the trends in PLAN most interesting in the Chinese writings
strong organizational tendencies to favor writings and practice to see how these examined are the ongoing debates arising
highly centralized command and control developments play out in both the short and from increased informatization. One major
arrangements, as seems to have happened in long term. Of perhaps most critical concern debate concerns the offense-defense balance
some recent U.S. military operations. would be any evidence of radically different, in information warfare. The conceptual goal is
These are challenges that the entire asymmetric approaches to informatization obviously full information assurance for one’s
PLA must confront, but there are also some and the attainment and exploitation of infor- own forces and complete information denial to
service-specific issues that navy command- mation dominance that could offer China the enemy’s forces. The more likely outcome is
ers will need to resolve. First, command presently unforeseen and potentially disrup- some position between the extremes, depend-
and control of PLAN assets is complicated tive military capabilities. ing on capabilities and geography. One could
due to the organizational structure of the How informatized does the PLAN posit that information assurance tends to favor
People’s Liberation Army. The command- really need to be? The second broad ques- short-range operations close to home, where
ers of the three fleets answer to both PLAN tion centers on how close the Chinese are to one can rely on land lines and high power line-
headquarters and regional military com- achieving the so-called informatized force. of-sight communications, while information
manders. Second, the deployment of SSBNs The 2006 Defense White Paper established a denial might predominate at long range away
will present the supreme command and goal of being able to fight and win informa- from home, where one becomes reliant on sat-
the PLAN with special challenges. Again, tionalized wars by the mid-21st century. This ellite communications and long-range signals
the supreme headquarters exercises direct reflects a perceived gap between the Chinese that might be jammed or geolocated. It will be
command and control over strategic missile armed forces and the world’s most advanced interesting to follow the progress of this debate
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 29
FORUM | Information Technology and China’s Naval Modernization
in Chinese writings, especially as strides are The overall implication could be December 20, 2006, available at <www.fas.org/
made toward creating a more powerful navy, that Beijing is on a path to conduct highly nuke/guide/china/ONI2006.pdf>.
18 Eric A. McVadon, “China’s Maturing Navy,”
potentially with blue water capabilities. effective centralized operations close to
Naval War College Review 59, no. 2 (Spring 2006).
In this vein, a key possibility that China itself. This may be useful in an access
19 Wang Hangyu et al., “The Exploration of
planners must consider is that the PLAN’s denial role, but it might also be an effective
the Key-Technique in Sensors Networking,” Fire
continuing development of modern C4ISR limitation on future power projection, in
Control & Command Control 30, no. 4 (August
capabilities will not only enhance its ability which information assurance decreases with
2005), 118–121.
to operate effectively, but also increase its distance. Clearly, the evolution of the theory 20 Li Qiang et al., “Research on Data Integration
vulnerability to command and control and practice of Chinese naval informatiza- of C4ISR System,” Command Control & Simulation
warfare. As the navy becomes more reliant tion will merit careful observation in coming 28, no. 4 (August 2006), 29–32.
on high-tech C4ISR systems, it must be pre- years. JFQ 21 Liu Gang et al., “Evaluation Model of UAV
pared to contend with electronic, computer Combat Effectiveness,” Fire Control & Command
network, and kinetic attacks designed to Control 31, no. 1 (January 2006), 45–51.
22 Guo Weimin and Ma Aimin, “Visualized
disrupt or deny its ability to use these new NOTeS
Simulation of Image Sonar on ROV,” Fire Control
capabilities. Indeed, the PLAN—along with
the rest of the military—will likely need to 1 David Lague, “China Airs Ambitions to Beef & Command Control 31, no. 2 (February 2006),
Up Naval Power,” International Herald Tribune, 66–68.
devote just as much attention to protect-
December 28, 2006. 23 Mi Jinguo and Jiang Xiangjie, “Soul-Stirring
ing its own C4ISR capabilities as it will to
2 Wu Shengli and Hu Yanlin, “Building a Pow- Training Carried Out by PLA Naval Forces in
degrading or destroying those of its potential erful People’s Navy That Meets the Requirements Complex Electromagnetic Environments,” People’s
adversaries. The Chinese appear to be pursu- of the Historical Mission for Our Army,” Seeking Navy, July 3, 2007, 1.
ing both efforts with equal vigor, practically Truth, no. 14, July 16, 2007. 24 Zhang Jian and Yuan Zhenjun, “Data Plat-
and theoretically. PLAN writings do not yet 3 Ibid. form Links to Three-Dimensional Battleground,”
offer a definitive assessment of this problem, 4 Liu Jiangping and Zhui Yue, “How to Reform People’s Navy, August 4, 2006, 1.
but it would seem to be important for future the Navy in Order to Execute China’s Maritime 25 For example, Cha Chunming et al., “From
Chinese naval operations, including PLAN Strategy in the 21st Century,” Modern Navy (June Scene Where PLA Navy Conducts an Informatized
power projection. 2007), 6–9. Joint Drill,” People’s Navy, September 1, 2006,
The second debate concerns the appro- 5 Hu Jintao, Report to the Seventeenth 14–19.
National Congress of the Communist Party of 26 Li Fuxiang and Wu Dengfeng, “Navy Orga-
priate balance between centralization and
China, October 15, 2007, available at <http:// nizes Multi-service Arm Maritime Combat Com-
decentralization. The conceptual goal for
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/ munications Exercise,” People’s Navy, August 16,
most militaries is centralized planning and content_6938749.htm>. 2006, 1.
decentralized execution—that is, empowering 6 Liu and Zhui. 27 Zhang Yulang et al., ed., “The Joint Blockade
the lowest levels with information so they can 7 Information Office of the State Council of Campaign,” The Science of Campaigns (Beijing:
leverage superior tactical training and initia- the People’s Republic of China, China’s National National Defense University Press, 2006), 10.
tive. Certainly, the practical experience in the Defense in 2006, December 29, 2006. 28 Ibid., 11.
West does not always match this conceptual 8 Ibid. 29 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, ed., The
goal; often, the reality is that “commanders 9 Ji Chengxin et al., “Some Ideas of Naval Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military
who can control, do control.” This is an issue Service Equipment Information Modification,” Science Publishing House, 2005), 265.
that has been raised in Chinese writings— Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command & 30 Joint campaigns involve the participation of
Technology 17, no. 1 (February 2006), 10. forces from more than one service, while combined
with the proverbial 10,000-mile screwdriver
10 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Mili- arms campaigns involve the participation of mul-
as evident to PLA analysts as it is to their
tary Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2007, tiple branches from a single service. For full defini-
Western counterparts. Decentralized opera-
Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: tions, see Joint Publication 1–02, DOD Dictionary
tions will likely be an even more difficult issue Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007), 42, avail- of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC:
for the PLA, which is not known for valuing able at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523- DOD, April 12, 2001, as amended through Septem-
and cultivating battlefield initiative. Nonethe- China-Military-Power-final.pdf>. ber 17, 2006), available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
less, PLAN “connectivity” theories and efforts 11 “China Reinforces Construction of National jel/doddict/index.html>.
appear to have provoked a debate between C3I System,” Kanwa Defense Review, April 1, 2005, 31 DOD, 16.
advocates of centralization and proponents 18–19. 32 Peng and Yao, 253.
of decentralization. This controversy is unre- 12 Ibid. 33 Ibid., 268.
solved, and it remains to be seen whether the 13 Ibid. 34 Ibid., 262.
PLAN will use its enhanced C4ISR capabilities 14 Wang Feng and Yang Yuwen, “Navy’s Com- 35 Zhang Shuhui, “Revelation to Weapon
prehensive Military Information Network Officially Equipment Construction Based on Integrative
to push information down to lower levels and
Established,” People’s Navy, August 28, 2006, 1. Joint Firepower Strike,” Journal of the Institute of
empower junior commanders to make deci- 15 DOD, 16. Command and Technology, 2007, 2.
sions or instead will attempt to leverage new 16 Robert Hewson, “Chinese Missiles Raise 36 Ibid., 255–256.
ISR capabilities and growing communications
Their Game,” Jane’s Navy International, January 1,
capacity to further strengthen centralized 2007.
command and control—an option more con- 17 Office of Naval Intelligence, “Seapower
sistent with the traditional Chinese approach. Questions on the Chinese Submarine Force,”
30 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu