War and Diplomacy in Kashmir,1947-48

240 Pages·2002·31.9 MB·English

by  C Dasgupta

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CopyrightC C. Dasgupt.a, 2002
All rights resefVed. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,
recording or by any Information storage or retrieval system, without permis
sion In writing from the publisher.
Fust published in 2002 by
Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd
M-32, Greater Kailash Market I
New Delhi 110 048
($);
Sage Publications Inc. Sage Publications Ltd
2455 Teller Road 6 Bonhlll Street
Thousand Oaks, Califomia 91320 London EC2A 4P<l
Published by Tejeshwar Singh for Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, type
set by Line Arts in 10/12pt. Korinna Bt, Pondicherry and printed at
Chaman Enterprises, Delhi.
Ubrary of Congress Cataloging-In-Publication Data
Dasgupta, C., 1940-
War and diplomacy In Kashmir, 1947-48 IC. Dasgupta.
p. cm. .
Includes bibliographical references and Index.
1. Jammu and Kashmir (lndia}--Politics and government I. lltJe.
DS485.K27 D39 954'.6042-dc21 2001 2001048155
ISBN: 0-7619-9588-9 (US-Hb) 81-7829--069-3 (lndia-Hb)
0-7619-9589-7(US-Pb) 81-7829-070-7 (India-Pb)
Sage Production Team: Sana Aiyar, Mathew, P.J. and Santosh Rawat
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I Introduction 9
II Junagadh-A Curtain Raiser 20
Ill Crisis In Kashmir 34
IV The Defence of Srinagar 42
V Reactions in London 53
VI Jammu Province 63
VII The Governor-General as Mediator 70
VIII Military Plans 86
. IX Counter-Attack or UN Appeal? 97
X The Security Council 110
XI A Private Initiative 133
XII The Spring Offensive 143
XIII The UN Commission for India and Pakistan 161
XIV Limited Offensives 167
~ The Last Round 178
XVI Ceasefire 191
XVII Conclusion 200
Post.script 211
216
Endnotes
Index 234
About the Author 240
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The conflict which broke out between India and Pakistan in 1947 was
unique in the annals of modem warfare: it was a war in which both
the opposing armies were led by nationals of a third country. British
generals commanded the armies of the newly independent states of
India and Pakistan. In India, moreover, the Defence Committee of the
Cabinet was chaired by Lord Mountbatten, not Prime Minister Nehru.
Thus the course and outcome of the lndo-Pakistan conflict cannot
be explained simply in terms of the political objectives and military
capabilities of the antagonists. A crucial determinant was the role of
the British officers at the helm of the two armies and, in the case of
India, the British Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten.
While it was unique in this one respect, the first lndo-Pakistan war
was also a typical third world conflict from a broader perspective.
External factors tend to play a major part in wars between medium or
smaU states. Their dependence on major powers for military supplies,
economic assistance and diplomatic support makes these states vul
nerable to external pressures. Thus the positions taken by the great
powers can influence the duration, intensity and even the outcome of
such conflicts. The Kashmir war of 1947-48 is one such example.
For both India and Pakistan, Britain was the leading overseas partner
in trade, industry and finance. Both countries turned to Britain for
military equipment, spares and oil supplies. The war was unique only
in the extent to which the two new states were vulnerable to British
influence on account of the presence of British officers at the
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senlonnost levels of their anned forces. These officers were in a posi
tion to directly influence the course of the war through the advice
they tendered to their respective governments and the manner in
which they implemented-or ignored-government directives.
India and Pakistan emerged as independent states in a world dom
inated by two-and-a-half great powers. Two ascendant great pow
ers-the United States and the Soviet Union-strove to consolidate
their respective positions in a war-devastated Europe. Britain, a great
power in rapid decline, no longer possessed the resources required
to play a global role. In March 1947, she handed over to Washington
the task of securing Greece and Turkey against a communist take
over and she was soon to bow out of her Palestine mandate. Never
theless, Britain still enjoyed the prestige of a great power. She saw
herself as a true partner of the United States equal in status and
influence if no longer in actual power. She still ruled over a vast
empire and her American ally continued to defer to her the leading
role in South Asia and the Middle East. It was only in the next decade
that the United States would supplant Britain as the dominant power
in the Indian Ocean area. At the t)me of India's independence, Wash
ington was content to follow the British lead in the region.
Britain was thus exceptionally well situated to influence the course
of events in the first lndo-Pakistan war. She was largely responsible
for shaping the attitude of the Western powers and, thus, the interna
tional context of the conflict Moreover, her voice could not be Ignored
by belligerents depending upon her for military and oil supplies. Above
all, British officers in India and Pakistan were in a unique pos!tion to
directly shape military events. Yet, curiously, the role of the British
government and Britons holding high office in India and Pakistan has
received little attention. Moreover, the military and diplomatic devel
opments of 1947-48 have been studied in isolation from each other,
ignoring their lnterlinkages. As a result, basic questions concerning
the war are still shrouded in mystery: Why did India not carry the war
into Pakistan, as she was to do in 1965? Why did she take the Kashmir
issue to the United Nations? Why was no serious effort made to clear
Pakistani forces from the western areas of Poonch and Mirpur? Why
did India accept a ceasefire when she clearly had military superiority?
A study of Britain's policy regarding the Kashmir war must begin with
an examination of her strategic interests in the subcontinent. For two
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