Welfare and rational care

150 Pages·2002·0.815 MB·English

by  Darwall, Stephen L

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Copyright©2002byPrincetonUniversityPress
PublishedbyPrincetonUniversityPress,41WilliamStreet,
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LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Darwall,StephenL.,1946–
Welfareandrationalcare/StephenDarwall.
p.cm.—(Princetonmonographsinphilosophy)
Includesbibliographicalreferences(p.)andindex.
ISBN0-691-09252-4(alk.paper)
1.Ethics.2.Contentment.I.Title.II.Series.
BJ1012.D3352002
177′.7—dc21 2002019845
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ThisbookhasbeencomposedinJansonandCentaurDisplay
Printedonacid-freepaper.∞
www.pup.princeton.edu
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Contents
o
Acknowledgments ix
•
CHAPTER I: Welfare’s Normativity
1
CHAPTER II: Welfare and Care
22
CHAPTER III: Empathy, Sympathy, Care
50
CHAPTER IV: Valuing Activity: Golub’s Smile
73
Notes 105
•
References 123
•
Index 133
•
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A
cknowledgments
o
THEIDEASpresentedherewerestimulatedbyaconversa-
tionIhadabouttenyears agoovercoffeewithElizabeth
Anderson. I had been reading the manuscript of Ander-
son’sValueinEthicsandEconomicsandhadbeenstruckby
her claim that we value the state of realizing someone’s
welfare because we care for that individual and so value
her in a distinctive way. Surely, I had thought, caring for
someone just is wanting herwelfare. I accepted the Kan-
tian doctrine that respect is a distinctive attitude toward
a person rather than a state, but I hadn’t seen that this is
alsotrueofwhatIherecallsympatheticconcernorcare.
Over the course of that conversation, Liz convinced me
that I had been wrong.
Slowly the idea began to grow in me that if that were
right, then perhaps the very idea of a person’s good or
welfare could itself be understood in terms of what one
should want for someone insofar as one cares for her or,
equivalently, what one should want for her for her sake.
This is the rational care theory of welfare that I defend
in this book.
In writing it, I have incurred many debts. Philosophi-
cally, I have drawn most, as I say, from Anderson and, as
well, from David Velleman, as will be evident from the
notes. I have also been much helped by Allan Gibbard’s