Xenophon’s Socrates

187 Pages·1972·8.283 MB·English

by  Leo Strauss

Xenophon’s Socrates
by LEO STRAUSS
Cornell University Press
ITHACA AND LONDON
H <3 7
H
Copyright © 1972 by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this
book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without
permission in writing from the publisher. For information address
Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850.
First published 1972 by Cornell University Press.
Published in the United Kingdom by Cornell University Press Ltd.,
2-4 Brook Street, London WiY iAA.
International Standard Book Number 0-8014-0712-5
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 71-38122
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY VAIL-BALLOU PRESS, INC.
Librarians: Library of Congress cataloging information appears on
the last page of the book.
Foreword
With this volume Professor Strauss completes his study of
the Socratic writings of Xenophon, begun in Xenophon's
Socratic Discourse: An Interpretation of the uOeconomicus”
(Cornell University Press, 1970). Along with On Tyranny
(Cornell University Press, 1968), these volumes constitute a
monumental scholarly effort to restore the traditional dignity
of Xenophon as a wise writer and to give a lesson in the ancient
art of writing. They are almost indispensable guides to the
charm, grace, and profundity of Xenophon and thereby teach
much about the beliefs that have rendered him incomprehensible.
But of greater importance, this study is an attempt to recover
the true Socrates and, with that, the character of political
philosophy itself. It investigates the origins of political philoso¬
phy, its possibility and intention, against the nonphilosophic
background from which it emerged. Thus, it is a clarification
of the phenomena of a lost natural world which has been
obscured by later traditions. Professor Strauss’s reflections on
Aristophanes and Xenophon are his way of seeing again a
Socrates who is hardly understood because he seems so well
understood. As is always the case with Professor Strauss’s
books, this one is difficult of access; but to those who wish to
understand the texts and the phenomena to which they refer,
his works are a permanent possession.
Allan Bloom
Toronto
Preface
With this volume I complete my interpretaton of Xenophon’s
Socratic writings. I wrote and published first an interpretation
of the Oeconomicus because that work is, it seems to me, the
most revealing and at the same time the most misunderstood of
Xenophon’s Socratic writings. It is the most revealing because
in its central chapter Socrates is directly contrasted with a
perfect gentleman. In interpreting the other Socratic writings,
I could not help repeating some points which I had been
compelled to make in the earlier publication. The reader who
notices the repetitions will, I trust, forgive the prolixity and
note that I could without impropriety have been more prolix.
L. S.
St. John's College
Annapolis, Maryland
[3I3ISISM3J Contents
Memorabilia i
The Refutation of the Indictment 4
Socrates as Benefactor of His Companions 17
The Man Himself 18
Relatives 39
Friends 43
Men Longing for the Noble Things 55
Descent 73
Book IV 91
Apology of Socrates to the Jury 127
Symposium 141
Appendix 179
Index 181
JSJqUSISMgIJ Memorabilia
The title Apomnemoneumata may be rendered provisionally
by “Recollections.” Apomnemoneuein (or derivatives) occurs
only once within the Me?norabilia (I.2.31); there it means “re¬
senting,” “remembering one’s grudge.” To use this passage for
the interpretation of the title is to begin with the height of
absurdity, and we all are beginners. The title is misleading for
a more obvious reason: it is silent on the fact that the book
consists exclusively of recollections about Socrates. The title
would be appropriate if we could assume that the most mem¬
orable experience that Xenophon ever had was his intercourse
with Socrates and not, for instance, with Cyrus or with Agesi-
laos. We do make that assumption and expect to transform it
into a certainty.
The Memorabilia opens as follows: “Many times I wondered
by what possible speeches those who indicted Socrates per¬
suaded the Athenians that he deserved death from the city. For
the charge against him ran about as follows: Socrates commits
an unjust act by not worshipping (respecting, believing in)
the gods whom the city worships but carrying in other, novel
divine things (daimonia); he also commits an unjust act by
corrupting the young.” Xenophon indicates that his quotation
of the indictment is not quite literal. In this he proceeds like the
Platonic Socrates (Apology of Socrates 24b8-ci). But while
the changes made by the Platonic Socrates are very consider¬
able, the change made by Xenophon is almost negligible: he
replaces the “leading in” of the original by “carrying in” (cf.
5
4 | Xenophon’s Socrates
Plato, Republic 51^8). This difference can be taken as repre¬
sentative of the difference between Plato’s presentation of
Socrates and Xenophon’s.
The Refutation of the Indictment
1.1. Since the indictment speaks of two crimes of Socrates,
the refutation of the indictment consists of two parts, the ref¬
utation of the impiety charge and the refutation of the cor¬
ruption charge. At the beginning of the refutation of the
impiety charge Xenophon reminds us of the fact that Socrates
was charged with not worshipping (believing in) the gods of
the city. To refute that charge, Xenophon speaks of Socrates’
sacrificing and his using divination; he devotes to sacrificing
about 2 lines and to his using divination about 57 lines. The
reason for this unequal treatment is this: while in regard to
sacrificing Socrates behaved in an altogether normal or incon¬
spicuous manner, in regard to divination he was notorious for
saying that the daimonion gave him signs; this was probably
the reason why he was accused of bringing in new daimonia.
Yet Socrates was not guilty of any innovation, for the others
who divine, say, from sacrifices, mean that the gods dissuade
or persuade them through the sacrifices but say misleadingly
that the sacrifices do this. Socrates however said exactly what
he thought; he said that the daimonion gave him signs. In other
words, Socrates’ appeal to his daimonion is one kind of divina¬
tion not different in the most important respect from the other
generally known kinds. Yet Xenophon does not suggest that
Socrates used the vulgar kinds of divination. Socrates’ dai¬
monion was very reliable. He told many of his companions to
do this or not to do that on the ground that the daimonion
foretold the outcome, and the outcome proved him right.
Socrates would never have foretold the future to those of his
Memorabilia | $
companions to whom he did foretell it, if he had not trusted
that he was foretelling the truth; but to whom can one trust in
these matters except to a god? And if he trusted gods, how
could he believe that there are no gods? Yet this argument
hardly proves that Socrates believed in the existence of the gods
of the city, and he had not been accused of atheism in the indict¬
ment. Yet Socrates went further. He did not merely make use
in his way of divination, i.e., of his daimonion. He sent his
“friends” (epitedeioi) away to consult oracles about the proper
subjects. Are the “friends” different from the “companions”
(synontes) to whom he gave the benefit of his daimonion?
When talking to these “friends” he did not speak of his dai¬
monion. Or are they identical with the companions? Did he
send his companions to the oracles when only approval of an
intended course of action by a public oracle could protect
them against the possibly harsh disapproval on the part of the
city (cf. Anabasis III. 1.5)? Or did he send them to an oracle
when his daimonion remained silent? While Xenophon does
not clear up this point, he makes quite clear what the proper
questions to address to oracles are. The gods have given to
men to know “the necessary things” or to learn all the arts
and skills which are meant to lead them to their obtaining the
various goods. What the gods reserved for themselves to know
is precisely the most important thing in these matters, namely,
the outcome of men’s efforts: a man possessing the strategic
art cannot know whether the exercise of that art will benefit
him. Regarding the most important things in these matters one
must consult the oracles, i.e., one must try to find out what is
beneficial from the gods through divination, for the gods give
signs to those to whom they are gracious. Regarding their most
important matters Socrates sent his friends to consult the
oracles: he did not consult the oracles for his own guidance;