Wittgenstein's anthropological philosophy

279 Pages·2017·5.13 MB·English

by  Gebauer

History of Analytic Philosophy
Series Editor
Michael Beaney
King’s College London
Humboldt University Berlin
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Gunter Gebauer
’
Wittgenstein s
Anthropological
Philosophy
GunterGebauer
InstitutfürPhilosophie
FreieUniversitätBerlin
Berlin,Germany
TranslatedbyDeborahAnneBowen
HistoryofAnalyticPhilosophy
ISBN978-3-319-56150-9 ISBN978-3-319-56151-6(eBook)
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-56151-6
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’
Series Editor s Foreword
fi
During the rst half of the twentieth century analytic philosophy
gradually established itself as the dominant tradition in the English-
fi
speaking world, and over the last few decades it has taken rm root in
many other parts of the world. There has been increasing debate over
‘ ’ fi
just what analytic philosophy means, as the movement has rami ed
fl
into the complex tradition that we know today, but the in uence of the
concerns, ideas and methods of early analytic philosophy on contem-
porary thought is indisputable. All this has led to greater self-conscious-
ness among analytic philosophers about the nature and origins of their
tradition, and scholarly interest in its historical development and philo-
sophical foundations has blossomed in recent years, with the result that
fi
history of analytic philosophy is now recognized as a major eld of
philosophy in its own right.
fi
Themainaimoftheseriesinwhichthepresentbookappears,the rst
series of its kind, is to create a venue for work on the history of analytic
fi
philosophy, consolidating the area as a major eld of philosophy and
‘
promoting further research and debate. The history of analytic philoso-
’
phy is understood broadly, as covering the period from the last three
fi
decades of the nineteenth century to the start of the twenty- rst century,
beginningwiththeworkofFrege,Russell,MooreandWittgenstein,who
fl
aregenerallyregardedasitsmainfounders,andthein uencesuponthem,
and going right up to the most recent developments. In allowing the
v
vi SeriesEditor’sForeword
‘ ’
history toextendtothepresent,theaimistoencourageengagementwith
contemporary debates in philosophy, for example, in showing how the
concerns ofearly analytic philosophyrelate to currentconcerns. In focus-
ing on analytic philosophy, the aim is not to exclude comparisons with
— — fi
other earlierorcontemporary traditions,orconsiderationof guresor
themes that some might regard as marginal to the analytic tradition but
whichalsothrowlightonanalyticphilosophy.Indeed,afurtheraimofthe
series is to deepen our understanding of the broader context in which
analytic philosophy developed, by looking, for example, at the roots of
analyticphilosophyinneo-KantianismorBritishidealism,ortheconnec-
tions between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, or discussing the
workofphilosopherswho were importantin thedevelopmentof analytic
philosophy butwho arenow oftenforgotten.
–
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 1951) is without doubt the most con-
fi
troversial gureinthehistoryofanalyticphilosophy.Notonlyhasthere
fi
been intense debate about the signi cance and interpretation of his life
andworkbuttherehasalsobeendisagreementabouthisverystatusasan
fi
analytic philosopher. His rst book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
fi
published in 1921, is rmly entrenched in the canon of analytic philo-
sophy,butinhislaterthinkinghecriticizesmanyofhisearlierviewsand
ff
o ers a new approach to philosophy, which for some undermines
analytic philosophy itself and for others merely inaugurates a new
fl
phase in analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein has had an enormous in u-
ence on thinkers both within and outside the analytic tradition, and the
receptionandinterpretationofhisworkisitselfanimportantpartofthe
history of twentieth-century philosophy.
ff
In this book Gunter Gebauer o ers a reading of Wittgenstein from
outside the predominantly analytic, English-speaking tradition. Drawing
on some of the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, among others, and paying much
’
moreattentionthanisnormalwithintheanalytictraditiontoWittgensteins
life,andthemanyremarksthatWittgensteinmadeabouthimselfincoded
’
entries in his notebooks, Gebauer elucidates what he calls Wittgensteins
‘ ’ ‘ ’
anthropologicalphilosophy.Thisemergedfromthe anthropologicalturn
thathisthinkingtookbetween1929and1932,andfoundexpressionboth
fi
in the rst part of the Philosophical Investigations, which was essentially
completeby1939,andinthenew linesof thoughtthathedevelopedafter
SeriesEditor’sForeword vii
’
theSecondWorldWar.GebauershowshowWittgensteinsanthropological
fl
turnwasin uencedbyconversationsinCambridgewiththeItalianecono-
ff
mistPieroSra a,andmakestheinterestingsuggestionthatWittgensteinwas
inspiredbyashorttextbyMarxabouttheinteractionbetweentheproduc-
—
tionandconsumptionofgoods whichWittgensteinappliedtothecaseof
language.
’
Wittgensteins conception of language-games and his discussion of
rule-following are central to Part I of the Investigations. Gebauer sheds
light on both of these, and their interconnections, by appealing to and
’
elaborating on Bourdieus conception of habitus, understood as the
system of dispositions that an individual acquires through internalizing
ff
the structures of social practices. This also enables Gebauer to o er an
account of the normativity of our rule-following practices, which arises
fromtheunderstandingthatparticipantsintherelevantlanguage-games
developofthedemandsthataremadeontheminsoparticipating.Asfar
’
as Wittgensteins work in the last few years of his life is concerned,
GebauerdiscusseshisideasinOnCertaintyandhisremarksonseeing-as,
many of which came to form the longest section of Part II of the
ff
Investigations. He o ers an especially rich and insightful account of the
importance ofseeing-asfor Wittgenstein,notonly in helpinghimcome
to terms with himself but also in his philosophical methodology. In the
“
Investigations, Gebauer writes at the end of Chapter 7, readers are
”
guided through systematic exercises in seeing-as . Here, above all, we
’
see how Wittgensteins life and work were intimately connected.
This book was originally published in German in 2009 and I am
delighted that it is appearing in English translation in this series on the
history of analytic philosophy. I would like to thank Deborah Anne
Bowen, with help and advice from Gunter Gebauer himself, for produ-
ff
cing such an excellent translation. Gebauer o ers us an account of
’ ff
Wittgensteins philosophy that di ers from what one might expect
‘ ’ fi
from more analytic treatments, but as he would be the rst to stress,
it should not be seen as contradicting other accounts but as shedding
’
lightonother,nolessimportantaspectsofWittgensteinslifeandwork.
February 2017 Michael Beaney
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Notes 12
Other Authors 14
2 The Practice of Philosophy 15
1 Working Language 16
2 The New Certainty 20
“ ”
3 The World Observed From Above, in Flight 23
4 Repeating, Working Through 29
5 Seeing The World Anew 32
Notes 35
Other Authors 38
3 From Seeing to Practice 41
1 The Sense Outside the World 42
2 Projection 44
3 Grasping the Sense of the World 48
4 The Subject at the Limit of the World 52
5 The Subject Interacting with the Things of the World 56
6 The Intentionality of the World 60
Notes 67
Other Authors 73
ix
x Contents
4 The Turn to Anthropology 75
1 Gestures as Body Use 77
2 The Method of Operating with Words 80
3 Learning to Do the Same 85
4 The Empirical Conditions for Like Action 88
“ ”
5 The Common Body 92
6 Gestures, Grammar, Practice 98
Notes 101
Other Authors 106
5 Intention and Perspectives of the Language-Game 109
1 From Grammar to the Language-Game 110
2 Openness and Productivity of Language 113
3 The Intention of the Language-Game 116
4 Perspectives 119
5 Recognition and Perceptual Decision-Making 122
Notes 125
Other Authors 129
6 The Interaction Between Rules and Habitus 131
1 The Problem of Rule-Following 134
2 Critique of the Assumption of a Private Circulation
of Language 138
3 Excursus on a Text by Marx and Its Possible Reception
by Wittgenstein 145
4 Background and Habitus 148
5 The Normative Aspect of Rules 152
Notes 158
Other Authors 161
7 Materialism and Belief 163
ff
1 What We Cannot Think Di erently 164
2 Groundless Certainty 168
3 Grasping and Being-Contained 172
4 Agreement 177
5 Mechanism and Organism 180