What is an institution

19 Pages·2011·0.18 MB·English

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Pina-Cabral, Joao (2011) Afterword: What is an institution? Social Anthropology
(Journal of the European Association of Social Anthropologists), 19 (4).
pp. 477-494. ISSN 0964-0282.
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JOA˜ O DE PINA-CABRAL
Afterword:
What is an institution?
Whatisaninstitution?WesuccessivelyexaminedefinitionsprovidedbyDurkheim,Mauss,Parsons,Goffman
andBerger,andLuckman.Whilstanthropologistsacknowledgethatthestuffofhumaninstitutionsis‘the
combinationofmodesofactionwithmodesofthinking’,somehowtheyhaveseentheepitomeofthatembodied
inthecompulsoryorganisationsofmodern,state-run,Westernsociety.Thepaperarguesfortheabandonment
ofrepresentationalsolutions,whichoperatewithaCartesianviewofmind;sociocentricsolutions,which
viewgroupnessasunitaryandteleological;andindividualistsolutionsthatfailtoseepeopleasconstituted
inontogenythroughintersubjectiveattunement.Humansocialityandhumanunderstandingmustnotbe
separatedfromtheworld,butpersonsdonotpre-existintersubjectiveattunementandthisoperatesthrougha
processoftriangulationbetweenself,otherandworldwhereallelementsareintrinsicallyinvolved.
Keywords institution,representation,sociocentrism,individualism,intersubjectivity
Introduction
Overacenturyago,SirJamesFrazerpresentedaconferenceataneveningmeetingof
theRoyalInstitutionofLondoncalledPsyche’sTask(1909).Hisargumentwassimple:
WhiletheinstitutionswithwhichIshalldealhaveallsurvivedintocivilisedsociety
andcannodoubtbedefendedbysolidandweightyarguments,itispractically
certainthatamongsavages,andevenamongpeoplesthathavereasonabovethe
levelofsavagery,theseverysameinstitutionshavederivedmuchoftheirstrength
frombeliefswhichnowadaysweshouldcondemnunreservedlyassuperstitious
andabsurd.(1909:2)
Hechoosestofocusonfourinstitutions–government,privateproperty,marriage
andrespectforhumanlife–and,attheendoftheessay,hetellsusthatthischoiceis
basedonhisconvictionthattheseinstitutions‘arethepillarsonwhichreststhewhole
fabricofsociety’(1909:82).Thereis,therefore,amorallessoninhisargument:‘More
and more, as times goes, morality shifts its ground from the sands of superstition to
therockofreason,fromtheimaginarytothereal,fromthesupernaturaltothenatural’
(1909:81).InFrazer’sreadingofthemythologicaltale,thetaskimposedonPsycheby
jealousAphroditeconsistedof‘sortingouttheseedsofgoodfromtheseedsofevil’.In
thisway,theauthoriscommentingonthegrandtaskthatheimposeduponhimself,as
SocialAnthropology/AnthropologieSociale(2011)19,4477–494.(cid:2)C 2011EuropeanAssociationofSocialAnthropologists. 477
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478 JOA˜O DE PINA-CABRAL
hesiftedthroughthemyriadexamplesofhumanbehaviourthathisvoluminousbooks
itemiseinordertofindwithinthemtheseedsoftheinstitutionsuponwhichcivilisation,
ashesawit,isfounded.
Thisutopiandeclarationoffaithinmodernityandintheredeemingpowersofthe
rationalindividualisverycharacteristicofhisimperialepoch.Tothatextent,itshould
not surprise us. But it does help us to focus our mind on how distant we are from
theassumptionsthatgrantcogencytoFrazer’sargument.Wordslike‘savage’,‘reason’,
‘morality’,‘superstition’,‘institution’nolongercarrythesameechoesforusthatthey
carried in his day. They seem to have undergone a significant ‘change of aspect’ and
that is why Frazer’s argument sounds so quaint to us today. The following essay is
inspired by Rodney Needham’s methodological injunction that we should focus on
such ‘changes of aspect’ of the analytical terms upon which our arguments depend.
He claimed that identifying such ‘changes of aspect’ might help us detect both the
‘treacherousnessofwords’andthe‘secretsympathies’thattranspire(1983:esp.1–18).
For Frazer, a word such as ‘institution’ required little exegesis for it to be
understood – he never even bothers to define it. But we can legitimately ask: how
hasthewordchangedduringtheinterveningcentury?Furthermore,ifweconcludeit
has, what ‘secret sympathies’ does it still carry within its cavernous belly? How are
weaffectedtoday–onewholecenturylater–bytheimplicitassumptionswritteninto
Frazer’suseoftheword?
If we are looking for a contemporary definition of ‘institution’ we can go,
for example, to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: ‘Typically, contemporary
sociologists use the term to refer to complex social forms that reproduce themselves
such as governments, the family, human languages, universities, hospitals, business
corporations,andlegalsystems’(s.v.‘socialinstitution’1).
Thefirstthingtonotehereisthenotionof‘complexsocialforms’–complex,in
relationtowhat?Contrarytomanyofmycolleagues,Iampronetofeeluncomfortable
whenafeatureofsociallifeisdescribedinrelationtoanopposingattributethatisleft
unspecified.Nothingiscomplexinandofitself withoutcomparisonwithsomeother
thingthatis,somehow,lesscomplex.Weare,therefore,immediatelylefttowonderwhat
othersocialformsmightnotbecomplex.Furthermore,wealwayshavetoaskinwhat
capacityisthatthingcomplex–andagainthequestionseemssomehowtohavebeen
elided.Weknowwhatcameofthelonghistoryofcategoricaloppositionssuchasthe
onebetween‘complexsocieties’andthoseunnamed‘Other’societies.There,inthose
days(notsolongago–TheSocialAnthropologyofComplexSocieties,Banton1966),
theelidedtermwasactually‘primitive’,aconceptthatnoonecouldshedbutofwhich
everyonewasfrightened.Whatistheelidedtermnow?Arewenotencounteringhere
asetof‘secretsympathies’withFrazer’stracingoftheinevitablepathfromsavageryto
civilisationasaprocessofrationalisation?
Let us look a little more attentively at the list of examples provided in the
StanfordEncyclopaediadefinition:thefamily,notfamilies;governments,nottheState;
universities, not classrooms; legal systems, not practice of law business corporations,
not voluntary associations; human languages, not sign systems... There is a strange
coherence in the way these examples seem to line up and in what each one of them
excludes by its very presence in the list. There is an unstated assumption here that
institutionsarehierarchicalsystemsboundbyexplicit,rational,writtencodes.
1 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-institutions/
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WHAT IS AN INSTITUTION? 479
Thisassumption,infact,ispartofourcommonuseoftheword.Forinstance,ifI
saythat‘inPortugal,cousinsareaninstitution’,IaminthelimitsofwhatIcanexpecta
commonspeakerofEnglishtounderstandandevensocialscientistsareboundtofind
myuseoftheexpressionsomewhatcontrivedormetaphoric.However,ifIthengoon
tosaythatbeingthegodfatherofmycousin’schildisaninstitutionalaspectofmylife,
noonewilltakemeseriously.
Asimilarsortoffailureinsemanticextensioncanbedetectedintheusethatthe
capitalised word ‘Institute’ has been given over the past decades to name all sorts
of modern, purpose-geared, formal organisations with a hierarchical structure. My
employer, for example, is an Institute of Social Sciences. But here too, there seem to
be limits to the word’s relevance. For example, if I worked for an organisation that
had nothing to do with the State, it would more likely be called an ‘association’ or a
‘foundation’thananinstitute.AnNGOisnotlikelytobecalledaninstitute,afactoryis
notlikelytobecalledaninstitute,ouruniversitychoirwillnotbecalledaninstitute.All
ofthesearemodern,purpose-geared,formalorganisationswithahierarchicalstructure.
The matter has its legal implications, of course, in the sense that our codes of
lawandourestablishedadministrativepracticesenshrinecertainusagesofwordssuch
as institute, foundation and corporation, limiting their applicability. One might have
searchedthereforexamples.Butitdoesnotseemnecessary,asIbelieveitissufficiently
clear by now that the notion of institution fits some contexts better than it does
otherswhilst,atthesametime,neverlosingitsoriginalbroadsense.Itisasifcertain
typesoforganisedformsofbehaviourtypifiedbetterthanothersthatbroadestofall
characteristicsofsocieties:theconstitutionofinstitutions.Bycomparingitsdifferent
contexts of use we get a sense of how it changes its aspect and how that reveals the
sympathiesitcarrieswithinitself.
Written into the way in which we have come to use the word ‘institution’, there
is a modernist disposition to see society as a formally coherent system that imposes
itself upon individuals. We acknowledge that the stuff of human institutions is the
recurrentcombinationofmodesofactionwithmodesofthinkingbut,somehow,we
see the epitome of that principle embodied in what Weber called the ‘compulsory
organizations’ of modern, State-run, Western society. The imperial narrative about
world history – to which Frazer adhered with the full force of ‘reason’ – seems to
still explain the sympathies that ground the word’s application today, much as, for
anthropologists like us at the beginning of the 21st century, that imperial narrative is
littlemorethana‘superstition’.
Ultimately, in this paper, I aim to contribute to a view of sociality as ‘being in
company’.Asthepaperconcludes,Iwillproposeaneurophenomenologicallyredefined
conceptofmutuality,where(i)thoughtisconceivedofasaformofactionandwhere
(ii) persons are understood not to pre-exist intersubjective attunement. Therefore, I
argue against the utopia of the rationalist individual that has dominated the social
sciences throughout the 20th century with its representationalist and logocentric
conceptionsofmind.
Inmanyways,thepaperisconceivedasanalternativeapproachtoinstitutionality
to that recently proposed by Pascal Boyer and Michael Bang Petersen (2011).2 As
2 Tomymind,theauthorsdonotquestionsufficientlytheimplicationsoftheconceptualtoolsthey
use: individual, marriage, law, reason, etc. For example, the statement that ‘institutional designs
aredirectlyfacilitatedbythestructureofhumancognition’(BoyerandPetersen2011:12)turns
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480 JOA˜O DE PINA-CABRAL
I see it, there is little to doubt in the observation that processes of human physical
development impose marginal constraints to all historically evolved forms of human
sociation.Howthisoccurredinhistory,however,iswhatweneedtotraceout.Boyer
andPetersenassumetheoriesofcausalitythatimplicitlytreatthesortofinformation
thatprofessionalhistoriansandethnographershavebeengatheringoverthepastcentury
aslargelysecondaryinthefaceof‘real/natural’(biological,economic,material)causes.
Now,Darwin’stheoryofevolutionisahistoricistformofexplanationparexcellence.
Suchtreatments,therefore,aredeeplycontrarytotheveryspiritofthegeneraltheory
theyaimtouphold.
Searle and the teleology of institutions
Let me start with another recent example that shows how little we have learnt from
ourmistakesoverthepastcenturyofsocialscientificthinking.In2010,JohnSearle,the
well-known American philosopher, published a small but extremely ambitious book
calledMakingtheSocialWorld,wherehebelieveshesucceedsinunearthingnothingless
than‘thestructureofhumancivilization’.Intypicalfashion,hestartsfromdisembodied
semantics–hiscriticismofCartesianthinkingdoesnotseemtogoasfarastoquestion
arepresentationalmodelofmind(cf.Edelman1992).So,hetellsusthat
Aninstitutionisasystemofconstitutiverules,andsuchasystemautomatically
createsthepossibilityofinstitutionalfacts.ThusthefactthatObamaispresident
orthefactthatIamalicenseddriverorthefactthatachessmatchwaswonbya
certainpersonandlostbyacertainotherpersonareallinstitutionalfactsbecause
theyexistwithinsystemsofconstitutiverules.(2010:10–11)
Youwillnoticetheinterestingwayinwhich,muchliketheearlierlisttakenfromthe
StanfordEncyclopaediaofPhilosophy,thereisastrangeconsistencyinhisexamples.His
examplesaresolidlyrootedinhisownuppermiddle-classAmericanlifeexperience:all
of his three cases involve explicit legislation and literate rule making applied to fully
individualpersonswhoseengagementinsocietyismadebyrationalcontract.
Constitutiverules,Searleargues,aresystemsthatnotonlyregulatewhatisdone,
but‘createthepossibilityoftheverybehaviourthattheyregulate’;forexample,when
Isay,‘youaremyboss’,Iinstituteinthatwayapreviouslyinexistenthierarchy(2010:
10). According to him, then, institutional reality is created out of such declarations,
thatis,speechactsthatchangetheworldbydeclaringthatacertainstateofaffairsis
thecase.Whilst,inactualfact,onemightnotneedtoutterthecorrespondingwords,
hetellsus,onedoesuselanguageinsuchawayastoassumethestatusfunctionsthat
createinstitutions.Thus,heconcludes,‘allofhumaninstitutionalrealityiscreatedand
maintainedinexistenceby(representationsthathavethesamelogicalformas)Status
Function Declarations’ (2010: 13). His representational institutions are best typified
bythelegalistideologythatpervadescontemporarymiddle-classAmericanmodesof
thinking.
outtobeatruismfor,whilstitisboundtoseemreasonabletomostcontemporaryreaders,the
subsequentstructuresofdeterminationthataremadetohangonitare(i)exceedinglysimplisticand
(ii)formulatedinahistoricalterms.
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WHAT IS AN INSTITUTION? 481
The lessons of over 100 years of anthropological research do not seem to have
penetratedProf.Searle’sworldview.Contemporaryphilosophicaldebatesconcerning
representation(cf.Needham1983;Brooks1991;Clark1997;Chemero2009),anthro-
pologicaldebatesconcerningdividuality(cf.Strathern1988;Mosko2010;Pina-Cabral
2010a and 2011) or concerning the argumentative nature of human reasoning (cf.
MercierandSperber2011),andpsychologicaldebatesconcerningontogeny(cf.Bra˚ten
2006; Toren 2011) have caused no ‘change of aspect’ in Searle’s use of the notions of
‘institution’,of‘group’,orof‘individual’.
Yetwecannotblamehimtoomuch,forthetrapwassetforusfromthestart.This
strangewayinwhichtheconceptofinstitutionisfoundatthelogicalrootofallsocial
phenomenabutthenisinstantiatedbymodernist,State-associated,legalisticformsof
behaviour has a long history in social thinking. Much like Searle’s ‘status function
declarations’,thereisateleologicalaspecttotheword‘institution’inpracticallyallof
itsuses.Isayteleologicaltomeanthatinstitutionsaresupposedtohaveapurpose,to
serveafinality,andtoexistbecauseofthatfinality.
The idea is enshrined in the word’s very history. It derives from the Latin word
institutum, which means ‘purpose, design, plan, ordinance, instruction, precept’. It
originatedintheverbstatuere,meaning‘toestablish,ortocausetostand’.Accordingto
theOxfordEnglishDictionary,theword‘institute’hasbeenusedsincetheRenaissance
in English and French and it bears four main meanings: firstly, to mean purpose (as
in the English expression ‘Satan’s institute’); secondly, to mean something instituted
like an established law, a custom, a usage or an organisation; thirdly, a principle or
elementofinstruction;andfourthly,asocietyororganisedgroupinstitutedtopromote
something of public relevance as well as the house wherein it is based. See how the
meaning moves from functional relevance (‘Satan’s institute’), to formalised rules of
behaviouransweringthatfunction(aprincipleofinstruction),toapublicorganisation
(theInstituteofSocialSciences),tothebuildingwherethatorganisationisbased(Av.
An´ıbalBettencourt9,CampoGrande,Lisbon).
Embedded in the meanings carried by the word institution, therefore, there is
decidedlyanimplicationoffunctionalrelevance:aninstitutionisanorganisationthat
servesapurpose.Inshort,ifinstitutionsaretheverybasisofallsociality,asmostsocial
thinkers seem to have agreed over the past 100 years, then the foundational fact of
society involves finality, an act of will. Society seeking its own existence! This is the
essenceofwhatwecallsociocentrism,followinginthisDurkheimandMauss’s(1963)
ownexplicitformulationintheiressayonprimitiveclassifications.
Institutions exist because of the functions they perform for society; that much
seemstobeconsensualeversincethesocialsciencescastawaythedivinenarrativeat
thetimeofDarwin.Theyemergefromthedepthsofirrationalityduetotheveryforce
of their rational purpose, which imposes itself with its purifying power. But how do
thesepurposesimposethemselves?Whatisthesecrethandthatprintsthem?Therewas
atimeinwhichitwaspossibletonarrateexplicitlyhowthisworkedoutinhistory.
Forexample,thisishowWestermarcktoldthestoryin1908:
The original character of the taboo must be looked for not in its civil but in
its religious element. It was not the creation of a legislator, but the gradual
outgrowthofanimistic beliefs,to which theambition andavariceofchiefsand
priestsafterwardsgaveanartificialextension.Butinservingthecauseofavarice
andambitionitsubservedthecauseofcivilization,byfosteringtheconceptions
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482 JOA˜O DE PINA-CABRAL
oftherightsofpropertyandthesanctityofthemarriagetie,–conceptionswhich
intimegrewstrongenoughtostandbythemselvesandtoflingawaythecrutch
of superstition which in earlier days had been their sole support. For we shall
scarcely err in believing that even in advanced societies the moral sentiments,
insofarastheyaremerelysentimentsandarenotbasedonaninductionfrom
experience,derivemuchoftheirforcefromanoriginalsystemoftaboo.Thuson
thetabooweregraftedthegoldenfruitsoflawandmorality,whiletheparentstem
dwindledslowlyintothesourcrabsandemptyhusksofpopularsuperstitionon
whichtheswineofmodernsocietyarestillcontenttofeed.3(inFrazer1909:27,
myemphasis)
Wedohaveataleofsociogenesis,then,butithascometoconflictwiththeworld
asweexperienceitsincetheendofthecolonialeraandweprefertoelideit.Eversince
thelate1960s,weprefertosayofthosewecondonethattheyare‘complex’,elidingthe
factthatthisimpliesthattheremainderare‘primitive’.Weallowthesecretsympathies
constituted by the imperial narrative to operate unquestioned. Having no other, we
allowtheimperialnarrativeofsociogenesistopassinsilencebymeansofwhatFrazer
wouldhavecalledsmallactsofsympatheticlogic.Afterall,wetooseemtobefeeding
on‘sourcrabsandemptyhusks’.
Mauss’ minimalist definition
Letusfollowsomeoftheprincipleturningpointsinthehistoryofthewordinstitution.
Inanessayon‘religiousfacts’,writtenin1906,Durkheim’sprincipaldisciples,Hubert
andMaussdefinetheconceptofinstitutionas‘publicrulesofactionandthought’(in
Mauss1968/1969:25).4Theyarguethatbothsacrificeandmagicare,indeed,institutions
inthissense:thefirst[sacrifice]inapublicfashion,asthenatureoftherepresentations
atstakeareopentoall;thesecond[magic]inalesspublicbutnonethelessstillcollective
fashion. For them, as indeed for Durkheim (and it would seem for Searle as well),
societyiscomposedoforganicallyseparateindividualswho,inasense,abdicateoftheir
independence in the name of the collective: ‘We believe we have (...) demonstrated
how,inmagic,theindividualonlythinks,onlyactsundertheguidanceoftraditionor
pressedbyacollectivesuggestion,oratleastbyasuggestionthatheprovidestohimself
underthepressureofthecollectivity’(1968[1906],I:25).
In fact, they explicitly want to defend themselves against the attack by certain
colleagueswhohadaccusedthemofhavingoverextendedtheirexpertiseassociologists
becausetheymadeastudyofcategories,whilstsociologistsshouldlimitthemselvesto
institutions.Buttheyexplicitlyrefusetoseparateactingfromthinking:
Sociologists,itwouldseem,mustlimitthemselvestogroupsandtheirtraditional
practices. But these people seem to forget that there are ways of thinking in
commonaswellaswaysofactingincommon.Calendars[forexample]aresocial
thingsaswellasfeasts,signs,ortelepathicphenomena,justasmuchasexpiations
3 Thissimileofhislesscivilisedcoevalsto‘swine’mightbesoftenedifweconcedethatheisassuming
thatpigsarefedoncrabapplesandacorns,aswasperhapsthecaseinhisday.
4 InOeuvres(1967,I),HubertandMauss(inMauss1968/1969)‘L’analysedesfaitsre´ligieux’.All
translationsoftextsreferencedinFrencheditionsaremyownresponsibility.
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WHAT IS AN INSTITUTION? 483
forbadluck.Alloftheseareinstitutions.Thenotionsofsacred,soul,time,etc.,
are all equally institutions because, as a matter of fact, they do not exist in the
mindoftheindividualotherwisethandressedintheformsthattheytookfrom
specificsocieties.Theindividualreceivesthem,througheducation,intraditional
formulae.Theyare,therefore,theobjectsofsociology.(1968[1906],I:36)
Notethefascinatingwayinwhichtheauthorsareexplicitabouttheepistemology
of their undertaking: they explain, in a frank manner, that later social theorists are
pronetoabandon,thatideasassuchactuallyoccurintheheadsofindividualpersonsas
representationsandthatthecollectivenatureoftheseisconstitutedbythewaytheyare
‘dressed’–‘reveˆtuesdeformesqu’ellesontprisesdansdessocie´tesde´termine´es’,thatis
theiractualformulation(1968[1906],I:36).Wefindhereechoesofthewayinwhich,
forMauss,inhisessayontheperson,individualsinprimitivesocietyare‘masked’by
therolestheyaresupposedtoassumeinordertobecomelegitimatesocialagents.
Inatextabouttheobjectsandmethodsofsociology,nowinco-authorshipwithPaul
Falconnet,5 Maussexplainsthat‘eachindividualencounters[thesehabitsorcustoms]
already formed, so to speak instituted, since he is not their author, since he receives
themfromtheoutside,theyarethuspreexisting’(hisemphasis,1969[1901],III:149).
Theword‘institution’,therefore,isbestusedtodescribe‘analreadyinstitutedsetof
actionsandideasthatindividualsfindbeforethemandthatimposethemselvesonthem
to a greater or lesser extent’ (1969 [1901], III: 150). And, they proceed: ‘Institution,
therefore, in the social order, plays the same role as function in the biological order;
andinthesamewaythatlifescienceisthescienceofvitalfunctions,sothescienceof
societyisthescienceofinstitutionsthusdescribed’(1969[1901],III:150).
ThereisacuriousinconsistencyinMauss’swritingsovertheyearssince,whilsthe
insists on the way in which institutions include both actions and thoughts, he never
abandons the separation between what he and Durkheim called the ‘physiology of
practice’definedas‘socialactions,socialpracticesandinstitutions’andthe‘physiology
ofrepresentation’definedas‘ideasandcollectivefeelings’(1969[1901],III:208).Theirs
isadecidedlyneo-Kantiananthropology.
In Durkheim’s earlier work De la division du travail social, written in 1893, the
conceptofinstitutionisintroducedbymeansofadiscussionofmedievalcorporations,
whichareseenasthebasisofthemodernstate.Theyareinstitutionsinsofarasthey
persistthroughtimeindependentlyoftheirparticularmanifestations(1967[1897],I:21)
andtotheextentthattheyfulfilthepurposesforwhichtheywerecreated(1967[1897],
I:25).Hereagainwewitnessthetendencytojumpfrom(i)aminimalistprincipleof
socialityto(ii)itssupposedlyperfectinstantiationinformalmodernorganisations:‘For
aprofessionalmoralityandlawtoestablishitselfinthedifferenteconomicprofessions
itwasnecessaryforthecorporation,insteadofremainingaconfusedaggregatewithout
unity, to become (or rather to become again) a defined, organised group; in a word,
a public institution’ (1967 [1897], I: 19). So, we conclude that, for the old master, a
public institution is ‘a defined, organised group’. This tendency to associate (i) with
(ii) constitutes a semantic slippage6 that runs through the whole history of the word
‘institution’ in the 20th century, as it is what allows it to carry the meanings that we
haveallbecomeusedtoattributetoit.
5 InOeuvres(1967,III),FalconnetandMauss‘LaSociologie.ObjetetMe´thode’.
6 Iusetheexpressionhereinthesenseofdoublereadingandverbalassociation.
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484 JOA˜O DE PINA-CABRAL
In fact, in Durkheim, the evolutionary nature of the association is quite explicit
eventhoughitsformulationsoundslessimperialtoourearsthantheformulationsby
FrazerandWestermarckpresentedabove.Hedescribesforusaprocesswhereby,inthe
historyofhumanity,basicinstitutionsareprogressivelyoverlaidbyotherinstitutions
without fully disappearing. Thus, ‘for the division of labour to be able to develop, it
wasnecessaryformentocastofftheyokeofheredity,forprogresstobreakcastesand
classes.Theprogressivedisappearanceofthelattertends,infact,toprovetherealityof
thatemancipation;sinceonecannotverywellseehow,ifheredityhadnotlostitsrights
overtheindividual,itmighthavebeenweakenedasaninstitution’(1967[1897],II:71).
Buttheseancientinstitutionsremain astheground,so to speak,uponwhich the
othermoreperfectinstitutionsareseated.
Ancient institutions never fully disappear before new institutions, to the point
of leaving no trace of themselves. They persist, not only as survivals, but also
because something of the needs to which they responded continues to persist.
Effective neighbourhood will ever constitute a link among men; therefore, the
politicalandsocialorganizationonaterritorialbasewillcertainlysurvive.Only,
itwillnothaveanylongeractualpreponderance,preciselybecausethatlinkhas
lostsomeofitsforce.(1967[1897],I:37)
Weber’s compulsory organisations
The Durkheimian formulation is arguably the most influential use of the word
‘institution’ in sociological and anthropological theory over the 20th century. For
example,inanextremelyinfluentialessay,theHuxleyMemorialLectureof1951,called
‘The Comparative Method in Social Anthropology’ (1952: 15–22), Radcliffe-Brown
againusesthewordinstitutioninthisbroadDurkheimiansensebyreferringtojoking
relationshipsandtomoietyexogamyasinstitutions.Thisminimalistsenseoftheword,
best suited to Mauss’s definition of ‘public rules of action and thought’ might have
wontheday.Still,aswesawinSearle,andasweseeineverydaysocioscientificlingo
all around us, the other meaning enshrined in the Stanford Encyclopaedia definition
(‘complexsocialformsthatreproducethemselves...’)isequallyimportant.Forclarity
sake,wewillrefertothissecondmeaningasthe‘complexdefinition’.
IstronglysuspectthatthisdefinitionisonthewholeduetotheinfluenceofMax
Weber’sworkwhich,whilstroughlycontemporarywiththatofDurkheimandMauss,
onlycametohaveanimpactonthesocialsciencesoutsideGermanophonecirclesafter
the1930sand,mostdecidedly,throughtheagencyofTalcottParsons,aftertheSecond
World War. Certainly, in anthropology, as Marshall Sahlins has recently reminded us
(2011:6–7),CliffordGeertzandDavidSchneider,studentsofParsonsatHarvard,went
ontobecomeextremelyinfluentialworld-wide.Surelytheyhadaninfluenceinthis.7
Theneoinstitutionalistschoolineconomyisespeciallyresponsiblefordeveloping
the line of interpretation of the word that is more associated with Weber’s complex
definitionandlesswithMauss’minimalistdefinition.Iwouldbetotallyoutofmydepth,
7 Itisinterestinghowthismodifiesthemorecommon‘Boas,Benedict,Mead’pedigreeof‘culture’
thathereproducedearlieronintheintroductiontohisinfluentialshortbookHistoricalMetaphors
(Sahlins1981).
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WHAT IS AN INSTITUTION? 485
however,ifIevenpretendedlightlytopresenthereeconomicneoinstitutionalism.8So
IwilllimitmyselftocallingyourattentiontothefactthattheactualwordthatWeber
usedwasnot‘institution’butAnstalten–atermthathardlybearstheimplicationsthat
characterisetheLatinwordthatcametotranslateitinFrenchandEnglishafterWeber’s
impactonsocialthinkinginthesecondhalfofthe20thcentury.
In Weber’s Economy and Society (1968 [1956]), the translators9 decided that
the concept of Anstalten should be translated as ‘institutions’, even although for
Weber the proper definition of the term would have been closer to ‘compulsory
organizations’. The term Anstalt (feminine noun) means roughly ‘establishment’. It
comesfromAnstellenmeaning‘toengage,tohire,toemploy,tostaff’which,inturn,
isverycloselylinkedtoEinstallenmeaning‘toadjust,tohire,toengage,toconfigure’.
Thus, the German word – meaning ‘to make arrangements for’ or ‘to get ready to’ –
alsobearsthepurpose-geared(teleological)implicationsimplicitintheLatintermbut,
insteadofthearchitecturalmetaphor,itseemstofocusmoreonhumanengagement.
In order to define Anstalten, Weber starts with the notion of ‘organization’, that
is, as he puts it, ‘a social relationship which is either closed or limits the admission
of outsiders (and whose) regulations are enforced by specific individuals (...) with
representativepowers’.Anstaltenare‘compulsoryorganizations’,thatis,‘organizations
wherethereisapersonorpersonsinauthoritycarryingintoeffecttheordergoverning
theorganization’(1968[1956],I:48).
Forhim,acompulsoryorganisationmustbea‘formalorganization’,thatis,itmust
possess‘acontinuouslyandrationallyoperatingstaff’(1968[1956],I:52).Finally,heis
specific:‘anorganizationwhichimposes,withinaspecifiablesphereofoperations,its
order(withrelativesuccess)onallactionconformingwithcertaincriteriawillbecalled
a compulsory organization or association (Anstalt)’ (1968 [1956], I: 52). Note that,
here, ‘compulsory organization’, ‘association’, and in English translation ‘institution’
areheldtobesynonyms.Infact,thewordinstitution,whichdoesexistinGermanand
isgiveninmostGermandictionariesasasynonymofAnstalt,onlyappearsinWeber’s
workpassingly.
For Weber, the compulsory organisations par excellence are the State, ‘with its
subsidiaryheterocephalousorganizations’,andtheChurch,andwhethertheindividual
joins these institutions voluntarily or not does not change the situation. Note the
differenceofimplicationsfromtheDurkheimianuseoftheword,whereindividualsare
mouldedbyinstitutionsandyetcannotbutjointhem,sincethatistheverycondition
ofsociality.
Elsewhere Weber gives us a more complete definition of Anstalten which fully
confirmsthisreading(andheretheeditors,RothandWittich,actuallyalertustothe
factthatthewordhastwomeanings:institutionandcompulsoryorganisation):‘groups
inwhich(i)membershipdependsonobjectivecriteriaregardlessofthedeclaredwillof
thoseincluded(incontrasttothe‘voluntaryassociation’)and(ii)rationallyestablished
rules and an enforcement apparatus codetermine individual action (in contrast to
amorphousconsensualgroupingwhichlackarationallyestablishedorder)’(1968[1956],
II:1380).Evidently,suchadescriptionfailstoapplytoMauss’minimalistinstitutions
suchascalendars,marriages,magicbeliefs,etc.
8 TheirsistheinspirationofBoyerandPeteresen(2011).
9 AmongwhomTalcottParsons.
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