M U Utilitarians identify morality with the impartial promotion of L G well-being. This Element asks how utilitarianism might develop A N in possible futures broken by climate change or transformed by new technologies. It argues that concern for future people should dominate our ethical thinking, that an adequate utilitarian future ethic must be collective and pessimistic, and Ethics that future utilitarians must think imaginatively about the nature of well-being, the value of possible future populations, and the threat of human extinction. Utilitarianism is presented as a living ethical tradition, not an abstract set of timeless principles or a purely historical artefact. U Utilitarianism t ilit a r ia n is m About the Series Series Editors This Elements series provides an extensive Ben Eggleston overview of major figures, theories, and University of concepts in the field of ethics. Each entry Kansas Tim Mulgan in the series acquaints students with the main aspects of its topic while articulating Dale E. Miller the author’s distinctive viewpoint in a Old Dominion manner that will interest researchers. University, Virginia Cover image: Walking in twilight. Vural/Getty Images ElementsinEthics editedby BenEggleston UniversityofKansas DaleE.Miller OldDominionUniversity,Virginia UTILITARIANISM Tim Mulgan University of St Andrews and University of Auckland UniversityPrintingHouse,CambridgeCB28BS,UnitedKingdom OneLibertyPlaza,20thFloor,NewYork,NY10006,USA 477WilliamstownRoad,PortMelbourne,VIC3207,Australia 314–321,3rdFloor,Plot3,SplendorForum,JasolaDistrictCentre, NewDelhi–110025,India 79AnsonRoad,#06–04/06,Singapore079906 CambridgeUniversityPressispartoftheUniversityofCambridge. ItfurtherstheUniversity’smissionbydisseminatingknowledgeinthepursuitof education,learning,andresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence. www.cambridge.org Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781108730600 DOI:10.1017/9781108582643 ©TimMulgan2020 Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements, noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublished2020 AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. ISBN978-1-108-73060-0Paperback ISSN2516-4031(online) ISSN2516-4023(print) CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof URLsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain, accurateorappropriate. Utilitarianism ElementsinEthics DOI:10.1017/9781108582643 Firstpublishedonline:January2020 TimMulgan UniversityofStAndrewsandUniversityofAuckland Authorforcorrespondence:TimMulgan,[email protected] Abstract:Utilitariansidentifymoralitywiththeimpartialpromotionof well-being.ThisElementaskshowutilitarianismmightdevelopin possiblefuturesbrokenbyclimatechangeortransformedbynew technologies.Itarguesthatconcernforfuturepeopleshoulddominate ourethicalthinking,thatanadequateutilitarianfutureethicmustbe collectiveandpessimistic,andthatfutureutilitariansmustthink imaginativelyaboutthenatureofwell-being,thevalueofpossible futurepopulations,andthethreatofhumanextinction.Utilitarianismis presentedasalivingethicaltradition,notanabstractsetoftimeless principlesorapurelyhistoricalartefact. Keywords:Utilitarianism,FutureEthics,MoralPhilosophy ©TimMulgan2020 ISBNs:9781108730600(PB),9781108582643(OC) ISSNs:2516-4031(online),2516-4023(print) Contents 1 IntroducingUtilitarianism 1 2 ANewUtilitarianism:Future-Oriented, Collective,Pessimistic 4 3 Well-BeingandPossibleFutures 26 4 SomePuzzlesinContemporaryFutureEthics 40 5 ConcludingRemarks 63 References 64 Utilitarianism 1 1IntroducingUtilitarianism Utilitarianismisahistoricaltraditioninmoralandpoliticalthought.Although utilitarian themes are present in all philosophical schools – throughout the Western tradition since the Ancient Greeks, and also in early Chinese and Indian thought – modern utilitarianism is especially associated with three thinkers active in Britain between the late eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries: Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), John Stuart Mill (1806–73), and Henry Sidgwick(1838–1900). Utilitarianism wasa dominant modeofethical thinking in Western philosophy in the early twentieth century. Although less dominanttoday,itremainsveryinfluential. This Element is neither a historical account of the utilitarian tradition nor astandardtextbookintroductiontocontemporaryutilitarianism.Severalother books already fill those niches admirably.1 Instead, this Element explores the future of utilitarianism, asking where utilitarians’ perennial preoccupations might lead in various possible futures. Section 1 introduces the utilitarian traditionandtheapproachtakeninthisElement.Section2arguesthat,inour presentcircumstances,thefutureshoulddominateourethicalthinkingandthat anyadequateutilitarianfutureethicwillbecollectiveandpessimistic.Section3 outlines contemporary debates about the content and scope of well-being and asks how those debates might be transformed across a range of different possible futures. Section 4 addresses a number of puzzles in contemporary future ethics – especially Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion and Non-Identity Problem,asymmetriesinprocreativeethics,thedestabilisingimpactofempiri- calandnormativeuncertainty,andexistentialthreatsofhumanextinction. Anyaccountofatraditionasrichandvariedasutilitarianismisboundtobe controversial. My aim here is not to defend any detailed exegesis (either historical or contemporary) but rather to draw out some central utilitarian themes.Thedefiningfeatureofutilitarianismisthatitbasesitsmoralevalua- tionsonimpartialpromotionofwell-being.(Aswe’llsee,differentutilitarians evaluate different things: acts, rules, moral codes, social institutions.) Impartiality, promotion, well-being: these three key terms need unpacking. I explore promotion in section 2.2 and well-being in section 3. I begin with impartialityanditsimplications. Utilitariansarecommittedtoimpartiality.Inthefamousphraseattributedto JeremyBentham:‘Everyonetocountforone,andnobodyformorethanone.’2 1 Good introductory textbooks on utilitarianism include Bykvist, 2009; de Lazari-Radek and Singer, 2017; Mulgan, 2007; Shaw, 1999. An excellent contemporary overview is Eggleston andMiller,2014.AnexcellentrecenthistoricaloverviewisSchultz,2017. 2 TheattributiongoesbacktoMill,1963,vol.10,p.257.WhileitisoftenattributedtoBentham, this precise phrase is apparently not found in any of his extant writings. Perhaps the closest 2 ElementsinEthics Human well-being is equally valuable no matter whose it is. Following Bentham,utilitariansemphasiseimpartialityasacounterweighttotheperennial threat of egoism. This threat is both practical and theoretical. We must guard againstournaturaltendencytogiveundueweighttoourowninterests,values, traditions,orperspectivesortobelievewhatsuitsourinterests,alignsourduties withourinclinations,confirmsourprejudices,orotherwiseenablesustothink well of ourselves. As a result, utilitarians are especially suspicious of moral principlesthatallowustoprivilegeourowninterests. Manymoraltheoriesagreethatweshouldtreatpersonsimpartially.(Indeed, manyphilosophershavebuiltimpartialityintotheverydefinitionofthe‘moral pointofview’.See,e.g.,Baier,1958;Hare,1982.)Bututilitariansgofurtherin twoways.First,utilitariansareimpartialbetweenspecies–or,moregenerally, between kinds of beings for whom things can go well. Well-being is defined without reference to any particular species – in particular, without special referencetoHomosapiens.Itisthenanempiricalquestionwhetherornotnon- human animals matter. For instance, if – as hedonists argue – well-being is pleasure and the absence of pain, then all sentient animals matter, and they matter in exactly the same way as human beings.3 This feature of utilitarian impartialityhasnotoriouslyradicalimplicationsforourtreatmentofanimals.(It is not a coincidence that many leading figures in the animal liberation move- ment are utilitarians. See especially Singer, 1975.) I argue below that future utilitarians may face analogous challenges relating tothe well-being ofextra- terrestrial organisms or digital beings. And, as we shall see throughout this Element, the underlying commitment to impartiality has many other implica- tionsforutilitarianfutureethics. Modernphilosophicalutilitarianismcomesinabewilderingvarietyofforms. Wecanillustratethesebystartingwiththefollowingbasicformulation. HedonistActUtilitarianism(HAU):Therightactinanysituationistheact that maximises expected total net pleasure (i.e., the balance of pleasure over pain). Although it appears simple, we can break HAU down into ten component claims: approximationisthefollowingpassagefromBentham’sRationaleofJudicialEvidence:‘every individualinthecountrytellsforone;noindividualformorethanone.’(Bentham,1838,vol.7, p.334.) 3 Hedonistscouldstillregardhumanwell-beingasmoresignificant,butonlyinsofarashumansare capableofgreaterheightsofenjoymentorgreaterdepthsofsufferingthananimals.Ahuman’s pleasureinlisteningtoasymphonyorterrorinthefaceofimminenttorturemightsimplybe greater than anything a spider can experience. But if the spider could appreciate Mozart, its pleasurewouldcountasmuchasours!Wereturntohedonisminsection3.1andtoanimalwelfare insection3.2. Utilitarianism 3 1 Consequentialism:Utilitariansinsistthatwell-beingisvaluable.Butthere aremanydifferentwaystorespondtothebeliefthatsomethingisvaluable. Should we honour what is valuable? (Treating its instances with respect, reverence,orworship;seekingtoprotectorpreservethem.)Orshouldwetry toembodyorinstantiateparticularvalues?(Shouldutilitariansrecognisethe valueofhappinessbyseekingtobehappy?)Consequentialistsarguethatwe should promote value by aiming to bring about valuable outcomes. Contemporary moralphilosophytreats utilitarianism asa species ofconse- quentialism.InthisElement,Iwilllargelyfollowthisassumption.However, Ioftenquestionspecificconsequentialistclaims,andinsection4.3Iexplore explicitlynon-consequentialistformsofutilitarianism. 2 Welfarism: Outcome value is determined exclusively by the welfare of individuals.(Alternativesincludeecologicalvaluesandperfectionistvalues.) 3 Hedonism: Individual welfare is determined exclusively by pleasure and pain.(Alternativesincludepreferencesatisfactionandobjectivegoods.) Consequentialism tells us to promote value, welfarism identifies value with optimalwell-being,andhedonismdeliversametricforthevalueofindividual lives.HAUthenaggregatesindividualvaluealongthreedimensions:persons, times,andprospects(cf.Broome,2004). 4 Totalism:Outcomevalueisdeterminedbytotalwelfare.(Alternativemea- suresincludeaveragewelfareandthedistributionofwelfare.) 5 TemporalNeutrality:Thecontributionthatanindividuallifemakestothe valueofanoutcomedoesnotdependonwhenthatlifeislived.(Alternatives includetemporaldiscountingandothertemporallyasymmetricalviews.) Aggregatingacrosspersonsandtimesgivesusameasureofoutcomevalue.To measurethevalueofacts,HAUthenaggregatesoverprospects. 6 Expectation:Thevalueofanactisthesumofthevalueofeachprospective outcomemultipliedbytheprobabilityofthatoutcomeoccurringiftheactis performed.(Alternativesincluderisk-aversionorrisk-seeking.) Havingrankedactsaccordingtotheirvalue,HAUthentellsushowweshould respondtoactvalues: 7 Maximisation: The right act is the one with the greatest (expected) value. (Themainalternativeissatisficing,whereagentsarepermittedtochooseany actwhose(expected)valueis‘goodenough’.) Finally, HAU’s initial decision to focus on acts itself combines three contro- versialclaims: 4 ElementsinEthics 8 Act Focus: The primary focus of consequentialist evaluation is acts. (Alternative foci include rules, motives, codes, outlooks, dispositions, institutions,constitutions,beliefs,etc.) 9 Direct Evaluation: We evaluate each act directly in terms of its conse- quences. (The alternative is to evaluate one unit indirectly in terms of a second unit chosen because of its (direct) consequences. For instance, rule consequentialism first directly evaluates codes of rules and then uses theoptimalcodetoindirectlyevaluateacts.) 10 Individual: Theprimary focusofconsequentialist evaluation istheparti- cular acts of an individual agent. (The main alternative is the collective evaluationofsetsofactsperformedbygroupsofagents.) Eachofthesetenclaimsisasiteofongoingcontroversywithincontemporary moralphilosophy.Someclaimsareregardedasessentialtoutilitarianism.For instance, utilitarianism is often defined as the set of possible theories that combineconsequentialismandwelfarism.And,asIsaidattheoutset,temporal neutralityisoftenregardedasacentralutilitariancommitment.Rejectinganyof thesethreecomponentswouldamounttoarejectionofutilitarianismperse.But thatstillleavessevencomponents:hedonism,totalism,expectation,maximisa- tion, act focus, direct evaluation, and individual evaluation. Rejecting any of theseclaimscountsasamovewithinutilitarianism. Isetmaximisationandexpectationasidefornow.(Ireturntothembrieflyin sections4.5and4.6.)Iwill focusonthreeremaining contested aspects ofthe utilitarianresponsetovalue. 1 Individualwelfare:Ishedonismthecorrectaccountofwell-being? 2 Aggregation:Istotalismthebestwaytogofromthevalueofindividuallives tothevalueofoutcomes? 3 Promotion: Once we have ordered possible outcomes by their value, how shouldwerespond?Whatisourfocusofevaluation(acts,motives,rules)?And shouldweevaluatethatitemdirectlyorindirectly,individuallyorcollectively? I address well-being and aggregation in sections 3 and 4.1 respectively. However, for reasons that will emerge as we proceed, I begin with the third setofquestions. 2ANewUtilitarianism:Future-Oriented,Collective,Pessimistic 2.1WhytheFutureShouldDominateUtilitarianThinking Utilitarianshavelongarguedthatourobligationstodistantstrangersaremore onerousthanmostofusassume.Wecannotdiscountwell-beingjustbecauseit