Who's Listening? Audiences, Alarms, and International Cooperation

118 Pages·2012·0.68 MB·English

by  Stephen Chaudoin

W ’ L ? A , A ,
HO S ISTENING UDIENCES LARMS AND
I C
NTERNATIONAL OOPERATION
STEPHEN CHAUDOIN
A DISSERTATION
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICS
ADVISER: HELEN MILNER AND CHRISTINA DAVIS
SEPTEMBER 2012
(cid:13)c Copyrightby Stephen Chaudoin,2012.
Allrightsreserved.
Abstract
A large body of literature with a lengthy history argues that international institutions facilitate
cooperation by providing information. Cooperation among nations is difficult without credible
punishmentfor defectors, and informationis key to detectingthe occurrence and severityof those
defections. Domestic audiences are thought to be a key source of punishment. This dissertation
explains how variation in the preferences and political strength of domestic audiences condition
theinformationalrole ofinstitutions. Idevelopa theory that showshow audience preferences and
strength affect how audiences react to information about defections, how their reaction, in turn,
affects member states’ strategic decision over whether to transmit information, and how policy-
makers choose whether to cooperate in the shadow of potential punishment. I demonstrate this
theory with evidence at both the macro and micro levels, both observationaland experimental. At
themacrolevel,Ishowhowaudiencepreferences andpoliticalstrengthaffect thetimingofWorld
Trade Organization disputes against the United States. At the micro level, I conduct an original
survey experiment that shows how audience preferences moderate the degree to which audiences
punishdefections. Takentogether,thetheoryandempiricalanalysisadvanceourunderstandingof
the promise and limitations of international institutionsand agreements as independent forces for
cooperation.
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Acknowledgements
I owe a large debt of gratitude to my advisers at Princeton University, Christina Davis, Robert
Keohane, John Londregan and Helen Milner. I also owe appreciation to my advisers while I was
an undergraduate student at Emory University: Clifford Carrubba and Eric Reinhardt. Numerous
other people have made helpful suggestions on each of the three chapters: Michael Aklin, Phillip
Arena, Marc Busch, Terrence Chapman, Rex Douglass,SongyingFang,JenniferGhandi, Alexan-
der Hirsch, Sarah Hummel, Kosuke Imai, Matthew Incantalupo, Johannes Karreth, Jeff Kucik,
Shawn Ramirez, Kristopher Ramsay, Emily Ritter, Tom Scherer, Dustin Tingley, and Johannes
Urpelainen each gave valuable advice. For chapter 2, I benefitted from feedback given by audi-
encesatthe2011AnnualMeetingoftheInternationalPoliticalEconomySocietyandInternational
StudiesAssociationandfromthe2012ConferenceonthePoliticalEconomyofInternationalOrga-
nizations. Forchapter3,Ibenefittedfromfeedbackgivenbyaudiencesatthe2010annualmeeting
of theInternational PoliticalEconomy Society, American Political Science Association,and Mid-
west Political Science Association. For chapter 4, I benefitted greatly from research support from
theNiehausCenter forGlobalGovernance.
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Tomy parents,Steveand Jenne.
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Contents
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
ListofTables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
ListofFigures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
1 Introduction 1
2 Theory: WhatMakes Commitments Credible? 7
3 Macro-level Evidence: The StrategicTiming ofTrade Disputes 41
4 Micro-level Evidence: Preferences OverConsistency and Policy 69
5 Conclusion 101
Bibliography 104
vi
List of Tables
3.1 Cox Models: Risk ofWTODispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.2 MNPModels: RiskofWTO Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.1 EffectofAll CovariatesonTreatmentProbability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.2 EffectofPre-treatment Covariateson TreatmentProbability . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3 EffectofTreatmentAssignmenton Free TradeResponses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.4 ApprovalRates by TreatmentGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.5 ApprovalRates by TreatmentGroup and byRespondent TradePreference . . . . . 100
vii
List of Figures
2.1 EffectofAudiencePreferences onOptimalPost-disputePolicy . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2 EffectofAudienceStrengthon OptimalPost-disputePolicy . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3 No. WTO Disputesvs. EstimatedAlpha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.1 MonthsBetween Tariffand WTO Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 EffectsofU.S. UnemploymentonPr(WTO Dispute) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 EffectsofU.S. UnemploymentonPr(Unil. Removal) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4 NewTariffs versesU.S. Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 EffectsofU.S. ExportsonProbabilityofExit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.6 EffectsofU.S. ImportsonProbabilityofExit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.1 ApprovalbyTreatmentGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.2 TreatmentEffects by TradePreferences: Int. Lawvs. Null . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3 TreatmentEffects by TradePreferences: Placebo vs. Null . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 TreatmentEffects by TradePreferences: Econ. vs. Null . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
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Chapter 1
Introduction
International relations scholars have long argued that international institutions and agreements
facilitate cooperation by providing information about member state behavior (Keohane, 1984;
Milgrom,Northand Weingast, 1990). The logic is simple: for nations to cooperate, there must
be a credible mechanism to punish defections. Information about the occurrence and severity of
defections is key to any punishment mechanism. Without the ability to detect defections, punish-
mentis ineffective.
A large and growing body of literature focuses on the domestic sources of punishment faced
by policymakerswho defect from cooperation. A policymakercould face electoral backlash from
voters, economic punishment from market actors, or decreased support from powerful interest
groups. In a world without international institutions and agreements, such defections may go
undetected, and therefore unpunished, because domestic audiences may not be able to perfectly
monitor their policymaker’s decisions. But in a world with information-providing institutions
and agreements, defections are detected and punished. The prospect of such punishment deters
policymakers from defecting in the first place. By providing an alarm that sounds when policy-
makers defect, institutionsand agreements facilitate cooperation. This logicforms the foundation
of many well-known explanations for how institutions and agreement facilitate cooperation, such
as those based on credible commitments (Simmons, 2000, 2009; SimmonsandDanner, 2010;
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Btheand Milner, 2008), audience costs(Tomz, 2007, 2008; Levenduskyand Horowitz, 2012;
Fearon, 1994), and myriad others (Mansfield,MilnerandRosendorff, 2000, 2002; Rosendorff,
2005; Elkins,Guzman and Simmons, 2006; Dai,2002,2007;Fang, 2008).
The launchingpointfor thisdissertationistwo observationsabouttheworld that divergefrom
these well-known stories. First, existing explanations describe institutionsas “trip-wires” that are
triggered whenever member states step out of line with policies that diverge from their interna-
tional institutions. But few institutions act as trip-wires that sound immediately after any and all
defections. The alarm sounds after some defections but not others. Even in the case when the
alarmsounds,itoftensoundsonlyafteralengthydelay. Thisisbecausethesoundingofthealarm
is not automatic. It is a strategic decision made by members of the institution or parties to the
agreement.
Second, existing explanations focus on pro-cooperation domestic audiences who have the po-
liticalstrength to influence policymakerdecisions. Yet thepoliticaleconomy facing policymakers
consists of multipledomesticaudiences, who may vary in their support for for cooperation and in
their political strength. Some audiences are pro-cooperation while others are pro-defection. The
balanceofpoliticalpowercan favoroneortheother,and can alsovary overtime.
Thefoundationofthisdissertationisan understandingofthefollowingcomponents: audience
reactions to institutional alarms, the strategic decision to sound the alarm, and policymaker deci-
sionsovercooperation. Variation in preferences and politicalstrength affects how audiences react
to hearing the alarm. Will they punish policymakers for defections from cooperation or reward
them? Is this punishment a strong or weak inducement for the policymaker to cooperate or de-
fect? This variation in turn affects the strategic decision over whether to sound the alarm after
defections. Will sounding the alarm, and potentially triggering domestic punishment, cause the
offendinggovernmenttochangetheirpolicies? Arethesechangesworththecostsofsoundingthe
alarm? And finally, how does the possibility of the alarm being sounded affect a policymaker’s
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