In May 1940 Nazi Germany was the unquestioned master of almost all of continental Europe, the only European power still standing other than the remaining neutral territories was now the UK but for how much longer would that be allowed to be the case.
The all conquering and seemingly unstoppable German Wehrmacht now stood poised like a coiled spring at the ready to jump across the Channel and launch a full scale invasion and occupation of all of the UK apart from the still neutral and recently formed Irish Republic.
Following on from the successful destruction of the RAF's daylight fighter and bomber forces by the more advanced and numerically superior Luftwaffe, the safe completion of the sweeping of the English Channel for mines by the Kriegsmarine and the weakening of the still surviving surface units of the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy by both the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine all conditions had been met and now all was ready for 'Unternehmen Seelöwe' to proceed as planned.
Two German Army combat groups were now set to cross 'The dirty ditch' and using the lessons learned in the Norwegian Invasion, storm the english beaches of southern England at various locations, with Kriegsmarine Support units and warships in company. Luftwaffe Airborne Fallschirmjäger units supported by U-Boat launched Brandenburger kampfgruppen would also take part in the operation.
Despite living with a nearly constant fear of the British Isles being invaded by the Wehrmacht from August to October 1940, the invasion never took place after firstly being postponed to spring 1941 before finally being abandoned entirely due to 'operational considerations of the future' (Greece, Crete and Russia chiefly).
The Author looks beyond the traditionally understood account of 'Operation Sea Lion', complete with plucky Home Guardsmen and the courageous pilots of RAF Fighter Command, to instead examine the real scale of Germany's ambitious plans and actual capabilities to carry out a successful invasion in either 1940 or later in 1941. In particular the Author examines with some depth how 'Unternehmen Seelöwe' fitted in with the overall German Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine operations undertaken around the British Isles, as he shows exactly what it was other then the sea conditions and weather that stopped Adolf Hitler from giving his approval for Unternehmen Seelöwe' to take place and its realalistice chances if launched of ending in success or failure for the Third Reich's forces carrying out such an invasion.
Robert Forczyk has a PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland and a strong background in European and Asian military history. He retired as a lieutenant colonel from the US Army Reserves after having served 18 years as an officer in the US 2nd and 4th infantry division's Armoured Unit and as an intelligence officer in the 29th Infantry Division (Light).
Dr Forczyk is currently a consultant with various groups, he lives and works in Washington DC.