Wittgenstein: Issues & Debates (Western Philosophy from C 1900) (Aporia)

150 Pages·2010·0.612 MB·English

by  Eric Lemaire (editor), Jesus Padilla Galvez (editor)

Eric Lemaire, Jesús Padilla Gálvez (Eds.)
Wittgenstein: Issues and Debates
APORIA
Apori/a

HRSG. VON / EDITED BY
Jesús Padilla Gálvez
(University of Castilla-La Mancha)
Alejandro Tomasini Bassols
(National Autonomous University of Mexico)

ADVISORY BOARD
Pavo Barišić (University of Split)
Michel Le Du (Université de Strasbourg)
Guillermo Hurtado (National Autonomous University of Mexico)
Lorenzo Peña (Spanish National Research Council)
Nuno Venturinha (New University of Lisbon)
Nicanor Ursua Lezaun (University of the Basque Country)
Pablo Quintanilla (Pontifical Catholic University of Peru)

Aporia is a new series devoted to studies in the field of philosophy. Aporia (Aπορία)
means philosophical puzzle and the aim of the series is to present contributions by
authors who systematically investigate current problems. Aporia (Aπορία) puts special
emphasis on the publication of concise arguments on the topics studied. The
publication has to contribute to the explanation of current philosophical problem, using
a systematic or a historic approach. Contributions should concern relevant
philosophical topics and should reflect the ongoing progress of scientific development.

Band 3 / Volume 3
Eric Lemaire, Jesús Padilla Gálvez (Eds.)

Wittgenstein:
Issues and Debates
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CONTENTS
ERIC LEMAIRE and JESÚSPADILLA GÁLVEZ 7
Wittgenstein: Issues and Debates
MICHELLEDU 11
Tacit Knowledge and Action
SABINEPLAUD 31
Synoptic Views vs. Primal Phenomena: Wittgenstein
on Goethe’s Morphology
ERIC LEMAIRE 47
Critical Remarks on Anti-Metaphyscial Readings of Wittgenstein
AY(cid:249)EGÜL ÇAKAL 65
What Does the Repudiation of Private Language Mean
in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy?
ALEJANDRO TOMASINI BASSOLS 83
Wittgenstein and the Myth of Hinge Propositions
LARSHERTZBERG 117
Hacker on Concepts
JESÚSPADILLA GÁLVEZ 127
Wittgenstein’s Criticism against Gödel’s Project of Metalogic
Abbreviations 149

Wittgenstein: Issues and Debates

Eric LEMAIRE and Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ

The title of the book refers to the philosopher Wittgenstein, and on issues
on which he was working. Through the publication of his writings of the
middle period, we have gained a new perspective of both, the Tractatus
and the Philosophical Investigations. In summary, one could say that
Wittgenstein has corrected some aspects that he had later considered as
mistakes in the Tractatus. He was very receptive towards the contemporary
discussions and addressed all the relevant issues in philosophy.
Consequently, his arguments became more and more sophisticated. The
book attempts to present a new view of Wittgenstein’s works.
Philosophy can give rise to a certain malaise. On the one hand, in
philosophy we ask important or fundamental questions about the nature of
human beings, the existence or inexistence of God, values we should
follow in our life, the limits of our knowledge, and so on. We want that
these questions do not remained unanswered while, on the other hand, as P.
van Inwagen notices, that they are no established facts or theories in
philosophy, no normal philosophy. Philosophical investigations do not give
rise to wide and long-standing consensus among philosophers, contrary to
what usually happens in natural sciences or mathematics. Why
philosophers never attain definitive solutions to philosophical problems?
During the history of philosophy, this fact has given to philosophers (like
Hume or Kant or the logical positivists for example) the occasion to raise
doubts on our abilities to pursue philosophical knowledge and has received
several explanations. One could say that philosophical problems are too
difficult for us, that our epistemic equipment is not suitable to solve them.
One could as well think that we could attain knowledge if we reform
philosophy, its methods, its ambitions, and its object. One could also
believe that we should be more patient while others assume this is a brutal
characteristic of philosophy itself. Wittgenstein’s answer, which is the
foundation of his conception of philosophy, is probably the most
disconcerting aspect of his works and maybe the most radical of all
answers ever given. According to Wittgenstein, philosophers should not try
to attain established theories because philosophical problems are only

Wittgenstein: Issues and Debates, (Eds. Eric LEMAIRE and Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ). Ontos
Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2010, 7-10.
8 Wittgenstein: Issues and Debates
apparent problems grounded in misuses of language, diseases that analysis
has to cure. Philosophy should not be theoretical; it should let everything
as it is. Philosophical propositions are pure non-sense. It has give rise to
incredulous reactions from distinguished philosophers like Russell or
Ramsey. It appears to be strongly opposed to traditional conceptions of the
discipline, in which the philosopher aimed at discovering objectively true
and widely accepted propositions. It remains until now a very interesting
topic, which is at the heart of many works from scholars. But there are
numerous disagreements between them about the nature of this conception
and its implications for philosophy itself. Is it consistent for a philosopher
to hold that philosophical propositions are non-sense? How should we cure
our understanding from philosophical diseases? What is the correct
methodology to pursue this therapy? Is this cure purely destructive or not?
Was Wittgenstein’s practice really faithful to his aims? Was his philosophy
really opposed to tradition? Works presented here try to discuss some of
these issues.
The work of L. Wittgenstein addresses a huge variety of topics. The
spectrum ranges from mathematics to the analysis of ethical problems.
These issues have generated many important philosophical discussions and
the aim of this book is to examine a broad range of philosophical problems.
It contains relevant issues and debates on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writings
that make reference to social sciences, morphology, metaphysics, private
language and the so-called hinge prepositions.
In his article entitles ‘Tacit Knowledge and Action’, Michel Le Du
investigates the problems and solutions proposed by L. Wittgenstein in his
philosophy of social sciences. M. Le Du analyzes the grammar of the
concept of understanding. L. Wittgenstein’s remarks on this topic are
scattered in many different places and are therefore difficult to catch in one
single grasp. Nevertheless, the author tries to sum up these remarks and
examine their implications for the social sciences.
The paper presented by Sabine Plaud deals with the issue of synoptic
views vs. primal phenomena concerning Wittgenstein’s remarks on
Goethe’s Morphology. S. Plaud showed that L. Wittgenstein did not
always Goethe the appreciation that he would have deserved for having
traced phenomena to their origins. Nevertheless, L. Wittgenstein took up
Goethe’s thoughts and consequently tried to re-evaluate Goethe’s approach
of primal phenomena so as to make it compatible with his own
conceptions. She will focus on a parallelism that might be drawn between
Tacit knowledge and Action 9

the “morphological method” supported by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in
his scientific writings on the one hand, and Wittgenstein’s concern for
“synoptic views” on the other hand.
Eric Lemaire’s article contains critical remarks on Wittgenstein’s
anti-metaphysical readings and asks whether Wittgenstein had actually
destroyed metaphysics. The author argues that if this were true it has to be
made clear that Wittgenstein’s philosophy cannot actually be qualified as
metaphysics. Moreover, he had underlined that metaphysical propositions
are nonsensical. By examining Wittgenstein’s texts, the author raises two
main questions, first whether there is an anti-metaphysical reading of the
second Wittgenstein. Second, E. Lemaire asks whether Wittgenstein’s
works actually offer a plausible explanation for the assumption that
metaphysical propositions are nonsense.
Ayşegül Çakal enquires what the repudiation of private language
means in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. By challenging, the dichotomy of
“inner” and “outer” in the Tractatus Wittgenstein rejects private language
by means of reducing it to something meaningless. However, in the
Investigations Wittgenstein expelled meaningfulness from mere internal to
external by eliminating the possibility of an internal way of grasping the
meaning of linguistic expressions. According to his view, the meaning of a
linguistic expression can thus only be learned by an ‘act of meaning’
within the society in which one lives through its use. Therefore, the radical
change in Wittgenstein’s position on meaning can be found in his private
language argument. She in this paper, I will examine his rejection of the
traditional distinction between reality and language and evince the effect
of it to his later understanding of meaning in language. To this aim, she
will first give a background of his understanding of language and meaning
in general. A. Çakal present the private language argument in parallel with
its effects on his later understanding of meaning in order to be able to see
how it renders private (internal) ostensive definition unintelligible and why
it is a rejection of identifying referential and representational attitudes and
the way of asking questions of traditional approaches.
Alejandro Tomasini Bassols focuses on Wittgenstein and the myth
of the so-called ‘hinge propositions’. From the point of view of the history
of ideas, the effects of this myth just cannot be ignored. Indeed, based on
this myth it now has become a sort of unavoidable fashion to speak of a
“third Wittgenstein”, a thinker who apparently would have superseded or
overcome his own magnum opus, i.e., the Philosophical Investigations. A.
10 Wittgenstein: Issues and Debates
Tomasini Bassols starts out from the following point: if we contemplate
his work as a whole, how many Wittgensteins is it reasonable to think
there are? His paper is devoted to answering this question.
Lars Hertzberg focuses on P.M.S. Hacker’s thoughts on concepts and
argues that it is through speakers’ responses to utterances that distinctions
between correct and incorrect enter into language. The misunderstanding
we need to guard against is that we could base a description of correct use
on neutral observations of the linguistic behaviour of the members of a
speech community. We need what Hacker calls an internal point of view.
However, if that is granted Quine’s reason for questioning the
analytic/synthetic distinction dissolves. On the other hand, the author has
some disagreements with the way Hacker construes that point of view.
Jesús Padilla Gálvez discusses Wittgenstein’s criticism against
Gödel’s project of metalogic. The author makes reference to a chapter in
the Big Typescript entitled ‘Metamathematics does not exist’ and that
presented a criticism of Gödel’s metalogic point of view. The author
examines the frame within which the meta-mathematical discussion took
place in Vienna at that time. He wants to analyse the historical background
of the meta-mathematical discussion in Vienna. He will deal with the
purpose of the calculus and he will try to define what a rule is. Finally, he
will focus on the problem of completeness and internal consistency in
Wittgenstein’s critical arguments against Gödel’s proposal. Wittgenstein’s
arguments create a new point of view in this field as he has shown that many
equivocal mathematical results originate from being based on ambiguous
philosophical terminology. In this book, the editors Eric Lemaire and Jesús
Padilla Gálvez have undertaken to sum up the papers presented at the
Congress on Wittgenstein ‘Philosophie et pratique de la philosophie’ in
Nancy in 2007. Additionally, some papers from specialist on Wittgenstein
were included in the publication.
We would like to thank all those colleagues who accepted our
invitation to both participate in the congress and to contribute to the book.
We are indebted to the public institutions that have financially supported
the congress. On this occasion, we benefited not only from the continued
and generous support of the Université Nancy, the Archives Henri
Poincaré (UMR 7117), the Conseil général de Meurthe et Moselle, the
Conseil scientifique de l’Université Nancy 2, the UFR Connaissance de
l’Homme, the University of Castilla-La Mancha and the Faculty of Law
and Social Sciences in Toledo.