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TELEOLOGY AND AWARENESS IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THOUGHT by Benjamin Max Manson PDF

193 Pages·2012·7 MB·English
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TELEOLOGY AND AWARENESS IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICAL THOUGHT by Benjamin Max Manson Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia August 2012 © Copyright by Benjamin Max Manson, 2012 DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS The undersigned hereby certify that they have read and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance a thesis entitled “TELEOLOGY AND AWARENESS IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICAL THOUGHT” by Benjamin Max Manson in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Dated: August 20, 2012 Supervisor: _________________________________ Readers: _________________________________ _________________________________ (cid:1) ii(cid:1) DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY DATE: August 20, 2012 AUTHOR: Benjamin Max Manson TITLE: TELEOLOGY AND AWARENESS IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICAL THOUGHT DEPARTMENT OR SCHOOL: Department of Classics DEGREE: MA CONVOCATION: October YEAR: 2012 Permission is herewith granted to Dalhousie University to circulate and to have copied for non-commercial purposes, at its discretion, the above title upon the request of individuals or institutions. I understand that my thesis will be electronically available to the public. The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author’s written permission. The author attests that permission has been obtained for the use of any copyrighted material appearing in the thesis (other than the brief excerpts requiring only proper acknowledgement in scholarly writing), and that all such use is clearly acknowledged. _______________________________ Signature of Author (cid:1) iii(cid:1) for e.g.h. (cid:1) iv(cid:1) Table of Contents Abstract……………………………………………….……………………. vii List of Abbreviations Used…………………………………….……….….. viii Acknowledgment……………………………………………………….….. ix Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 - Introduction to the Problem and a Survey of Previous Views…….......1 1.2 - Some Points About Aristotle’s Critique of Plato………………...……14 1.3 - Teleology, Function and Awareness………………………….….…... 24 Chapter 2: Ethical Principles and Moral Education 2. - Introduction……………….…………………………….………….......... 33 2.1 - The Participation of Moral Virtue in Phronêsis 2.1.1 - Moral Virtue and the Law……….………………..……....... 39 2.1.2 - Moral Virtue for the Sake of Phronêsis…….…………......... 53 2.1.3 - The “Orthos Logos” and the “Horos”…….………..….….....71 2.2 - Ethical Principles, Moral Education and the Three Lives 2.2.1 - Wish, Character, and the Appearance of the Good…….........84 2.2.2 - States of Character as Dispositions to Learn………….…..... 105 Chapter 3: Phronêsis as a Science and the Practical Syllogism 3. – Introduction………………………………………………….………… 115 3.1 - Deliberative Desire 3.1.1 - Introduction…………………………………….……............119 3.1.2 - The Temporal Standpoint of Animal Practical Cognition….. 130 3.1.3 - The Temporal Standpoint of Human Practical Cognition….. 141 3.1.4 - The Structure of Deliberative Desire……………………….. 147 3.2 - The Practical Syllogism 3.2.1 - Explanatory Reasons……………………………………….. 160 3.2.2 - Phantasia and the Practical Syllogism in the De Anima….... 173 (cid:1) v(cid:1) Chapter 4: Conclusion…………………………………………………. 176 Bibliography…………………………………………………….……. 179 (cid:1) vi(cid:1) Abstract In a famous argument at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that the function and good of the human being is the "actuality of the soul in accordance with virtue". Presenting a view critical of the widespread intellectualist reading of Aristotle's Ethics, in this thesis I argue that the characteristic function of the human being is constitutive of a distinctly human life as a dynamic formal cause teleologically operative in human awareness. I argue for the validity of my own view in a preliminary way in the introduction by way of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic forms. In the second chapter, I argue that the processes of the non-rational part of the soul are acquired and actively operate once acquired independently of singular dictates of active reason within the individual. By this I mean that the virtues do not obey reason in the sense that they receive individual commands from discursive reason to desire or feel in certain ways. Rather, although the moral virtues are formed gradually by repeated acts of choice, as affective states, they are activated by being affected from without by external stimuli. These external stimuli produce impulses in the soul which are conducive to virtuous action, including a cognitive element: primarily, non-rational and non-discursive evaluative judgments of phantasia, which supply a human agent immediately with the ends of his action and the beginning-points of deliberation. These judgments are the awareness of sensible particulars as pleasant. In the third chapter, I turn to the De Anima in order to illuminate the cognitive conditions of human praxis. Following on the arguments contained in the second chapter, I argue that there are two primary cognitive moments which are necessary conditions of action. While the ends of desire are immediate objects of awareness and move humans as unmoved movers, motivational desires, which move as efficient causes, are initiated by a distinct cognitive power: proclamations to pursue or avoid. (cid:1) vii(cid:1) List of Abbreviations Used Works of Aristotle Pol. Politics Phys. Physics Meta. Metaphysics Mem. On Memory and Recollection DA On the Soul (De Anima) EE Eudemian Ethics NE Nicomachean Ethics APo. Posterior Analytics De Inter. On Interpretation (De Interpretatione) Works of Plato Men. Meno Rep. Republic (cid:1) viii(cid:1) Acknowledgments There are a great number of people whom I must thank, without whose help I would not have been able to complete this project. For their generous financial support, I thank both the Killam Trusts and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. My parents have always encouraged me to pursue those things most important to me, have endowed me with a spirit of independence and a love of argument, and have taught me never to fear that my aspirations might drive me into unconventional territories. I am thankful for Emma Hassall, for her patience and understanding when I had to return to New York for two months this summer to work on this thesis, but more especially for all the support which she has given me over the years in keeping my head above water amidst all the turbulence of day-to-day life. My close friends Evan King and Jacob Singer have, in the many years that I have known and lived with them, provided countless hours of conversation about philosophy (and much more!) which have brought me much joy. Bryan Heystee has been there since the beginning and Daniel Watson was there urging me on at the finishing line, offering much perceptive guidance along the way. Donna Edwards has assisted me and brought order to my university life, I am sure, in more ways than I will ever know. My teachers, Dennis House, Sarah Cohen, Peter O'Brien, Leona MacLeod, Thom Curran, and Neil Robertson, have left lasting impressions on me. I am grateful for Michael Fournier's helpful comments on this thesis. Of my teachers, there are two who require special recognition. First, my supervisor Eli Diamond has been abundantly generous with his time and care ever since I first became his student. I am particularly grateful to have had the privilege of participating in his graduate seminar on the De Anima in 2008/2009, where I was first introduced to Aristotle, as well as for his concerted effort in assisting me over the course of the past four years, especially during the past two months. Second, Wayne Hankey has not only taught me in the seminars which have been the cornerstone of my education, but also, on several pivotal occasions, he has offered me personal guidance and compassion, without which I would not now have the opportunity to acknowledge those who have helped me. I am most appreciative for the high standard to which I have been held by my teachers from the very beginning of my time as a student in Halifax, and I can imagine few blessings greater than if, in Aristotelian fashion, it were permanently ingrained into my character. (cid:1) ix(cid:1) τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς μή τι μάτην δόξῃς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφηναμένοις ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει σύμμαχος ἐκείνοις. -Plato, Philebus (30d) Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 – Introduction to the Problem and a Survey of Previous Views While in our own day it is assumed by many that the Aristotelian writings which have come down to us amount to lecture notes of some kind, compiled and organized into distinct treatises by Aristotle’s successors in the Peripatos in an effort to clarify and preserve for posterity the teachings of their master shortly after his death, none of the principal texts of the corpus evokes the genre of lecture as explicitly as the Nicomachean Ethics. Of the several passages which suggest that the work was at some point presented as a lecture, perhaps the most significant is a passage early in the treatise, where Aristotle delineates which traits a person must possess in order to be admitted as a student of practical philosophy.1 The Greek word which Aristotle uses for student in this context is, revealingly, “akroates” (ἀκροατής), which means “hearer”. There are several conditions which a prospective student must meet before he can attend lectures on political and ethical matters. In order to take part, a student must: (1) have acquired a well-rounded and broad education, with the result that he possesses good judgment (κρινεῖν) and understands what level of exactness should be expected from the inquiries into ethical matters, given the science to which such questions belong, (2) he must have acquired a certain level of experience, because the content of ethical reflection is drawn from the lived experience of practical situations, (3) he must have lived for long enough to reach (cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1) 1 NE 1.3.1094b30-1095a13, NE 1.4.1095a31-1095b13 (cid:1) 1(cid:1)

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Graduate Studies for acceptance a thesis entitled “TELEOLOGY AND of D.J. Allan.34 The hinge upon which swings the difference between the
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