Frederick Copleston A History of Philosophy

314 Pages·2006·1.31 MB·English

Frederick Copleston
A History of
Philosophy
VOLUME IV
Descartes to Leibniz
DE LICENTIA SUPERIORUM ORDINIS:
J. D. Boyle, S.J., Praep. Prov. Angliae
NIHIL OBSTAT:
J. L. Russell, S.J. Censor Deputatus
IMPRIMATUR:
Franciscus, Archiepiscopus Birmingamiensis
Birmingamiae die 25 Julii 1957
CONTENTS
PREFACE

I. INTRODUCTION
Continuity and novelty: the early phase of modern philosophy in its relation to
mediaeval and Renaissance thought — Continental rationalism: its nature, its relation
to scepticism and to neo-Stoicism, its development — British empiricism: its nature
and its development — The seventeenth century — The eighteenth century —
Political philosophy — The rise of the philosophy of history — Immanuel Kant.

II. DESCARTES (1)
Life and works — Descartes’ aim — His idea of method — The theory of innate

ideas — Methodic doubt.

III. DESCARTES (2)
Cogito, ergo sum — Thinking and the thinker — The criterion of truth — The
existence of God — The accusation of a vicious circle — The explanation of error —
The certainty of mathematics — The ontological argument for God’s existence.

IV. DESCARTES (3)
The existence of bodies — Substances and their princicipal attributes — The relation

between mind and body.

V. DESCARTES (4)
The qualities of bodies — Descartes and the dogma of transubstantiation — Space
and place — Motion — Duration and time — The origin of motion — The laws of
motion — The divine activity in the world — Living bodies.

VI. DESCARTES (5)
Man’s awareness of freedom — Freedom and God — Provisional ethics and moral
science — The passions and their control — The nature of the good — Comments on
Descartes’ ethical ideas — General remarks about Descartes.

VII. PASCAL
Life and spirit of Pascal — The geometrical method, its scope and limits — ‘The
heart’ — Pascal’s method in apologetics — The wretchedness and the greatness of
man — The wager-argument — Pascal as a philosopher.

VIII. CARTESIANISM
The spread of Cartesianism — Geulincx and the problem of interaction.

IX. MALEBRANCHE
Life and writings — The senses, the imagination, the understanding; avoidance of
error and attainment of truth — God as the only true cause — Human liberty — The
vision of eternal truths in God — Empirical knowledge of the soul — Knowledge of

other minds and of the existence of bodies — God’s existence and attributes —
Malebranche in relation to Spinoza, Descartes and Berkeley — The influence of
Malebranche.

X. SPINOZA (1)
Life — Works — The geometrical method — The influence of other philosophies on

Spinoza’s thought — Interpretations of Spinoza’s philosophy.

XI. SPINOZA (2)
Substance and its attributes — Infinite modes — The production of finite modes —

Mind and body — The elimination of final causality.

XII. SPINOZA (3)
Spinoza’s levels or degrees of knowledge — Confused experience; universal ideas;

falsity — Scientific knowledge — Intuitive knowledge.

XIII. SPINOZA (4)
Spinoza’s intention in his account of human emotions and conduct — The conatus;
pleasure and pain — The derived emotions — Passive and active emotions —

Servitude and freedom — The intellectual love of God — The ‘eternity’ of the human
mind — An inconsistency in Spinoza’s ethics.

XIV. SPINOZA (5)
Natural right — The foundation of political society — Sovereignty and government
— Relations between States — Freedom and toleration — Spinoza’s influence and
different estimates of his philosophy.
XV. LEIBNIZ (1)
Life — The De arte combinatoria and the idea of harmony — Writings — Different

interpretations of Leibniz’s thought.

XVI. LEIBNIZ (2)
The distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact — Truths of reason or
necessary propositions — Truths of fact or contingent propositions — The principle

of perfection — Substance — The identity of indiscernibles — The law of continuity
— The ‘panlogism’ of Leibniz.

XVII. LEIBNIZ (3)
Simple substances or monads — Entelechies and prime matter — Extension — Body
and corporeal substance — Space and time — The pre-established harmony —
Perception and appetite — Soul and body — Innate ideas.

XVIII. LEIBNIZ (4)
The ontological argument — The argument to God’s existence from eternal truths —
The argument from truths of fact — The argument from the pre-established harmony
— The problem of evil—Progress and history.

APPENDIX: A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTES

INDEX
PREFACE
At the end of Volume III of this History of Philosophy I expressed the
hope of covering the period from Descartes up to and including Kant in
the fourth volume. I meant, of course, that I hoped to discuss the whole of
this part of modern philosophy in one book. This hope, however, has not
been fulfilled. I have found myself compelled to devote three books to the
period in question. And for the sake of convenience I have made each of
these three books a separate volume. Volume IV, Descartes to Leibniz,
deals with the great rationalist systems of philosophy on the Continent in
the pre-Kantian period. In Volume V, Hobbes to Hume, I discuss the
development of British philosophy from Hobbes up to and including the
Scottish philosophy of common sense. In Volume VI, Wolff to Kant, I
shall treat of the French Enlightenment and of Rousseau, of the German
Enlightenment, of the rise of the philosophy of history from Vico to
Herder, and finally of the system of Immanuel Kant, The title, Wolff to
Kant, is certainly not ideal; but in view of the fact that in his pre-critical
days Kant stood in the Wolffian tradition there is at least something to be
said in its favour, whereas a title such as Voltaire to Kant would be
extremely odd.
As in former volumes, I have divided the matter according to
philosophers, rather than by following out the development of first one
and then another philosophical problem. Furthermore, I have treated some
philosophers at considerable length. And though I think that division of
the matter according to philosophers is the most convenient division for
the readers whom I have principally in mind, this method certainly has its
disadvantages. Faced by a number of different thinkers and by more or
less detailed descriptions of their ideas, the reader may fail to grasp the
general picture. Further, though I think that the old division into
continental rationalism and British empiricism is justified, provided that a
number of qualifications are added, a rigid adherence to this scheme is apt
to give the impression that continental philosophy and British philosophy
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries moved on two sets of parallel
straight lines, each developing in entire independence of the other. And
this is an erroneous impression. Descartes exercised a modest influence
on British thought; Berkeley was influenced by Malebranche; Spinoza’s
political ideas owed something to Hobbes; and the philosophy of Locke,
who wrote in the seventeenth century, exercised a great influence on the
thought of the French Enlightenment in the eighteenth century.
As a partial remedy for the disadvantages attending the method of
division which I have chosen I decided to write an introductory chapter
designed to give the reader a general picture of the philosophy of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It thus covers the matter discussed
in Volumes IV, V and VI, which, as I have said, I originally hoped to deal
with in one volume. I have, of course, placed this introduction at the
beginning of Volume IV; and there will therefore be no introductory
chapters in Volumes V and VI. A descriptive introduction of this sort
inevitably involves a good deal of repetition. That is to say, ideas which
are discussed in later chapters at greater length and in more detail are
roughly outlined in the introduction. None the less, I consider that the
advantages to be gained by including a general descriptive introduction
greatly outweigh the accompanying disadvantages.
At the end of each of the three previous volumes I have added a
‘Concluding Review’. But just as the introduction covers the matter dealt
with in Volumes IV, V and VI, so will the Concluding Review. It will
therefore be placed at the end of Volume VI, that is, after the exposition
of Kant’s philosophy. In the course of this Concluding Review I propose
to discuss, not only from an historical but also from a more philosophical
point of view, the nature, importance and value of the various styles of
philosophizing of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I think that it
is better to reserve such discussion until after the historical exposition of
the thought of the period than to interrupt this exposition with general
philosophical reflections.
Finally a word about references. References such as ‘Vol. II, ch. XL’
or ‘See vol. III, pp. 135-9’ refer to this History of Philosophy, Image
Books Edition. As for references to the writings of the philosophers with
whom I deal, I have tried to give these in a form which will be of use to
the student who wishes to look them up. Some historians and expositors
have the practice of giving references according to volume and page of
the recognized critical edition, when such exists, of the writings of the
philosopher in question. But I am doubtful of the wisdom of adhering
exclusively to this practice in a volume such as the present. In the
chapters on Descartes, for example, I have indeed cited the volume and
page of the Adam-Tannery edition; but I have also given references,
where feasible, according to chapter and section or part and section of the
work in question. The number of people who have easy access to the
Adam-Tannery edition is extremely limited, just as few people possess the
recent splendid critical edition of Berkeley. But cheap editions of the
more important writings of the leading philosophers are easily obtainable;
and in my opinion references should be given with a view to the
convenience of students who possess such editions rather than to that of
the few who possess or have access to the recognized critical editions.
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
Continuity and novelty: the early phase of modern philosophy
in its relation to mediaeval and Renaissance thought —
Continental rationalism: its nature, its relation to scepticism
and to neo-Stoicism, its development — British empiricism: its
nature and its development — The seventeenth century — The
eighteenth century — Political philosophy — The rise of the
philosophy of history — Immanuel Kant.
1. Modern philosophy is generally said to have begun with Descartes
(1596-1650) or with Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in England and with
Descartes in France. It is not perhaps immediately evident with what
justification the term ‘modern’ is applied to the thought of the seventeenth
century. But its use clearly implies that there is a break between
mediaeval and post-mediaeval philosophy and that each possesses
important characteristics which the other does not possess. And the
seventeenth-century philosophers were certainly convinced that there was
a sharp division between the old philosophical traditions and what they
themselves were trying to do. Men like Francis Bacon and Descartes were
thoroughly persuaded that they were making a new start.
If for a long time the views of Renaissance and post-Renaissance
philosophers were accepted at their face value, this was partly due to a
conviction that in the Middle Ages there was really nothing which merited
the name of philosophy. The flame of independent and creative
philosophical reflection which had burned so brightly in ancient Greece
was practically extinguished until it was revived at the Renaissance and
rose in splendour in the seventeenth century.
But when at last more attention came to be paid to mediaeval
philosophy, it was seen that this view was exaggerated. And some writers
emphasized the continuity between mediaeval and post-mediaeval
thought. That phenomena of continuity can be observed in the political
and social spheres is obvious enough. The patterns of society and of
political organization in the seventeenth century clearly did not spring
into being without any historical antecedents. We can observe, for
instance, the gradual formation of the various national States, the
emergence of the great monarchies and the growth of the middle class.
Even in the field of science the discontinuity is not quite so great as was
once supposed. Recent research has shown the existence of a limited
interest in empirical science within the mediaeval period itself. And
attention was drawn in the third volume of this History to the wider
1
implications of the impetus theory of motion as presented by certain
fourteenth-century physicists. Similarly, a certain continuity can be
observed within the philosophical sphere. We can see philosophy in the
Middle Ages gradually winning recognition as a separate branch of study.
And we can see lines of thought emerging which anticipate later
philosophical developments. For example, the characteristic philosophical
movement of the fourteenth century, generally known as the nominalist
movement, anticipated later empiricism in several important respects.
2
Again, the speculative philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, with its
3
anticipations of some theses of Leibniz, forms a link between mediaeval,
Renaissance and pre-Kantian modern thought. Again, scholars have
shown that thinkers such as Francis Bacon, Descartes and Locke were
subject to the influence of the past to a greater degree than they
themselves realized.
This emphasis on continuity was doubtless needed as a corrective to a
too facile acceptance of the claims to novelty advanced by Renaissance
and seventeenth-century philosophers. It expresses an understanding of
the fact that there was such a thing as mediaeval philosophy and a
recognition of its position as an integral part of European philosophy in
general. At the same time, if discontinuity can be overemphasized, so can
continuity. If we compare the patterns of social and political life in the
thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, obvious differences in the structure
of society at once strike the eye. Again, though the historical factors
which contributed to the occurrence of the Reformation can be traced, the
Reformation was none the less in some sense an explosion, shattering the
religious unity of mediaeval Christendom. And even though the seeds of
later science can be discovered in the intellectual soil of mediaeval
Europe, the results of research have not been such as to necessitate any
substantial change of view about the importance of Renaissance science.
Similarly, when all that can legitimately be said to illustrate the continuity
between mediaeval and post-mediaeval philosophy has been said, it
remains true that there were considerable differences between them. For
the matter of that, though Descartes was undoubtedly influenced by
Scholastic ways of thought, he himself pointed out that the use of terms
taken from Scholastic philosophy did not necessarily mean that the terms
were being used in the same senses in which they had been used by the
Scholastics. And though Locke was influenced in his theory of natural
law by Hooker, who had himself been influenced by mediaeval thought,
4
the Lockean idea of natural law is not precisely the same as that of St.
Thomas Aquinas.
We can, of course, become the slaves of words or labels. That is to say,
because we divide history into periods, we may tend to lose sight of
continuity and of gradual transitions, especially when we are looking at
historical events from a great distance in time. But this does not mean that
it is altogether improper to speak of historical periods or that no major
changes take place.
And if the general cultural situation of the post-Renaissance world was
in important respects different from that of the mediaeval world, it is only
natural that the changes should have been reflected in philosophic
thought. At the same time, just as changes in the social and political
spheres, even when they seem to have been more or less abrupt,
presupposed an already existing situation out of which they developed, so
also new attitudes and aims and ways of thought in the field of philosophy
presupposed an already existing situation with which they were in some
degree linked. In other words, we are not faced with a simple choice
between two sharply contrasted alternatives, the assertion of discontinuity
and the assertion of continuity. Both elements have to be taken into
account. There are change and novelty; but change is not creation out of
nothing.
The situation, therefore, seems to be this. The old emphasis on
discontinuity was largely due to failure to recognize that there was in the
Middle Ages any philosophy worthy of the name. Subsequent recognition
of the existence and importance of mediaeval philosophy produced an
emphasis on continuity. But we now see that what is required is an
attempt to illustrate both the elements of continuity and the peculiar
characteristics of different periods. And what is true in regard to our
consideration of different periods is true also, of course, in regard to
different individual thinkers. Historians are beset by the temptation to
depict the thought of one period as simply a preparatory stage for the
thought of the next period, and the system of one thinker as no more than
a stepping-stone to the system of another thinker. The temptation is,
indeed, inevitable; for the historian contemplates a temporal succession of
events, not an eternal and immutable reality. Moreover, there is an
obvious sense in which mediaeval thought prepared the way for post-
mediaeval thought; and there is plenty of ground for looking on
Berkeley’s philosophy as a stepping-stone between the philosophies of
Lock and Hume But if one succumbs entirely to this temptation, one
misses a great deal. Berkeley’s philosophy is much more than a mere
stage in the development of empiricism from Locke to Hume; and
mediaeval thought has its own characteristics.
Among the easily discernible differences between mediaeval and post-
mediaeval philosophy there is a striking difference in forms of literary
expression. For one thing, whereas the mediaevals wrote in Latin, in the
post-mediaeval period we find an increasing use of the vernacular. It
would not, indeed, be true to say that no use was made of Latin in the pre-
Kantian modern period. Both Francis Bacon and Descartes wrote in Latin
as well as in the vernacular. So too did Hobbes. And Spinoza composed
his works in Latin. But Locke wrote in English, and in the eighteenth
century we find a common use of the vernacular. Hume wrote in English,
Voltaire and Rousseau in French, Kant in German. For another thing,
whereas the mediaevals were much given to the practice of writing
commentaries on certain standard works, the post-mediaeval
philosophers, whether they wrote in Latin or in the vernacular, composed
original treatises in which the commentary-form was abandoned. I do not
mean to imply that the mediaevals wrote only commentaries; for this
would be quite untrue. At the same time commentaries on the Sentences
of Peter Lombard and on the works of Aristotle and others were
5
characteristic features of mediaeval philosophical composition, whereas
when we think of the writings of seventeenth-century philosophers we
think of free treatises, not of commentaries.
The growing use of the vernacular in philosophical writing
accompanied, of course, its growing use in other literary fields. And we
can associate this with general cultural, political and social changes and
developments. But we can also see in it a symptom of the emergence of
philosophy from the confines of the Schools. The mediaeval philosophers
were for the most part university professors, engaged in teaching. They
wrote commentaries on the standard texts in use at the universities, and
they wrote in the language of the learned, academic world. The modern
philosophers in the pre-Kantian period, on the contrary, were in the
majority of cases unconnected with the work of academic teaching.
Descartes was never a university professor. Nor was Spinoza, though he
received an invitation to Heidelberg. And Leibniz was very much a man
of affairs who refused a professorship because he had quite another kind
of life in view. In England Locke held minor posts in the service of the
State; Berkeley was a bishop; and though Hume attempted to secure a
university chair, he did not succeed in doing so. As for the French
philosophers of the eighteenth century, such as Voltaire, Diderot and
Rousseau, they were obviously men of letters with philosophical interests.
Philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a matter of
common interest and concern among the educated and cultured classes;
and it is only natural that the use of the vernacular should have replaced
the use of Latin in writings designed for a wide public. As Hegel remarks,
it is only when we come to Kant that we find philosophy becoming so
technical and abstruse that it could no longer be considered to belong to
the general education of a cultured man. And by that time the use of Latin
had, of course, practically died out.
In other words, the original and creative philosophy of the early
modern period developed outside the universities. It was the creation of
fresh and original minds, not of traditionalists. And this is one reason, of
course, why philosophical writing took the form of independent treatises,
not of commentaries. For the writers were concerned with developing
their own ideas, free from regard for the great names of the past and for
the opinions of Greek and mediaeval thinkers.
To say, however, that in the pre-Kantian period of modern philosophy
the vernacular came to be employed in place of Latin, that independent
treatises were written rather than commentaries, and that the leading
philosophers of the period were not university professors, does not do
very much to elucidate the intrinsic differences between mediaeval and