Willing and Unwilling: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer

167 Pages·1987·5.23 MB·English

by  Julian Young (auth.)

WILLING AND UNWILLING
NIJHOFF INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES
VOLUME 33
General Editor: JAN T.J. SRZEDNICKI (Contributions to Philosophy)
Editor: LYNNE M. BROUGHTON (Applying Philosophy)
Editor: STANISLAW J. SURMA (Logic and Applying Logic)
Editorial Advisory Board:
R.M. Chisholm, Brown University, Rhode Island. Mats Furberg, Goteborg
University, D.A.T. Gasking, University of Melbourne, H.L.A. Hart, University
College, Oxford. S. Korner, University of Bristol and Yale University.
H.J. McCloskey, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Melbourne. J. Passmore,
Australian National University, Canberra.A. Quinton, TrinityCollege, Oxford.
Nathan Rotenstreich, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Franco Spisani,
Centro Superiore di Logica e, Scienze Comparate, Bologna. S.J. Surma,
Auckland University, New Zealand. R. Ziedins, Waikato University, New
Zealand.
For a list of volumes in this series see final page of the volume.
Julian Young
Willing and Unwilling:
A Study in the Philosophy
of Arthur Schopenhauer
Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V. •
Distributors
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Young, Julian.
Willing and unwilling.
(Nijhoff international philosophy series ; 33)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1788-1860. 2. Will--History-
19th century. I. Title. II. Series: Nijhoff inter
national philosophy series ; v. 33.
B3148.Y68 1987 193 87-12399
ISBN 978-90-481-8303-6 ISBN 978-94-015-7756-4 (eBook)
DOl 10.1007/978-94-015-7756-4
Copyright
©1987bySpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht
OriginallypublishedbyMartinusNijhoffPublishers,Dordrechtin 1987.
Softcoverreprintofthehardcover1stedition1987
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
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the publishers,
To
Percy and Renee
Foreword
The Anglo-Saxon reception of Schopenhauer has a long and valuable
tradition. An early reaction to Schopenhauer's thought from outside the
German-speaking world was the appearance in the Westminster Review for
1853of "Iconoclasm in German Philosophy", an insightful essayof apprecia
tion written by John Oxenford.Agratified Schopenhauerwas able to remark:
"my philosophy has just set foot in England" (To Lindner, 27.4.1853). It
remained there and spread throughout the English-speaking countries. In
the following decades Schopenhauer's works were translated into English:
carrying on the task of translation begun in the nineteenth century there
stands out, particularly, the masterly achievementof EricF.Payne. No less
active, however, has been the philosophical discussion devoted to Schopen
hauerin books and journal-articles. In 1890Wallace published the first biog
raphy of Schopenhauer in English, and the monographs by Caldwell (1894)
and Coppleston (1946)are cornerstones of a continuous, if not widespread,
concern with Schopenhauer's philosophy in the English language. An in
creased interest in Schopenhauer in the Anglo-Saxon countries has mani
fested itself in the last twenty-five years (Gardener (1963),Hamlyn (1980),
Fox (ed.) (1980),Magee (1983)inter alia).
The present study carrieson this tradition.Its distinctiveness consists in
its explicit connecting of Schopenhauer's work to the philosophy ofKant.
The author's intimate knowledge of both thinkers has already been estab
lished in previous studies. The present work offers a systematic, critical
discussion of Schopenhauer's central ideas that is insightful, equally, with
regard to both Schopenhauer and Kant. Of particular value for Schopen
hauer-scholarship is the fact that, along with Schopenhauer and Kant, the
presence of LudwigWittgenstein makes itself felt throughout the book even
where Wittgenstein (for contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy the dec
isively important thinker in so many areas) is not mentioned explicitly..
This points to the task of bringing about an examination of Schopenhauer's
metaphysics from the standpoint of contemporary analytic philosophy.
HereJulian Youngisapioneeruponwhomwecanrely.
RudolfMalter.
(TranslatedfromtheGermanbyJulianYoung.)
vii
Preface
Kant thought to reform metaphysics by showing, once and for all, that
knowledge of the transcedent is, for human beings, impossible. Philosophy
wastobecomemorerespectablebybecomingmoremodest,byrecognisingthat
"all possible speculative knowledge of reason is limited to mere objects of
[sense] experience" (CPR Bxxvi). Yet even before his own death Kant's
counsels of moderation and self-discipline were already being cast aside in
what developed into a positive orgy ofmetaphysical speculation of the most
outrageously ambitious character.
Bypopular repute, no-one bears greater responsibility for this distaste
ful spectacle than Arthur Schopenhauer. With his claim that the world in
itself is not, as Kant held, unknowable but is rather "will", he breached, it is
supposed, the Kantian limits to the legitimate deployment of human reason
with aflagrancysecond tonone.
Yet all his life Schopenhauer claimed to be a faithful disciple of the
greatman. He viewed himself, in fact,as the only genuine disciple left,and
claimed to experience a truly Kaniian disgust at the metaphysical excessesof
his contemporaries.
In this study I am concerned, firstly, to excavate, reconstitute, and
exhibit the rich vein of truth that is to be found in The World as Will and
Representation. Concerning, in particular, the foundations of natural science,
concerningart and genius, and concerningthemistakenness ofallowinglifeto
be dominated by the will, Schopenhauer has, Ibelieve, deep and sometimes
wonderful things to say. But,secondly,I am concerned with the question of
how to read Schopenhauer. Myanswer tothis question isdominatedby the
idea that his claim "ich selbst Kantianer bin" (PP I p.42) is to be taken ab
solutely seriously. Following this thread, I argue that he does not, in fact,
claim the world in itself to be will at all. Rather, he agrees with Kant that
it is, to the rational mind at least, unknowable. As I read him, while the
world may appear "as Representation" and, on a deeper level, "as Will",it
remains, like an actor who appears as Macbeth and as Hamlet but never as
himself, in itself, inscrutable.
I should like to express my deep thanks to Ron Atkinson, Jenny Die
praam, Andrea Dye, Gottfried Gabriel, Denis Robinson, Carol Schmid,
Krister Segerberg, Stan Surma, and Martin Tweedale, who, in various ways,
have helped this book to appear and to be better than it would otherwise
have been. I should like to thank, also, the University of Auckland for the
study leave that provided the time during which most ofit was written, and
the Universities of Exeter and Constance whose hospitality provided the
place. And I should liketo thank the German AcademicExchangeServicefor
the grant which made six months at the edge of the magical LakeConstance
possible. Finally, I should like to thank the editor of the Schopenhauer
ix
PREFACE
[ahrbuch, Rudolf Malter, for allowing me to use material from my 'A Scho
penhauerian Solution to Schopenhauerian Pessimism' (vol 68, 1987) in
Chapter X, and for writing the foreword to this book, and the editors of
Kani-Siudien, Gerhard Funke and Rudolf Malter, for allowing me to use
material from my 'The Standpointof Eternity: Schopenhaueron Art' (vol 78,
1987) in ChapterVII.
The translationsfrom the Germanused in the text are myownbutI have
not gratuitously departed from those cited in the bibliography. Serious de
partures are generally accompanied by the German original in parentheses.
Frequently cited works areabbreviated in the following manner:
Schopenhauer
TheWorld as Will and Repersentation vol I, vol II WR I, WR II
The Fourfold Root of the PrincipleofSufficientReason FR
On the Will in Nature WN
On the Basis of Morality BM
On the Freedomof the HumanWill FW
Parerga and Paralipomena vol I,vol II PP I,PP II
Kant
The CritiqueofPureReason CPR
(Numeralsprecededbyan'A'refertopagesin
the first edition,by a 'B' the secondedition.)
The CritiqueofJudgement q
(Numeralsrefer to sectionandparagraphs: thus
57.6refers to the sixth paragraph in § 57.)
ProlegomenatoanyFutureMetaphysics Prol.
Foundationof the Metaphysics of Morals PM
(Numeralsreferto the paginationin the Royal
PrussianAcademyEdition.)
Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Tr.
Notebooks1914-16 NB
x
Contents
Foreword pagevii
Preface ix
Part I The Kantian Legacy
Chapter I Idealism
1 Introduction 3
2 Kantian Arguments forIdealism 3
3 Biological Idealism 8
4 Summary 12
Chapter II Reason
1 Introduction 15
2 Practical Reason 16
3 Reasonand Perception 18
4 Concept-empiricism 22
Chapter III Metaphysics
1 The Kantian Challenge 27
2 A Naturalistic Metaphysics 28
3 Mysticism and the Limits of Philosophy 33
Part II The World as Will
Chapter IV The Limits of Natural Science
1 Introduction 39
2 Scienceand Natural Forces 40
3 The Nature of Matter 43
4 Scienceand Semantics 45
5 Summary 46
Chapter V The Individual Will
1 TheInward Tum 49
2 Will as Character 51
3 Character and Force 52
4 Integrating the Objectiveand SubjectiveImages 53
5 The Empirical Nature of Character 57
6 SomeObjections 60
xi
CONTENTS
Chapter VI The World as Will
1 Introduction 63
2 The Will in Nature 64
3 Can the Will be "Blind"? 70
4 The World-Will, the Platonic Ideas and Nature-Pessimism 73
Part III The Object seen sub Specie Aeternitatis
Chapter VII Art
1 Introduction 81
2 Ordinary Consciousness 82
3 AestheticConsciousness 85
4 Sentimentality 86
5 Artand Emotion 88
6 TheObjectsofArt 92
7 Artand Knowledge 93
8 The Beautiful 95
9 Art and Philosophy 97
10 Art and the Solution to the "ProblemofExistence" 99
Part IV The World seen sub Specie Aeternitatis
Chapter VIIIThe Metaphysics of Morals
1 CanPhilosophybePractical? 103
2 Death and Immortality 107
3 Egoism 111
4 Sympathy 115
5 Transcendental Solipsism as a Practical Postulate 118
Chapter XI The Denial of the Will
1 The Transition from Affirmation to Denial 123
2 Suicide 126
3 Nihilism and Mysticism 129
Chapter X Pessimism
1 Introduction 135
2 What Pessimism is Not 135
3 Negativity, Boredom,Timeand Egoism 137
4 ASchopenhauerianSolutiontoPessimism 145
5 TheRejectionofPerfectionism 150
xii