DTIC ADA403513: The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk

7 Pages·1.4 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

1229 Nardulli Pgs 3/13/02 8:00 AM Page 52
(cid:2)
AH–64 arriving at
Rinas,Kosovo.
Rodriguez)
Cesar
Squadron (
mera
Ca
mbat
Co
1st
The Operational Challenges
of Task Force Hawk
By J O H N G O R D O N I V, B R U C E N A R D U L L I, and
WA LT E R L. P E R R Y
O
peration Allied Force was a
major NATO success. The
Alliance withstood compet-
ing national agendas and
divisive political pressures while con-
ducting a 78-day campaign that ended
violence against Albanian Kosovars.
Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo and
refugees returned home. Yet the con-
flict also raised questions. While many
of the controversies were debated on
the levels of policy and strategy, differ-
ences on the operational role of U.S.
joint forces also arose. Task Force
Hawk was the most visible case. In-
tended to supplement airpower by Koste)
upslein lga uthnec hA Hro–6ck4e ht eslyicsotepmte r( aMnLdR mS)u, littis- Russell J.
ANTP–Q–37 radar, mpany (
Task Force Hawk. Co
Lieutenant Colonel John Gordon IV, USA (Ret.), Bruce Nardulli, and Lieutenant Signal
Colonel Walter L. Perry, USA (Ret.),are defense analysts with RAND. 55th
52 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02
Report Documentation Page
Report Date Report Type Dates Covered (from... to)
00 00 2002 N/A -
Title and Subtitle Contract Number
The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk
Grant Number
Program Element Number
Author(s) Project Number
Task Number
Work Unit Number
Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) Performing Organization Report Number
National Defense University Institute for National
Strategic Studies Washington D C 20319-5066
Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s)
Address(es)
Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s)
Distribution/Availability Statement
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
Supplementary Notes
The original document contains color images.
Abstract
Subject Terms
Report Classification Classification of this page
unclassified unclassified
Classification of Abstract Limitation of Abstract
unclassified UU
Number of Pages
6
1229 Nardulli Pgs 3/13/02 8:00 AM Page 53
Gordon et al.
Grafenwohr, Germany, on March 20,
Perimeter at Rinas
1999, just four days prior to the start of
Airport.
NATO air attacks. Initial guidance to
the Germany-based Army V Corps was
to plan to deploy a force of 1,700 to
Macedonia, where it would prepare for
deep attack helicopter operations. The
force would eventually grow to 48
AH–64s, although the initial deploy-
ment envisioned 24 aircraft plus sup-
port ships. A small number of MLRS
were included to provide air defense
suppression fires. Since the force was
Rodriguez) oMraicgeidnoanlliya aenndv ibsei opnoesidti otnoe dd enpelaory e lteo-
mera Squadro (Cesar Angela Stafford) mtstiiiczoe ensn u btCpCse plcooaaorfru rpkttssh e’w,s e fpo orNuleralcAqndeTu n bOpeeer sr oaAstt v lemlfacioietilidrano b inTRmle aaa.ispnzkiedd d Fl Roouegrnacicsiet--
Combat Ca S. Air Force ( Hseaawrckh ipnrgo fvoerd w caoyns ttroo vheirts iSaelr.b Hfiee lwdeads
1 U. forces in Kosovo, believing that their
destruction would convince the enemy
to end the conflict. He considered the
mission proved to be controversial there was no planning for a land com- ground forces a center of gravity for
among senior U.S. military officers. In ponent. This shortfall strongly influ- Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic. More-
addition, operations revealed major enced subsequent operations. over, he felt the political pressure for
failures in the integration of ground Although the initial mission was to results. Initial air attacks had done lit-
and air forces. take out the Serbian air defense system, tle to either damage Serb forces or halt
This article reviews the background air operations included provisions for ethnic cleansing.
leading to the decision to launch Task attacks on ground forces as well as fixed Where Clark saw benefits, JCS
infrastructure targets. Planners found risks. They immediately raised
while NATO had months to prepare realized at the outset that it objections. Critics cited such issues as
would be hard to locate and possible Serb attacks against the
for air operations, the timeline for
hit Yugoslav ground troops op- AH–64s’ operating base, low altitude
Task Force Hawk was constrained erating inside Kosovo where air defenses in Kosovo, and the dis-
regular army and police forces persed nature of ground targets. The
Force Hawk, its deployment, miscon- were conducting operations against the whole issue appeared moot when
ceptions regarding its speed of arrival, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Serbian Macedonia refused permission to
and the operational difficulties that conventional units were employed in mount offensive NATO operations
confronted the joint force. company- and battalion-sized battle from its territory. Army planners in
groups so forces could spread through- Germany learned the mission would
A Rumor of War
out the province and rapidly move to probably be cancelled on the Friday
Preparations for a campaign support the police. These tactics and before Easter.
against Yugoslavia started in summer the forested, hilly terrain produced a The situation changed over the
1998. With conditions in the province dispersed and nearly invisible enemy weekend. Albania agreed to accept
of Kosovo steadily deteriorating, mili- with long experience in small unit, ground forces. The President was per-
tary planning was conducted within combined arms operations. suaded at the same time to authorize
both NATO and U.S.-only channels. While NATO had months to pre- the mission despite strong JCS objec-
Planning was significantly constrained pare for air operations, the timeline for tions. On April 3, he decided to deploy
because few Alliance members per- Task Force Hawk was constrained. Task Force Hawk.
Russell J. Koste) csAtemaikveeer dii ncta hKnao t nstoohvreo y.N hIAnaT dpO av riltteiacalu dileanrrt,se hrneiespitt sh faaert- Atmhraamnt ydG eper nlianenr anCle hrWise efi,sn lE eEuyu roCroplaperaekn ,f iCUrsoStAm l,e maCraonnmedd-, On tThhee F nlyew base profoundly im-
mpany ( vinotreegdr autseidn gjo ginrotu onpde rfaotricoens. aWs phailret ofafi ralny wtearss icno Knosisdoevroin agt ua spinlagn natintagc kex herecliisceo pat- pthaec teadb spelnacnen oinf gU a.nS.d oorp eNrAatTioOn su.n Gitisv einn
Co
Signal eolpaebdo rtahtreo auigrh a ttthaec ke aorplyti ownins twere roef d1e9v9e9l-, Aotlbhaenri as utpop porrotv, idthe ef osriczee porfo ttehceti ofonr coer
55t
Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 53
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(cid:2)
JFQ FORUM
and placed under the operational con-
AH–64s near Tirana.
trol of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil,
commanded by Admiral James Ellis.
These dates did not compare unfa-
vorably with the expectations of U.S.
and NATO commanders. Task Force
Hawk met its goals despite the public
perception that it was slow to deploy.
The National Security Council set mis-
sion capability for April 23–24. On
April 23, 11 mission-ready AH–64s
were at Rinas and several mission
readiness exercises had been con-
Christina Ann Horne) dgAinourgmnc teaye c dwac.nie dIldnle n Affrtiao rca mtFn,o dtrt hchaeeen dovdeiteeshppwelirpot eoym mioninsethe n oattfp r ha tiahantde--
mpany ( tribuAtend tAop erqilu 4ip DmOenDt fparielussre s.tatement
Signal Co cpolonytrmibeuntet dw taos tshleo wfe. eKlienng ntehtaht tBhaec odne-,
55th Assistant Secretary of Defense for Pub-
lic Affairs, told a reporter, “You’re prob-
ably talking, when you consider the
the total number personnel to 5,100. A transportation challenges, about a week
major portion of the V Corps staff was or so, maybe seven to ten days....” A
deployed to Albania to control opera- formal press release the same day stated
tions. Lieutenant General John Hen- that it would “take up to ten days to
drix, USA, was named to head Task deploy the units,”1implying closure on
Force Hawk. April 14, well before the Clark or Na-
Expanding the size of the force tional Security Council targets. This es-
Koste) was not the only factor affecting de- tablished a false expectation in the
mpany (Russell J. pilainrlmrobiyivotmaeuldsne ntdmot . eh tawTunhemsne atosynfm Ciota–falf1lrl 7ioaasain rdps itenfrrlig ipdg arhaeytts. stRr, iicantnaesdd, mPreedpiOaa narncined g ian mf otohrue nWagte atrh,r et hpeu bplliacn. was for
Air defense position Co
on Albanian border. Signal equipTmraennstp odretps acraterrdy ifnrogm p eRrsaomnsnteeiln a naidr atitotnacakl ahnedli cpooplticeers utnoi tsst roikpee rcaotinnvge nin-
55th base on April 8. Helicopters began de- central and western Kosovo. The tar-
parting six days later. All arrived in Pisa, gets were to be developed by various
Italy, by April 18. They were held there means, including joint reconnaissance
grew dramatically. Small parties dis- several days. The situation at Rinas was systems, Army counterfire radars that
patched by V Corps to determine chaotic. There was limited ramp room were observing artillery and mortar fir-
where to locate the unit recommended for cargo aircraft and torrential rains ing against KLA in western Kosovo,
Rinas airport near Tirana. Other air- had turned the surrounding area into a and Army unmanned aerial vehicles
ports were ruled out because they were lake of mud. Humanitarian relief heli- from Macedonia.
within surface-to-surface fires range of copters landing in open fields had sunk All the missions were planned as
Montenegro. Still, Tirana was close up to their bellies. The attack ships night attacks by groups of four to six
enough to Serbia that the threat of air would have to wait while concrete land- AH–64s, supported by fixed-wing air-
and ground attacks could not be ig- ing pads were constructed. craft strikes and helicopters on standby
nored. This led to further task force ex- The first 11 AH–64s and 20 sup- for rescue in case a ship was shot
pansion. A battalion-sized mechanized port helicopters arrived April 21. The down. Extensive deception missions
task force with M–1 tanks and M–2 in- remaining 24 ships came five days and suppressive fires against air de-
fantry fighting vehicles, additional later. Hendrix declared an initial oper- fense sites were prepared. Lethal sup-
light infantry, an air defense battery, ational capability on April 26. On pressive fires were to come from MLRS
more MLRS, cannon artillery batteries, May 7, Task Force Hawk was declared and artillery units flown to Albania.
and support units was added. Force to be fully ready for deep operations
protection, support units, and com-
mand and control elements increased
54 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02
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Gordon et al.
Task Force Hawk: Helicopter Self-Deployment
V Corps ordered
to deploy Task Force Hawk
Initial operating
to Tirana Self-deployment of
capability declared
First elements AH–64 helicopters
depart Ramstein begins
April 1999 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Helicopter Locations
Giebslstad, Germany 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 6
Ilesheim, Germany 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Le Cannet, France 6
Pisa, Italy 12 24 24 24 24 24 13 12 12 12
Brindisi, Italy 1
Anacona, Italy 1
Naples, Italy 1 1 5
Rinas, AIbania 11 11 11 11 18
AAwwaaiittiinngg
DODD pOrDe sPsr eressle Raseele satsaet:es: ""Ccaallll Ffoorrwwaarrdd""
HHeledl du pu pb y
""Itit w wilill lt taakkee u upp t too t teenn
beBcGa uCsoed yo fb peacrakuisneg
ddaayyss t too d deepploloyy t thhee u unnititss."."
of parakti nRgin aats Rinas
For planning and control, V Corps The Chains that Bind Allied fighters were achieving at least
Deep Operations Coordination Center As with the deployment, Task some effect on enemy forces from
deployed to Albania, developed targets Force Hawk faced a variety of obstacles safer medium altitude attacks, al-
for attack helicopter strikes, and passed once in Kosovo. Overshadowing opera- though post-conflict analysis shows
those to the Combined Air Operations tional challenges was enduring senior that ground forces suffered less dam-
Center (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy. Task level disagreement over the risks versus age than was thought at the time.
Exacerbating the challenge of low
overshadowing operational challenges was disagreement altitude operations by the helicopters
was the fact that the aircraft would
over the risks versus benefits of employing the force
have been limited to several mountain
passes leading from Albania into
Force Hawk maintained close contact benefits of employing the force. Com- Kosovo; they could not fly over the
in Vicenza with the Battlefield Coordi- bined with Belgrade’s capitulation in mountains carrying weapons loads.
nation Element (BCE), a small Army early June, these factors resulted in Therefore, the enemy could concen-
detachment whose role was to negoti- Task Force Hawk never being employed trate its defenses on those ingress and
ate the details of proposed helicopter in direct combat. egress routes.
missions. As plans developed, the de- Authorization to employ the The rules of engagement were so
tachment communicated them to force directly never came for several restrictive that extensive lethal suppres-
CAOC to deconflict airspace, negotiate reasons. The target set in western sive fires were not viable. There was
fixed-wing support, and work out tim- Kosovo consisted of platoon-size great concern for the huge number of
ing. Task Force Hawk submitted mis- forces, dispersed and usually hidden refugees. NATO pilots were required to
sion proposals daily. While the force under trees and in villages. Attack hel- actually see their targets before releas-
prepared for strike operations, it also icopters penetrating at low altitude ing ordnance to confirm that there
developed targets that were passed to would have been exposed to small were no civilians in the target area. The
CAOC for possible fixed-wing strikes. arms fire, antiaircraft guns, and shoul- rules of engagement tightened every
der-fired missiles. Given the extreme time civilian casualties occurred. In the
U.S. and NATO unwillingness to suffer
casualties, the risks were determined
to be too great relative to the payoff.
Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 55
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(cid:2)
JFQ FORUM
case of night attack by helicopters, ex-
UH–60s supporting
tensive lethal suppressive fires would
civil engineering
have been required since low altitude
project.
air defense weapons did not need emit-
ting radars to conduct engagements
and were therefore hard to locate.
Washington’s support for opera-
tions also seems to have eroded as a
result of two crashes involving
AH–64s in Albania during training.
Both crew members were killed in the
second accident.
Meanwhile, Task Force Hawk con-
tinued to target enemy positions. Since
itth ed iedn enmoty ,h tahvees ep leorcmatiisosniosn w teor ee nnogmagie- Steffen)
nated for attack by other air assets. Chris
Hjooiwnet vperr,o dcueed tuor eths et loa cskh oafr per edeaxtiast ionng Squadron (
emerging targets and quickly respond, mera
most targets were struck hours later or Ca
not at all. Restrictive rules of engage- mbat
ment also limited the effectiveness of 1Cost
sensor-to-shooter linkages. The re-
MLRS mission
quirement for eyes on target to mini-
rehearsal at Kcirre,
mize collateral damage frequently Albania.
negated the utility of rapid targeting
data such as that provided by the task
force’s counterfire radars. synergies are preferable to
Despite the fact that the AH–64s single dimension opera- Horne)
were not employed in Kosovo, Task tions. A better joint ap- Ann
Foof rAcell iHeda wFko rccoen. tTrhibeu tleeadd teor sthhipe siunc cBeesls- ptor osaimchil aisr ncoenedtiendg eton crieessp.ond Christina
grade probably viewed it and the While NATO won the mpany (
NATO ground forces in Macedonia as conflict using airpower alone Co
the nucleus of an eventual ground at- and with no combat fatalities, Signal
tack into Kosovo.2 The presence of the joint planning and execution 55th
force also likely reassured Albania that were lacking and better joint
the Alliance was committed to its de- procedures would have helped. No land process needs to be worked out in ad-
fense during a time of extreme crisis component commander was ever desig- vance and well understood.
when tens of thousands of refugees nated. That precluded ground force Better methods to integrate Army
were flooding in from Kosovo. In addi- planning in the event that a land offen- attack helicopters with an air opera-
tion, the task force’s target location sive was ever required. It also added to tion are also needed. Allied Force
and reconnaissance systems, though the difficulties of establishing clean revealed a general lack of understand-
not used to best effect, also assisted in lines of command for the joint task ing about how to employ attack heli-
locating enemy forces. force commander. Additionally, land copters in conjunction with what was
component intelligence with its expert- primarily an air offensive, resulting in
For the Future
ise in enemy land force tactics could a lost opportunity to expand the
Operation Allied Force provides have facilitated strike operations. means of attack. Planners should con-
many lessons for joint operations. It Similarly, joint procedures for tar- sider how Army attack helicopters and
was an operation with strictly limited get coordination were slow to evolve. missiles can be employed in the initial
objectives and significant political There was a general lack of familiarity phase of a joint campaign before
constraints. Tomorrow’s joint opera- among the components as to how to ground forces arrive.
tions will present similar challenges. integrate and deconflict target requests. Campaign plans should also be as
It is thus possible that, due to politi- The BCE located at CAOC did not nor- multidimensional as possible. Execu-
cal realities, future operations will be mally work with corps-level headquar- tion will be compromised when there
air-only—despite the fact that air-land ters, and Air Force and Navy personnel are no air-land synergies on the opera-
there were unfamiliar with Army proce- tional level. Neither the United States
dures. The joint targeting coordination
56 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02
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Gordon et al.
consequences of adopting a lesser
Redeploying M–1 tank.
strategy. Key combat synergies derived
from joint air-ground operations and
the compelling force they can exert
on enemies were not realized. Allied
Force was a combined air campaign
that never had the benefit of a truly
joint command. Establishing such a
command would have helped the
overall effort. Ground intelligence an-
alysts would have brought their spe-
cial expertise to the identification of
targets in Kosovo, possibly improving
the effectiveness of the air campaign
Steffen) ajogianint sht eSaedrqb ufaorrtceerss. wAboouvlde halal,v ea bfuelelny
Cris better able to integrate Task Force
1Combat Camera Squadron (st Camera Squadron (Chris Steffen) HtAipoNaru1wiOlDs k 4Tge,,fr Eeo1nSn9uo9snt9e d, tL aooinn pdmke r,“e aUDnt.iSOto.i nDoAsn t.nt aemcwk osH rbeelr iicaeomfpitnJbeFgQris-,
mbat and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems to De-
Co ploy in Support of Operation Allied Force,”
1st DOD press release no. 145–99, April 4,
1999; DOD news briefing, April 4, 1999,
Kenneth H. Bacon, Assistant Secretary of
nor NATO was willing to consider a limited firepower, ground mobility, and Defense for Public Affairs.
Horne) ground attack into Kosovo. The practi- protection of light units, casualty- 2Clark states that Task Force Hawk “con-
Ann cal effect was that the enemy could tai- averse decisionmakers would probably veyed a powerful image of a ground threat
ristina lor countermeasures and tactics to min- have been loath to employ them even aSneed Wwoeuslledy h Kav. eC blaerekn, iWts algeiandg cMomodpeornn eWnta.”r
C imize the effects of air attack alone. KLA had there been a willingness to con-
mpany ( duct a ground operation. (SNomewe aYrogruke: tPhuabt ltihc eA tfhfareirast, o2f0 a0 1g)r,o upn. d4 2in5-.
Co the Army should expand ground force On the other hand, the vasion was one of several contributors to
Signal options to improve joint synergies heavy Army forces with Milosovic’s willingness to settle with NATO,
55t their M–1 tanks and M–2 citing Yugoslav precautionary measures
infantry fighting vehicles such as strengthening defensive positions
was such an inadequate ground force would have been severely constrained along possible invasion routes and position-
ing 80,000 mines along the Kosovo border
that police and conventional forces by the terrain. Indeed, Army engineers
with Albania. See Steve Hosmer, Why
could operate in a very dispersed man- in Albania who surveyed routes heavy
Milosovic Decided to Settle When He Did,
ner and still defeat it despite Allied units could have taken from Albanian
MR1351-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001),
command of the air. With no credible ports to the Kosovo border concluded
pp. 109–14.
threat of a ground offensive, there was that weeks of extensive engineering
no need to be concerned with creating would have been needed to shore up
defenses and massing units. Post-con- bridges, repair roads, and make other
flict analysis indicates that the minimal infrastructure improvements. The
damage inflicted on the forces inside Army’s current plans to introduce
Kosovo was largely due to their ability medium units into its force structure,
to disperse in the face of a single-di- as represented by the interim brigade
mensional threat. combat teams and the later Objective
The Army should expand ground Force, are appropriate given the Allied
force options to help improve joint Force experience.
synergies. Essentially two types of
ground units were available for opera- Allied Force demonstrated the
tions in Kosovo, light forces and heavy strategic deficiencies of not taking a
mechanized units. However, given the joint air-land approach to military op-
erations. The political impediments
were real enough, but so were the
Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 57