Verification in an Age of Insecurity: The Future of Arms Control Compliance

224 Pages·2009·0.701 MB·English

by  Philip O'Neill

VERIFICATION IN AN
AGE OF INSECURITY
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VERIFICATION IN AN
AGE OF INSECURITY
THE FUTURE OF ARMS
CONTROL COMPLIANCE
Philip D. O’Neill, Jr.
1
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
O’Neill, Philip D., Jr., 1951-
Verification in an age of insecurity : the future of Arms Control Compliance / Philip
D. O’Neill, Jr.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-538926-5 (hardback : alk. paper)
1. Weapons of mass destruction. 2. Nuclear arms control.
3. Nuclear disarmament—International cooperation.
4. Nuclear nonproliferation—International cooperation. I. Title.
KZ5675.O54 2009
341.7’34—dc22 2009027995
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction: Risky Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. The Evolution of Certainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B. The Superpower Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
(i) The Role of Parity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
(ii) The Adequacy of Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
C. The Post-Cold War Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
(i) Enhanced Certainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

(ii) The Cost of Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

D. The New Insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
III. The Price of Intrusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
B. The Traditional Calculus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
C. The Political Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
D. Managed Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
E. Disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
(i) The Trilateral Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
(ii) North Korea: A Future Test Case? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
(a) “Attribute” Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
(b) Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
(iii) Future Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
(a) Legal Responsibility: Who Pays? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
(b) Practical Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
F. The Limits of Cooperative Intrusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
IV. The Legacy of Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A. Problems in Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
B. Metrics in Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
VERIFICATION IN AN AGE OF INSECURITY v
Table of Contents
C. Challenges on the Horizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
(i) Bio Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
(ii) Fissile Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
D. Process Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
E. Enforcement Predictability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
V. Conclusion: Deliverance from Insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
vi VERIFICATION IN AN AGE OF INSECURITY
For the sake of our children
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: RISKY BUSINESS
The 21st century tests, in new ways, the continuing quest to prevent
and roll back the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Renewed political emphasis is evident in seeking arms control mea-
sures, as well as informal behavioral constraints.1 Calibrated movement
toward nuclear disarmament is again making legal process tools a
valued element of our layered WMD defense.2 An essential element of
that process is the manner in which we verify agreements to control,
limit, and disarm. Verification3 is well recognized, both in principle4
and politically, as “a key component of meeting our core objective
for our nonproliferation policies—namely preventing rogue states
and non-state actors from obtaining nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons and their means of delivery.”5 It was equally embraced as an
1 For example, nuclear weapon states within the Nonproliferation Treaty Regime
currently adhere to fissile material production and underground test ban moratori-
ums while they seek formal agreement in these areas.
2 See, e.g., Brian Jones, Intelligence, Verification and Iraq’s WMD, Chapter
10 in Verification Yearbook (2004) (“The verification of a particular nation’s com-
pliance with its obligations under international agreements is one aspect of one
element in a layered approach to defending against WMD. The overlapping ele-
ments are: to prevent or minimize possession; where this fails, to deter use; and, in
the event of use, to reduce the effectiveness of the weapons.”).
3 Verifi cation can be generically defi ned as a process in which data are collected,
collated and analyzed in order to make an informed judgment as to whether a
party is complying with its obligations. U.N. Report of the Secretary General,
“Verifi cation in all its Aspects, Including the Role of the United Nations in the
Field of Verifi cation,” A/50/377 at p. 16 (22 September, 1995) accessed at http://
www.un.org/documents/gn/docs/50/plenary/a50–377.html (“Verifi cation Report
of the Secretary General”).
4 U.N. General Assembly 1996 resolution A/51/182 6 embraced the Disarmament
Commission’s recognition of Sixteen Principles of Verification (The U.N.
Verification Principles”). Principle 2 states verification is an essential element in
the disarmament process.
5 Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance and
Implementation, “The New U.S. Approach to Verification,” Remarks at the Carnegie
VERIFICATION IN AN AGE OF INSECURITY 1