World War II battlefield communications

66 Pages·2010·6.774 MB·English

by  Gordon L Rottman, Peter Dennis, Martin Windrow

Elite • 181 Thehistoryofmilitaryforces,artifacts,
personalitiesandtechniquesofwarfare
E
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1 World War II Battlefield
8
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Communications
World War II Battlefield
Communications
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Thedevelopmentofpractical,man-portableradiosetsfor l
d
communicationbetweencompaniesandbattalionheadquarters, W
a
andlaterbetweenplatoonsandcompanies,wascentraltothe r
I
characterofWorldWarIIinfantryfighting.Itenabledunitstoemploy I
B
flexible,coordinatedtactics,allowingtheircommanderstoexploit a
t
t
success,callinsupportingfire,orlimitthecostsoffailure.However, le
f
i
thenewman-packradioswerestillimmatureandinfantrycommanders e
l
d
alsohadtoemployothermeans,fromwire-linkedfieldtelephones
C
tothemostbasicofall–asoldiercarryingamessage.Thisconcise o
m
guidetoavitalandfascinatingaspectofWorldWarIItacticsexplains m
u
theequipmentandpracticeoftheUS,British,Soviet,German,and
n
i
Japanesearmies.Itisillustratedwithmanywartimephotos,andwith c
a
t
colorplatesshowingeverythingfromtelephonesandradiostoflags i
o
n
andflarepistols,andhowtheywereused.
s
Fullcolorartwork Unrivaleddetail Photographs Diagrams
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elite • 181
World War II Battlefield
Communications
Gordon L. rottman Illustrated by Peter dennIs
ConsultanteditorMartinWindrow
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FirstpublishedinGreatBritainin2010byOspreyPublishing, DEDICATION
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1011121314 987654321 IMPERIALWARMUSEUMCOLLECTIONS
ACIPcatalogrecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary ManyofthephotosinthisbookcomefromtheImperialWarMuseum’shuge
collectionswhichcoverallaspectsofconflictinvolvingBritainand
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ColchesterRoad,FratingGreen,Colchester,Essex,CO77DW DifferencesinUS&Britishterminology
E-mail:[email protected] American British
www.ospreypublishing.com SignalCorps(SC) RoyalCorpsofSignals(RSigs)
radio(key)orradio-telegraph wireless-telegraphy(W/T)
radioortelephone(voice) wireless-telephony(R/T)
radio-teletype teleprinter
spiral-fourcable quadcable
Abbreviations antenna aerial
vacuumtube valve
AM amplitudemodulated simplex superpose
CP commandpost fieldwire cableorline
CW continuouswave(i.e.Morsecodecommunication) wirereel cabledrum
FM frequencymodulated communicationofficer signalofficer
GMT GreenwichMeanTime messagecenter signaloffice
HQ headquarters messenger runner
IDL InternationalDateLine courier dispatchrider(D/R,“Don-R”)
MC megacycle
Mhz megahertz
OP observationpost Frequencymeasurement
RDF radiodirectionfinding(er)
SCR- SignalCorpsRadio(US) DuringWorldWarIImostcountriesusedmegacycles(MC)for
WS wirelessset(UK) frequencymeasurement;in1960thisstandardwaschangedto
XO executiveofficer(second-in-command) megahertz(MHz).BritishandEmpire/Commonwealthforces
measuredwavelengthinmeters.
Frontcover:EasternFront,January1944:aforwardobserverforan 300,000dividedbykilocycles=meters
300,000dividedbymeters=kilocycles
artillerybatteryofPzGrenDiv“Grossdeutschland”usinga
Fernsprecher33fieldtelephone.(Sipho)
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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 4
MEANS OF TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS 6
Fieldtelephones radios Visualsignals:flareandsmokeprojectiles–smokegrenadesand
candles–signalflags–markerpanels–signallights–armandhandsignals Messengers
audiblesignals
UNIT COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 20
unitedstates britainandempire/Commonwealth sovietunion Germany Japan
COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES 38
Phoneticalphabets Morsecode timesanddates documents:securityclassifications–
messageprecedence Messagecenteroperations Communicationscountermeasures
SIGNAL UNITS 50
divisionalunits Infantryregimentalandbattalionsignalelements:unitedstates–britainand
Commonwealth–sovietunion–Germany–Japan
UNIT COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 57
CONCLUSION 61
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 62
INDEX 64
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WORLD WAR II BATTLEFIELD
COMMUNICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Military communications – (“commo” or “comms”), signals (“sigs”), or in
theGermantermNachrichten–describesawiderangeofmeanstotransmit
theGermanTornisterFunkgerät
“Cäsar”and“Dora”modelswere orders,information,andrequestsbetweenheadquartersandunits.Thevaried
externallysimilarandboth means to accomplish this included radios, field telephones, telegraph,
man-portable,themain
teletype, pyrotechnic signal flares, colored smoke signals, signal flags,
differencebeinginfrequency
ground–air signal panels, heliographs, signal lamps, messengers (human
coverageandweight.thisset,
mountedinaKfz2 oranimal),andmore.
Nachrichtenkraftwagen(signals Theservicesprovidedbyanarmy’scommunicationsbranchpersonnelwere
car)byanartilleryunitof17.
equally widely varied. Besides operating all of these varied means they had
Panzerdivision,isprobablya
to develop, maintain and repair equipment; provide communications
20kg(44lb)torn.Fu.crather
thana17kg(37.5lb)torn.Fu.d2. equipment, supplies and related items to other organizations and units; lay
4
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Inthe1940stherepairingof
communicationsequipment
wasaconstantdemandupon
signalsunits.evenintheus
armyunitsdidnothavespare
radios,andtherelativelyfragile
andtechnicallyimmaturesets
hadtobe“turnedaround”in
therepairshopsasquicklyas
possible.
Correctingsome
common
misconceptions
andrepairtelephoneandtelegraphlines;provideencryptionanddecryption * thevoicerangeofthe
greatmajorityofbattlefield
services; allocate and manage radio frequencies, call signs and codeword
radioswasverylimited.
systems; reduce or counter enemy intercept and jamming efforts; attempt to * aMandFMradioscannot
intercept,monitorandjamenemycommunicationstraffic;monitortheirown communicatewithone
another.
communications to ensure security compliance, and develop and implement * Whencommunicating
securitymeasures;operateradar,provideradiodirection-finding,andestablish betweentworadiosonly
oneoperatorcanspeakat
andoperateradiobeaconsandnavigationguidancesystemsforaircraft.Some
atime–theothercannot
armies’signals services hadadditionalresponsibilities suchas providing still interrupt.
* listeninginonradioand
andmotion-picturephotography,andproducingtraining,motivational,and
wirecommunicationsat
propaganda films. Some also broadcast radio news and entertainment small-unitlevelobtained
programs,andpublishednewspapersandotherinformationpublications. littleusableintelligence.
Withradioitwasextremely
difficulttodetermineeven
*** wherethetransmittingunit
was.anyinformation
Great strides had been made in radio and other means of communications
obtainedwasextremely
through the 1930s. On the eve of World War II many researchers felt that perishableowingtothe
rapidlychangingtactical
tactical radios could not be much further improved, and mass production
situation,andoflittleuse
commenced.Itwasthefirsttimethattacticalunits(i.e.regimentsandbelow) unlessactedupon
wereprovidedwithmeaningfulnumbersofportableradios,butevensothe immediately.
* long-range
numbersprovedtobeinadequate.Inlightofcombatlossesandthearmies’ communicationssuchas
massive expansion, even the US Army – often described as possessing bysecretagents,
coastwatchers,long-range
extravagantquantitiesofradios,andsupplyinghugeamountsofequipment
reconnaissanceaircraft,
toallies–didnotcatchupwithactualneeduntil1944. etc.,couldnotbe
conductedbyvoice–they
Alliedcountriesworkedondevelopingimprovedtacticalradiostomake
hadtouseMorsecode.
them more reliable and robust for field use, lighter, more compact and * radiodirectionfinders
transportable, longer-ranged, and capable of better reception. The Axis (rdF)wereextremely
inaccurate,andevenifthey
nations,strappedformaterialsandresourcesandfacingmultipledemandsfor wereableto“triangulate”
what they had, were mainly forced to make do with existing systems, and asignaltheymightbe
hundredsifnotthousands
couldnotevenreplacelosses.
ofmetersoff;thiswas
Signaltroops operatedatalllevels,although–dependingonthearmy– dependentnotonlyon
operatorproficiencyand
communicatorsintacticalunitswerenotnecessarilyassignedfromthesignals
equipmentaccuracy,but
service,butbelongedtotheirunit’sparentbranchsuchasinfantry,armor,or onsignalstrength,distance
artillery. The focus of this book is on tactical communications at infantry fromthesignal,and
atmosphericinterference.
regiment/brigadelevelandbelow.
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MEANS OF TACTICAL
COMMUNICATION
FIELD TELEPHONES
Field telephones, wire communications, or “land-lines” were the principal
meansoftacticalcommunicationinallarmies.Mostfieldtelephonesofthe
era were relatively heavy box-like affairs with a handset containing the
mouthpieceandearpiece(seePlateA).Mostoperatedwitharingingcircuit
activated by turning a small crank, which rang a ringer on the other end
oralertedaswitchboard,andusuallyalightaswell(theringercouldbecut
offforsilence).Tospeak,apush-to-talkbuttonwaspressedonthehandset,
which was powered by a battery. Most phones used a two-line wire. The
Germans used a ground (or earth) return system, with a great saving
inmaterials;thisrequiredonlyasingle-strandlineandashortwireconnected
toasteelstakedrivenintotheground.Thedisadvantagewasthattheenemy
couldeasilytapinbysimplydrivingtwostakesattachedtoatelephoneinto
thegroundinthegeneralarea.
Another type was the sound-powered telephone. These lightweight sets,
with a range of no more than a quarter-mile (440 yards) were suited for use
within a company – e.g. for contact with an observation post – or to link
the gun positions within a battery. When the mouthpiece was spoken into
adiaphragmcausedacoiltovibrateandtransmitsoundthroughthewire,and
acoilinthereceivingphonewasvibratedbyamagneticfieldtoproducesound.
The advantages of land-line telephones were significant. They had much
longer ranges than radios; they were more reliable; sound quality was
relatively good so long as distances were not too great, and amplifiers could
be integrated into the system to boost signal strength over longer distances.
A given unit could talk to a subunit in another unit by going through the
battalion switchboards, and the connection could be made in just a couple
ofminutes.Withradioitwasadifferentmatter.Thesendingunitwouldhave
to have access to the other unit’s radio frequency and callsign. Changing
aGermanwirepartylaysafield
telephoneland-lineparallel
withamuddyroadonthe
easternFront;theleadman
carriesa“wirepike,”usedto
stringcableintrees.Wirewas
morelikelytobecutby
vehiclesifitwaslaidonthe
groundthanbyartillery
fragmentsifitwassuspended.
(stavka/nikCornishWH849)
6
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theGermansmallswitchboard
fortenlines(kleiner
Klappenschrankzu10Leitungen)
requiredanextralinked
Feldfernsprecher33field
telephonetooperateit.
frequencies might require precise tuning and even antenna changes, and
during such communication the operator would be “off net” and unable
tocommunicatewithinhisownunit’snet.Withatelephonetheswitchboard
operatorcouldbreakinandlettheunitknowithadanimmediatecall.
Telephonetrafficwasmoredifficulttointerceptthanradiotransmissions,
althoughthiscouldbeaccomplishedbyinfiltratingintoenemyterritoryand
tapping into the line. Phones were not appreciably affected by atmospheric
conditionsandweather.Ifexistingcommercialphonelineshadnotbeenbadly
damaged,then,withthecooperationoflocalcivilians,theycouldbetapped
into and used by the military (although, of course, the lines had to be cut
wheretheyranintoenemyterritory).
When laying telephone wire (see Plate H), virtually all armies followed
the practice of the higher-echelon unit laying wire to its subordinate units
andsoondowntheline.Typicalpracticewhenconnectingtoadjacentunits,
i.e.,unitsontheflank,wasforaunittomakecontactwiththeunittotheir
right. This was usually only practiced at regimental level: for example,
adjacentbattalionsfromtwodifferentregimentsdidnotlinkupdirectlyby
wire,butthetworegimentalheadquartersdid,andthusthebattalionscould
be connected through adjacent switchboards. This was not as inefficient
asonemightimagine,butensuredanorganizedandefficientcommunications
system; if battalions from different regiments attempted to execute actions
withoutcoordinationwithandapprovalfromtheirparentregiments,itcould
leadtoagreatdealofdangerousconfusion.
Telephonesnaturallyhadtheirlimitations,too.Itrequiredagooddealof
time and wire for a unit to establish a complete wire system. This involved
layingwiretoallsubunits,alternatelines,andlateralconnections,testingthe
lines, and verifying that all stations were on line. Crucially, maintaining
the wire system required ceaseless work. The miles of line were constantly
beingcutbyartilleryandmortarfire,enemyinfiltratorsandpatrols,hostile
civilians,weatherdamage(highwinds,fallentrees,flooding),and–theworst
culprit of all – friendly vehicle traffic. In the Pacific amphibian tractors
(amtracs), extensively used in rear areas to haul supplies, were notorious
for cutting wires. Patrols infiltrating behind enemy lines routinely cut every
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telephonelinetheyencountered,
often pulling down lengthy
sections;theymightalsoambush
wire-repair parties. In rough
terrain and at night it was so
difficult to locate breaks that it
wasofteneasiertolayanewline.
It was preferred that wire was
strungonpolesortreestoavoid
vehicle traffic, but that made
it more susceptible to artillery
and required much more time.
Wiremenmightpresswiredown
into muddy ground in an effort
to protect it; sometimes special
vehicle-pulled plows were used
to cut a groove and bury wire,
but these were limited to the
higherechelons.Indesertandon
large plains such as the Russian
steppestherewerenoconvenient
trees, and wooden poles, if
availableatall,hadtobetrucked
redarmywiremenstringing inoverlongdistances;forexample,theMarinesarrivedontreelessIwoJima
afieldtelephonelineacross withthousandsoftelephonepolessentfromAustralia.
afloodedstream.Whendoing Another issue was the amount of wire necessary. The Germans and
thisthebarewireattheend
Japaneseoftenexperiencedshortages,asdidtheAlliesattimes.Duringrapid
hadtobekeptoutofthewater
topreventitshortingout,and advances and withdrawals wire often had to be left behind, and would be
thelinewouldlaterhavetobe recovered by the other side. There were several types of telephone wire
anchoredacrossthebottom available.Frontlineunitsusedlightweight“assault”wire;easiertocarryand
topreventfloatinglogsand
lay,itofferedshorterrange.Heavierdutywireswereavailableforreararea
debrisfromsnaggingand
breakingit.thefieldtelephone units, and there was also telephone cable capable of transmitting multiple
carriedslungbythe simultaneoustelephoneandtelegraphtransmissions.
foregroundsoldierappears Telephones operated in one of two manners: “point-to-point” or “local
tobeanF-41.Wiremenofall
battery” was when two phones were directly linked together; a “common
armiesoftencheckedthe
battery” system was when a number of telephones were linked to a
telephoneconnectionwhile
layingaline,toensurethat switchboard, as found at battalion level and above. Switchboards signaled
nobreakshadoccurredwhile incomingcallsonspecificlines,andtheoperatorcouldconnectthemwithany
itwasbeinglaidandthat
otherphone.Commonswitchboardsatregimentallevelsandbelowincluded
receptionwasstillacceptable,
six-,10-,12-and20-linemodels.Thebettermodelshadintegralearphones
whichwasaconcernwithlong
lines.(stavka/nikCornisha41) and mouthpieces (an “operator’s pack”); Soviet, German, and Japanese
switchboards,especiallysmallermodels,requiredanextrastandardtelephone
tobeattachedfortheoperator.
While telephones were ideal in the defense, in other situations they lost
someoftheirutility.Duringthemarchtothefrontandotherdisplacements,
unitsnaturallylosttheuseoftelephones,andatelephonenetwasestablished
asquicklyaspossiblewhenunitsoccupiedtheirnewpositions.Theywerenot
withouttheirusesintheoffense,however.Reserveandsupportingunitsand
artillerystayedonthenetuntilrelocatingforward.Advancingunitslaidwire
behind them, and maintained continuous contact down to company level.
Itwasnotuncommonforshort-rangepatrolsoperatingforwardofthefront
linetolaywiretoreportbackinformationimmediately.
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RADIOS
Radio or “wireless” had been used to a limited extent in World War I, but
unlike the rapid advances made in aircraft and motorized vehicles, radio
theorywasnotfullyunderstoodanddevelopmentwasslow.Voiceradiowas
introduced in the 1920s and spread rapidly; previously wireless telegraphy
hadbeenused.Betweenthewarsradioswereimprovedtothepointthatthey
weremadelightandruggedenoughtobetransportedbysoldiersorcarried
in vehicles. Many refinements were introduced, but there were still serious
limitations.Periodradios,includingman-portablemodels,wereheavy;some
had to be broken down into two or more loads, with the receiver and
transmitter carried separately from batteries or a hand-cranked power
generator, antennas, and accessories. Radios were temperamental, required
precisefrequencytuningandcalibration,andstilldemandedgentlehanding
owingtotheirsolderedconnectionsandfragileglassvacuumtubes.
Thereweretwotypesofradios.Mostwere amplitudemodulated(AM).
Theseachievedlongrangebyvoice,butwhenusingcontinuouswave(CW)
transmission–thatis,key-tappingMorsecode–theycouldreachevenlonger
ranges. They used skip-wave transmissions – radio waves reflecting off the
ionosphere.AMvoicesignalsweredirectlymappedintochangesintheradio
signal’s amplitude. AM radios could not be operated on the move, but had
to be set up, with a long wire antenna strung in a certain direction and
itslengthadjustedforthefrequencyused.Themessagewastransmittedwhile
theradiowaspoweredbyahand-crankedgeneratorcontinuouslyrecharging
the heavy battery. All of this preparation and set-up was a time-consuming
process.Voicetransmissionshadrangelimitationsandwerenotalwaysthat
clear,pickingupmuchstatic,andthereceivingstationmightnotreceivethe
transmission due to interference from other stations or atmospheric
conditions. AM radios were not conducive to fast-moving situations, and
were not as effective when mounted in vehicles; mechanical operations,
aswellasthevehicle’selectricalsystem(batteries,sparkplugs,lights),created
interferenceevenwithshielding.OneadvantageofAMradioswasthatwith
Mindoro,Philippines,1945:
ausarmycommandpost
operatingansCr-284radio,
thecommonaMsetfor
communicationsbetween
battalionandregiment.the
houseonstiltsprovidesshelter
fromtherainandconcealment
fromover-flyingJapanese
fighters.(Keystone/Getty
Images)
9
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