Table Of Content

Victory in Vietnam MODERN WAR STUDIES Theodore A. Wilson General Editor Raymond A. Callahan Jacob W. Kipp Allan R. Millett Carol Reardon Dennis Showalter David R. Stone James H. Willbanks Series Editors Victory in Vietnam The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975 The Military History Institute of Vietnam Translated by Merle L. Pribbenow Foreword by William J. Duiker University Press of Kansas ©2002 by the University Press of Kansas All rights reserved Published by the University Press of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas 66045), which was organized by the Kansas Board of Regents and is operated and funded by Emporia State University, Fort Hays State University, Kansas State University, Pittsburg State University, the University of Kansas, and Wichita State University. First published in Hanoi, Vietnam, in 1988, and then in a revised edition in 1994, under the title History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, Volume II [Lich su Quan doi Nhan dan Viet Nam, Tap II]: The Maturation of the People’s Army of Vietnam during the Resistance War against the Americans to Save the Nation (1954–1975) [Thoi Ky Truong Thanh cua Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam trong cuoc Khang Chien Chong My, Cuu Nuoc (1954–1975)] for the Military History Institute of Vietnam, Ministry of Defense, by the People’s Army Publishing House. Edited by Senior General Hoang Van Thai, former Deputy Minister of Defense, and Colonel General Tran Van Quang, former Deputy Minister of Defense. Authors: Senior Colonel Phan Dinh (Part I), Senior Colonel Hoang Co Quang (Part II), Senior Colonel Nguyen Duc Thong (Part III), Senior Colonel Ho Huu Vinh (Part IV), Colonel Nguyen Quoc Dung (Parts I–V), Lieutenant General Hoang Phuong (conclusion). Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Victory in Vietnam : the official history of the people’s army of Vietnam, 1954–1975 : the Military History Institute of Vietnam / translated by Merle L. Pribbenow ; foreword by William J. Duiker. p. cm. — (Modern war studies) Includes index. ISBN 978-0-7006-2187-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975—Vietnam (Democratic Republic). 2. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975—Campaigns. 3. Vietnam (Democratic Republic). Qu˘an dòãoi—History. I. Series. DS558.5.V47 2002 959.704'3—dc21 2001006344 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The paper used in this publication is recycled and contains 30 percent postconsumer waste. It is acid free and meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. Contents Foreword: The History of the People’s Army, William J. Duiker ix Translator’s Preface xvii List of Terminology xxi Introduction xxv Part I. Building the People’s Army into a Regular, Modern Armed Force: Maintaining and Developing Revolutionary Armed Forces in the South, 1954–1960 1 1. Urgently Reorganizing Our Forces: Preparations to Deal with a New Enemy 3 2. The People’s Army Begins to Build a Modern, Regular Army: Maintaining Our Armed Teams in South Vietnam 20 3. The Development of Our Armed Forces during the General Uprising Movement: The Birth of Transportation Group 559 49 Part II. Intensifying the Work of Building a Modern, Regular Army, Expanding Our Massed Forces in South Vietnam, and Defeating the “Special Warfare” Strategy of the American Imperialists, 1961–1965 71 4. Developing Forces, Building a Battle Posture, and Preparing for a New Struggle 73 5. Increasing the Combat Strength of Our Main Force Mobile Troops and Developing Our Massed Troops on the Battlefields of South Vietnam 91 vi VICTORY IN VIETNAM 6. Intensifying Massed Combat Operations: Fighting alongside the Entire Population to Defeat the American Imperialist “Special War” Strategy 123 Part III. The People’s Army of Vietnam Simultaneously Fights and Conducts Force Building and, Together with the Entire Population, Defeats the “Limited Warfare” Strategy of the American Imperialists, 1965–1968 151 7. Rapidly Expanding Our Forces and Continuing the Offensive: Initial Victories over the Americans 153 8. Increasing Our Combat Power: Defeating the American Expeditionary Army in South Vietnam and the American Air Force in North Vietnam 173 9. The People’s Army, Together with the Entire Population, Conducts the General Offensive and Uprising of Tet 1968 206 Part IV. The People’s Army of Vietnam Launches Large-Scale Combined-Arms Operations and, Together with the Entire Population, Partially Defeats the U.S. Imperialists’Strategy to “Vietnamize” the War, 1969–1972 235 10. Maintaining Our Main Force Elements in South Vietnam, Conducting Counterattacks and Offensives, and Developing a New Strategic Posture 237 11. Increasing Our Ability to Conduct Combined-Arms Operations and Intensifying Counterattacks and Offensives in the Three Nations of Indochina, 1970–1971 258 12. The People’s Army, Local Armed Forces, and the Entire Population Launch the 1972 Strategic Offensive and Defeat the Enemy’s Second War of Destruction against North Vietnam 283 13. Air Defense and Air Force Units Conduct an Anti-Aircraft Campaign: Defeating the B-52 Strategic Bombing Raids Conducted by the American Imperialists 311 Part V. The Formation of Strategic Army Corps: The Entire Nation Urgently Prepares and Launches the Spring 1975 General Offensive and Uprising, Bringing the Resistance War against the United States to Save the Nation to a Victorious Conclusion, 1973–1975 331 14. Developing Mobile Main Force Corps-Sized Units, Combating Enemy Efforts to Capture Our Territory, Creating a New Battlefield Posture, and Preparing for the General Offensive and Uprising 333 CONTENTS vii 15. Striking with Combined-Arms Power: Seizing the City of Ban Me Thuot, Liberating the Central Highlands, and Opening the Way for the Spring 1975 General Offensive and Uprising 361 16. Seizing the Opportunity: The Armed Forces of Military Region Tri-Thien, Military Region 5, and 2nd Corps Coordinate Attacks to Liberate Hue, Danang, and the Provinces of Central Vietnam 378 17. The Ho Chi Minh Campaign: The People’s Army and the Entire Nation Fight the Decisive Battle to Liberate Saigon and the Provinces of Cochin China, Bringing the War against America to Save the Nation to a Glorious Conclusion 396 Conclusion 428 Notes 451 Index 477 Foreword: The History of the People’s Army William J. Duiker In the quarter of a century that has elapsed since the fall of Saigon, the performance of the U.S. armed forces in the Vietnam War has been exposed to exhaus- tive, and often critical, analysis. Relatively little attention has been paid, at least in the United States, to the victors. Although a few scholarly studies have focused on the origins and the buildup of the North Vietnamese army (formally known as the People’s Army of Vietnam, or PAVN), a full-scale analysis of its own performance in the South has not yet appeared. Several books on the PAVN have been published in Hanoi, but until now, none has been translated into the English lan- guage. This is unfortunate, because the role of the PAVN in the South and the nature of its relationship with the local insurgent forces (known popularly as the Viet Cong) has never been properly explored. With the publication of this book, ably translated from the original Viet- namese by Merle Pribbenow, the University Press of Kansas thus fills a yawning gap in the growing literature on the Vietnam War. Published in a second edition in 1994, it was written by a committee of senior Vietnamese military officers under the general direction of the Military History Institute in the Ministry of Defense in Hanoi. There are, of course, some inherent limitations with this approach, since institutions have a natural tendency to laud their own performance and cover up mistakes. This drawback is undoubtedly even more pronounced after a military victory, when it is tempting for senior military commanders to gloss over errors that have been committed and bask in the aura of success. Such shortcomings are fully visible here. Aheavy dose of triumphalism per- meates the text, as well as a sense of moral superiority that the forces of good have inevitably been victorious over the ranks of global imperialism. Still, the authors are not entirely unwilling to admit errors in the drafting and execution of policy, and on occasion they display a refreshing sense of candor in admitting instances of defeatism and hubris within the ranks. It is for these reasons that this ix