WWII Aircraft Warplane Development 1939-45

154 Pages·1997·41.2 MB·English

by  Philip Jarrett

PUTNAM'S HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT
Series Editor:
. ·pJanett
PUTNAM'S HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT
Aircraft of the
Second World War
The Development of the
Warplane 1939-45
Series Editor: Philip Jarrett
Tirkpage photograph:CSAAF/'-51 ,\I"$/<1l1g$onli",· (l"SAirFuree .\/J f-I Tuylorl
Aircraft oftill?SeCOlldU"orldliar
Tile Dewlopml?lIfoftill?lIarpltme /939-45
Contents
Suit'SHdi,or:l'lIUipJllrl'C'lt :'>Ol"manJ'r;~dml<n And."....~ah..m
I'hibpP=nIS, f~,,,uhor.c.bler,wb- t'ormanI'nedman....-orbat'l13\-aIanaIl,,1'I Andrc-A'S"ahumhasb«nfasanated ~
editorandcom.ulwu.opccWWflI: -.on theHudw..>nlm.ttWl(...:-.:"",.y"",,andI«tur-e< nt:llmnn....."nuh.,mother~tuma
*'.............
Hebcpn"TU1/'lIon on 196-• iIl"IlIlndlhc"'OII.J,Dnaibcd'"·/..",encII tlOIS' !labanmodd.....,.(1motor.., )'OU"i
.00'" lorl bcumc_ mnor0( Ieadonc.....--.1"Tlln·.he..thorauthorof"'..... bo)' liehat_nl1m"idd\'onilUtorr'IUU\...
AlrtllfUn.!heR",-.JAcronMJDcaISocxt)', ZOboob .00",,,n(roullIrtK:Io:sUlduJme lusl"'> and"'"'-'kstnduJc: TNR.of.mAm>
"""~pt'flie......,IISliu.nlcUltorofAt~,., 8nm4r",r-rinAt""_.tr"".np1H"I",mJ """N,AI«lutplu".and.a.ro-author.TN
M,,o.,,mhl"from 1\l?3to 1\180.andprodlKtlOIl fHt~id/,mt:'"andS",'<IIR.Wr,Ill,updaled Rollt·N,,>'C~C"..... HeisCumorof
~IorofJo"lilJIlf",mlUtlOfWlfrom 1\18010 edmonoflhehlghh Kda,mcdS.n:uJl",muu ACT'OI\lluua\II, liteSctcnce.\Iu§(Uffi.IAlnJnn.
G...Jr~lr"..uSolIWUt.>,......Sy>"""hal
ra--crld)'been~ Introduction 7
.\1JP 1Jooo')-n-
.\1>chKIBo-"}'W'I",tanl'"..woon,,-as
1..0..'d"eo·n,cr.h...tcIlmld.lIhl)e1hMugemlRd..I1O93IQ,Lsr"$h"lp",p.,aned jJoohhnnGGool/kIey}'tnl,llft1,nCanadaonT'llCfMOIhs ID>rrAAllffrreeddPP.-ricicce.......-aiasanIIrC1T" officerin Axis Aircraft at the Outbreak of\X'ar I I
".,.,-f,,,,
n:cordJnaandlOOnpholOinophlllg~,,(raft.and andHar\"llrds.thenlVIlWktC'danAFU«MJfIC !heRAJ'.sp«u.Its'l1gmel«lronic and
lhrou&hootthehostl1ll>CShecompiled~ onMa§ln-tlInthelJKbefore""",...nmg10 alffi&hU"l~ Uponlea'~1\ll theS iccin 2 Allied Aircraft Development in the Early\VarYears 33
rKDr'lk;oflhcC'\"mlSfrom, nnp><ksnI-After Hurncaneaandl)~I~19~)-.l~he 19-~hebecame'full-umcll\"WJOIl"TIt and
ocn...VI!heRAt'M bc<:artK, ieadutJ...... """,."llh2~!;~andIhmb«'arnc, • !he",thor...,ro-tIuthorof~1boob.~.
IlIOnlus.Ionan.lOUl'TIIImn ...tIvw.combon ~VC....crucmr·H.rsboobIfIdudeA.'f'mr IlII1-..tJ/0..,*"","" &t.1ItJ/Hruatll:" 3 Fightcr Developmcnt) l\'tid-1941 to A-tid-1945 59
....~Km'un,,\lhanacadnruo<;~ t'nh..lk.J.lhciI<lr) of!heCorn.momt.ftlthAtr lIoJfJnlll.ly,anJTNS/'UlirrSUIry He1">oI.k,
TratlUna:Ptan H<SllX)'PhDfrom I~U ,......"
CatllnlnEri"Urown andi,al'eOo..., oflhcR"'''llli,lOr 1Soc>et)" 4 The Bomber Revolution 91
CaptaInEne!lrown.thel'kflAU"Arm',rtl(lOot "alricklIan~U
d«ontcdpiloc.had, th,tt)·~-)'ftrcareer'" l'aInd:;H-U.,nlKT'Odynarmmt....mntfor
theitO)-alS"a\"}".lieKn-.:d.._ piIolfrom Har>lIIC'\'1"agc.llAC.~.oo Sub.Afl.... 5 Airmobility: Aircraft in Support of Ground Forccs 127
1942,n-cnNall) bctnI'fIllOWC'dOudt',...--.I "'-mt},.fj,...)"eWS..mdustn·heIoflo...~.
TntPlb.RAI'I~.oo~­ Pl'opcIen..199-110~on~· E1fanapR~
JIlltheEnnn)"Atn.nflfliathl,lhcIIIghSP«d JIll"iation""tor).particularh Inlhc..-ntof aranIIJIReohatb«n1Il\-oh"ft!",thhe:1I_ 6 Naval Aircraft in the Second \'(forld \'(far 149
I'llghlandlhcAer(ldrnam"",".f.l'ltghl.Heron· xronaul..."lIIt~·. ~"IrampOrt,and!he COI'I(nfor_ thanlhln,,)"Can,""'n'ngand
ullucdInlIl)·.na,ftnthe an1<lnlnlla pobu<.'\II1,...,nlro!of"1&'1011de',dol'met1t publishinglhe""""3inul"llll,ls'trIrIId,,·Q(tltJ'
,.:oridre<:onllouJ0(.1S-t..iclttrttloft1)l'Cl' J,,~r.....,1OIWl andUdiJ.J1ol and,from 7 The Helicopter's First\X'ar 177
""~- I~(TIteam 1969.bulkhncUp'unoquerolJ«uonofIt..
Groupc.poa.nl'ncrllcun.Me. __-cdJO "'""rotu<cnft,,·Iudtfo.-mcd!henudculat
RWalI:tee0uV )~'"anRAl-'!"andou",JtIlI"IpUlIInstructor, I(lol,i.,·.lmernaoo.>nalH......"OJ"!er.\I~ lie 8 Armament Diversifies 193
RW.n.c.,Outl.ches_TInm""1dd) IJD........ft ITiImmcandKr\UlC,,"J\hAIfbomct'<!n:aand :ako"'f'RXn1lltheItcbrortermdlnlJ)on
artnllmmlfor!pCOlIIu,I(lU.IllI/s,andlUI"''0 !heSAS II~..the,uU>or0(K"\......boobon K"\-n-al_ionaland'memat>onalbodws.and
~ulhonlau,,,,-olutnC'tOf\llnmhAlrcnifl ll"ialionlop""tndudmj TN.~1'r<t(W,lui III....eekendsnICSIus",,'n"nlas<'1'tchropler", 9 TheWell-equipped Warplane 221
Ilrma""llI,pUbbsllcdin 1993and 199~....·ne lnl(mauonaU)'K\;laimedtllllOf)"ofplll1Khul' ",laxandrnamlalllcurrc"C)·.
"'tdd)acdallnCd lie..alto!hel:KfCJ"l'S<"'I' '''I,lieISabo,",-",'dlSt.apublishedpanand
Ia'lfi',)..d.IolcflNhcan49_200G..roourp!hAeMcrootiuapu',onW.'Canrfdt ' , tekhcrolantn..."T\una. 10 Propulsion 251
S=IndWorld'«'ar~ ER Hooton I>cTek\\ood
ERllooron" dden<:e"TIler.has"TInm J)er-ri;Wood,,~ foundercd>t0l"pubIoshcr0( 11 Testing and Ferrying 267
1-"eoo",bc-I numerousarucleofor.nlernauonalrubltahon. JoUWiDqfmc-<!'1r...4~ lieha.b«nIn'\"Iaoon
AflerlC1",·1ttIIIlhe:RAt'fro'" 1939-16I.... Herrodllcn1lI,-aI~fe"'n« PUbll<.'lll~"" f". allJdcfen«wmet"for",..,r~5l"can.and""'"'
*C'o''o''m'''h''c'fa.nbdea~m<:aresearlciheeorpacncdWW""n,"leIrllolnhc Jbaon.o..b.olnnfolrhmcaClotounneGseroCuip,'i.jaWndarh,tah'c"lTUtl1tkener c!halelOLnosndfroonmc1d9ll5o3r1o0fl1n9l8lT6\al"n"d,"..r.o.u<p:oorTfcptpuobnll'. 12 Training: aVital Command 285
Imror)"of....fon:cl~andm!he<It Warand!heLu""-aff~from 19181019<W lie demfor'-anoIK_~from 1961 to
.lh.c..,uatnhdolruso.IfO7f1)'woA(l.h"c".".".,.:(r:a.fdtpcuodan:rotJt-nloi e_ IUS1cfutwrr.-naMffel)focro.m...r.k..u.n&:&Aarnmoothuerr~borokolMnu1l&hc:the P1r9<816I«IIeI..-:bd<>toIJt>.Inr.d..U,.o.,kl1lor~,'<anud-A,\II.m...p.o. Index 299
FqIm.Cctdtpol19r4-Z010 Sl:0C')"to 194-1. troJ,.....,.~J.
C>I'ulnamAeron.uncalBooq 199?
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[Bibliographies are included al the end ofeach chapter)
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P.-mtWandbow>dmSpam
Introduction
Philip Jarrett
The years 1939~S sawrapid and unprecedenledde\'c!· mechanical or operational shortcomings to be pin
opmcnt in all spheresofaviation,as thewarring nations pointed :Jnd resolved.
vied to gain a tcchnological edge O\W their opponents Japan's pro\·ing ground was the conflict with Russia
andwinmasteryofcheskies,andtherebysecureultimate in 1939, where the inadequacies of its aircraft became
\'ictory. Designers, engineers and scientists in industry disastrouslyevident.The problems in thiscasewere that
and in research institutions laboured to impro\"(~ lhe technologically modern aircraft were being built to out
acroplane and enhance ilScapabilities and equipment. moded requirements, and the consen·atism of military
By the end of the Second \'l;'orld War enormous traditionalists inhibited the development ofmodern tac
strides had been made, not only in weaponry and de tical philosophies.
structive power, but in all of the cssential technologies Derek \\700d's sun'CY of the dewlopment of Allied
thatwould re\"Olutionise airtransportin theyearsahead. aircraft in the early war years spotlights the manner in
For all its grim horror, che war accelerated the aero which Germany's neighbours left the modernisation of
plane's de\<c!opmcnt as nothing else I;ould ha\'e done. theirairarms toolate,some adhering to the nai\'ebeljef
While it is undeniably true that much wartime research chatchcirneutralitywould berespected,andocherstrust
and development work concentr::tted on whllt might be inginstaticdefencesoroutmodedtacticalconceplS.The
termed the destructi\'e arlS, equal or greater effort was failure of the European aviation industry to meet the
devoted 10the sa\'ingoflivcs and improving the perfor sudden and o\'erwhelming demand for modern combat
mance, reliability and ergonomics of the complex ma aircraft resultt'd in the USA's manufacturers receiving
chine that chc aeroplane wasbecoming. orders for a \'ariety oftypes.This had the fortuitous ef
Supercharging enhanced thealtitude performanceof fects of bringing about an expansion of che American
the piston engine, radar helped !.he pilot find his way at companies' productionfacilitiesandofenabling them to
night and locale otheraircraft,newsystems made flying assesstheirproducts'performanceinoperationalservice
safer and more comfortable for aircrew, :Jnd the ad\'ent :Jnd introduce impro\'ements before the USA actually
ofthc jet engine hCf'J.lded a new era in the conquest of enteredthewar. Insomeinstances,however,thishadun
the skies,offering hitherto undreamed-ofspeeds JUSt as fortunate results for che customer nations. Those who
the piston engined, propeller-drh'en aeroplane was orderedthe BellAiraeobra,BrewsterBuffaloandCurtiss
reaching the limitsofits de\·c!opmcnl. Hawk75A,for example,found totheirdismay that cheir
In these pagesleading:H'iation \\Titerspresent an au investments had been wasted, and that their brand new
thoritative accoum ofchis drJmatic erJ. in che history of fighters were no mutch for the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s.
a\'iation technology.To set che scene, E,R.Hooton sur Tragically,the need was sodesperate that some ofthese
veys the air arms of the Axis forces at the outbreak of aircraft werethen put to work in Indiaand the Far East,
hostilities in 1939, examining their equipment and the where they proved equally \'ulnerable to theirJapanese
political, military, economical and technological factors counterparts.
or philosophies that had shaped chem and eicher fur Howe\'er, there were great success stories, Out
thered or frustratcd cheir dewlopmenl. It was not nu standing examples were che Norch American Mustang
mericalsrrcngch chat madeGermany'sairforce the most and Mitchell, Lockheed Hudson, Douglas Boston,
powerful,asinchissenseitwasdwarfedbytheSovietAir Boeing B-17 and Consolidated Liberator, all of which
Force.ThesecretofilSstrengthlay in themoderndesign saw widespread use after initial teetlling troubles were
of the \'ast majority of its aircraft. Italy's Rcgia resolved.
Aeronautica, alchough regarded as second only to che Britain's industry, too, had its share of failures and
German air force, suffered as a result of an under successes.The FaireyBattleand\'\IcstlandWhirlwinddid
capitalised aircraft industry, an apparent reluctance to nO! come up to expectations, but others, such as the
abandonbiplanefighters,alackofsuitablypowerfulaero AHO Manchester and Hawker Typhoon, were trans
enginesand theabsenceofadoctrineofairpower. Both formed from problem children into mature and potent
arms,however,had used theSpanishCi\'ilWarasatest warriors. De\'e!opment potential is the hallmarkofgreat
ing ground for their new from-line aircraft, allowing design, and the aircraft lacking in this attribute, such as
both pilots and ground crew to bcrome familiar with the Hurricaneand Stirling,flew brieflyintothespotlight
them under combat conditions, and enabling initial and then receded. Those ha\ing it in abundance were
7
AlkCkAI'!" Ol'l HE SECOSI) WORl.D WAR I:-<TkOD!JCTlO"'-
theSpitfireand Mosquito,thelaueralsobeingendowed regarded theirrespecU\'etypes,theMe 262 and Meteor, and its min engme bombers were suited to both army Although reconnaissance and fleel prolection 'l1."re the
With eXtraOrdinary \'crsaulity; a gre"l assct in war. One .....ith almost casual mlerest, 5ttIng them as outside of and na\1- usc.Again \"UlnerabiIiIY ...."3Sa major problem. roles initiaUy pe:rformro by na\"'9.l aircraft, the camers
thing many ofthe successful machines had in common their requirtments_ Ho.....e...er. once the .\Ie 262 had An a1temati\oc solution .....as the: high-speed unarmed alsosen'ed as ftoaung bases from ....hlchstrikescould be
was the Rolls-Royce ,\teIlin engine, another product pro'oro Its orth against US hca\1 bombers and the bomber.ThiS concept was embodied ....ith great success launched. uSing 10rpedO and di\-e bombers_ Na\-al air·
which hadgltltde...elopmempotential onush got ,ord of German dC'\1."lopments. both sides in the Mosquito.. origtnally dismissed b)' Bomber craft also pr<n'Ct! an effccti\1." de:tcrrcnt 10 submarmes,
Kussla's greal strength at the war's OUtsel lay in its pursued the sub)CCt 'lith \igour_ Dr Pricedismisscs the Command's Commander-In-Chicf as being of no usc, and coO\'Oy prolection by land- and carrier-based air
abilityto takethcaggressor's first mightyand unexpcct· postwar myths thai the ,\te 262 was nol PUI mto large bul soon to pr<noc its wor-th - and \\ith a sigmficantly craft, usmg progrcssl\ocly Impro\"Cd radar syslems, be.
t..d blow and then. afler a maSSI\OC IogISUes exercise in scale production early enough. I1nd thai Hitler's edict lower loss rate compared .....ith its Bomber Command camea mal and effectiveduty.
which its threatened factories were withdrawn 10 the thai the aircrafl should imtially be used as a fighler contemporanes,as the authorshO\\"5. Both Britam and the SA suffered from the inability
depthsofthis \"3stcountry,to rail),recoupits Iosscsand bomber caused any appreciable delay in its operational japan was the only nalion to resort to the desperate ofthe diffcrent SCrvices to agree on their respccth,.. reo
hit back ....1th a ...engeance_ It was formnate for both II1troductionasafighter.The great.....caknl..'!iSCSofthe,'vie measurt of mass SUIcide or Kamikaze attacks, mostly sponsibilities.Thus the RAF regarded its flying boats as
Britainand the USSR thaiGermanyhad failed todc\-c! 262 were liS unreliable engmes and poor ser...iceability, using agcing aircraft adapted for the purpose, but also an ahernatiw to the fleet, and the Royal Na\1' was not
opaSuccl..'!isfullong-rangebomber. I-Iad Ilitlcrbeenable and a comparison of\ictories claimed ag-Jimt losses rc· with the purpose-designed Ohb, essentially nothing permittedtoha\-e land-attackaircraft. Inthe USA 11 was
to cripple the centreS of manufacrure of either nation, n..als poorresults. more than a rocket-propelled piloted bomb. Although some time before the US Navy assumed responSlbilily
the outcomewould ha\'c been \'erydifferent. The spectacular nature of the diminutive '\·Ie 163 there can be no doubting the success ofmany ofthese for all maritime patrol aircraft, having hithcrto been reo
ThestoryoffighterdC\'c!opmcnt from 1941 onwards rocket-propelled interceptorbelied itsdisapl>ointingand operations,the COSt in pilots']j\-es was horrendous. stricted tocarrieraircraftandwater-based machines.On
istaken upby DrAlfred Price,who begins bysurvcying dangerous Service usc,and again we arc presented wim The aeroplane which brought Ihe war wilhJapan to theothcrhand,thejapanesena\'y'sfreedom touscwhat
the continuing and parallel development of Britain's figures which showittoha\'e beenfar from successful in its climactic end was the B-29 Superfortrcss, the e\'olu. eH'rairernftit wantedresultedin muchduplicatederfor!
Spitfireand Germany'sBf109,and thedlsad\-antagcsof combat_ tion of which had begun in 1938, before the war had and imposed astrain on the narion's industries_
such prolonged continuationofaline. Hethen rumshis Speculationcanbeapointlesspursuit,but there\-ela· e\1."n staned. It \\'as the mosl technologically ad\'anced Newtcchnolog)' and techniques had tobedC\'eloped
attention on new fighter types introduced into service oonoftheoutstandingsuperiorily'oftheVampireIwhcn piston engined hea\1' bomber ofthe war, but Germany for anacking capital ships. both 'lith bombs and torpe
dunngthewarbyBritain,Germany,theUSA,Japanand compared ....1th theSpitfire XIV,inaU :lISPCCUiofcombat progressed II stage further. de\'e!oping the \...orld·s tirsl docs, and for operating aircrnft from carriers which, in
Ihe USSR,underlining theessential requirementsofen· pe:rformance, m.:lIkes one .....onder how the ;CI fighter operational ;ct bomber, the Arado Ar 2348. As the au tum. imposed bmlts on aircraft size and .....clght.
gme and armament and how these wcre affected by the might ha\'c affected air combal had the .....ar continued. thorpointsOUI in hisconclusion,the principal elements Funhermore, the limned number ofaircraft thai could
specific role or operanonal sUmluon_ Comparative per In truth,ho.....e...er,the jet fighters had a negligible mflu of the Cold War ....ocre ready at the .....ar·s end; the Jet becarriromeantthatonellircraftIypemlghlbereqUIred
formance data highlight the: relau\'e:ments and dcments ence on thewar_ bomber,thecruIsemissile (embodied m!heVI)and the toperform5C\ocraldifferenl roles......hicheITccti\oclycom·
oftheprincipal t}'PCS- In his chapter 'The Bomber Ke...oIuOCn·. Mike alomic bomb_ promised its design.The great variety ofaircrafl de\ocl
Nighlfighting placed theemphasison qUite: diff~nt Bo.....y·er Stres5CS the diffenng tactical phi105ophies thai Airmobilit}·,orthetransportoftroopSandequipment oped10meetthe....1derangeofrequirementsISappartnt
fighterattributes,andthe~oondealing....iththisaspect determinedtheapproachestaken by thevariouswarring by aireraft.came into Its O\\-n in the SecondWorldWar. in thc author'scountr)'-by-country-sun-ey.
opens \\1th an outline ofBritain's night air defence sys· nations_WhileGermany had concenlratroon thesmall· Petcr Hearn describes how the German aS53ull on the Itmightbethoughlthairowy.....ingroaIrcraftplayed
tern,atthetimetheonl)'reallyeffeco\ocs)"5temofitstype cr, hort.range Iwin engined ~dlUmbombers and sin Lo..... Countries. using par.uroops and gilder-borne m· an insignificanl part in the Second\'\:orld\'("ar.but E1fan
in theworld.and the way in which the fighlers operated gle engined Slukas, belie...ing dive·bombing to be an fantry, took. the defenders completely by surpnsc_ ap Rccs' chapter shO\\-s that the leading combatant na
.....ithin it.The LuftwalTe sySlem e\'Olved on similar lines essenual capabililY if accuracy .....as to be achic\'Cd, Although both the Kussians and Italians, as well as Ihe tions e\inced a continued interest in their posslbdlUes,
bUI look longer to de\-e1op, and the incessant 'batlie of Brilaln'S bomber force ....'as Initially formed 'lith theaim Germans,had de\'e1oped theconceptofairborneopera· and thai IOlorcraft....ocremoreaCU\'e thanisgene:rall)' re·
the boffins' 10 de\ise increasingly bener radars and, in ofwaging a slnncgic campaign to destroy the enemy's tions in the intern-ar years, Britain was conspicuously alised. Britain, France, Germany, japan and Russia all
responsc, more cffccth'e radar countermeasures, is a industril..'!iand navy,and Ihereforecomprisedlong.range slow in recognising both the threat and the potential of employedautogyrosof\'arioustypesina\-ariet)'ofroles,
~..cntral theme. Iwin enginc bombers,with a new generation offour en such aSSliults, and lacked nOI only the aircraft bUI also and helicopter developmcnts by Focke.Achgclis and
The usc ofthe fighter-bomber was pioneered by the gine heavy bombers under dcvelopmcnI. In both eases the knowledge: to follow suit. Thus disadvantaged, RettnerinGcrmllnyandSikorskyintheUSAresultedin
Lurtwaffe, bUi once its advantages wcre pcrcei\-ed by the resulting machines initially proved inadequate and Britain's armed services had an uphill struggle to catch practical machines which saw Service use in the latter
their opponents the type became an important compo vulnerable in the face of determined opposition, and up with lhe tcchnology, bUI were able to begin opcrn yearsofthewar. In Britain,developmentof~Weirhe
nenlofallofthecombatant forces. Unlikeabomber,the both sides learned theirrespective lessons the hard way, tions in 1941.In the USAaswell thc militarywere slow Hcopler ha\ing been abandoned early in Iile war, the
fighler.bomber could re\-ert to Its pure fighter role and sulTering little successand heavylosscs. 10adopt the concept, but at least they had the C-47, a Sikorsk.yhelicopterwasadopted.but\\"3SnOIusedoper
dcfcnd itselfonceithadreleaseditsbombs.].,10TeO\ocr,it While Britain upgraded only tile\'('e1hngton, prefer purpose-built transporl .....hich .....as tobecometheAllics' ationallybefore the ....-ar·send.
was cheaper, required fewer crc:....., and had far beller nng to Introduce complelely new t)'PCS, Germany fol principal air-support aircraft,and ample production fa RWallace Clarke's srudy of thc de\"elopment ofaIr·
spttdandaltitudeperformance. Disad\'anlages.....erethe lo.....ed a path of continual updating of the original cilities"ocllbeyondtheenemy'sreach_Thesuccessfuluse craftarmamemisdi\1dedofnecessityimosectionsdeal
smaU bomb load and limited radius ofaction. Such air designs. A SIgnificant contribution 10 the Allied CilUse of airborne di\isions In the in\"aslon of Euro~ and to Ing 'lith guns, gunslghung, powe:red gun turrets and
craftdemanded newoperationaltechniquesandspecial ca~ from thc USA,.....heresc\ocl'llolexcellent bombersof supponthe Rhinecrossmgdemonstraled that the lesson rocketweapons,each section then beingsubdhided into
ly developed weapons, particularly for use against \"arious classes werede\'clopocd,as menuoned earlicr. In had been learnl, but the dlsasler al Amhem underlined thercspeeth-enations.AsinallotheraspectSoftheaero
difficult targets such as tanks. Dr Priceexposes the fal RussiatheI:rTIphasis'l'aSagainont'lin-<:ngincdmedium theCOSI ofbad planning. plane's C'\-oIution, the 'baptlsm of fire' qUlckl)' re\"ealro
laC)' ofthc much-vaumed air-launched unguided rockl:t bombers, though one four engined slnucgic Ilea\') As Norman Friedman stlQ\\"5, the pan of the aero theshoTicomingsofthe\"'20nousweaponsandweaponm
pro)Cetl.lc,which lacked accuracy and wasquile ineffec bomber, the Pe-8. was de\ocloped. Germany's only true planein thewaralsca....-assignificant.NeitherGennan)' stallations. Some lessons w~rt surprising_ Few pilots
ti\OCagamst armoured \-ehicles_ bombermthiSclass.theI-Ie 177,.....asdoggedthroUghoul nor Italy had any aircraft carriers, bul large forces of could hil anything at ranges greater than t\\'O or three
He concludes ....ith a SUI\ocy ofthe development and itsoperationallifebyinlerminablepoy,ocrplantproblems. these vessels ....OCrt operated by Britain, japan and the hundred rards,denSItyand rateoffire .....as mof1." impor
use of rocket· and ;ct.propelled fighters_ Interestingly, and ne\,..rrealised its potential. USA_Inaddmon,land·basedaircraflandseaplanes ere tam than the calibre ofthe: shells, and solid sleel shells
both Luftv.-affe and RAF semor officers initially Japan PUI range befort defence in bomber design, used in maritime roles by all of the major po ers. ....1."re more destructive than hlgh-<:xplosive projeculcs.
8 9
AIRCRAFT or Till Sl'co:.:n WORI.D \i'AR
\X'hik Britain and the USA concent.r.lted on output.re by Dr Price,butwhile oneauthor isconsidering the air
1
liabilityand commonalily ofilmmunition,Germany up o-aft from thepomt of\'iCYI ofthe tcchnology itembod
graded Its weapons eonstanuy and produced a \\ide ied, the other is concerned with its effecth'eness as a
Axis Aircraft at the Outbreak ofWar
rangeofne\\ typc5 ofgun. Norwascommonality a pri combat aircraft.11'11sser\'es to remmd us that there arc
orityoftheJ~panesc,thenav)'usingdifferentweaponsto at least twoSIdestoe\'eryquestion,and thatconclusions
E R Hooton
the army,and oothSer\'ices mixing tyj)CSand calibres. depend to a large dcgr« on the approaches on which
The SlghU used \\1m the guns, and the tUlTets in thcyarc based
which thegunswe~moumed.wereasrich intheir\-ari The second part of this chaptcr. contributed by Germany concept of the Operational (Operrlll't-'eT) Art, \\;th
etyasthegunslhemsch'es,andoothweresub}eCttocon l»atnck HasseU, looks at the extrnordinary business At the outbre:tk ofwar In September 1939 Germany' Strateg)· confined to acti\;ty abo\-e army group le\d.
stant development and imprO\'Cment, UnguIded rockets of aircraft ferry1ng, ooth ....;thin the British Isles from Reichsluftwaffe....lISthe .....orld's most pcmnful air force_ Thisphilosophy ubsequentlyhelpeddefinemilitaryalr
we~ fairly basic de\'ices, but Germany pioneered the factory to nice umt,and across \-aSt oceans andcon This status ....lIS achie\'ed not m('rely numerically, for liS CT3ft reqUl~ments.
guided missile\\1thIU\\1~-guidcd X~andradio-guided tinent!. It is no usc hanng new aeroplanes pounng fll"St-Jinestrengthof4,093aircraft....-asnearlyhalfthatof Tacucal operanons were largely lhe responsibility of
Hs 293, from the production lines ifyou cannot get them to the the Sol;e1 Air Force (.....hich had 7,321 on NewYear's the Nahaufklarungsstaffeln on land and the Sttnahauf
E\-ery aeroplane embodies a number ofsy'5tcms and plaen whCTt' they are d perately needed, and the ac DilY 1939), but on the fact that the vast maJOril)' of k1arungsstafTein as well as the Bordfliegerstaffeln at sea.
an assorunent ofeqUIpment, some \1tal to the machine complishments of the Air Transport Auxiliary. the Its :un:raft (92 per cent) were of modem design and 'flll;: former were attached toArmee Korps and Panzer
itselfor itsCf'C\\,and some toenable thelllrcraft to per Atlanuc Ferry OrganlS3uon and the Return Ferry conSlrucuon, Dh;sionc-n and .....cre essentially .....hat the: Royal Flymg
form Its appointed task In Chapter9 Le5 Coombs \;\' Senice WeTe tmpressi\'e, to sa}' the leasLThe impactof Germany'ssuccessincompletingaerialre-cquipment Corps in the First \X·orld War had called CofJl'S Aero
IdlyiUusmtes thegreatad\-ancesmadein thewaryean;, the experience gamed m mtc:rconunental operations on bcfo~ its enemies gave the Luftwaffe an edge .....hlch II planes,smgle-t:ngmedtwo-seaterswiththc:rolesoftaCb
and the rapIdly Incre:tsmg complexitY of the machine the postwar deveLopment of commercial air trnnsport used todC\-astaangeffect 0\'Cf the ~xt three years.Tbc: cal reconnaiss:mce (\·isual and photographic), artillery'
that was the aeroplane. '\X'eU-cqulpped' is. ofcourse, a was surely profound, edge \\-as made keener by the slrucrure and philosophy obscn-ation and di~on,ground attack. and resupply,
rclath-e term that changes in accordance With the stan Tlus\"olumeconcludes~ithJohnGoUey'saccountof oftheLuft\\lIffe,.....hichwasfarmorethanlhepurclytac Their f100tplane equh-alents in the Royal Na\-aJ Air
dardsofeach particularperiod,Although the 31rcrart of thetralMlngsystemsadopted byGermanyandlheA1bes. ticalforce \\hichmostpost-....-ara\iationhisloriansclaim. Sen1ce had sundar tacucal Tttonnaissance llInd artillery
theearly....-arperiod mIght ha\-ebeen regardedasteprc The title 'Vital Command', chosen by him. streSSeS the Indeed, had it been a tactic-.ll force it would ne\~r ha\~ supportduties,butre:sponsibilil)'forcoastalanti-subma
senungthe latest in technological accomplishment.they importance oft.r.lining to all air arms,and the essenlial spearhcadedNUlGermany'ssuccess,buttounderstand fine operauons replaced ground-attack./rnuppl)'duties,
we~ not total 'weapons systems'as we now understand and basic need for a system that ensures a continual its philosophy requires a slight di\~rsion Into German In most of Europe's air forces, Corps Aeroplanes
theterm. Indeed,compared\\1ththemachinesofthelate fiow of \\-eU-trained aircrcw. Closely allied to this, of nuLnary thought, comprised 20 to ~O per celli of the lOtal first-line
......arperiod theyseem rdati\'e1ySImpleIn some respectS. course,....-asthepr0l1SlonofSUItable airo-aftonwhich to In theaftermathofthe Napoleonic....-ars theGerman strength, but In the Luftwaffe they were only 7,5 per
Thein~santbailieto increase safN)'and $3\'e \-aluable t.r.lln them. TlIe author ShOll'S that the Lufl\\-affe had Gencral Staff fC'COgniscd that the appearance of mass cent,The maiorit}' of the Nahautklarungsstaffeln were
pilots'lives,impro\'t: the performanceandcapabilitiesof ample faclillies and rttrults. but that its training system armiesmeant that theolddi\;sionofmilitaryoperatlons equipped WIth the Henschel Hs 126. a stressed-skin
the machine and countcr or outsmaf( the opponent was inadequate and began to fragment owing to the intoTacticsilnd Strategy.....asinildequate.Theytherefore monocoque, braced-wing monoplane .....ith a radial
meant thai significant progress ....-as milde in the five urgcnt nced to replace combat losses, whereas the confinedTactics to operations by army corps and their enginc and fixed undercarriage. Itwas typical ofthe last
years of....-ar. Empire FJ};ng Training Scheme tapped rt."'SOurces component units (although these could be extended to genef3tionofsuch airCT3ft,beingdesigned for operation
Andrew Nahum's short chapter on ilero engines around theworld.Moroo\'er, thesignificantcontribution armies III certain circumstances), and the acti\'itics of from smaU, roughly prepared fields to a requirement
establishes the state ofengine development at the war's ofthe USA ensured Ihal there was an ample supply of armies ilnd army groups now came under the new which emphilsised \·isibilil)' from the semi-enclosed
outbreak and looks at the problems engine designers wcll-trained aircre\\' tooperate the machines.
faced as they sought to improve efficiency ilnd reliabili Last, but b~' no means least, mention must be made
ty'. The allied and insepilrable subjects of high-octilne of artist rrunk Munger's splendid cutaway drawing of
fuels and supercharging are also co\'ered, as are prob the HawkerTyphoon, undoubtedly the first such draw
lematic engines, Finallr, the hurdles confronting the ing ofthis aircraft e\'er produced.The aim in thisseries
designers ofthe first jet engines ilrcouUined. is to feature a cutaway in each \'Olume, the aircraft
Chapter II compriSt.'S contributions from two selccted being typical ofthe period covered rauler than
authors. Capt Eric Brown, an accomplished test pilot, exceptional.111cTyphoon suits this criterion admirably,
describes the role offhght testing in \\-artime and high beingvcrymuchaproductoftheSecond World\X'aref3
lights some specificaspects and aircraft. His assessment \\;th regard toits design,structure and powerplant.
of thc Me 163 as a 'landmark in a\'iation technologr·
might ~m tobe at \-ariance with theopinionexpressed PhilipJarrell
'I'M H~/ Hs /26 CDTfJJ airc;ru.ft had la~Jy ""laud the HnnM/ He 45 and He 46 in 1M ."'ahaujkliirungutoffi/n
by1Moutbreakofuoar.
10 II
Alf.lCf.lAI'T OF 1'1I1~ SECOND \!:'Of.lLIl \1;'AR AXI~ Alf.lCf.lAf'T AT THE OUTBREAK 01' WAf.l
naissance and higher performance. B)' 1939 protOlypes
ofthenewalrerafl,the Focke-WulfF..... 189,.....ere flying.
rollowing a trend common in the late 19305, it was a
t\\1n-boom design, like the Fokker G.I and Lockheed
P-38, Like the contemporary Pota 637 armyco--<:Ipera
tion alrcrafl, the F\\ 189 (which entered sen;ce lale in
1940) had t\\;n engincs,a retractableundercarriageand
a full)' enclosed cockpit, which made it seem a world
away from the 1-15 126,although Ihl-irperformance and
combal capabililyweresimilar,
One protOI)"pc Fw 189 was modified to meet the
c1~-support or 'Schlachl' reqUirement. 11m mission
1M FocJu..tl'u(fFw 189V3 was lhe drirdprolot~ofthe was de\'e1oped by the German Army during the Firsl
ncm--mgmtdCorpJClffmtftdaignrotorrplaa theHs 126. \XOrkl\X'ar,.....henSchlachtaircraft.....erecssentiallyfiring
TN O'Ptbtganto~1lI"strt"i«from lheautumnofI9-10, storm rroops designed to assist an ad\'ance on the bu.k(/lluteIkknsit:~anllOmCltI£J10reJnign of1MDominDo 171jortlXlrd/uMlilg.r,alldrhist.WSiolltmtrtdstr1.'IC"tIII Ihe
ground by anad"ng enemy uoops .....ith aUiomanc IU1llltlnof1938UStheDo I-Z,sunhnr.AllhoughlheaircrafthaJ0,,1yasmallbombbay,Irrros!rrqllentlyustdjorIou:-ltt.-el
cockpit. Tlle radio and the topographic camera m the weapons and small bombs. Its .....3rume success meanl Jl/rpriMatliJdub«uu~irssholllJn"wl/mtdrrlllKJma~IItaJtnferpilots10JIl.Jgt Ihnraill/IIIM,
rear ba)' (5upplemcntcd b). a hand-opcraled camera on thaI III 1934 an updated reqw.rement ....'as issued as the
the port side) were the most imporlaIlt items ofequip Light Di\"Cbomber. for which the Henschel Hs 123 U'aS wellasCI1I.mpcd,butIt.....ascheaper10buildand in 1941 jumo 20Se diesels proved extremdy unreliable, al
ment, wtule ~ armament, I)"plcall)', was derisory, selected.Thiswasacuriousmixtureofoldandnew,with .....as selected for production. though they pfO\;ded exceptional operuting economy,
composing a smgle fixed 7.9mm (O.30in) MG 17 ma~ sesquiplaneconfiguration,fixed undercarriageandopen The oa\'31 equi\'alcnl of the lis 126 \\'as me Arado IIO\\'C\'('(,radialengmed\,(,(SIOnsPfO\"Npopularabroad
chine-gunfor the pilotandaslmJl,ar-calibreMG 15ona cockpit bul all·metll1 monocoque construction and Ar 196floatplanc. an elegant all-metall\\in-ftoatdesign and thC)o' scn-edU1th fi\·e airforces.
lTIO\'3ble mounting for the observer, The maximum mixed-construcuon wmgs. The 'Em-Zwel-Dref, as it ofmodcm construction wtuchwas 10 prowsurpnsmgly The other IWO were designed to follow another t)"J)
bomb load ....'as only lookg (2201b), Against the latest .....aspopularlycalled,formed thebasisoftheStuka(SIU agde,At the oUlbreakof....'artheArado.....as bemg intrO leal 19305fashion, theconcept ofa bomberfast enough
~neration of high-performance fighten, such aircraft r.tkampfflugzeug) Gruppen, and despite the support of duced mto the BordfilegerstiltreIn, but these stilI had to outpace cnemy fighters, The concepi refte<:ted the
were dead meat with only their manoeuvrability to the LuflwafTe's head of de\"Ctopmcnt, Oberst \'i:'olfram many He 60 biplanes ....hich also equipped the tcchnological rt\'o.Iution crealed by combinmg light
protectthem. von Richthofen, II was gl1ldually withdrawn from SccnahaufklarungsstafTcln and mar be rcgard~"(\ as the weight monocoque,streSSed-skin airframes \\;th po.....er
ManyoftheNahaufkHirungsstaffeln retainedsomeof scn;ce, flootplanc cquh'alenl ofthe He 45. ful engmes at a ume .....hen fighler d~ign emphasised
me older Heinkel He 45 biplanes and He 46 braced In 1937.hO\\e\'er,Rlchthofen (acousinofthefamous Curiously, the Luft.....affc·s first ckj(uIOchiefofstaff, manOCu\T3bIILI)' al the expense ofspeed and firepower.
monoplanes withwoodenwingsand fuselages ofwelded 'Red Baron' and minor 'ace' in his 0\\'11 right) became Oberst (later Gencralleutnant) \,\'alther \'\'e\ocr, brought Agalllsi bIplane or bracl:d-wing monoplane fighters the
steel tube covered by doped fabric and metal panels. chiefofslafT10the Condor Legion,meGermancxpedi \\'nh him when he transferred from the arm)' the laner's fashion prO\·cd sound,asthe Hc 111 and Do 17.....ereto
This form of construction had appeared in the First tionary force fighting in Spain for Franco's Nationalists. behefin the supremacy ofTactJcal air power,but extell demonslr,ltc during the next IWO years. Both were
WorldWar and .....asextensiwlyemployed until theearly The Legion had copied the Spanish and used itsobsol sh'c reading led him to change his mind.\X'ithin a year elegant, streamlincd dcslgns, but experience in the
19305,whenit wassupplantedbyall·metal,Stressed-skin ete Heinkel He 51 fightcrs for the Schlacht role \\;th \'('e\'cr h:Jd nOt only accepted thai the Luftwaffe should Spanish Ci\'il \'\'ar. and natural caution, dictated a
monocoquc construction lechniques which produced great success, and had nx:ommended the development ha\'c anopcratit'Crrolewith the emph:Jsis upon bombers strengthening of defensive armament to supplement
lighter bUI stronger airframes.Yel mc Corps Aeroplanc ofdedicated ground-anack aircrafl with armoured pro interdicting the enemy rear al arm)'/armr group or fleet self-scalingtanks,TheHe 1111'-1 hadonlymreeI\IG 15
itselfwasbecomingananachronism,ableneithertofight Icction for theThctical role, 1tis interesting to nOle that level and destroying enemy air po.....er, but he had also
norflee,andtheLuftwaffehad begundevelopingamore the Russianscamc toasimilarconclusion,leadingtothe 'sold' the concept to thc Army's high command. '111(:
modern conccpt from 1937 based upon tactical recon- de\'elopmem ofthe Ilyushin 11-2'Ilyusha·. concept .....as also acceptable to his political masters be·
At the outbreak of war only olle Schlachtgruppe cause thebomberscouldalsobeusedtocowGermany's
cxisted, and this was equipped with the ageing Hs 123, ncighbours in peacetime b)' threatening to annihilate
which \\HdS essentially a nying machinc-gun nest, with theircilies and factories.
two ,\\G 175 which could be supplemented by up to Luftwaffe bombers .....ere therefore designed to strike
200kg (4-101b) ofbombsortwo 20mm (0,78in) MG FF at Germany's immedialc neighbours, and four designs
cannon. hs potcntial replacements,the Fw 189Vlband emerged during the mid 19305,The Lufl\\'3fTe require
thc Hs 129, both twin.engined aircraft, .....ere ft);ng in ments had assigned priori!)' to bomb load, followed by
protolYpe form by the outbreakofwar.The former was speed, defcnsive armamenl and range, but the general
atwo-seatarmOl.lrcdversionoftheFw 189(theSchlachl requirement .....as for an aircraft .....ith a I,OOOkm (600
model of which ....'as to be dcsignated Floi' 189C), ....'ith mile) range, a maximum spcc<i of 350km/h (215mph)
four MG 17sand tWO MG FFforn'ard and IWO 7.9mm and a 1 tonne (2,2oolb) bomb load. The reqUirement TIltHtl1lktlHe 111113ifonltnlyHe Illb)of1935feWllu
Em",,,,svviufromJuly 1939,IheArudoAr 196 rrplaad MG 815 aft,while the laner was adedicated single-seat .....asmetbrthreedesignswhich.....ereessentiallycomple S«OtW bombn prolotypt and 'M poI/ern for Ihe lit/tin
tluHein~lHe60,Da~m aspollnaircraft,itwasuwi design\\;tharmourplate6-12mmthick,7Smmthickar m.:ntary, the Donuer Do 17, Heinkel He III and poo.oemJHe IIIA sniarcilh 8,\11171J 6.02engines. Only
for a WrIe'ty ofdutin including esccm fighttr, and could mouredglassandan armamentoftwoMG 175and two junkers ju 86, the emphasis in each dcsign being on rche" Iht DO/min-Be"::600alld]IlrtknsJumeU'tn'Imro
soffUtinlnmaldtthe8«lujighln,Trwoftheseaircraftht/ptd ""IG FF The Hs 129', protection ....'3S its only advan speed,bombload and rangerespecth-ely,By 1939theju dlluddidtheHe III b«ometMjormidabkaircraftrrhldt
UJcapturetheBritishsubmoriMHMSScaJ.. tage, for the aircraft proved sc\ocrely underpo.....ttt'd as 86 hadbttn ....;thdra.....n from ~T\;cebtt3uscitsjunkers trwthe'tl/lrdkg'oftheKompfgruppm.
12 J3
AXIS AII(CI(AI''l' AI tilL Ol.:TIlREAK 01' 'X'AR
AIRCRAFT 01' TilE SI::COl"1) 'X'0 11.1.I) WAR
".
A !kill"u;huhf.'W"IIIt/~nghlPWaatt/~riglll "II/~.LJII~Jn~ral~,,~rOIrrru!tofIII~"'''~,t/~JWllImJu 51could~
aJiJPI.-Jtoabombn,lJ"JSrtvra/Jt:spauludfOSpainIn 1936pntomuJbolhroles.LJrg.-ml'tINrsfl.Yl'tbflliIasbombersorring
Wlhi!failureoftire'>Omur1>011 13/23family,anJt-irtualiylJ/11wJNf'l IrUIISjrrr.-J10mmsportll/IIUl!YYptembcr1939.
Al tlult ti"reII rwsalsollMJfortrami",ami..l«tro"U:imeUigcu:..,n:ltikdunnglireftllT11fMSfilteJn:I111 a la~ m.og'relit:
coilform.op~tit:""'leSU'«f'mg.
machine-guns in nose. dorsal and \'entrn! positions, but n:ceh-w the appropriate difC'Ct.ion-finding (OF) loop
later\~rslOnssuch illSthe I~~ had armourprotection for aenal.111eRAFbycontrastwasslownotonlycreatinga
the pilot. a second MG IS In the nose and (wo finng beacon networl!; and equippmg llS aircraft but also pro ---~
from thesidewIth III fifth crew membertooperatethem. viding sufficient nangators. 'llIe Lufthansa practice of "l71l! ~rfoml<lllU of Ille Jllnkers JIl 88 1"3. Ilut first proWl"",.. to 1k1tv: JunlItTS Jllmo 211s, cli"cht:d the arrard of
Similar improvements were made in the He 111H-2, all-weather operation extended into the nighl, and !.his. til..'Sc1mrl/bombcr'corurcut 10 tire Itl(Jllllfoctrirer. ProdUCtlO1/ oftiltJII 88 m:lJ Imderfro)' 11/ &pumbn 1939,andtlU! t)'pt
while the Do 17Z expanded its defensiw armament 100. was copied by the LuftwalTe. all of whose major ~C<Jmto'leofIht1.Jifltroifes II/0SI llseflllairemft.
from thrce: to four MG 15s but \'entral co\'Cr was im bases had Lorenl: instrument-landing systemsand all of
pro\'cd through a redesigned nose.The Do 1- was ex whose bombers had the approprillte receivers.The sys~ Amajorweakness ofthe first generation ofGerman who assumed the position ofGeneralluflZeugmcister in
poned 10 Yugosla\'llll and an improved export \'ersion tern was modified IOtO an instrument bombing system, bombers (Do 11/13{23 andJu 52) had been poor bomb 1938. but also under his prcdl'o:ssor, Rkhthofen. \\ho
with DB601Ain-lineengineswasunderde\'elopmentat 'X-Verfahren', one of three in sen'ice or at advanl;ed sights.which led 10 intense interest in dive-bombing for initially went toSpainto test new typesincludingproto
the outbreakofwar as the Do 215,and was destined to stagesofde\'(~lopmentat the outbreakofwar. greater accuracy. From its earliest days the Luftwaffe type Ju 87s. Another enthuSiast was Oberst Hans
had Sturt.kampftlug-J.eug units. and the Ught Dh'e Jeschonnck. the Luftwaffe chiefofslaffin 1939, whose
join the specialised AufkhirungssLalTein ofthe LuftwalTc
bomber requirement which led to the Hs 123 was earher staff appointment ga\'c him I;onsiderablc
Ihgh Command (ObdL). B)' the beginning of the war
accompanied by II Heavy Dh'e-bomber requirement innuence in aircraft development. The combination of
the Luftwaffe had 1,171 medium bombers or 28.5 per
cent of its first-line stlength, but their indi\'idual bomb drafted around theJu 87, the emphasis ofthis latter re innuences WlIS 10 han' a pernicious effl'Ct upon
loadwaslimited.·lnehoril:ontlllbombbaysoftheDo 17 quirement being on bomb load. Dcspite the acquisition Luflwaffc bomber development, as \\'as becoming clear
I;ould nOt accommodate anything larger than 250kg ofthe Lolfe 7D Lachometric bomb sight by September lit the outbreakofwar.
1939,the Luftwaffewastheonlyland-basedairarmw1lh A demand for a dh'c-bombing capability was
(SSOlb) bombs,and withafull bombload thetacticalra
alargedh'e-bomber force, which comprised 24 percent included in lhe requirement for the LuflwalTe's next
dius was reduced 10about 320km (200 miles).The He
III had threeurnesthisrunge,butthe\'erticalcellsofits ofall German bombers.TheJu 8- could I;arry a 500kg gener.ltion medium and hea\'y bombers. the Ju 88,
(1.102Ib) bombsome 600km (370 miles),and could be Do217 and lie 177.'Inefirst,em;sagedasahigh.speed
bomb bay could accommodate nothing larger than
500kg (1,1201b) bombs, hea\'ier loads. induding a used for eithertaetic'dl oroptroliu~rmissions.butdefen three-scal lllrCfaft \\;th a speed of5ookm/h (310 mph),
I,OOm:g bomb, ha\'ing to be carried externally,with the sive armament (two fixed j\lG 17s forward and one arangeof3.000km (1.850miles) andamaximumbomb
resultingdrag limiting range. TheJIIIlIt.-rsJII 871'3 prololy"..firstflew i" 1935,mida movllble j\lG 15 aft) WliS bmiled and it required I;ondl loadof2lOnnes(4.4IO1b),hadadded10ilal'('quiremem
One feature of Luftwaffe bombers not generally )'('.or/.ater a prt-prodllctlOfl aIrcraftseN:td briefly II' Spam tionsofaenalsupenomytooperateeffeclJ\·ely.Alonger 10conduct30"-angledh'e-bombinganacks,and Spanish
notedWIiStheirabilllytooptruleIIIallweathers.This re mukrIll' SIl/WP'tUlon ofObnsllfbifr.all/{.v*n Ruilihofen.It ranged version was completing development for expcrien~ indicating the need for bener dcfensh'e
quirement came from Milch, whose direction had Ctl rt:tft,,~d10 G..rmallyif! 1937,bfll/.alain year.omltn anti-shippingoperations 35 theJu S-R,and astudywas armamenlled toafourth ere\\ memberbeingadded.As
sun:d that Lufthansa possessed such a capabilit)· befon: beTofproductionditv:-bo",bvsftv1'Utl110Spai"andbegan alsounderwayofa carrier-borneversionoftheJu 8-B, arcsuhofnumerousdesignchanges.theweightoftheJu
the Nazis came to power. This was emulated by the tlu I)~'s j.amolts COr«J". By Ilu o/ltbT«lil of tNT tliJill theJu87C. 88doubled and performancedropped,sothaitheinitilll
Luftwaffe.whichestablished anetworkofrudio beacons SwkaKllIppen ttt'rt: I" seN:ice, rilT« IWIkr Ri<.hthofen as Di\~-bombingfascinated the Lufl:\\'3ffe de\'Clopmem production aircraft. which was cmcring scn;ce at the
throughout the Reich, and C'\~ry multi-engined aircraft F/~IIrtr:obi'IkJl.-rFllqn-RorpsI'ill!. orgamsauonnotonlyunderGcncralleumamEmstUdet, outbn:ak of Wat, had a maximum speed of 460km'h
15
14
AIRCRAFT OF THE SECO~O \'i'OR!.D \X'AI{ AXI.:s AIRCRAFT AT TilE Ol;TBREt\K OF \\:'AI{
\
.L ,""'"
~,~
i
.J
C.O
Unlike{he RAT;tileLlif/waffedevelopeda10llg-rullgecuorlfighler!illlerceplOr ill Ille AJesserschmill Hf110, ProJlIClioll (LIas
slowdllrillglheslimmerof1939,alldolllyafer/) Zcrs/orergmppell J/lld receivedIhe Iype whe" Pola"du:a.sillvudlod.The Silll
miol/grud/wllyimproved,Qlld(('illli" aJ'tartheHf110wasbcillg/lsedforotherrolesinell/dillgrffQllllaissallCi',forrdllth lhis
Hf110C-5tOO!dctx/oped,
(286mph) and a range of 1,770km (1,100 miles).-Ille outbreak ofwar. Fortunately Focke-\X'ulfhad been de fenestration. The majority of reconnaissance aircraft I-Ie 59 twin-cngincd multi-role floatplane which was
maximum imernal bombload was 1,800kg(3,960Ib) or signing along-range maritimereconnaissance \'ersion of were Do 17F{p\'ersionsofthe Do I7E/"Ibombers,with used also for anti-ship operations and minelaring.
2,OOOkg externally, the internal bomb load being theFw200B four-engined airlinerfor theJapanese Na\'y cameras in the bomb bay,supplemented by small num Experience quickly confirmed that both were at the end
confined to 50kg bombs. as the Fw 200C,and in September the Luftwaffe placed bersofJu 88As and He IIIHs.The philosophyofusing of their opcratioml! lives, but the replacement for the
'Illedive-bombing requiremem wasalso extended to an order for asmall number. bombers for long-range reconnaissance was part ofthe Do 18, the three-engined Blohm undVoss Ih 138 with
Germany'sfour.engined bomber,the He 177,whichwas Interestingly Dipllng Heinrich Hertel,who had con First World War philosophical baggage, when dual use Jumo 20S diesel engines,required considerable redesign
scheduled to be in widespread sen'ice by 19~2. ducted initial design work on the He 177, joined the was the norm,such aircraft being capable either ofOut and was not a\'ailable until the follo\\ing summer.
Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe this extremely sophisti Junkers organisation in the summer of 1939 and took pacingoroutfightingthefew fighters which might inter Fortunately there were no such problems with the He
cated aircT'Jft, designed to the Bomber A requirement, charge of the Homber B design. This was aJu 88 rt' cept them. As the Luftwaffe Quickly disco\·ered. this I15 multi-role f10atpJane which was to replace the He
wastobe plaguedbyde\'elopmcntproblems.Theproto placement,the requirement for which was issued inJuly philosophy depended upon the enemy having old-fash 59.'1l1enewaircraftwastheantithesisofitspredecessor,
typc's four Daimler-Benz DB 601 engines were paired 1939and the development ofwhich proved as accident ionedfighters,andtheintroductionofhigh-performance an all-metal monoplane with enclosed crcw positions
in two nacelles as the DB 606, and were prone to over prone as that of BomberA. In this programme also the interceptors placed aircraft such as the Do 17 in the in and a bomb bar which could hold mines or torpcdoes.
heating,"Illis exacerbated the aircraft's wcight problem Luftwaffe was toprO\'e tooambitiousand Udet'sorgan ddious position where they could neither out-fight nor The floatplane configuration was to impose increasingly
causedby the need for strengthening to meeta600 dive isation inadequate. out-run th<'ir opponents, especially wht'n the lauer severe performance restrictions, bUI (ht' He 115 was (Q
angle requirement. It had been anticipatcd that the 'Ille di\'C-bombing requirement also plagued the had radar to provide early warning of thcir \"ietim's prO\'ea robustand reliable design.
loaded weight of the operational He 177 would be Do 217,agenuinely twin-engined hea\'y bomber which approach. Unlike its rh-als, Ihe Luftwaffe had only one modern
approximately 27 tonnes (59,sOOlb), but successive may be regarded 3S the equi\'alem of lile Avro The solution was based upon adapting fighter single-engine fighler design at the outbreak ofwar, and
prototypes increased in weight until the first production ",Ianchester.The maiden flight was inAugust 1938and designs for re<:onnaissance using their high speed at \'irrually all the Jagdgruppen had the Bf 109, wilil a
\'ersion (I-Ie 177A-I) had a loaded weight of30 tonnes de\"elopmem was under way in 1939, but the umbrella lower altitudes or, e\'en more effcco\'ely, flying at \'ery strength of I,I5I aircraft."Ille selection of the Bf 109
(66,IOOlb). like dive brake in the tail pro\'ed a major headache and high altitudes which even forewarned interceptors had was a political and operational triumph for its designer,
The idea ofa four-engined bomberdidngat6if has e\'entually, in 1939, Udet authorised the temporary sus difliculty in reaching. "ro meet the former requirement Professor\X'illiMesscrschmitt,whohadhad toovercome
been much derided by aviation histOrians, but it should pension of the di\'C-bomhcr requirement, As the han the Messerschmitt Bf IIOC-5 was already being de\'CI personal prejudice (from the Luftwaffe's second-in
be noted thtlt R.A.F Specification P.I3136, which led dlingcharacteristicsoftheaircraftpro\'Cduns.1tisfactory, oped at lile outbreakofwar,while for the latter require command, Gencraloberst Eberhard Milch) and conser·
directlytotheHalifaxand indirectlytothe [Jlncaster,in amajorredesignwasauthorised,leadingtothe Do217E ment, for which the British swiftly used modified \'atism which might h3\'e been epitomised in Udet
cludedan unspecifieddiveanglerequirement,7rY'atone the following ye3r. Spitfires,the Luftwaffe again used bombers.A proposal (whose62 victorieswerewon in traditional fighters). Far
time being seriously considered. In the e\'ent Goring -1l1e Luftwaffe's bombers (and those of Italy's Regia was rec<'i\'ed from Junkers to com'ert Ju 86 airframes from being a stick-in-the-mud, howe\'er, Udet quickly
personally authorised removal of the di\'e-bomber re· Aeronautica) were also its 'eyes', both in their normal with pressurised eabins and impro\"ed engines as theJu recognised the \"alue of the Bf 109 and his demonstra·
quirememenrly in Ihe He I77'sdevelopment,but Udet's configuration and in dedicated long-range reconnais 86H (laterJu 86P), and this appeared in the summerof tions undoubtedly helped 10 extinguish any opposition
compartmentalised organisation with its blinkered engi sance versions. 'Ibe latter were assigned to separate 19~0together with lile Bf1IOC-5. from traditionalists.TheBf10912wastheprimefirst-line
neers wasunable to rt'soh'e the bombersproblemsuntil Arm~' and Luftwaffe Fernauf1:.liirungsstatfeln, although "Ibe only Luftwaffe reconnaissance units wilil dedi aircraft, with a maximum speed of 550kmjh (3~2mph)
19~3. 'Ibe absence of the He 177, which was to ha\'e the Kampfgeschwader themselves conducted a great catt-d reconnaissance aircraft were the Sedernauf and a formidable armament of two 20mm MG FF
been thebackboneofthelong-rangeanti-shippingforce, deal of reconnaissance for their own missions and klarungsstaffcln and the Ktislenmehrlweckstaffcln, the cannonandtwo,\IG 17machinc.guns,butasubstantial
created a major problem for the Luftwaffe :It the German bombers were noted for their extensive former with the Do 18flying boat and the lalterwith the number ofthe older Bf 109Ds were in service with the
16 17
AIRCRAFT OF TilE SECOND '«'ORLD WAR AXIS AIRCN.ArT AT TltE OUTBREAK OF '«'AN.
'Ikm~ngmcdaircraft WIth twO-or three-man crews, airfields behmd enemy lines. Not e\'cn the So\'iet A,r
such as the Bf 110, wcre greatly influenced by experi. Force, which had pioneered airborne operations, had
ence in the First \X'orld \X'ar, notably with the Bristol such a force.
Fighter and !he Caudron C.II. In the face ofthe high
pcrformance fighters such as the Bf109 whichemerged Ital)'
III the late 19305, all ofthe long.range fighters were 10 Serond onlyto the Luftw~dffe in prestige at theoutbreak.
pro\~a disappointment, lacking the speed or manoeu ofthe Second\'('orldWarwas haly's Regia Aeronautica.
\Tability to dogfight with the single...engined aircraft Europc's second autonomous air force, It had some
Most were to be reduced in status lOground-attackdu 2.800 first-line aircraft in September 1939,'Ine prestige
ues m daytime,although some, like lhe Bf110, were to hadbeengamedthroughtheinheritanceofthemantleof
earn anewI~ofhfeas nlghtfighlers, the greal prorhet of air power, Gen Guilio Douhet,
10 Sffppkmtm Iht Bf 109, dt'f.1tlopmtl/t had beglm ofI~ Cenaml}' the outbreak ofthe W:;lr 5a\\ the Luft\\'lItfe through IUoperationalexperienceinEthiopiaandSpain
FocJu..lnlifFtc 190,tlu"Iprotol>1'tdtp~ttJIurrfi>,''Zfor acti\'Cly considering IWOdesigns as successors tothe Bf 35 \\~II as numerous record-breaking flights. Conse
I~fir'll lmu ,1/Jwu 1939.As fl:'1lh tM Hoo:ker1j-phoon, 110 in !he Zcrstorcrgruppen, 'Ine Messcrschrruu Me quently many air forces ordered Itnlian aircraft before l..ikelheJil 52,IkSoooia-.\lo1'CMui5.81 PJplStrtl/Q(Bat)
1Mtksign m:u pwglltJbytrlgint probbu,althollgh in 1M 210,ofwhich the prototype flew on 5September 1939, lhe Second \'('orld \'\'ar, and as late as the summer of U'CU a bombn mil/sport frhich saw almm.1t Mn'1a ",
~ of 1M Gin/lUll Ulrcraft '''~' m'n' r.w«rl!aud by was the fa\'OUTite, gh·en Messenchmiu's cxperience. 1940C\'Cn the RAF\\'35seekingCaproni light bombers. Spain,fr1urtitprot1tdobwInctm,ytltt'tll In 1939llfornud
btirtallarJCY/II 1MRL\f presuge and mfiuence, wlule the Arado Ar 240, which "ne reallly was that the Regia Acronautica \\'lIS a Ihtbackbolleof1MGnippiBT.aluu)f(glrincrMsinglyilm:u
first flew In May 19.1(), W:;lS the back.up programme, turkey rather than an eagle, due largel)· to luly's w~ak ratrictedtomghlbombiflg.
7..erstorergruppen pending the delivery of adequate Both were extremely sophisticated designs with defen mdustrial base, \\ith both a.trcrart comparues and com
numbersofBf IIOs,and alsoIn!he Nachtjagdgruppen, si\'C armament including remotely controlled barbeues, ponent manufa.cturers under-capnaliscd. leading to low traditional construction, with steel tube or wooden air·
Development of the replacement Sf 100F "i!h Iughcr Unfortunatelybothdesignsdisplayedappallmghandhng rates ofproduction. Nevertheless_ industry was seeking frames CO\'cred "i!h woodordoped fabric, and most of
pcrfomun~. including a maximum s~ of6OObn,Ih characteristics,esp«ially\\1th regard10stablliry.,ne,\le to meet the Regia Acronautica:s expansion plan, the bombers had sunilar cO\'CTings on their \\lngs.
(373mph) but weaker armament, was already under 210 programme m parucular pro\'ed prolonged lind so Programme R, and all the modem bombers such as !he Compared \\1th the all-metal monocoque, these weaker
wa)'.andmentionshouldalsobe madeofacarrier·bome disastrously unsuccessful that it pro\'ided Milch with an CRDACant Z.IOO"7bisAlcione(Kingfisher),FiatOR20 structures look a higher proportion of the take-off
\-crsion With Improved range,the Hf109'1',underdevel opponunity for re\'enge upon the designer, ....·hom hc Cicogna (Stork) and Sa\'Oia-MarcheniS.-9-1 Spaniero weighl, imposing penalties upon both range and pay·
opment at theoutbreakofwar humiliated in 1942. (Sparrow HaWk),were low.wingcantile\'er monopl.ancs load, \\hile !he m31crials were more vulnerable to eO\i
The success of!he Hf109 made the higherechelons InonerespectatleasttheLufl\\'3ffewasStreetsahead "1th retractable undercarriages,while the othercompo- ronmental conditions which reduced aircraft life.
in the LurtW'atre reluctant to oonsider another fighter, of Its m"als."Inat \\'3S In the pro\ision ofair transpon, nent of the GruPPI BombardamentoTeTTCSte. the S.81 The problem \\'3S compounded by the inabilily' of
but !he \'3lue of hea\ier llfTllament and a more robust although th,s was by' accident rather than design. In its I'ipcstrello (Bat) bomber-transport had a fixed under· Italian aero-engme manufacturers 10 pro\'ide high.
undercarflageledUdet'sorgamsalJonreluctantJytocon ellrly days tJle Luftwaffe Intended supplementing its Do carriage. Howcvcr, as \\i!h most of !he Regia. power,waler-cooled, in-line motors,which forad them
sider just such a requirement. By the outbreak ofwar, II bombers wilhasmallnumberofJu 52/301 transports t\eronautiea's combat aircraft, theirfuselages wereall of 10 rei)' upon radials oftcn dcveloped from foreign
therefore,work ....'lISwell ad\'3ncc:d on!he Fw 190 witha which would be operated by LufthanS3 and be capable
radial,air.cooled engine,and in]une 1939theprototype of conversion into bombers With !he appropriate kit.
made its maiden flight. The lack of integration \\ithin AI!houghit\\'lISanall·metalmonoplanewithacantile\'er
Udet's organisution mean! that [WOyears were toelapse wing,the'-nulleju'(Aunticjunkers), as the aircraft was
before tJle n~w figiller entered scn'ice,and it required a nicknamed, was techniC'.tll)' an oldcr-gcncration design
jagdgcschwadcrtechnicalofficertoprovidethedirection with astructure ofcorrugated aluminium O\'era tubular
which was to make the Fw 190<me ofthe great fighters stcel fr.tmework, a strong fixed undercarriage and three
ofthe SecondWorldWar. UM\XI 132 radial engines.
Udet's influence, and that 0f the Nazi Party in the The fllilure of the Do II series, despile radical re
shapc ofMesserschmin's good friend RudolfHess,also design, led to thedecision to usc theJu 5213m as aStOp
helped ensure the Luftwaffe I)ad a long-range fighter gap pcnding the arrh'QI of the second-generatiol
(Zerstonrr or Destroycr in German terminology) in the bombers (Do 17, He III,ju 86),"111e air bridge which
Bf 110. of which 102 were available.lne Bf 110 was allowed General Franco to mo\'e thousands of troops
typical ofattempts b)' many air forces during !he 19305 from Morocco 10Spain in theearlydaysofthe Spanish
to develop an alrcrnrt which could either accompany Cinl War, mostl)' relymg upon com'Crted ju 52/301
bom~r form:llions throughout their missions or inter bombers, alerted the Luftwaffe to the llId\'anlagesofair
ceptenemybombersfar fromtheirtargets (animportant tr.msport.At the outbreak ofwarsome 550 were in ser
requirement in the days before radar WllS widel)' lI\'lIil \ice,and apart from adozen aircraft in an X-Verfahren
able), Curiously, although the Luftwaffe had developed bombmg urnt, all "~re transporu. Iialf of them were
drop-woksb)' theoutbreak.ofwar,theideaofextending assigned to general transport duties (inclUding those
smgle.cngme fighter range b)' these means does not requislljoned from Lufthansa), ready to ft}· m replace IUJJy~tkgom eaminjRillnit;deU'Adriati£o(Cam) Z.I007bisAkiolle(Killgjis!ur)trlltrtdseTt--Kein 1939alldhtlptdform
appeare\'en tohan~~considered,although a similar mentsandsuppliestoforward units,\\hiletheremainder Ihe badtbont of1Mtmrll/'U Grupp'-BoII/bardommtt TtrrtSu,ytl If aJso SIlmmllristd the fl.1ta)mnsn ofthe Ira/ian airaufl
CTlUc1Sm might also be applied to the US Eighth Air \\~re assigned to '-liegerdi\'ision 7 with crews trained indllstr;)~Millg ofall-fJ:OOdtn collSmielion btcallSe there m:u insufficinu im;n/mtlllfor all·,nelalaircrafl,andhunng tlrru
Foftt in 1942, either to drop troops b)' parachute or to fly them into tIIgl/lelbtcauset~i"dustrym:ui"wpabltofproducinghigh-powendengillo.
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