Virtue Jurisprudence

276 Pages·2008·5.501 MB·English

by  C. Farrelly, L. Solum

Virtue Jurisprudence
AlsobyColinFarrelly
ANINTRODUCTIONTOCONTEMPORARYPOLITICALTHEORY
CONTEMPORARYPOLITICALTHEORY:AReader(editor)
JUSTICE,DEMOCRACYANDREASONABLEAGREEMENT
AlsobyLawrenceB.Solum
CIVILPROCEDURE:PRINCIPLESANDTHEORY
18MOORE’SFEDERALPRACTICE,3rdedition(withSusanBandees)
SEMIANNUALRELEASES(withTomRowe)
DESTRUCTIONOFEVIDENCE(withJamieGorelickandStephenMarzen)
DESTRUCTIONOFEVIDENCE:Supplement(1989–2006annualsupplements)
Virtue Jurisprudence
Editedby
Colin Farrelly
and
Lawrence B. Solum
Editedmatter,selection,introduction,chapters4,5,6
©ColinFarrelly&LawrenceB.Solum2008
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Contents
ListofContributors vi
Acknowledgments vii
AnIntroductiontoAretaicTheoriesofLaw 1
Colin Farrelly and Lawrence B. Solum
1 TheCentralTradition—ItsValueandLimits 24
Robert P. George
2 Prudence,Benevolence,andNegligence:VirtueEthicsand
TortLaw 51
Heidi Li Feldman
3 JudgesofCharacter 88
Suzanna Sherry
4 CivicLiberalismandthe“DialogicalModel”ofJudicial
Review 107
Colin Farrelly
5 AVirtue-CenteredAccountofEquityandtheRuleofLaw 142
Lawrence B. Solum
6 Natural Justice: An Aretaic Account of the Virtue of
Lawfulness 167
Lawrence B. Solum
7 Virtue,Vice,andCriminalLiability 193
Antony Duff
8 OnAristotelianCriminalLaw:AReplytoDuff 214
Kyron Huigens
9 TwoWaysofDoingtheRightThing 236
Rosalind Hursthouse
Index 256
v
List of Contributors
AntonyDuff,ProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityofStirling,Scotland.
Colin Farrelly, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of
Waterloo,Canada.
HeidiLiFeldman,ProfessorofLaw,GeorgetownUniversityLawCenter,
USA.
RobertP.George,McCormickProfessorofJurisprudence,Universityof
Princeton,USA.
KyronHuigens,ProfessorofLaw,CardozoSchoolofLaw,USA.
Rosalind Hursthouse, Professor of Philosophy, The University of
Auckland,NewZealand.
SuzannaSherry,CalTurnerProfessorofLawandLeadership,Vanderbilt
UniversityLawSchool,USA.
Lawrence B. Solum, John E. Cribbet Professor of Law, University of
Illinois,CollegeofLaw,USA.
vi
Acknowledgments
Theeditorsaregratefulforpermissiontoreprintthefollowingmaterial:
Robert P. George, Making Men Moral (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993),
19–47.
Heidi Li Feldman, “Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue
EthicsandTortLaw”,74Chicago-KentLawReview,1431(2000).
Suzanna Sherry, “Judges of Character” 38 Wake Forest Law Review, 793
(2003).
Colin Farrelly, “Civic Liberalism and the ‘Dialogical Model’ of Judicial
Review”25LawandPhilosophy,489(2006).
Lawrence B. Solum, “Equity and the Rule of Law”, Nomos XXXVI: The
RuleofLaw,120(1994).
Lawrence B. Solum, “Natural Justice”, 51 American Journal of Jurispru-
dence,65(2006).
R. A. Duff, “Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an
AristotelianCriminalLaw?”6BuffaloCriminalLawReview,147(2003).
Kyron Huigens, “On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff” 18
NotreDameJournalofLaw,Ethics&PublicPolicy,465(2004).
vii
An Introduction to Aretaic Theories
∗
of Law
Colin Farrelly and Lawrence B. Solum
1. Introduction
Contemporarylegaltheoryhasbeendominatedbytherealistparadigm.
The extreme version of realism is captured by the slogan of the critical
legalstudiesmovement:“Lawispolitics!”Otherheirstotherealisttradi-
tion(includingnormativelawandeconomics,thelegalprocessschool,
legalpragmatism,andsoforth)coalescearoundwhatwemightcallthe
instrumentalist thesis—the point of legal institutions (especially courts)
is to use the law as an instrument to achieve the goals of some norm-
ativetheory(suchaswelfarismordeontology)orapoliticalideology(of
the left, right, or center). There are, of course, opposing tendencies in
contemporary legal theory. Some neoformalists emphasize the duty of
adjudicatorstofollowthelawandgivethepartieswhattheyaredue;in
aroughandreadysortofway,theseneoformalistsadoptadeontological
perspectiveonlegaltheorythatcompeteswiththeconsequentialismof
contemporaryneorealists.
In this introduction, we sketch an alternative direction for contem-
porary legal theory, an approach that we call “virtue jurisprudence.”
Our core idea is quite simple. In moral theory, virtue ethics offers
a third way—an alternative to the deontological and consequen-
tialistapproachesthatdominatedmodernmoralphilosophyuntilvery
recently.Whatwouldhappenifwetransplantedvirtueethicsintonorm-
ative legal theory? The essays in this anthology are part of a growing
bodyofworkthatanswersthatquestion.
Before we go any further, we ought to say that the version of virtue
jurisprudence offered in this brief introduction paper is hardly full
∗©2007bytheAuthors.
1
2 AnIntroductiontoAretaicTheoriesofLaw
blown. Rather, we will focus on one aspect of virtue jurisprudence—a
virtue-centered theory of judging. That leaves a good deal of territory
unmapped. In particular, we only skim the surface of the implications
of virtue jurisprudence for the ends of law. An aretaic theory of legis-
lation would naturally begin with the premise that the telos or proper
end of law is the promotion of human flourishing. If the purpose of
lawistoenablehumanstoacquire,maintain,andexercisethehuman
excellencesorvirtues,itseemslikelythattherewillbeimportantimplic-
ationsforfamiliardebates.Somearguethatthecentralfunctionoflaw
is to prevent actions that harm offers or invade the moral rights of
others. Virtue jurisprudence is naturally inclined to doubt this conten-
tion.Othersarguethatbecausethepurposeofthelawistheprotection
ofproperty(understoodinthewidesensethatincludesthepersonand
liberty of individuals), it follows that it would be improper for law to
aim at equality. Virtue jurisprudence is naturally inclined to the view
that the law should enable and sustain the material and social condi-
tionsthatwouldenableeachandeveryindividualtoachievethehighest
level of human functioning that is consistent with a similar level of
functioningforall.
Instead of these topics, this introduction to the volume provides a
briefintellectualhistoryofthearetaicturninlegaltheory,followedby
asynopsisofthechaptersinthevolume.
2. The aretaic turn in legal theory
Contemporary legal theory endeavors to answer at least two big
questions of practical jurisprudence1: First, what is the aim of law?
Second, how can legal institutions best do their job of resolving disputes?
Virtuejurisprudenceoffersdistinctiveanswerstothesequestions.
Forvirtuejurisprudence,thefinalendoflawisnottomaximizepref-
erence satisfaction or to protect some set of rights and privileges: the
final end of law is to promote human flourishing—to enable humans
to lead excellent lives. Second, the best way to improve the ability
of legal institutions to resolve disputes is not to populate the bench
witheconomistsormoralphilosophersfromeithertheleftortheright;
instead,achievinganexcellentjudiciaryrequirestheselectionofjudges
who possess the judicial virtues—civic courage, judicial temperament,
judicial intelligence, wisdom, and, above all, justice. These answers to
thebigpracticalquestionsareunifiedbyacentralthesis:thefundamental
concepts of legal philosophy should not be welfare, efficiency, autonomy, or