Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances

352 Pages·2018·3.98 MB·English

by  Tricia Bacon

Why Terrorist Groups
Form International
Alliances
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WHY TERRORIST
GROUPS FORM
INTERNATIONAL
ALLIANCES
TRICIA BACON
University of Pennsylvania Press
PhiladelPhia
Copyright © 2018 University of Pennsylvania Press
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for
purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book
may be reproduced in any form by any means without written
permission from the publisher.
Published by
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104- 4112
www.upenn. edu / pennpress
Printed in the United States of Ameri ca on acid- free paper
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Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Names: Bacon, Tricia, author.
Title: Why terrorist groups form international alliances / Tricia Bacon.
Description: 1st edition. | Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
 [2018] | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017056083 | ISBN 9780812250169 (hardcover: alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Terrorist organi zations—C ase studies. | Terrorism—
 Case studies. | Terrorists—C ase studies. | International relations and
 terrorism—C ase studies. | Terrorism—P revention—C ase studies.
Classification: LCC HV6431 .B325 2018 | DDC 363.325—d c23
 LC rec ord available at https://l ccn. loc . gov/ 2017056083
Contents
Introduction 1
Chapter 1. A Theory of Alliance Hubs and Alliance Formation 27
Chapter 2. The Popu lar Front for the Liberation of Palestine:
Pioneering Partnerships 63
Chapter 3. The Red Army Faction: Pursuing Palestinian Partners 103
Chapter 4. Al-Q aida Before 9/11: Building Alliances One Dollar
at a Time 127
Chapter 5. Al-Q aida After 9/11: Calling in Debts and Capitalizing
on Cachet 170
Chapter 6. Egyptian Jihadist Groups: Divergent Solutions,
Similar Probl ems 216
Conclusion 255
Notes 287
Index 335
Acknowle dgments 345
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Introduction
As for the answer to your question, why did we join Al Qaida?
We say, why shouldn’t we join Al Qaida? God ordered us to be
united, to be allied, to cooperate and fight against the idolaters in
straight lines. . . . W e are a jihadi ancestral community. We rely
on legitimacy before anything else as a base of our decisions.
— Abdelmalek Droukdal, leader of al- Qaida of the Islamic
Maghreb, formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
In 2005, the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) was
a shadow of its former self. After two amnesties in Algeria and more than a
dec ade of conflict, its ranks had thinned considerably, and its cause of creat-
ing a “true” Islamic state in Algeria no longer resonated with the war- weary
public. Once an existential threat to the government, the jihadist insurgency
was largely a law- and- order prob lem relegated to the outskirts of the coun-
try. Newly radicalized Algerian militants gravitated toward the insurgency
against the United States in Iraq rather than join the discredited cause at
home.1 Surrendering members reported that the group’s fighters strug gled
to survive on rations and lived in desolate conditions.2
Then, on the five- year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, al- Qaida anointed
the GSPC as its affiliate in the Maghreb. The alliance did not occur over-
night. Discussion had been under way for at least a year before the announce-
ment. Al- Qaida had concerns stemming from its acrimonious break with
the GSPC’s parent group, the Armed Islamic Group. The Armed Islamic
Group was reputed to have been infiltrated by the Algerian security ser vices
and had alienated even fellow jihadists with its violent excesses. Al- Qaida
turned to another ally, its affiliate in Iraq led by Abu Musab al- Zarqawi,
which had contacts with the GSPC, for reassurances that the GSPC did not
suffer from the same defects.3 For its part, the GSPC grappled with unity
2 Introduction
woes about the group’s direction and lack of support from the Algerian pop-
ulace, which culminated in the overthrow of its founding leader. The GSPC’s
new leader moved to publicly align the group with al- Qaida, signaling his
desire for an alliance. Private communications ensued, eventually producing an
alliance announcement in late 2006.4
In early 2007, the GSPC changed its name to reflect the alliance. The
newly minted al- Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) then unleashed re-
newed vio lence, shattering the Algerian government’s claims that the jihad-
ist insurgency was defeated. AQIM’s next attack that March struck a more
global target, albeit in the local context, the Rus sian contractor Stroytrans-
gaz. AQIM also adopted al- Qaida’s modus operandi of suicide operations,
which broadened its reach and increased the lethality of its attacks. It struck
in the heart of Algiers— a locale considered largely secure from the group’s
bombings and ambushes— not once, but twice. In April, a suicide bomber
attacked the headquarters of Algeria’s prime minister, killing sixty- seven.
Six months later, AQIM struck Algeria’s Constitutional Council and the
United Nations building with truck bombs, killing over forty people. Si-
mul ta neously, the group expanded its lucrative safe haven in the Sahel and
attracted some members outside its Algerian base. AQIM had been reju-
venated, and some of the credit went to its alliance with al- Qaida.
The GSPC’s transformation reflects how partnering with certain terror-
ist groups creates opportunities for organ izations to improve their resource
mobilization and operational capability.5 Like the destruction produced by
AQIM’s adoption of suicide operations, terrorist groups with allies, particu-
larly partners that are highly capable, tend to conduct deadlier attacks.6 As
AQIM’s renewal suggests, alliances can increase terrorist groups’ longevity
and resilience. Overall, alliances can improve partnering groups’ strength,
efficiency, and bargaining leverage.7
When alliances occur, they often cluster around select, capable groups
like al- Qaida.8 In essence, hubs operate at the epicenter of alliance networks
with numerous satellite groups surrounding them. Consequently, hubs’ re-
lationships account for a disproportionate number of alliances. Al- Qaida
behaves as an alliance hub, although, as this book will examine, it was by no
means the first or last hub. Before al- Qaida, groups like the Popu lar Front
for the Liberation of Palestine, Fatah, and the Red Army Faction also sought
to build alliance networks. Moreover, since severing ties with al- Qaida, the
so- called Islamic State has emerged as a rival alliance hub. Given the danger
Introduction 3
posed by hubs’ relationships specifically and terrorist alliances more broadly,
we need to understand why some groups emerge as hubs and why groups
gravitate toward hubs as their partners.
The U.S. government has had little success disrupting or preventing
alliance hubs or their networks, even though doing so has been a policy priority
for over a de cade. As early as 2003, the U.S. counterterrorism strategy as-
serted that “the interconnected nature of terrorist organ izations necessitates
that we pursue them across the geographic spectrum to ensure that all
linkages between the strong and the weak organ izations are broken, leaving
each of them isolated, exposed, and vulnerable to defeat.”9 The need to under-
stand alliance hubs shows no sign of dissipating as the Islamic State devel-
ops its alliance network and al- Qaida’s alliances persevere despite prolonged
counterterrorism pressure.
While terrorist organ izations garner benefits through alliances, they face
substantial obstacles to forging these relationships.10 As a result, the apex of
cooperation— a joint operation involving allied groups— occurred in less
than 1  percent of terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2007.11 This reflects,
in part, the hurdles that terrorist groups face when attempting to forge the
commitments that alliances require.12 As the GSPC and al- Qaida’s lengthy
negotiations suggest, alliances necessitate incurring risks. They involve the
possibility of infiltration, betrayal, and additional counterterrorism pressure.
They have the potential to alienate followers or cause internal dissension
that can lead to splintering. Therefore, terrorist groups must ally carefully
and selectively.
Like the GSPC’s justification of its relationship with al- Qaida, observ-
ers and even terrorists themselves frequently attribute terrorist alliances to
shared ideologies and common enemies. Indeed, a strong correlation exists
between both shared ideology and alliances and common enemies and alli-
ances.13 However, the conventional wisdom about ideology and enemies
cannot explain why select organ izations emerge as desirable alliance partners
or how they build their dangerous alliance networks. If enemies and ideology
cause alliance hubs, alliances would form where they are often absent. Alone,
neither can fully explain the timing of many alliances involving hubs.
Conventional wisdom cannot explain the emergence or appeal of alli-
ance hubs because it omits the influence of orga nizational considerations. The
objectives they seek and the tactics they use can obscure the fact that terrorist
groups share core characteristics with all organ izations. Fundamentally, like