Why did the United Party loose the 1948 General Election?

29 Pages·2007·0.571 MB·English

by  Murray Baird

Geschichte
Murray Baird
Why did the United Party loose the 1948
General Election?
Essay

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Murray Baird
Why did the United Party loose the 1948 General Electi-
on?
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Apartheid and resistance in South Africa, 1948 – 1994.

Essay

Why did the United Party loose the 1948 General Election?

Murray B C Baird (BA Hons)
1
The reasons why the United Party in South Africa lost the 1948 General Election
must be scrutinised in the context of changing international dispositions and the
impact of competing ideologies of liberalism, Nazism communism, and capitalism.
These ideologies went some way to structuring South African society, both during the
war and in the post-war era prior to 1948, influencing the way in which the United
Party governed South Africa. The structure of society placed Smuts’ United Party in
an invidious position between the divergent and increasingly prominent nationalisms
of radical Afrikaners and that of a developing African identity and citizenship. The
manner in which the United Party managed these pressures is crucial to this
discussion. Within this context, the reasons for the United Party’s General Election
defeat will be ascertained by examining the effects of World War II on South African
politics, the impact of international affairs on Smuts’ government, together with the
policies of the United Party, National Party and the emergent articulate black
intelligentsia at the forefront of a resurgent and politicised African nationalism. The
role of trade unions, urban and rural economics, will also be analysed, as will the
electioneering of the protagonists during the election preliminaries, together with the
parliamentary and voting system.

During the 1940s the pre-existing schisms in the South African political structure
and society widened. These enlarging schisms were partly the result of the fear of,
and the eventual defeat of, Nazism, and the ensuing flood of liberalism, together with
the threat of communist ideology. The widening gulf between English-speakers and
Afrikaners created by Smuts’ controversial decision to enter World War II further
fractured the white population. The threat of fascism, abroad and at home, threw
together alliances of African nationalism, Coloured people, Indians and communists
2
seeking a “united, greater and free South Africa.”1 This in turn further engendered the
fear of ‘black swamping’ in the Afrikaner community and the paramountcy of
Afrikaner self-preservation. According to Giliomee, “the main ideological influences
on apartheid were not Nazi racial dogmas.”2 However, as Furlong3 convincingly
argues this was not so. The association of Nazi style organisations such as the anti-
Semitic Greyshirts and the Ossewabrandwag to the Nationalist cause - however
minimal and short-lived - fostered racial hatred, heightening fears amongst liberal
whites and non-Europeans alike of a fascist revolution in South Africa. Indeed, as
late as January 1948 Malan’s National Party was being accused of fraternizing “with
organisations [Broederbond and Ossewabrandwag] which aim at overthrowing the
constitution.”4 Meanwhile, the perceived optimism generated internationally by the
Atlantic Charter of 1941, with a more liberal and anti-colonial “wish to see sovereign
rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of
them,”5 infused African nationalism in South Africa with new found hope and vigour.
The impact of these ideologies on South Africa is not offered as an excuse or a
reason for the defeat of the United Party in 1948. Nevertheless, the schisms they
created placed the United Party in an invidious and difficult political position, creating
a conducive climate for their General Election defeat.

1 Joint Declaration of Cooperation by Dr. A.B. Xuma, Dr. G.M. Naicker and Dr. Y.M. Dadoo in March, 1947 in
Dadoo Y.M., South Africa’s Freedom Struggle: Statements, Speeches and Articles including Correspondence
with Mahatma Ghandi (London: Kliptown Books 1990), p. 43.
2 Giliomee, H., The Afrikaners: Biography of a People, (Cape Town: Tafelburg Publishers, 2003), p. xvii.
3 Furlong P. “Apartheid, Afrikaner Nationalism and the Radical Right: Historical revisionism in Hermann
Filiomee’s The Afrikaners” in South African Historical Journal 49 (November 2003),
4Honourable Member Friend of the House of Assembly in Union of South Africa: Debates of the House of
Assembly fifth Session – Ninth Parliament Volumes 62 and 63 (Cape Town, Parliamentary Printers 1948), p. 410.
5 “African Claims in South Africa” at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/claims.html (accessed on 15
October 2007).
3
World War II not only deepened the existing rift between white Europeans in
South Africa, it provided monomaniacal motivation for the United Party. This
motivation was directed by Smuts as a recognised international statesman of repute
following his involvement with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and with the resulting
League of Nations. The United Party under Smuts’ leadership pursued international
policies to the detriment of internal affairs and politics, as Dubow correctly states, this
“served to create a stasis in the governing party.”6 Smuts’ inclusion in Churchill’s war
cabinet, his preoccupation with the prosecution of the war, expansionist aims in
South West Africa and the aggrandizement of the British protectorates of Basutoland,
Bechuanaland and Swaziland were all at the expense of attempting to resolve
domestic problems. Dr. A.B. Xuma, President of the African National Congress,
recognised this when commenting on Smuts’ expansionist aims in 1946 that “South
Africa must first remove colour bar, restrictions, discriminations at home.”7 Such was
Smuts’ single-mindedness in international affairs, Sir William Clark, British High
Commissioner to South Africa, bemoaned that once he had “made up his mind,
General Smuts can be very determined and ruthless.”8 Smuts’ expansionist policies
received severe censure at the United Nations, particularly “the racial discrimination
to which the South African nationals of Indian origin are subjected by the
Government of the Union of South Africa.”9 Any hope of achieving his expansionist
aims was dependent on the acceptance of a perceived attempt to address racialism
in South Africa before the international community would relent. It is arguable,

6 Dubow S., “Introduction: South Africa’s 1940s” in Dubow, S. and Jeeves, A. (eds.), South Africa’s 1940s:
Worlds of Possibilities (Cape Town: Double Storey c2005), p. 12.
7 “Cable from Dr. A.B. Xuma to the General Assembly of the United Nations” at
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/letters/1946_cable-united-nation-xuma.html (accessed on
20 October 2007).
8 Sir William Clark, British High Commissioner to South Africa, quoted in Henshaw P. “South African
Territorial Expansion and the International Reaction to South African Racial Policies, 1939 to 1948” in South
African Historical Journal 50 (May 2004), p. 67.
9 “Letter from P.P. Pillai, Representative of India to the United Nations” at
http://www.anc.org.za/un/undocs1a.html#2 (accessed on 22 October 2007).
4
therefore that the introduction of a more ‘liberal’ racial policy, as discussed
hereunder, was intended to advance imperial aims in Africa, rather than the creation
of a more egalitarian society. Therefore, the United Party lost the 1948 General
Election because it alienated the party from large sections of voters by pursuing
monomaniacal international policies.

Smuts’ Holism in international affairs did not extend to domestic problems. Food
shortages, war angst amongst Afrikaners created by the use of internment camps
and the huge urban influx of African labour to the disadvantage of agricultural areas
were not addressed adequately by the United Party. Moreover, the threat of a
“Hitlerite victory” meant for non-white people in South Africa “the adoption of a rigid
policy of racial discrimination and segregation,”10 clearly stated the concerns of non-
whites to a possible Nationalist government with perceived Nazi tendencies. This
should have galvanised the United Party to introduce far reaching reform to prevent
these concerns arising. Indeed, Smuts’ Holism meant “the ultimate ‘unity and
oneness’ of mankind under the dominance of the Teutonic peoples,”11 and did not
extend to non-Europeans in South Africa. Discontent with United Party domestic
policy was evident as early as 1943. According to Alexander and Seekings, the
United Party “handsomely” won the General Election of 194312. However, Tothill
argues that victory gave only the “illusion of a triumph,”13 and should not be
construed as being indicative of either United Party dominance or National Party

10 Communist Party of South Africa, Communists Plan for Victory: Reports of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of South Africa to the National Conference quoted in Furlong P.J., “The Bonds of War: The
African National Congress, the Communist Party of South Africa and the Threat of ‘Fascism’” in South African
Historical Journal 36 (May 1997), p. 78.
11 A.P. Mda quoted in Edgar R., “Changing the Old Guard: A.P.Mda and the ANC Youth League, 1944 – 1949”
in Dubow S. and Jeeves A. (eds.), South Africa’s 1940s: Worlds of Possibilities (Cape Town: Double Storey
c.2005), p. 162.
12 Davenport T.R.H., “South Africa’s Janus Moment: The Schizophrenic 1940s” in South African Historical
Journal 52 (2005), p. 199.
13 Tothill F.D., “The South African General Election of 1943” in Historia (May 1989), p. 77.