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37 Pages·2010·0.53 MB·English

by  Congressional Budget Office

MEETING FUTURE AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS:
BRIEFING ON PRELIMINARY ANAL YSIS OF
COSTS OF AL TERNA TIVE APPROACHES
March 1984
John D. Mayer Jr.
Principal Analyst
National Secur i ty and
Interna tional Affairs
William P. Myers
Cost Analyst
Congressional Budget Office
NOTE
All costs are in fiscal year 1985 budget authority dollars.
Costs associated with retirement accrual accounting are not
included in the cost summaries. Cumulative costs reflect
the cumulative changes to the operating and support baseline
costs of the 1988 programmed airlift fleet. All
specifications regarding operating and support costs were
provided by the Air Force.
INTRODUCTION
o Department of Defense 1982 proposal for near term
airlift enhancements
o Air Force 1983 plan for future airlift and airlift
force structure
o Secretary of Defense 1981f endorsement of the
C-17 aircraft and proposed force structure changes
Introduction
The Air Force submitted a Request for Proposal to the aircraft
industry in 1980 for a new intertheater airlift aircraft called the C-X.
After evaluating the proposals submitted, the Air Force announced the
McDonnell-Douglas C-17 as the selection. It became the Air Force position
that the shortfall in airlift capability could best be met by procuring a
future force mix of KC-lOs and C-17s. In spite of this initial Air Force
recommendation, the Department of Defense chose in its FY 1983 budget
submission to the Congress to address the near-term intertheater require
ment and requested funds for 44 KC-IO and 50 C-5B aircraft. Although this
option did not provide all of the airlift capability that the Department of
Defense felt was required, defense officials argued that it provided the best
near-term solution to the airlift shortfall. After much debate, the Congress
agreed to the request.
Funding for the C-17 research and development remained in the
budget for fiscal years 1983 and 1984. The Congress and the Administra
tion, however, significantly constrained the C-17 budget each year, appro
priating $60 million in fiscal year 1983 ($59 million of which was to be taken
from lower priority Air Force programs) and $26.8 million in fiscal year
1984. Although this level of funds was sufficient to keep the program alive
and the aircraft design teams together, it did not signify a commitment on
the part of the Administration or the Congress to procure a C-17 aircraft in
the immediate future.
In September 1983, the Air Force published the Airlift Master Plan
(AMP). The document was presented as the Air Force long-term plan for
the effective management and employment of airlift assets. It recom
mended that the C-17 be procured as the future airlift aircraft. In
conjunction with this, it recommended restructuring the airlift forces by
retiring some of the older C-130s and C-141s and transferring the remaining
C-141s into the reserves. On February 27, 1984, the Secretary of Defense
forwarded to the Congress a report validating the requirement concepts and
design of the C-l7 aircraft. It is also an endorsement by the Secretary of
the force structure plans recommended by the Air Force in the Airlift
Master Plan.
BACKGROUND
o Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study -
airlift requirement of 66 million ton miles/day
(MTM/D)
o Current and programmed airlift capability
o Long term investment plans
Background
As part of the Department of Defense authorization act for 1981, the
Congress required the Department to conduct a study to determine overall
U.S. military mobility requirements. This study, known as the Congres
sionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS) was presented to the Congress in
April 1981 and has since been accepted as the most current statement of
total airlift needs for the United States. The study recommended that the
United States strive to acquire an additional intertheater air transport
capability equivalent to 20 Million Ton Miles per day (MTM/D) to achieve a
goal of 66 MTM/D.
The current airlift fleet can achieve approximately 45 percent of the
goal. Due to a shortage of spares for the C-5 and C-141 aircraft, they
would not be able to sustain a wartime utilization rate of 12.5 hours per day.
Any decrease in the sustained utilization rate below 12.5 hours per day
decreases the overall fleet capability. Programmed enhancements to
include additional spares for existing aircraft and additional C-5, KC-I0,
and CRAP aircraft will raise the fleet capability to 48.5 MTM/D by the end
of the 1980s.
Long-term airlift enhancements are directed toward the 17.5 MTM/D
difference between the late 1980s programmed capability and the CMMS
goal. Retiring existing aircraft or failing to support C-5 and C-141 aircraft
wartime utilization rates of 12.5 hours per day would increase the differ
ence between the 66 MTM/D goal and the capability of the programmed
fleet.
QUESTIONS FOR THE CONGRESS
o Will budget limitations permit further additions to the
air lift fleet?
o What long-term airlift fleet characteristics should
the Congress pay for now?
o What is the future requirement for a tactical air lifter
and how should that requirement be met?
Questions for the Congress
Congressional concerns over budget deficits have resulted in defense
budgets below the levels originally requested by the Administration. Before
the Congress considers which airlift alternative is preferable, it will have to
determine the extent of possible additions to the airlift fleet within current
budget constraints.
If the Congress considers the requirement for additional airlift suffici
ently urgent, the decisions pending action will affect the entire nature of
the airlift fleet for at least the next 30 years. Aircraft entering the fleet
during the end of this decade should still be operational in the airlift fleet
beyond the year 2015. Some characteristics that the Congress may wish to
see in the fleet then may have to be paid for now.
Decisions the Congress makes concerning inter theater airlift may not
satisfy future needs for a tactical or intra theater air lifter. The majority of
the C-130s in the fleet today will have to be replaced early in the next
century. Although the C-17 offers some intratheater capability, it may not
satisfy the need for a C-130 follow-on aircraft. Tactical airlift require
ments are not well defined today, but there are no plans to eliminate the
need for a C-130.
PURPOSE OF THE BRIEFING
o Review the recommendation of the Airlift Master Plan
o Discuss alternatives for future airlift enhancement
o Discuss near term and longer term budgetary
implica tions
Purpose of the Briefing
The Airlift Master Plan provided a clear alternative for structuring
the future airlift fleet. The foundation of the plan is the C-17 aircraft.
Under the Air Force alternative, at least 180 of these aircraft will be
procured before the end of the century. The Air Force views this as a
modernization alternative that will meet the intertheater airlift require
ment while allowing them to streamline the current fleet.
As an alternative to the Air Force plan, the Congress could choose to
continue to procure existing aircraft, namely C-5s and KC-lOs, to meet a
speCific airlift requirement. This alternative projects the strengths and
limitations of current airlift into the future.
This briefing presents a comparison of near-term and long-term costs
of two alternatives. Since both meet the mobility requirement of 66
MTM/day, the difference in cost between the two alternatives may be the
decisive factor. Near-term costs tend to reflect the acquisition costs
associated with each alternative. Long-term costs reflect the steady state
operating and support costs of the alternatives. In a more thorough study to
be released this summer, CBO will also examine alternatives that emphasize
sealift investments as directed by the Committee. Time was not available
to include this analysis in this briefing.