Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History PDF
Preview Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History
This page intentionally left blank VIOLENCEANDSOCIALORDERS Allsocietiesmustdealwiththepossibilityofviolence,andtheydosoindifferentways.This bookintegratestheproblemofviolenceintoalargersocialscienceandhistoricalframework, showinghoweconomicandpoliticalbehaviorarecloselylinked.Mostsocieties,whichwecall naturalstates,limitviolencebypoliticalmanipulationoftheeconomytocreateprivileged interests. These privileges limit the use of violence by powerful individuals, but doing so hindersbotheconomicandpoliticaldevelopment.Incontrast,modernsocietiescreateopen accesstoeconomicandpoliticalorganizations,fosteringpoliticalandeconomiccompetition. Thebookprovidesaframeworkforunderstandingthetwotypesofsocialorders,whyopen accesssocietiesarebothpoliticallyandeconomicallymoredeveloped,andhowsometwenty- fivecountrieshavemadethetransitionbetweenthetwotypes. Douglass C. North is co-recipient of the 1993 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sci- ence.HeistheSpencerT.OlinProfessorinArtsandSciencesatWashingtonUniversityin St.Louis,whereheservedasdirectoroftheCenterforPoliticalEconomyfrom1984to1990, andistheBartlettBurnapSeniorFellowattheHooverInstitutionatStanfordUniversity. A member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a former member of the BoardofDirectorsoftheNationalBureauofEconomicResearchfortwentyyears,Professor NorthreceivedtheJohnR.CommonsAwardin1992.Theauthoroftenbooks,including Institutions,InstitutionalChange,andEconomicPerformance(CambridgeUniversityPress, 1990)andUnderstandingtheProcessofEconomicChange(2005),ProfessorNorthhasresearch interestsinpropertyrights,economicorganizationinhistory,andtheformationofpolitical andeconomicinstitutionsandtheirconsequencesthroughtime.Heisafrequentconsultant fortheWorldBankandnumerouscountriesonissuesofeconomicgrowth. JohnJosephWallisisprofessorofeconomicsattheUniversityofMarylandandaresearch associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. He received his Ph.D. from the UniversityofWashingtonin1981andwentontospendatwo-yearpostdoctoralfellowshipat theUniversityofChicago.Duringthe2006–7academicyear,hewasaVisitingScholaratthe HooverInstitutionandaVisitingProfessorofPoliticalScienceatStanford.ProfessorWallis isaneconomichistorianwhospecializesinthepublicfinanceofAmericangovernmentsand moregenerallyontherelationbetweentheinstitutionaldevelopmentofgovernmentsandthe developmentofeconomies.Hislarge-scaleresearchonAmericanstateandlocalgovernment finance,andonAmericanstateconstitutions,hasbeensupportedbytheNationalScience Foundation. BarryR.WeingastistheWardC.KrebsFamilyProfessorintheDepartmentofPoliticalScience andaSeniorFellowattheHooverInstitutionatStanfordUniversity.HeisalsoaSeniorFellow (bycourtesy)oftheStanfordCenterforInternationalDevelopment.Weingastreceivedhis Ph.D. from the California Institute of Technology in 1977. Prior to teaching at Stanford, ProfessorWeingastspenttenyearsatWashingtonUniversityinSt.LouisintheDepartment ofEconomicsandtheSchoolofBusiness.TherecipientoftheRikerPrize,theHeinzEulau Prize, and the James Barr Memorial Prize, among others, he has also worked extensively withdevelopmentagenciessuchastheWorldBankandtheU.S.AgencyforInternational Development.ProfessorWeingastcoauthoredAnalyticalNarratives(1998)andcoeditedThe OxfordHandbookofPoliticalEconomy(2006).Hisresearchfocusesonthepoliticalfoundations ofmarkets,economicreform,andregulation,includingproblemsofpoliticaleconomyof development,federalismanddecentralization,andlegalinstitutions. Violence and Social Orders A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History DOUGLASS C. NORTH WashingtonUniversityinSt.Louis JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS UniversityofMaryland BARRY R. WEINGAST StanfordUniversity CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521761734 © Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast 2009 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2009 ISBN-13 978-0-511-51783-9 eBook (NetLibrary) ISBN-13 978-0-521-76173-4 hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. ThisbookisdedicatedtoourwivesElisabeth,Ellen,andSusie Contents Preface pagexi Acknowledgments xv 1. TheConceptualFramework 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 TheConceptofSocialOrders:Violence,Institutions,and Organizations 13 1.3 TheLogicoftheNaturalState 18 1.4 TheLogicoftheOpenAccessOrder 21 1.5 TheLogicoftheTransitionfromNaturalStatestoOpen AccessOrders 25 1.6 ANoteonBeliefs 27 1.7 ThePlan 29 2. TheNaturalState 30 2.1 Introduction 30 2.2 Commonalities:CharacteristicsofLimitedAccessOrders 32 2.3 Differences:ATypologyofNaturalStates 41 2.4 Privileges,Rights,andEliteDynamics 49 2.5 Origins:TheProblemScaleandViolence 51 2.6 NaturalStateDynamics:FragiletoBasicNaturalStates 55 2.7 MovingtoMatureNaturalStates:Disorder,Organization, andtheMedievalChurch 62 2.8 MatureNaturalStates:FranceandEnglandinthe Sixteenth,Seventeenth,andEighteenthCenturies 69 2.9 NaturalStates 72 Appendix:SkeletalEvidenceandEmpiricalResults 75 vii viii Contents 3. TheNaturalStateApplied:EnglishLandLaw 77 3.1 Introduction 77 3.2 Chronology 79 3.3 TheCourts,LegalConcepts,andtheLawofProperty 87 3.4 BastardFeudalism 91 3.5 BastardFeudalismandtheImpersonalizationofProperty 98 3.6 TheTypologyofNaturalStates 104 Appendix 106 4. OpenAccessOrders 110 4.1 Introduction 110 4.2 Commonalities:CharacteristicsofanOpenAccessOrder 112 4.3 Institutions,Beliefs,andIncentivesSupporting OpenAccess 117 4.4 Incorporation:TheExtensionofCitizenship 118 4.5 ControlofViolenceinOpenAccessOrders 121 4.6 GrowthofGovernment 122 4.7 ForcesofShort-RunStability 125 4.8 ForcesofLong-RunStability:AdaptiveEfficiency 133 4.9 WhyInstitutionsWorkDifferentlyunderOpenAccess thanLimitedAccess 137 4.10 ANew“LogicofCollectiveAction”andTheoryof Rent-Seeking 140 4.11 DemocracyandRedistribution 142 4.12 AdaptiveEfficiencyandtheSeemingIndependenceof EconomicsandPoliticsinOpenAccessOrders 144 5. TheTransitionfromLimitedtoOpenAccessOrders: TheDoorstepConditions 148 5.1 Introduction 148 5.2 PersonalityandImpersonality:TheDoorstepConditions 150 5.3 DoorstepCondition#1:RuleofLawforElites 154 5.4 DoorstepCondition#2:PerpetuallyLivedOrganizations inthePublicandPrivateSpheres 158 5.5 DoorstepCondition#3:ConsolidatedControlofthe Military 169 5.6 TheBritishNavyandtheBritishState 181 5.7 Time,Order,andInstitutionalForms 187 6. TheTransitionProper 190 6.1 InstitutionalizingOpenAccess 190
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