DTIC ADA441455: Complexity and Military Strategic Thought Balancing Order and Chaos

13 Pages·0.68 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
COMPLEXITY AND MILITARY STRATEGIC THOUGHT
BALANCING ORDER AND CHAOS
Core Course 5 Essay
CDR Tony Laud/Class of ‘96
Mlltary Strategy and Operations
Semmar A
COL Rothmann
CAN’T Tyson
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1996 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1996 to 00-00-1996
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Complexity and Military Strategic Thought Balancing Order and Chaos
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
“We have it m our-power to begm the world over agazn ” Thomas Pame
I Today’s complex, interdependentg lobal commumty has been thrust mto a perrod
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of dtscontmurty, rapid change and uncertamty No longer able to predrct future events
with ,any degree of certainty, countnes are desperatelys earchmgf or new and innovative
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strategies to match hrmted meanst o ambrguouse nds Tins IS especiallyt rue for the
Umted States, which has been profoundly affected by two major events
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1; The first major event affecting strategy 1st he transztzont he Umted States IS
currently undergoing from the mdustnal age (Second Wave) to the mformatton age (Thud
Wave) r The economy of SecondW ave mdustnal mass productron with its homogeneous
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society IS being replaced by a Third Wave brain-basedt nformatron and servrcee conomy
with a heterogeneouss ociety The “mformatlon age” 1sp roviding the U S and its mrhtary
a quantum leap advantagei n advancedt echnology, lnformatlon systems,a nd mnovative
ways to exploit knowledge However, it 1sa lso creating a more fragmented society with a
plethora of special interest groups, srgmficantly mcreasmgt he complexity of
orgamzatlonal mteractlons Thts fundamental shrft m the way the Umted States conducts
its $falrs, both mtematlonally and domestically, profoundly affects every dynamrc system
(for example, pohtlcal, economrc,m rhtary, or environmental) the country interacts with
acrosst he full spectrum of the globe It IS changing the very nature and conduct of war
The second major event tmpactmg strategy 1st he collapseo f the Soviet Umon No
longer m a stable, bipolar world, the Umted Statesa nd the global commumty have been
’ Ahm and Held1 ToflIer, War and An&War (Eoston Little Eronn and Compaq 1993) 22-23
thrust mto a state of uncertainty, ambrgurty, and mstablhty The Umted States and the rest
of the world are now m a tramrtron phaseb etween Cold War world “order” and post-
Cold; War “chaos ” This transmon, like the SecondW ave to Third Wave transmon, also
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affects every dynamrc systemt he country interacts with and fundamentally affects U S
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mrhtary strategic thought These two events,t ogether wrth drastically reduced budgets,
fundamentally have changedt he landscapeu pon which the country’s national securrty and
rmhtary strategies are based
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Our rmhtary strategy must be able to adapt to these “transmons” and at the same
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time; cope with current fiscal and global realities In thrs era of reduced defense spending
and mcreasedw orldwide mrhtary commrtments,t he gap between means and ends
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con$nues to expand Matchmg dnnmrshedm eanst o ambiguous, ever-mcreasmge nds
while mminnzing nsk is no easyt ask and gets more drfhcult wrth each passing day New
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idea/sa re needed Perhaps a whole new and mnovatrve approach to strategic thmkmg wrll
provide a different perspectivet o the problems now facing the strategist
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I This paper proposesl ust that, a nontradmonal approach unrquely designedt o
explain systemst hinkmg conceptso f drscontmurty,t ransmon and adaptation It does so m
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a way that may help the strategist comprehendp roblems more clearly and m turn provrde
mnotatrve solutrons It will show that dlscontmumesa re mevltable, unpredictable, and
that seemmgly small events can lead to catastrophic outcomes It will also explain that
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due to these dlscontmumes, actors will changea nd make adaptations Thrs m turn will
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effect m some way all the other actors, starting another sequenceo f change and
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adaptation This explams that the only “certainty” a strategist has 1st hat everythrng IS
mpredzctable
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/ Umted States rmhtary strategic thought 1sc urrently undergoing a transztzonf rom
“order” to “chaos,” attempting to adapt its dynamic systems( orgamzatlons) to the
tremendous changesb rought about by these two revolutronary events This 1sa very
drfficult task, trying to make senseo f the uncertain, chaotic future and develop a strategy
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to deal with rt Because many of the tradmonal Cold War threats no longer exrst, most of
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the actors have changed then interests, objectives, pohcles, and the way they interact in
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the global commumty In fact, they are also m the mrdst of transmon Addmonally, there
are many new players in the game who do not necessarilyk now, or play, by the rules In
essence,c urrent n&at-y strategy 1st rying to managet he “chaos” It has found itself
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engulfed by Perhaps U S mrhtary strategists should not simply attempt to managet he
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chaos, but instead attempt to ensure chaos 1sn ever achieved It may be better m fact to
remam m the “transmon” phase,n ever fully reachmgo rder or chaos Strategists should
therefore focus on steadily managing the “transmon” by balancing order and chaos
I Transmon, that is, changing from one state to another (order to chaos), m the
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context of m&tar-y strategy is a complex, nonlinear process affecting many actors
(dynamrc systems) The increasing complexrty of mihtary affairs forces the rmhtary from
mteractmg m the realm of tradmonal actors (arnues,n avres,a nd air forces) The m&tar-y
now finds itself m a more complex arena involvmg such actors as other U S government
agencies,m ultmatronal corporations, rehglous fimdamentahsts,N GO’s, terrorist groups
and,many other polmcal, envuonmental and ethmc groups In addmon, the issuest he
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mlhtary must deal with are no longer stnctly mihtary related but now include economrcs,
polmcs, religion, the envn-onmentt,h e list goes on
Fortunately for the strategist, there 1sa relatively new sciencet hat deals precisely
with complex dynarmc systemsu ndergoing transmon from “order” to “chaos ” This new
scrence1 sc alled Complexrty Science It attempts to explam the dynamrcsa nd mteractrons
complex systemse xperiencew hrle undergoing order-to-chaos transitrons Complexrty
science also demonstratest hat somehow all these complex systemsr emain amazingly
balanced between order and chaos, constantly movmg back and forth between the two,
always seekmg out the best posmon The systemsn ever reach chaos, instead they remain
focused around a balance point between the two states Thrs balancep oint, called “the
edge of chaos,” 1sw here the components of a system never quite lock mto place (order),
but never quite develop mto turbulence (chaos), either It 1sm ost accurately descrrbeda s
follows
; “The edge of chaos 1sw here new ideas and mnovatlve genotypes are forever
mbblmg away at the edgeso f the status quo, and where even the most entrenched
Io ld guard wrll eventually be overthrown The edge of chaos 1st he constantly
’ shrfimg battle zone between stagnation and anarchy, the one place where a
~c omplex system can be spontaneous,a daptive, and alive “*
As it per-tamst o mrhtary strategy, complexity scienceo ffers a fresh new insight
mto the process of transmonmg from SecondW ave, Cold War “ordered” strategy to Third
Wave, post-Cold War “chaotic” strategy It provides the strategist a new perspective on
dlscontmulty, change and adaptation It 1sa concept that deservesa hard look, as rt may
’ M Mtchell Waldrop, ComDlewh (New York Simon and Schuster, 1992) 12
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be the tool m the strategist’s box that makest he difference m this unpredictable, forever
changing world of uncertainty
Complexrty science,a ccording to SantaF e Institute founder George Cowan, 1so ne
of the new scienceso f the twenty-first century It 1sa sciencea bout complex, nonlinear
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dynarmcal systems3 It 1sa n mterdrscrphnarys ciencet hat uses elementso f vanous other
sciences,m cludmg biology, mathematics,e conomics, ecology, artrficlal life, physics and
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chaos theory It 1sa n alternative to the reductromst,l inear thmkmg that has dommated
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saerjce since the time of Newton 4
’ Complexity scienced eals with systemst hat are complex, m the senset hat a great
many independent actors are mteractmg with each other m a great many ways An
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example would be all the trillion upon tnlhon interconnected water molecules that make
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up an ocean The systemsm ust also be dynamic, in that they change( transmon) or adapt
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dunng then mteractions, constantly seekmgs elf-improvement or mutual accommodation
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with other systemsm the environment In a way, these systemse xhrbrt self-orgamzatron
(explamed later) They somehow make decrsronsb ased on then vanous mteractlons,
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atoms seekmg mmrmum energy statesb y formmg molecules, genesd evelopmg into
specific cells, or mrlitarres organrung hrerarchresto simultaneously perform acrossa range
of ol3erations
Complexrty theory, as noted earlier, 1sb asedu pon a combmatron of elementsf rom
several sciences These elements,t aken m various combmatronsa nd forms, provrde the
3 &other outstanding source for ‘q stemst hmkmg ’ IS Peter I4 Senge’sT he Fifth DisciDhne (Kerr York
Doubleday , 1990) Chapter 5 pro\?des an exepuonal explanation of complevty as it applies to systems
thmkmg
4 M Mtchell Waldrop Comolevh (Sew York Simon and Schuster, 1992:)1 3
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substancet o build the concepts that provide the foundatron to the theory Three mam
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concepts, self-organized cntrcah&, phase transmons, and coevolutlon provide key
conceptual ideas behmd complexrty theory A basic understanding of these concepts 1s
necessarym order to appreciatet he mnovatrvei nsight the theory brmgs to the strategist
and how it may be applied to mrhtary strategy now and m the future
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, Self-orgamzed crmcahty 1sa bout dlscontmuny Perhapst he best way to describe
thrs concept 1st o use physicist Per Bak’s sandp ile metaphor ’ Imagme a small pile of
sand on top of a table and a slow but steady sprinkle of sandf alling on rt from above The
pile contmuously grows, old sand shdmg down the side as new sand accumulateso n top,
until/ rt can not grow anymore In the senset hat the sand pile reachest hrs state without
the exphcrt help from an outside actor, it 1ss aid to be self-organrzed But, it 1sa lso m a
state of cntrcahty, m that the grams of sand on the surface are Just barely stable
So what happensw hen the next gram of sandf alling from above hits the pile? The
surface grams are interlocked m an infinite number of combmatronsa nd ready to grve at
any time, so there really 1sn o way to predict that Perhapsn othmg happens Maybe lust a
fewisand grams will shift a little Or maybe, rt leads to a catastrophic landslide that wipes
away one whole side of the sand pile According to Bak, over time all these thmgs wrll
occur Small shrfis, or readjustments,a re frequent whrle large avalanches,o r catastrophic
events, are rare The fact is, these eventsw tll happen If not now, zmnpredzctablmy the
future
’ M Sfitchell Waldrop, ComDleuh (Ne\\ York Simon and Schuster 1992) 301
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An mterestmg spin-off from crmcahty 1sr t demonstratest hat small, seernmgly
msrgmficant events can lead to major changesm future outcomes, perhaps even with
catastrophic results Remember,j ust one small gram of sand dropped at the nght spot can
create a major avalanche In the realm of nuhtary operattons, one small, seemmgly
msigrirficant event while conductmg a relatrvely bemgn MOOTW could possibly lead to an
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MRC in the future
The sand ptle metaphor descrrbmgc rnicahty can apply to any complex dynamical
system A steady input of energy mto a systemw ill drovet hat systemt o self-orgamze,
eventually reaching a point of cnticahty The system essentiallyb ecomesa n aggregate of
“mtrtcately mterlocking subsystemsju st barely on the edge of cntlcahty--with breakdowns
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of all sizes ripping through and rearranging things just often enough to keep them poised
at the edge “6 This 1sw here discontinuity exists, right at this edge of criticahty, most
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being small shifts, or readjustments However, the rare catastrophy is also possible For
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the strategist this meansh e must know that drscontmuny wrll occur, unpredictably sooner
or later, forcmg a change m strategy For a strate,T this meanst hat it must be constantly
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reassesseda nd changed
The second concept of complexrty theory, phaset ransmons, is about change
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When a system undergoes a changef rom one state to another, it does so via a process
known as transition The classice xample dealsw ith matter, solids transition to fluids
Thrs is exactly what happensi n dynamical systems,o rder transitions to chaos In the case
6 M btitchell Waldrop. COndexlh (Net\ York Slmon and Schuster, 1992) 305
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nonlinear dynamics, though, transrtron 1sp hrased“ complexity ” The reason being the
nature of the transition, it 1sf undamentally different
There are two types of transitions m nature, first-order phaset ransitions and
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second-order phaset ransrtrons Fn-St-orderp haset ransmons are the type most people are
famllrar with They apply to matter transttronsa nd are linear, definrtively changing matter
from one state to another For example, if heat is applied to a piece of Ice and its
temierature increasesp ast 32 degreesF , the ice changest o water It happensa ll at once,
the molecules are basically forced to make an either-or choice between order and chaos
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Any ,moleculesb elow the boundary are moving slowly and make the “decision” to sohdtfy
(order) Conversely, molecules above the boundary are movmg too fast to solidi@, so
they “decide” to be water (chaos) These transmons are defined and exact, occurrmg on
thin !boundanes( m thrs case,p recrselya t 32 degreesF )
Second-order phaset ransitions, m contrast, are not well defined, per-tamt o
dynamical systemsa nd are nonhnear They drive systemst o eqzrzlzbrzzzbnezt ween the two
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stat&s These transitions do not requrre systemc omponents to make either-or choices nor
do they occur all at once However, hke first-order phaset ransitions, the boundary (edge
of chaos) is an lnfimtesrmally thin barrier separatmgo rder and chaos It IS precisely at this
“edge of chaos” where order and chaos are balanced As the components of a system
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transmon from order to chaos, they begin to slowly transform mto the chaotic state,
comprlsmg both order and chaos at the samet ime At any grven time, a system
component can exrst m any varying degree of both “order” and “chaos ” In fact, whrle m
the &ansmon phase,t he system components can shrfi back and forth from being more
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