World Crisis and British Decline, 1929–56 PDF
Preview World Crisis and British Decline, 1929–56
WORLD CRISIS AND BRITISH DECLINE, 1929-56 By the same author THE HISTORY OF THE LIBERAL PARTY 1895-1970 LAND, PEOPLE AND POLITICS IN THE YEAR OF MUNICH THE ADVENT OF WAR, 1939-40 NEW ALLIANCES, 1940-41 FROM WAR TO COLD WAR, 1942-48 1939: A RETROSPECT FORTY YEARS AFTER (editor) WORLD CRISIS AND BRITISH DECLINE, 1929-56 Roy Douglas Reader University of Surrey M MACMILLAN © Roy Douglas 1986 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1956 (as amended). Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published 1986 Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke. Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world Typeset by Vine & Gorfin Ltd, Exmouth, Devon British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Douglas, Roy, 1924- World crisis and British decline, 1929-56. I. Great Britain-History-20th century I. Title 941.082 DA566 ISBN 978-0-333-40579-6 ISBN 978-1-349-18194-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-18194-0 Contents List of Cartoons vi Acknowledgements vii 1 A Kind of Stability 1 2 The Great Depression 11 3 The Darkening Skies 24 4 Stresa and After 42 5 Polarisation 58 6 Appeasement 71 7 Into War 86 8 Annus Mirabilis 99 9 Grand Alliance 114 10 Strains of Empire 124 11 The Course of War 139 12 Uneasy Peace 157 13 1947 172 14 The Lines are Drawn 188 15 The Deepest Danger 197 16 Withdrawal from Empire 211 17 A Calmer World 225 18 Suez 241 19 Reflections 253 Abbreviations Used in the Notes and Bibliography 272 Notes and References 273 Bibliography 281 Index 286 v List of Cartoons The Depression, 1930 23 Some Members of the National Government, 1931 25 The Czechoslovak Crisis, 1938 78 A German Wartime Forecast, 1943 146 The Cost of Victory, 1945 158 Marshall Aid, 1947-48 176 vi Acknowledgements The author wishes gratefully to acknowledge those who have helped in the production of this book. First he would like to thank his wife, and Dr Michael Burstall of the University of Surrey, who have read and criticised the manuscript, and whose comments have proved of enormous value. He would also like to thank the proprietors of copyrights in the various manuscripts listed in the bibliography, and the very helpful librarians of the institutions indicated. The author has tried to keep notes to a minimum. Those statements which the reader may be disposed to query, and which are not covered by notes here, will mostly be found in the appropriate volume of the author's four books covering the period 1938-1948 which are listed opposite the title-page. ROY DOUGLAS Vll 1 A Kind of Stability The world of early 1929 appeared to have recovered from the 1914 war, in the sense in which a man may be said to have recovered from the amputation of a limb. His life is no longer in imminent danger, he has adjusted himself to the loss, and he is going about his activities in the way in which he expects to continue for a long time to come. The countries of western Europe exerted an influence utterly disproportionate to their size and population. Their empires comprised about 45 per cent of the land mass of the world, and a similar proportion of its population. The British Empire, larger than the others combined, covered rather more than a quarter of the globe. India, which then included also Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, carried about three quarters of the total population of that Empire. In Asia and beyond, the British Empire included Australia, New Zealand, Malaya, Ceylon, parts of the archipelago joining Asia to Australia, and Hong Kong. A large part of Africa, many of the West Indian islands, and various territories in other parts of the world, also came within the Empire. Europe was the only continent in which - outside the British Isles themselves - Britain had few possessions: Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus, all of them acquired and held essentially for strategic reasons. Substantial 'Mandates' had been acquired at the end of the First World War: over former German or Turkish possessions for which, at least in theory, Britain was accountable to the League of Nations. There were also various Protectorates which were under local rulers, but in which British interests were safeguarded by 'unequal treaties'. In many places lying outside the Empire - countries like Egypt and Persia, for example - British influence was strong. Much even of the territory lying formally within the British Empire was for practical purposes independent so far as internal government was concerned- although it was not until1931 that the Statute of Westminster formally acknowledged that the United Kingdom Parliament would not legislate for these 'Dominions' unless requested by them to do so. Independent or not, the whole British Empire looked to Britain for a lead in matters of defence and foreign policy. 1 2 World Crisis and British Decline, 1929-56 Britain's great organ of defence was the Navy-still, by most tests, the strongest in the world. The navy, which cost the taxpayer about £55 millions a year, was the essential link of the Empire, and- as wartime experience had shown-the vital means of ensuring supplies offood and other goods to the home islands. 'Showing the flag' in foreign waters was an acknowledged means of emphasising, in a friendly but firm manner, that British sea power was not to be trifled with. The other British forces together roughly balanced the Navy in cost, and the number of men serving in them was three or four times the number of sailors; but their international importance was far Jess. Nobody expected the British army to match up to the army of-say-France, or saw any reason why it should do so. In so far as soldiers were required for defence of the overseas Empire, they were to a large extent local levies, stiffened by British officers and troops. Conscription had been in force for a little under three years of the 'Great War', but it had been abandoned with relief at the end, and nobody thought of reintroducing it in the peaceful world of 1929. Why should Britain wish to have a great army on a continental scale? Soldiers returning from the war were determined that neither they nor their sons should repeat the experiences of the Western Front. Pacifists who hated all war on principle, realists who denied that war was worth what it cost, military officers who had no wish to train conscripts, taxpayers anxious to reduce their burdens, enthusiasts for civil liberties who feared that large armies must always be a threat to those liberties - they all agreed with the ex-soldiers' views for their disparate reasons. Britain's economic position was less secure than in 1914, but by no means alarming. Historians have argued about at just what point Britain began to decline relative to other countries: perhaps about the middle of the nineteenth century. The war had given the United States the dubious benefits of being the universal creditor. Yet the British economy was still, to all appearances, very strong. Overall exports of merchandise and bullion were considerably exceeded by imports - £1292 millions against £926 millions in 19291 - but the difference was met, and exceeded, by large revenues from overseas investments, shipping and other services, which totalled £517 millions in the same year. Thus there was usually a healthy balance available for new investment overseas. The recent memories of the First World War, and the 'lessons' which should be drawn therefrom, dominated political thinking in the 1920s and, indeed, for long afterwards. The 1914 war had come as a bolt from a clear sky, in the sense that there was no living tradition of anything
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