Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict

315 Pages·2011·1.559 MB·English

by  Erica Chenoweth, Maria J. Stephan

erica cheNoweth is an assistant pro- praise for “After the breathtaking events of 2011, For more than a century, from 1900 to 2006,
fessor of government at Wesleyan Univer- WHY CIVIL can anyone doubt that nonviolent civil campaigns of nonviolent resistance were
sity. Previously she was a fellow at Harvard RESISTANCE more than twice as effective as their violent
resistance is an effective tool for politi-
University’s Kennedy School of Government WORKS counterparts in achieving their stated goals.
cal change? In this provocative, well-
and a visiting fellow at the University of Cali- By attracting impressive support from citi-
written, and compelling book, Erica
fornia at Berkeley’s Institute of International zens, whose activism takes the form of pro-
Studies. “This is the first major scholarly book Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan tests, boycotts, civil disobedience, and other
to make a well-supported argument demonstrate that nonviolent civil re- forms of nonviolent noncooperation, these
Maria J. StephaN is a strategic planner that, contrary to what many people sistance is usually a better way to force efforts help separate regimes from their main
with the U.S. Department of State. Formerly believe, nonviolent resistance is more political change. They identify the sources of power and produce remarkable re-
she served as director of policy and research sults, even in Iran, Burma, the Philippines,
effective than armed resistance in conditions favoring its success and pro-
at the International Center on Nonviolent and the Palestinian Territories.
overthrowing regimes, an advantage vide a convincing explanation for why
Conflict (ICNC) and as an adjunct profes- c
that is maintained even when the tar- nonviolent resistance is so effective.
sor at Georgetown University and American h Combining statistical analysis with case stud-
University. She has also been a fellow at the get is not democratic.” Their analysis is rigorous yet accessible, e ies of specific countries and territories, Erica
n
robert JerviS, ColuMbia universiTy
Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer and their conclusions have profound o Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan detail the
Center for Science and International Affairs. implications for anyone seeking to un- w factors enabling such campaigns to succeed
“Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. e and, sometimes, causing them to fail. They
derstand—or promote—far-reaching t
h find that nonviolent resistance presents fewer
Stephan offer a fresh, lively, and pen-
social and political reform.”

& obstacles to moral and physical involvement
etrating analysis of the conditions un- StepheN waLt, harvard universiTy
S and commitment, and that higher levels of
der which nonviolent resistance suc-
t participation contribute to enhanced resil-
e
ceeds or fails. Using a wealth of data “This is social science at its best. Years
p ience, greater opportunities for tactical inno-
and in-depth case studies, they show of critical study culminate in a book h vation and civic disruption (and therefore less
a
that the scholarly emphasis on force- on one dominating issue: how does n incentive for a regime to maintain its status
ful approaches is misguided: nonvio- nonviolent opposition compare with quo), and shifts in loyalty among opponents’
erstwhile supporters, including members of
lent movements are often better able violence in removing a regime or
the military establishment.
to mobilize supporters, resist regime achieving secession? The authors
crackdowns, develop innovative resis- study successes and failures and al-
Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that suc-
tant techniques, and otherwise take ternative diagnoses of success and
cessful nonviolent resistance ushers in more
on and defeat repressive regimes and failure, reaching a balanced judgment durable and internally peaceful democra-
build durable democracies.” meriting careful study.” T cies, which are less likely to regress into civil
h
DaNieL byMaN, GeorGeTown univer- thoMaS c. ScheLLiNg, harvard uni- e war. Presenting a rich, evidentiary argument,
S
t
siTy and senior fellow, saban Cen- versiTy, reCipienT of The nobel r they originally and systematically compare
a
t
Ter aT The brookinGs insTiTuTion prize in eConoMiCs e violent and nonviolent outcomes in different
gi
N c historical periods and geographical contexts,
o L
coLuMbia StuDieS iN terroriSM aND irreguLar warfare N o
vi gi debunking the myth that violence occurs
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JaCkeT desiGn by MartiN N. hiNze 9 780231 156820 wpriwNtweD. ciNu tphe.c uo.Sl.ua.mbia.edu Columbia Maria Jw. eStthe phan oNfLict pvteiooglliiectin cgtar ilo nugsnoudarglss.e. nIcnys ties arda,r etlhye j uasuttifihaobrsle d oinsc sotvrear-,
why civil resistance works
columbia studies in Terrorism and irregular Warfare
columbia studies in Terrorism and irregular Warfare
Bruce Hoffman, Series Editor
This series seeks to fill a conspicuous gap in the burgeoning literature on terrorism, guer-
rilla warfare, and insurgency. The series adheres to the highest standards of scholarship and
discourse and publishes books that elucidate the strategy, operations, means, motivations, and
effects posed by terrorist, guerrilla, and insurgent organizations and movements. It thereby
provides a solid and increasingly expanding foundation of knowledge on these subjects for
students, established scholars, and informed reading audiences alike.
ami Pedahzur, The israeli secreT services and The sTruggle againsT Terrorism
ami Pedahzur and arie Perliger, JeWish Terrorism in israel
lorenzo vidino, The neW muslim BroTherhood in The WesT
Why civil resisTance Works the strategic
logic of nonviolent conflict
erica chenoWeTh & maria j. sTephan
columbia university Press new york
The views expressed in this book
do not represent those of the United States Government.
columBia universiTy press
Publishers Since 1893
new york chichester, west sussex
copyrighT © 2011 columbia university Press
All rights reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Chenoweth, Erica, 1980–
Why civil resistance works : the strategic logic of nonviolent conflict / Erica Chenoweth
and Maria J. Stephan.
p. cm. — (Columbia studies in terrorism and irregular warfare)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-231-15682-0 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-231-52748-4 (electronic)
1. Civil disobedience. 2. Nonviolence. I. Stephan, Maria J. II. Title. III. Series.
JC328.3.C474 2011
303.6'1—dc22 2010037567
Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper.
This book was printed on paper with recycled content.
Printed in the united states of america
c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the
author nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or
changed since the manuscript was prepared.
cover & interior design by marTin n. hinze
for my family
—e. c.
to my Parents and brother
—m. j. s.

contents
list of illustrations ix
list of tables xi
acknowledgements xiii
parT i Why civil resisTance Works 1
one the success of nonviolent
resistance camPaigns 3
two the Primacy of ParticiPation in
nonviolent resistance 30
three exPloring alternative exPlanations for
the success of civil resistance 62
parT ii case sTudies 85
introduction to the case studies 87
four the iranian revolution, 1977–1979 92
five the first Palestinian intifada, 1987–1992 119
six the PhiliPPine PeoPle Power movement,
1983–1986 147
seven why civil resistance sometimes fails:
the burmese uPrising, 1988–1990 172
case study summary 192
parT iii The implicaTions of civil resisTance 199
eight after the camPaign: the consequences of
violent and nonviolent resistance 201
nine conclusion 220
ePilogue 229
aPPendix 233
notes 243
references 261
index 279

illustrations
figure 1.1 frequency of nonviolent and violent
camPaign end years 7
figure 1.2 number of nonviolent camPaigns and
Percentage of successes, 1940–2006 8
figure 1.3 success rates by decade, 1940–2006 8
figure 1.4 rates of success, Partial success,
and failure 9
figure 1.5 success rates by camPaign objective 9
figure 2.1 the effect of ParticiPation on the
Probability of camPaign success 40
figure 2.2 the effect of ParticiPation on security-
force defections 50
figure 3.1 Percentage of camPaigns by location’s
Polity score 67
figure 3.2 Percentage of camPaigns by location’s
relative Power 72
figure 3.3 rates of camPaign success by region 74
figure 8.1 the effect of resistance tyPe on
Probability of democracy 215