Waco, national test bed

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When we magnify this picture, the soldiers are clearly visible, directing the activity. In the
entrance to the War Gallery, we saw that military equipment was present at the Mt. Carmel
Center from Day One. Here's what they had lined up on Day Two. Also see Dallas Morning News,
March 3, 1993 for more equipment photographed on Day Two.

On July 30, 1992, one of David Koresh's business associates, Henry McMahon, received a visit from
several ATF agents. The subject of the inquiry was recent gun purchases made by David Koresh.
McMahon, himself a gun dealer, phoned David Koresh while the agents stood in front of him, and told
Koresh about the ATF inquiries. Koresh invited the ATF out to inspect his premises and his guns.

According to Mr. McMahon's testimony in the 1995 Congressional hearings, when he relayed Koresh's
invitation, the ATF agents declined to accept the invitation. The legality of David Koresh's guns were,
then, never the issue. They could have gone out and inspected the guns at any time.

Had the ATF not wanted to accept Koresh's invitation to come out to inspect the guns, and had the
simply wanted to arrest him on some pretext, they could have apprehended him when he was out of the
Mt. Carmel Center. But ATF claimed that David Koresh never left the property, and therefore a raid was
necessary to apprehend him.

In an article entitled: "Residents, businessmen say Howell not a recluse," which appeared in the Waco
Tribune-Herald, March 4, 1993, one Waco resident was quoted:

"To say that he never leaves that place is ridiculous. He is always out everywhere. Everybody and their
dog see him and many of the people out there. But I guess they are just trying to cover themselves
because they are going to be in big trouble--hopefully," she said.

David Koresh used to like to work on car engines at a repair shop owned by the Davidians, which was
about five miles from the Mt. Carmel Center. He was also "seen dining and drinking at Chelsea Street
Pub, a popular West Waco eatery, at least twice in the past six weeks," according to the paper. There
was no need for an assault, no need to endanger ATF agents, and no need to endanger peaceful civilians.

What was at issue? The issue seems to be that the February 28, 1993 raid and ensuing siege provided the
US the opportunity to test, for the first time, the "National Response Plan." (Treasury Report, pg. 152 for

Waco:
National
Testbed
Center

description).

Purpose of National Response Plan

It is impossible to get a plain English definition of the National Response Plan" from the Treasury
Report. The nature of the plan and its purpose must be inferred from the obfuscated verbiage.

A chart of the National Response Plan's organization
appears on Treasury Report, pg. 63. At the top of the
chart, we see that control of the plan is vested in the
"National Command Center," which was ostensibly
under the command of an ATF agent (Treasury
Report, pg. 152). At the bottom of the chart, we see
other federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies, the Department of Defense (DoD National
Guard Support). Thus we are asked to believe that an
ATF agent sits at the top of the organization board (in
command) and that the Department of Defense is at
the bottom of the organization board.

It is of course unbelievable that an ATF employee
would be taken seriously if he tried to issue directives
to the Pentagon concerning the deployment of
Pentagon troops. The picture of a four star general,
having climbed to the top of the military chain of
command by decades of careful politics, taking orders
from Treasury Department functionaries is not
credible. Had this organizational chart borne
semblance to reality, we surely would have seen
"DoD" box at the top of the chart.

National Military/Police Take-over Plan

What was the purpose of the plan? The National Response Plan "sought to define ATF objectives,
policies, and procedures to ensure a coordinated response and rapid deployment of ATF resources to
situations that exceeded the capabilities of a single field division," (Treasury Report, pg. 62). According
to the schema, DoD National Guard units could be called up to assist the ATF.

But the ATF is essentially a tax-collecting agency. What "situations" could exceed the capabilities of an
ATF field division to collect taxes? Clearly any situation that required the power of the DoD National
Guard would be a major civil upheaval. The NRP is a preparation for armed confrontation between the
military/police forces in the US government and US citizens.

Since the US citizenry is not preparing a massed attack against the military/police combine, we can only
conclude this National Response Plan is a plan for military/police occupation of civilian society.

How the Plan Was Tested

The Waco locals were recruited as helpers in the planning. For example:

� The ATF chose the Texas State Technical College (TSTC) as site for the command post of the
operation. The sheriff's department had previously gotten cooperation from the airport manager.
(Treasury Report, pg. 55).

� At the suggestion of the local police, the planners chose Bellmead Civic Center as the staging area
because it was large enough to accommodate the agents, it was close to Mt. Carmel Center, and
had ample parking. (Treasury Report, pg. 56)

� The Texas Rangers were lined up to surround the Mt. Carmel Center and prevent anyone from
leaving (Treasury Report, pg. 79)

� The McLennan County sheriff's department was lined up to "provide other support
functions." (Treasury Report, pg. 79).

� When the raid "failed," Mt. Carmel Center was cut off from its neighbors through the efforts of
local law enforcement personnel and SWAT teams, including:

� the Austin Police Department,

� the McLennan County Sheriff's Department, and, for federal balance,

� the US Marshall's Service (Treasury Report, pg. 112).

� By March 2, 1993, 400 local, state, and federal law enforcement officers had converged on Waco,
according to the Dallas Morning News of March 3, 1993.

� During the 51 days of the siege, the FBI sent 668 people to Waco. Each day an average of 217
agents and 41 support people were present. The DoJ Report, pg. 10, states that other military/law
enforcement personnel on site were:

� ATF -- 136

� Customs -- 6

� Waco Police Department 18

� McLennan County Sheriff's Office -- 17

� Department of Public Safety (Texas Rangers) -- 31

� Department of Public Safety (Patrol) -- 131

� US Army -- 15

� Texas National Guard -- 13.

The raid was a bonanza for the local merchants:

� ATF officials conducted a briefing at the Best Western Hotel. Attending were members of the
arrest and support teams, National Guard members, explosives specialists, dog handlers, and
laboratory technicians.

� Local merchants were lined up to supply the raiders with:

� ambulance services,

� portable toilets, and

� doughnuts.

� The sheriff's department saw to it that coffee would be ready for the raiders at the staging center
on the morning of the raid (Treasury Report, pg. 79).

Delta Force Founder on Hand to Critique

Even the founder of the Special Operations commando group, the Delta force, was on hand critiquing
the efforts of the first trial run of the National Response Plan. Col. Charlie Beckwith, an insider with
Soldier of Fortune magazine, was not pleased with the ATF's efficiency.

The Treasury Report says, "Colonel Charlie Beckwith, U.S.A. Ret., on assignment for Soldier of
Fortune magazine, claims that he managed to advance on foot to within less than a mile of the
Compound without being challenged." (Treasury Report, pg. 112). "Note: Beckwith was within one mile

of the Mt. Carmel Center during hostilities, and he was not arrested--yet, several days after the fire in
April--reporters from the Associated Press and Houston Chronicle were arrested for getting within two
miles of the complex (see Inside the Concrete Room in the Death Gallery)".

In an article appearing in the Soldier of Fortune, July 1993, Col. Beckwith also criticized the ATF's
handling of the media. "It was not until the FBI arrived on 29 February (sic) that the media was put
under control and moved outside the target area," he lamented.

Military Occupation of Local College

"At the central command post on the campus of the Texas State Technical College, officials set up
briefing tents on the lawn. Hundreds of agents passed in and out of the barracks at the former military
field, which includes an aircraft hangar and airstrip.

"Just before 11 a.m., a number of buses and heavily armed ATF agents carrying plastic flex-cuffs left
the base for the compound. Dozens of agents began carrying tables, chairs and stenography machines
into the hangar, students and instructors at the college said.

"Then ATF agents began evacuating the campus. Students said armed officers entered classrooms and
told them to leave."

-- This from the Dallas Morning News, March 3, 1993, pg. 14A.

And How Did The Test Come Off?

The first test of the National Response Plan went very well, it seems.

1. State and local police, from the Texas Rangers to the local county sheriff's department cooperated
with the federal government.
2. The local merchants enjoyed the business opportunity afforded by visitors to Waco,
3. The news services conducted almost no independent investigation whatsoever, and faithfully
relayed the government propaganda line. In other words, the media covered Waco in the same
way they covered the Gulf War (see Veracity of Contemporaneous News Coverage).
4. Civic organizations--from the American Civil Liberties Union to the Southern Baptist Conference,
barely made a whisper of protest or opposition.
5. The politicians in Washington DC conducted cover-up Congressional investigations (see Burial
Gallery).

Aside from a few glitches, some of which you will read about in this Museum, the National Response
Plan drill came off very well. It's too bad so many innocent Americans died as a result, of course, but
those that died were not the ones making the money. It's just a question of being in the wrong place at
the wrong time, as opposed to being in the right place at the right time.

In the military takeover of a country, paradigms must be established, from which the people can learn
that resistance to the new order can only result in annihilation. With the practical details embodied in the
National Response Plan, the new paradigm was established in Waco, Texas, in 1993.

Update, June 7, 1995:

And the Tests Go On . . .

Since the Waco Holocaust, the US military practice sessions have become even bolder. The Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, June 5, 1996 reported that "urban environment" warfare exercises have been conducted in
a number of US cities, including Atlanta, Chicago, and Dallas.

Most recently, Special Ops exercises in Pittsburgh provoked considerable negative public reaction.
According to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette report, between midnight and 2 a.m. on June 4th, 200 Special
Ops commandos buzzed the city with Black Hawk helicopters, slid down ropes to the streets, and landed
in the Brighton Heights area. They fired loud explosions and fired blank bullets for sound effects, and
set off small explosions to breach doors in an abandoned building. Department of Defense Spokesmen
said they were simulating a "rescue."

Notice the same Orwellian rhetoric used in Waco: This is not an assault, this is a rescue.

According to another report, one startled resident said, "If I had been up on my third floor, I could have
touched it "the helicopter" with a broom handle. That's how close it came."

The 911 emergency operators were given handouts instructing them to tell panicked callers they were
witnessing "training" exercises. Callers who would not be placated were to be given another telephone
number which connected them to the DoD.

Some local officials had been warned of the exercises, and indeed helped in setting them up. But the
public had deliberately not been warned, ostensibly to avoid the public safety issues created by curious
onlookers.

These exercises are, in part, mass desensitization sessions, the object of which is to dull public reaction
to the sights and sounds of military takeover of urban areas. See "The Making of a Commando" in The
Black Army for a description of desensitization programs.

Visitors who have read The Boy Who Cried Wolf may remember what the young shepherd with a
warped sense of humor learned: If you fake a wolf alert too often, people stop coming when you cry
wolf. Now the wolf has learned the trick: Its only a drill, a practice session, I'm here to rescue you. Go
back to sleep.

These practice sessions will enable the Pentagon to send a flotilla of military helicopters over any major
city, day or night, land soldiers in the streets, set off guns and explosions, breach doors with grenades--
and people will ignore them.

Paul Revere may ride, but we will ignore him, too. We all know the British are just maneuvering and
practicing their skills--they are just here to rescue us.

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