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276 Pages·2008·5.501 MB·English
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Virtue Jurisprudence AlsobyColinFarrelly ANINTRODUCTIONTOCONTEMPORARYPOLITICALTHEORY CONTEMPORARYPOLITICALTHEORY:AReader(editor) JUSTICE,DEMOCRACYANDREASONABLEAGREEMENT AlsobyLawrenceB.Solum CIVILPROCEDURE:PRINCIPLESANDTHEORY 18MOORE’SFEDERALPRACTICE,3rdedition(withSusanBandees) SEMIANNUALRELEASES(withTomRowe) DESTRUCTIONOFEVIDENCE(withJamieGorelickandStephenMarzen) DESTRUCTIONOFEVIDENCE:Supplement(1989–2006annualsupplements) Virtue Jurisprudence Editedby Colin Farrelly and Lawrence B. Solum Editedmatter,selection,introduction,chapters4,5,6 ©ColinFarrelly&LawrenceB.Solum2008 Remainingchapters©theirauthors2008 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2008 978-0-230-55289-0 Allrightsreserved.Noreproduction,copyortransmissionofthis publicationmaybemadewithoutwrittenpermission. Noparagraphofthispublicationmaybereproduced,copiedortransmitted savewithwrittenpermissionorinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthe Copyright,DesignsandPatentsAct1988,orunderthetermsofanylicence permittinglimitedcopyingissuedbytheCopyrightLicensingAgency, 90TottenhamCourtRoad,LondonW1T4LP. Anypersonwhodoesanyunauthorisedactinrelationtothispublication maybeliabletocriminalprosecutionandcivilclaimsfordamages. Theauthorshaveassertedtheirrightstobeidentified astheauthorsofthisworkinaccordancewiththeCopyright, DesignsandPatentsAct1988. Firstpublished2008by PALGRAVEMACMILLAN Houndmills,Basingstoke,HampshireRG216XSand 175FifthAvenue,NewYork,N.Y.10010 Companiesandrepresentativesthroughouttheworld PALGRAVEMACMILLANistheglobalacademicimprintofthePalgrave MacmillandivisionofSt.Martin’sPress,LLCandofPalgraveMacmillanLtd. Macmillan(cid:2)isaregisteredtrademarkintheUnitedStates,UnitedKingdom andothercountries.PalgraveisaregisteredtrademarkintheEuropean Unionandothercountries. ISBN 978-0-230-55289-0 ISBN 978-1-349-60073-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-60073-1 Thisbookisprintedonpapersuitableforrecyclingandmadefromfully managedandsustainedforestsources.Logging,pulpingandmanufacturing processesareexpectedtoconformtotheenvironmentalregulationsofthe countryoforigin. AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. AcatalogrecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheLibraryofCongress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 Transferred to Digital Printing in 2011 Contents ListofContributors vi Acknowledgments vii AnIntroductiontoAretaicTheoriesofLaw 1 Colin Farrelly and Lawrence B. Solum 1 TheCentralTradition—ItsValueandLimits 24 Robert P. George 2 Prudence,Benevolence,andNegligence:VirtueEthicsand TortLaw 51 Heidi Li Feldman 3 JudgesofCharacter 88 Suzanna Sherry 4 CivicLiberalismandthe“DialogicalModel”ofJudicial Review 107 Colin Farrelly 5 AVirtue-CenteredAccountofEquityandtheRuleofLaw 142 Lawrence B. Solum 6 Natural Justice: An Aretaic Account of the Virtue of Lawfulness 167 Lawrence B. Solum 7 Virtue,Vice,andCriminalLiability 193 Antony Duff 8 OnAristotelianCriminalLaw:AReplytoDuff 214 Kyron Huigens 9 TwoWaysofDoingtheRightThing 236 Rosalind Hursthouse Index 256 v List of Contributors AntonyDuff,ProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityofStirling,Scotland. Colin Farrelly, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo,Canada. HeidiLiFeldman,ProfessorofLaw,GeorgetownUniversityLawCenter, USA. RobertP.George,McCormickProfessorofJurisprudence,Universityof Princeton,USA. KyronHuigens,ProfessorofLaw,CardozoSchoolofLaw,USA. Rosalind Hursthouse, Professor of Philosophy, The University of Auckland,NewZealand. SuzannaSherry,CalTurnerProfessorofLawandLeadership,Vanderbilt UniversityLawSchool,USA. Lawrence B. Solum, John E. Cribbet Professor of Law, University of Illinois,CollegeofLaw,USA. vi Acknowledgments Theeditorsaregratefulforpermissiontoreprintthefollowingmaterial: Robert P. George, Making Men Moral (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 19–47. Heidi Li Feldman, “Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue EthicsandTortLaw”,74Chicago-KentLawReview,1431(2000). Suzanna Sherry, “Judges of Character” 38 Wake Forest Law Review, 793 (2003). Colin Farrelly, “Civic Liberalism and the ‘Dialogical Model’ of Judicial Review”25LawandPhilosophy,489(2006). Lawrence B. Solum, “Equity and the Rule of Law”, Nomos XXXVI: The RuleofLaw,120(1994). Lawrence B. Solum, “Natural Justice”, 51 American Journal of Jurispru- dence,65(2006). R. A. Duff, “Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an AristotelianCriminalLaw?”6BuffaloCriminalLawReview,147(2003). Kyron Huigens, “On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff” 18 NotreDameJournalofLaw,Ethics&PublicPolicy,465(2004). vii An Introduction to Aretaic Theories ∗ of Law Colin Farrelly and Lawrence B. Solum 1. Introduction Contemporarylegaltheoryhasbeendominatedbytherealistparadigm. The extreme version of realism is captured by the slogan of the critical legalstudiesmovement:“Lawispolitics!”Otherheirstotherealisttradi- tion(includingnormativelawandeconomics,thelegalprocessschool, legalpragmatism,andsoforth)coalescearoundwhatwemightcallthe instrumentalist thesis—the point of legal institutions (especially courts) is to use the law as an instrument to achieve the goals of some norm- ativetheory(suchaswelfarismordeontology)orapoliticalideology(of the left, right, or center). There are, of course, opposing tendencies in contemporary legal theory. Some neoformalists emphasize the duty of adjudicatorstofollowthelawandgivethepartieswhattheyaredue;in aroughandreadysortofway,theseneoformalistsadoptadeontological perspectiveonlegaltheorythatcompeteswiththeconsequentialismof contemporaryneorealists. In this introduction, we sketch an alternative direction for contem- porary legal theory, an approach that we call “virtue jurisprudence.” Our core idea is quite simple. In moral theory, virtue ethics offers a third way—an alternative to the deontological and consequen- tialistapproachesthatdominatedmodernmoralphilosophyuntilvery recently.Whatwouldhappenifwetransplantedvirtueethicsintonorm- ative legal theory? The essays in this anthology are part of a growing bodyofworkthatanswersthatquestion. Before we go any further, we ought to say that the version of virtue jurisprudence offered in this brief introduction paper is hardly full ∗©2007bytheAuthors. 1 2 AnIntroductiontoAretaicTheoriesofLaw blown. Rather, we will focus on one aspect of virtue jurisprudence—a virtue-centered theory of judging. That leaves a good deal of territory unmapped. In particular, we only skim the surface of the implications of virtue jurisprudence for the ends of law. An aretaic theory of legis- lation would naturally begin with the premise that the telos or proper end of law is the promotion of human flourishing. If the purpose of lawistoenablehumanstoacquire,maintain,andexercisethehuman excellencesorvirtues,itseemslikelythattherewillbeimportantimplic- ationsforfamiliardebates.Somearguethatthecentralfunctionoflaw is to prevent actions that harm offers or invade the moral rights of others. Virtue jurisprudence is naturally inclined to doubt this conten- tion.Othersarguethatbecausethepurposeofthelawistheprotection ofproperty(understoodinthewidesensethatincludesthepersonand liberty of individuals), it follows that it would be improper for law to aim at equality. Virtue jurisprudence is naturally inclined to the view that the law should enable and sustain the material and social condi- tionsthatwouldenableeachandeveryindividualtoachievethehighest level of human functioning that is consistent with a similar level of functioningforall. Instead of these topics, this introduction to the volume provides a briefintellectualhistoryofthearetaicturninlegaltheory,followedby asynopsisofthechaptersinthevolume. 2. The aretaic turn in legal theory Contemporary legal theory endeavors to answer at least two big questions of practical jurisprudence1: First, what is the aim of law? Second, how can legal institutions best do their job of resolving disputes? Virtuejurisprudenceoffersdistinctiveanswerstothesequestions. Forvirtuejurisprudence,thefinalendoflawisnottomaximizepref- erence satisfaction or to protect some set of rights and privileges: the final end of law is to promote human flourishing—to enable humans to lead excellent lives. Second, the best way to improve the ability of legal institutions to resolve disputes is not to populate the bench witheconomistsormoralphilosophersfromeithertheleftortheright; instead,achievinganexcellentjudiciaryrequirestheselectionofjudges who possess the judicial virtues—civic courage, judicial temperament, judicial intelligence, wisdom, and, above all, justice. These answers to thebigpracticalquestionsareunifiedbyacentralthesis:thefundamental concepts of legal philosophy should not be welfare, efficiency, autonomy, or

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