Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4–17 July 1943

639 Pages·2010·18.91 MB·English

by  Mark Healy

Zitadelle
Zitadelle
THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST
THE KURSK SALIENT 4–17 JULY 1943
M H
ARK EALY
For Eileen and Ron,
For their many kindnesses over the years.

First published 2008
This paperback edition published 2010
by Spellmount, The History Press Ltd
The Mill, Brimscombe Port
Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QG
www.thehistorypress.co.uk
This ebook edition first published in 2016
All rights reserved
© Mark Healy, 2008, 2010
The right of Mark Healy to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the
Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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Aircraft profile on page 11 of the colour section, below, courtesy of Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK, from
Jagdgeschwader 52: The Experten, John Weal (Aviation Elite Units 15)
EPUB ISBN 978 0 7509 7957 3
Typesetting and origination by The History Press Ltd.
eBook converted by Geethik Technologies
CONTENTS
Introduction
Acknowledgements
Chronology
Maps
PART ONE: WHY KURSK?
1 The Führer and the Field Marshal
2 What is to be Done?
3 The Case for a Mobile Strategy – Manstein’s Backhand Option
4 The Führer’s Agenda
5 Enter Zeitzler
6 Operational Orders Numbers 5 and 6
7 The View from the Kremlin
8 The Role of Enigma and Lucy
9 The Decision and the Plan
10 The ‘Citadel’
11 Air Power and the Role of the Partisans
12 ‘Know Thine Enemy’
13 Delay After Delay …
14 … After Delay
15 The German Plan
16 The Role of the Luftwaffe
PART TWO: THE ARMIES
17 A ‘New’ Red Army
18 Soviet Industry and Lend-Lease
19 The Ostheer on the Eve of Zitadelle
20 The Waffen SS at Kursk
PART THREE: CHARIOTS OF FIRE – THE TANKS AT KURSK
21 A Neglected and Much Abused Instrument
22 December 1942 – The State of Panzer and AFV Production
23 ‘I Need You’ – the Return of Guderian
24 The ‘Wonder Weapons’
25 The Workhorses
26 Armour and Firepower
27 Tank Design, Crew Proficiency and Training
28 Tactics, Terrain and Weather
PART FOUR: THE BATTLE OF KURSK: 4 JULY – 11 JULY 1943
29 The Overture: Thursday 1 – Sunday 4 July 1943
30 The Offensive Begins: Monday 5 July – Army Group South
31 Monday 5 July – Army Group Centre, Ninth Army
32 Tuesday 6 July – Army Group South
33 Wednesday 7 July
34 Thursday 8 July – 4th Panzer Army
35 Thursday 8, Friday 9 and Saturday 10 July – Ninth Army
36 Friday 9 and Saturday 10 July – 4th Panzer Army
37 Why Prokhorovka? A Misinterpretation
38 10 July – SS Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps
39 Sunday 11 July – Headquarters: Army Detachment Kempf
40 Sunday 11 July – 4th Panzer Army, Voronezh Front and 48th Panzer
Corps
PART FIVE: THE BATTLE FOR PROKHOROVKA 12–17 JULY:
‘SPECTACLE WITHOUT PROFIT’
41 Monday 12 July – The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka
42 Monday 12 July – From the Railway Embankment Southward through to
Belenikhino
43 Monday 12 July – North of the Psel and East of the Donets
44 The Real Tank Losses
45 Tuesday 13 July – 5th Guards Tank Army, SS Panzer Corps and III Panzer
Corps
46 10–14 July – The view from Rastenburg
47 14–17 July – ‘Operation Roland’
PART SIX: CONCLUSION
48 Costs and Consequences
PART SEVEN
Appendix 1 German Army Order of Battle
Appendix 2 Soviet Army Order of Battle
Appendix 3 German and Soviet Aircraft
Appendix 4 German and Soviet Tank Types
Appendix 5 Other Weaponry
Bibliography
INTRODUCTION
T his is the second book I have written on the Battle of Kursk. The first,
published in 1992 and still in print, reflected the state of knowledge
available at the time. It therefore contains errors of fact and interpretation. Much
in the way of new information has become available since and this has led to the
publication of a number of titles addressing this great clash between the Ostheer
and the Red Army in the summer of 1943. This has permitted a far more
accurate picture of the antecedents of this battle, and of its course and
importance, to be offered to the reading public.
A number of these texts are of significance. Published in 1999 was the Battle
of Kursk by Col David Glantz and Jonathan House. In this work, the authors
chose to address the subject mainly from the Soviet perspective and this
benefited from the immense knowledge and expertise of the former deriving
from his many years of unprecedented access to, and study of, the archives of the
Red Army. Another book, by Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson published
in 2000, offers a remarkable statistical analysis of the battle and is unlikely to be
surpassed in the manner of its treatment of the subject. Of great importance also,
is that by Professor Steven Newton who has re-translated and provided his own
critical commentary of the almost forgotten documentation commissioned by the
US Army after the war from senior Wehrmacht staff who directly participated in
or were otherwise involved in the Kursk offensive. His book serves to bring
clarification to a number of still controversial aspects of the battle. All of these
books are deserving of serious study.
Coming from a different perspective are the remarkable text and photo books
published by J.J.Fedorowicz Publishing in Canada. This company specialises in
unit histories of the German Army and the Waffen SS. They have released a
number of publications concerning Zitadelle, the most significant being the two-
volume set by J.Restayn and N.Moller. Products of many years of research, these
two volumes address operations in the north and south of the salient
respectively. They contain a large number of new photographs and present an
unforgettable image of the scale of the battle. In addition, RZM publishers have
released a six-volume photo coverage of the battle employing recently
discovered film taken by PK cameraman who operated with II SS Panzer Corps
during the battle. Given the frequency with which new pictures are still being
discovered in private archives in Germany, it makes one wonder how many
Wehrmacht servicemen did not take a Leica camera to war with them!
So, given the number of recent texts published on the subject of Kursk, why
another? In the first instance, Kursk is an evergreen subject and thus generates a
seemingly inexhaustible fascination. This stems primarily from its perceived
status as the ‘greatest tank battle’ in history, the head-on clash of the II SS
Panzer Corps and 5th Guards Tank Army in the fields around Prokhorovka on
12 July 1943 having acquired an almost mythic reputation. As with all myths,
the reality is somewhat less grandiose but no less dramatic for the re-telling.
However, what in particular has motivated me is the question that has always
nagged whenever I have considered this battle: why did the Germans bother?
This was especially so, as by the time Zitadelle was finally launched in early
July, what had been deemed in March to be the essential pre-condition for its
success – that it be launched at the earliest opportunity after the ground was ‘dry
in the spring’ – had long since fallen by the wayside. Indeed, why did the
Germans persist with an operation that, ‘like topsy’, had grown and grown with
scarce military assets committed to it, and when professional military opinion
was being expressed that the possibility of a successful outcome was receding
the longer the delay in launching it? I hope I have produced a credible answer
here.
Nor has it traditionally been possible to identify who was responsible for the
delay of the attack date from early May to the beginning of July. In this matter,
the testimony of many of the surviving senior participants is dubious inasmuch
as many employed their memoirs to re-write their role in the planning process
and shift the blame for Zitadelle’s failure on to others. ‘Failure is an orphan’ and
no one wishes to claim parenthood! The traditional scapegoat has always been
General Zeitzler – the Chief of Staff of the Army (OKH). Whilst he was an early
and strong advocate for the offensive, and was responsible, with Hitler, for
formulating Operational Orders 5 and 6 – which provided the primary
documentation for Zitadelle – it is no longer possible to impute to him
responsibility for all that transpired after May 5, 1943.