Yoshida Shigeru and his time

304 Pages·2019·82.258 MB·English

by  Hisahiko Okazaki

Y o sh id a
S h ig e ru
and
His Time
Okazaki Hisahiko
Translated by Noda Makito
Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture
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TRANSLATION NOTE
All Japanese names appearing in this book are written with surname first and given name last. In
addition, all Japanese words and names have been romanized in accordance with the Hepburn
system, and macrons have been applied to indicate long vowels wherever deemed appropriate.
Yoshida Shigeru and His Time
Okazaki Hisahiko. Translated by Noda Makito.
Published by
Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture (JPIC)
2-2-30 Kanda-Jinbocho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0051, Japan
First English edition: March 2019
© 2003 Okazaki Hisahiko, Okazaki Akiko
English translation © 2019 The Japan Publishing Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
All rights reserved
Originally published in Japanese by PHP Institute, Inc., in 2003 under the title Yoshida Shigeru
to sono jidai.
This book is the result of a collaborative effort between the Japan Institute of International
Affairs (JIIA) and Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture (JPIC).
Book design: Miki Kazuhiko, Ampersand Works
Printed in Japan
ISBN 978-4-86658-070-8
https://www.jpic.or.jp/
Contents
CHAPTER
1
How Japan-the-Loser Was Treated
—Unconditional Surrender: The Winners Take All— 11
U.S. Occupation Policies 11
Tragedy in Manchuria 23
Smooth Withdrawal from Mainland China 27
CHAPTER
2
Prince Higashikuni Cabinet and General MacArthur
—Any Humiliation Is Worth Enduring to Maintain the Imperial System— 33
Problem Child with a Promising Future 33
First Hurdle toward Peaceful Surrender 37
Shigemitsu Mamoru’s Persuasion 39
Emperor Pays a Visit to MacArthur +3
Bonner Fellers’ Views on the Emperor System 46
CHAPTER
3
Resurrection of Freedom and Democracy
—Shidehara 's Devotion to Reconstruct and Reform Japan on Its Own Initiative— 51
Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Association 51
Shidehara Kijuro’s Remedial Measures 54
The World’s Most Outstanding Gentlemen 59
Emperor Showa’s Humanity Declaration 65
Reforms Must Be Implemented by the Hand of the Victor 68
CHAPTER
4
Psychology and Logic of the Victors
—Occupation Policy Divided: A Thorough Reform of Japan,
or an Anti-Soviet Strategy?— 73
Some in Japan Maintained Their Self-Respect 73
Realism vs. Idealism 78
Treating Enemies and Friends Equally 83
CHAPTER
5
Shidehara Kijuro’s Agony
—What Did Shidehara and MacArthur Discuss on January 24 ?— 91
Abrupt Issuance of the Purge 91
Shidehara’s Visit to MacArthur 94
Consistency in Shidehara’s Thinking 99
An Unspeakable Promise with MacArthur 102
Dumbfounded Washington 106
CHAPTER
6
Yoshida Shigeru Comes to the Stage
—How a Diplomat with No Distinct Ideology or “Ism ” Became Prime Minister— 109
Hatoyama Ichiro Purged from Public Service 109
Extremely Arrogant and Insolent 112
A Stereotypical British-Style Gentleman Who Values Common Sense 1 IS
Argument for the Central Role of Foreign Ministry in Diplomacy 116
Yoshida’s Manchurian Policy: Departure from Shidehara Diplomacy 119
Pursuing Rainbows: Partnership with Britain and the United States 122
The Substance of the Yoshida Doctrine 12S
Fearless Optimi st 127
CHAPTER
7
The First Yoshida Shigeru Cabinet
—From Addressing the Food Problem and Agrarian Reform
to Promulgation of the New Constitution— j 3 3
The Price of the Prime Ministership 133
Food Crisis and Imperial Properties 134
Conditions to Form a Cabinet Are Now Complete 136
Dreams and Efforts of Agricultural Administrators 139
Diet Deliberation on a New Constitution 142
Forever Renounce War... 146
CHAPTER
8
The Tokyo Trials (1)
—The Worst Hypocrisy in History— 1S 3
Was It a FairTrial? (Willoughby) 153
Winner Judges Loser 157
Punishment by an Ex Post Facto Law 160
The Greatest Defect of the Tokyo Trials 166
About Time to Settle Accounts of the Tokyo Trials 170
CHAPTER
9
The Tokyo Trials (2)
—Insight of the Two Who Squarely Argued Against the Tokyo Trials' Historical View— 173
What Does It Mean to Judge History? 173
Did the Nanjing Incident Really Take Place? 176
We Should Blame the Military for Everything 181
Judge Pal and T5jo Hideki 185
Why Did Japan Have to Choose the War Option? 189
To Speak for Japan and Defend the Emperor 193
CHAPTER
10
Absolute Power of GHQ
—The Deep Scars to the Japanese Mentality— 197
Occupation Administration That Resembled Colonial Rule 197
A Wide-Ranging Purge List 200
Even Ishibashi Tanzan Had to Be Purged 204
Historical Accomplishments of Et5 Jun 207
Censorship Guidelines Include 30 Items 210
A Thorough Reorganization of the Traditional Value System 213
CHAPTER
11
Change of the Tide
—Japan's Shift from a “Sea of Red Flags ” to the Road to Reconstruction— 217
Atmosphere Akin to the Night before a Revolution 219
Conflict of Opinions within GHQ 222
Yoshida’s Strategic Move to Facilitate Longtime Rule 224
The Government Section’s Futile Struggle and the ‘Conspiracy Dissolution” 228
Occupation of Japan Was One Failure after Another 230
Shift in Occupation Policy 234
CHAPTER
12
End of the Occupation
—The Paradox of Rearmamen t— 239
Peace Negotiations Shelved 239
No Rearmament of Japan 244
Paving the Way for a U.S.-Japan Security Pact 245
It Has to Be the Japanese Spontaneous Initiative, No Matter What 248
Obstacles to Be Overcome or Just Excuses? 252
MacArthur’s Dismissal 256
EPILOGUE
The Distorted “History Issue” in Postwar Japan
—Japan’s Self-Generated Masochistic View of History— 261
History of the Anglo-Saxons, the Winners 261
The U.S. and the Ideology of Unconditional Surrender 263
Earlier Occupation Policies Amplified by the Left Wing in Japan 266
In the 1970s, “End of War” Period No Longer 269
Settlement of Japan-Korea-China Historic Issue Is Possible 272
Comfort Women Issue Brought up by the Japanese Side 274
Anti-Government Movement by the Japanese Themselves 278
REFERENCES 280
APPENDIX
Chronological Table of Yoshida Shigeru’s Life and Accomplishments 283
INDEX 295

Chapter
1
How Japan-the-Loser Was Treated
—Unconditional Surrender: The Winners Take All—
U.S. Occupation Policies
On August 15, 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and surren­
dered to the Allies.
It meant a close to a half-century of history for the Empire of Japan
since the days of the First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. End­
ing the war required the extraordinary insights by national leaders, includ­
ing Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro and Emperor Showa, as I wrote in the
final chapter of the previous volume of this series, Shigemitsu/Togo to
Sono Jidai (Shigemitsu, Togo, and Their Time).
Japan had ceased to be an actor that could decide its own destiny. By
that time, Japan had no other option than to entrust its fate to the hands of
the victors.
One may wonder, then, how the Allies, including the United States,
intended to treat Japan. According to diplomatic historian Iokibe Makoto,
The Suzuki Kantaro cabinet and the Harry Truman administration,
two governments bom in April 1945 on opposite sides of the Pacific
[the Suzuki cabinet formed on April 7; Truman succeeded Franklin