When Cities Lobby: How Local Governments Compete for Power in State Politics

209 Pages·2021·4.76 MB·English

by  Julia Payson

When Cities Lobby

When Cities Lobby
How Local Governments Compete for
Power in State Politics
JULIA PAYSON
1
3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Payson, Julia, author.
Title: When cities lobby : how local governments compete for
power in state politics / Julia Payson.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2022] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021038643 (print) | LCCN 2021038644 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780197615263 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197615270 (paperback) |
ISBN 9780197615294 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Lobbying—United States. | Local government—United States. |
Polarization (Social sciences)—United States.
Classification: LCC JK1118 .P39 2022 (print) | LCC JK1118 (ebook) |
DDC 324/.40973—dc23/eng/20211001
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021038643
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021038644
DOI: 10.1093/ oso/ 9780197615263.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Paperback printed by LSC communications, United States of America
Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America
For Mom

Contents
Figures ix
Acknowledgments xi
1. Cities as Lobbyists 1
2. The State of Local Lobbying 10
3. How City Lobbyists Bridge Representational Gaps 34
4. Exploring Municipal Mobilization across States 63
5. Who Gets What? City Lobbying and State Transfers 84
6. City vs. State: Power, Policy, and Preemption 108
7. Conclusion: Why Cities Lobby and Why It Matters 125
Appendices 135
Notes 159
Bibliography 169
Index 181
Online replication materials for this book are deposited in the Harvard
Dataverse (https:// dataverse.harvard.edu/ ).

Figures
2.1. Lobbying Expenditures in California 14
2.2. Total Local Government Lobbying by Type, 2006–2 015 17
2.3. Cities Lobbying the State and Federal Government 18
2.4. Geographic Distribution of Lobbying Cities, Population 20,000+ 24
2.5. Legislative vs. Executive Branch Lobbying in Florida 29
3.1. Correlates of Lobbying across Cities 43
3.2. Representational Correlates of Lobbying 45
3.3. Effect of Gaining More Representatives after Redistricting on Lobbying 47
3.4. Classifying Republican and Democratic Cities 51
3.5. Effect of Delegation Mismatch on City Lobbying: Difference-i n- Differences
Predictions 53
3.6. Effect of Delegation Mismatch on Lobbying by City Partisanship 55
3.7. Delegation Ideology by Aligned and Mismatched Cities 57
3.8. Effect of Delegation Conservatism on Lobbying: Difference-i n- Differences
Predictions 58
4.1. Proportion of Cities Lobbying by State 64
4.2. Geographic Correlates of City Lobbying across States 67
4.3. Local Tax Limits and City Lobbying across States 69
4.4. State Legislative Professionalism, Term Limits, and City Lobbying 72
4.5. Political Correlates of City Lobbying 76
4.6. State Transfers and City Lobbying across and within States 78
4.7. Within- State Effect of Lobbying on State Transfers as a
Proportion of City Budgets 79
5.1. Lobbying and State Transfers across Cities 93
5.2. Lobbying and State Transfers: Difference-i n- Differences Predictions 94
5.3. Effect of Lobbying on State Transfers: Parallel Trends 97
5.4. Effect of Lobbying Expenditures on State Transfers 98
5.5. Effect of Lobbying by Median Income 100
5.6. Bill Subjects Lobbied in California by City Income 103