USN Cruiser vs IJN Cruiser: Guadalcanal 1942

43 Pages·31.404 MB·English

by  Mark Stille, Paul Wright(Illustrator), Howard Gerrard(Illustrator)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND ILLUSTRATORS
MARKSTILLE (Commander,UnitedStates Navy,retired) received his BA
in historyfromthe University ofMarylandand also holdsan MAfromthe Naval
USN CRUISER
WarCollege. Hehasworked intheintelligencecommunity for 30yearsincluding
tours onthe faculty ofthe NavalWarCollege,ontheJointStaffand on USNavy
ships. Heiscurrently asenioranalystworkingintheWashington DCarea. Heis
the authorofnumerousOspreytitles, focusingon naval history inthe Pacific.
Heisalsothe authorofseveralwargames.
IJN CRUISER
HOWARDGERRARDstudied attheWallaseySchool ofArt and has been Guadalcanal 1942
afreelance designerand illustratorforover20 years. He hasworked for
anumberofpublishers and isan associate memberofthe
Artists. Hehaswon boththeSociety ofBritishAerospace CI
andtheWilkinson SwordTrophy and hasillustrated anumt
Osprey includingCampaign 59:Nagashino 1575and Camp
Howardlivesandworks in Kent. Howard completedthe bat
artworkforthistitle.
PAULWRIGHThas paintedshipsofall kindsformostofhis
insteelandsteamwarshipsfromthe late 19thcenturyto1
art hasillustratedtheworks ofPatrickO'Brien, Dudley POpE
amongstothers,and hangsin manycorporate and private
world.AnAssociate Memberofthe Royal SocietyofMarine
worksin Surreyand hecompletedthetarget sightviewsfo
MARK STILLE
FirstpublishedinGrearBrirainin2009byOspreyPublishing, Artist'snote
Midland House,WestWay,Borley,Oxford,OX2OPH,UK
Readersmaycaretonoretharrheoriginalpainringsfrom
443ParkAvenueSouth,NewYork,NY10016,USA
whichthecolorplatesinrhisbookwerepreparedare
E-mail:[email protected]
availableforprivatesale.Allreproductioncopyrighr
©2009OspreyPublishingLtd. whatsoeverisrerainedbythePublishers.Allinquiries
shouldbeaddressedto:
Allrightsreserved.Aparrfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofprivatestudy,research,
criticismorreview,aspermittedundertheCopyright,DesignsandPatentsAct, 1988,nopart ThePublishersregretthatrheycanenrerintono
ofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystcm,ortransmirrcdinanyform correspondenceuponthismatter.
orbyanymeans,electronic,electrical,chemical,mechanical,optical,phorocopying,recording
Aclmowledgements
orotherwise,withoutthepriorwrittenpermissionofthecopyrightowner. Inquiriesshouldbe
addressedtothePublishers. TheauthorisindebtedtothestaffsoftheUSNaval
HisroricalCenterPhotographicSecrionandtheYall1aro
ACIPcatalogrecordforthisbookisavailablefrom theBririshLibrary
Museum(formerlytheKureMaritimeMuseum)fortheir
PrintISBN:978 I846034664 assistanceinprocuringthephorographsusedinthistirle.
PDFe-bookISBN:978 I84908 I177
CONTENTS
Pagelayoutby: KenVailGraphicDesign,Cambridge,UK
IndexbyFinelineEditorialServices
TypeserinITCConduirandAdobeGaramond
MapsbyI3ounford.com
OriginatedbyPDQDigitalMediaSolutions,Suffolk,UK
PrintedinChinarhroughBookbuilders
Introduction 4
09101112131098765432
Chronology 8
Design and Development 10
The Strategic Situation 22
Technical Specifications 26
The Combatants 44
Combat 53
Statistics and Analysis 69
Aftermath 75
Bibliography 78
Index 80
FORACATALOGUEOFALLBOOKSPUBLISHEDBYOSPREY
MILITARYANDAVLATIONPLEASECONTACT:
OspreyDirecr,c/oRandomHouseDisrriburionCenrer,
400HahnRoad,Westminster,MD21157
Email:[email protected]
OspreyDirect,TheBookServiceLrd,DistributionCenrre,
ColchesterRoad,FratingGreen,Colchesrer,Essex,C077DW
E-mail:[email protected]
www.ospreypublishing.com
INTRODUCTION
OnAugust7, 1942thecourseofthePacificWatbetween theUnitedStatesandJapan,
now eight months old, tooka new turn. On this date the US Navy mounted its first
offensiveofthewar,landingontheislandofGuadalcanalintheSolomonIslands.This
first tentativeattackpromptedafiercestrugglebetween theUSandImperialJapanese
navies, which was ro last from August 1942 until February 1943 when theJapanese
werefinallyforcedrowithdrawfrom theisland.Duringthistime, thetwonaviesfought
a rotal ofseven major battles.Two ofthese, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, were
battles between carrier forces. The remaining five were fought between the surface
forces ofthe two navies. 1926, theJapanesehad added 18 heavycruisersro their fleer. Oneofthese had been Minneapolisshawnin
Before the war, both sides expected the question of naval supremacy in the sunk in June 1942 and another so heavily damaged it would not return ro service November1942after
Pacific ro be decided by a decisive clash ofbattleships somewhere in the western until 1943. The remaining 16 ships were an instrumental part ofJapanese naval takingtwotorpedohitsfrom
Japanesedestroyers.Onehit
Pacific. Buttheadventofairpowerand the unexpectedscopeofjapaneseexpansion doctrine and were expected ro play key roles in any clash with the Americans. By
tookoffthebowasfarback
during the initial stages ofthe war changed that. The US battle line had been contrast, Japanese light cruisers were designed ro operate in conjunction with the
asTurret1andthesecond
crippled at Pearl Harbor and the Imperial Navy preferred ro keep the majority of ImperialNavy's destroyer flotillas andwere notcapableofactingas partofthe battle floodedNumber2fireroom.
its battleships in homewaters in expectation ofthe decisive battle.When the focus line- unlike theheavycruisers. Despitepre·wardoubtsabout
theirabilitytowithstand
ofPacific naval combat shifted ro the south Pacific, following the US landing at The US Navy had also invested heavily in its cruiser force before the PacificWar.
damage,USNavyTreaty
Guadalcanal, the bulk ofeach navy's surface power resided in its cruiser forces. Beforethewar,atotalof18 heavycruisers had been built; however,sincetheUS had
cruisersoftendisplayedan
Both sides retained powerful carrier forces after the Battle ofMidway, but the commitments in two different oceans, not all ofthese were available for use in the abilitytotakeheavydamage,
limited number ofcarriers and their demonstrated fragility meant that they were Pacific. BeforeAugust 1942oneofthesehad alreadybeen lost toJapaneseaction, so asshownhere.(USNaval
committedonlyformajoroperations.With battleshipsroovaluableand potentially coming inro the Guadalcanal campaign the US Navy suffered from a numetical HistoricalCenter)
vulnerable ro beexposed in the confinedwaters around Guadalcanal, especiallyat disadvantageinheavycruisers. In part,thiswascompensated forbyanumberoflight
night, this left the cruiser as the major combatant surface ship during the initial cruisers that were much larger than their Japanese counterparts. Nine large light
parts ofthe Guadalcanal campaign. cruisers were commissioned before the war and most were assigned to the Pacific
In August 1942 both sides possessed large cruiser forces. In heavy cruisers the theater.Added ro this, thefirstoftheAtlanta-classlightcruiserslaiddowr,justbefore
4 Imperial Navy held anumerical, andarguablyaqualitative, advantage. Beginningin thewarwerecoming intoservice by the time thestruggle for Guadalcanal began.
Ofrhe five majorsurface batrlesfought during rhesnugglefor Guadalcanal, rwo Brooklynpicturedafterher
completionin1937.The
wereconresred byforces ledbycruisers,andborhofrheseoccurredduringrhe initial
arrangementofherfivetriple
parr ofrhe campaign_ The first was the Barrie ofSavo Island, fought on August 9
6-inchgunturretsisevident.
immediatelyafterrheAmericanlanding.Asidefrom PearlHarbor, rhiswas rhesingle (USNavalHistoricalCenter)
mosr disastrous clash for the US Navy during the war and it clearly showed the
Japanesecruiserforce at irs best.Two monrhs larer, bycontrasr, during the Batrleof
CapeEsperance, an American cruiserforce would out-duel aJapanese cruiserforce
in another confusing night clash. However, these were the last pure cruiser barrles
fought during rhe campaign, as in November 1942 the snuggle for Guadalcanal
WichitapicturedinMay1940, came to a head and in rwo climacric naval clashes berween November 13 and 15, successful nightcombatagainsttheJapanese.Thedesign ofUSNavypre-warcruisers
clearlyshowingthehull borhsidesalso commirred barrleships. Larer, on November30, aJapanesedesnoyer provedsoundand flexible enough to allow them to perform inanumberofroles for
designsimilaritytothe
force dealt an embarrassing reverse to an American cruiser force in rhe Barrie of rhe remainder ofthewar. For rheJapanese, rhe results ofthe Guadalcanal campaign
Brooklyn-classlightcruisers.
Tassafaronga. Because they involved forces based around cruiserson both sides, the were particularly dire. Though the vast majority of rhe Imperial Navy's cruisers
Thesubstitutionof8-inch
gunsisevident,asisthe barrles ofSavo Island and Cape Esperance will be used as models to examine rhe survived the Guadalcanal campaign, their employmenr in the fierce batrles off
uniquearrangeoftheship's designstrengthsandweaknessesaswellas theemploymentdoctrinesofbothJapanese Guadalcanal did nor rhe pay theJapanese rhe dividends rhey expected.Theamition
secondarybatteryconsisting andAmerican cruisers. begun during the Guadalcanal campaign would continue into 1943 as the batrle
ofacombinationofeight Furutakapicturedafterthe
The batrles around Guadalcanal, while cosrly for both sides, did not prove in moved to thecentraland norrhern Solomons.As rheJapanesebecamemorerelucranr
single5-inchgunsinopen completionofhermajor1937
mountsandturrets.(USNaval rhemselves to be decisive for rhe surface fleers ofeitherside. The US Navysuffered to commitships as largeas heavy cruisers to rhese nighr acrions, rhe Imperial Navy's modernization.Clearlyshown
HistoricalCenter) more heavilyin rhese barrles, burfinally learned the techniques necessary to conduct desrroyers were forced to shoulder the burden, a task rhar eventually gurred the areherthreenewtwin8-inch
gunturrets,thequadruple
desrroyer force. As air power played an increasingly dominanr role throughour rhe
torpedomountsandthe
Pacific, neveragainwouldsurfaceforces playsuchan imporranrroleas rheydidduring
heaviercatapult.[Yamato
the cruiserduels of1942. Museum]
6

TypeAcruisers TypeBcruisers Total
USNavy 180,000 143,500 323,500
ImperialNavy 108,400 100,450 208,850
January 1930inLondon. Bythis time theBritishhad relentedontheir insistencethat
theybepermittedtopossessgreatercruisertonnage than theAmericans,sofor thefirst
time an agreementwas reachedlimitingoverall cruiser tonnage. As far as theUS and
Imperialnavieswereconcerned,theFirstLondonTreatyallowed thefollowingtonnage:
DESIGN AND Type A cruisers were defined as ships with guns greater than 6.1 inches (the 8-inch
limitwasstillineffect),andType Bas thosewithgunsof6.1 inchesorless. ForType
Acruisersthisconstitutedalimitof18 heavycruisersfor theUS Navyand 12for the
DEVELOPMENT
Imperial Navy. These limits were further defined during the Second London Naval
DisarmamentConferenceheld in 1935. BythispointJapanhadessentiallywithdrawn
from the navaldisarmamentprocess,and theconferencetreatywassigned bytheUS,
Britain,andFrance. Itlimitedtheconstructionoflightcruisersto8,000 tons, butthe
US had insertedaprovision that this would not pertain to the 10,000-ton Brooldyn
class cruisers already underconstruction.
Japan gavenoticein 1936shewouldwithdrawfrom naval limitationtreatiesby the
The number and characreristics ofUS and Japanese cruisers going into the Pacific endof1938. Howeverforsome 16years the naval limitation treatieshad defined the
Warwere determined by theseriesoftreatiesenteredinto by the majornaval powers size and nature ofthe US andJapanese cruiser forces, and the resultingships would
in theperiodbetweenthewars. In 1921 theAmericansproposedthataconferencebe form the backboneoftheircruiser fleets in the comingwar.
convenedinWashingtonwith thepurposeoflimitingfuturenavalconstruction.What
resulted from the Washington Naval Conference was aTreaty for the Limitation of
ArmamentsignedonFebruary6, 1922.The focus ofthe treatywas on the numbers
US NAVY TREATY CRUISERS
ofbattleships that each signatory nation could keep in service or build during the
period the treaty was in effect. After existingships were replaced, both the US and
Britainwererestricted to 500,000 tons ofbattleshipsandtheJapanese300,000 tons. In December 1922 the US Navy building program called for 26 new cruisers- ten
Thesame tonnage ratiowas establishedfor aircraftcarriers. Omaha-class scout cruisers and 16ofthe new 10,000-tonTreatycruisers. Not until
However, becauseofBritish objections, nosimilar restrictionswere placedon the December 18, 1924 did Congress fund the first Treaty cruiser. At this time eight
construction ofcruisers. Nevertheless, all participants did agree that future cruiser cruiserswereauthorized, but notfully funded until 1927.Thesewere to become the
constructioncouldnotexceed 10,000 tons pership and that eachshipcouldmount two Pensacola- and thesix Northampton-class ships.
amaximumof8-inchguns.Thislimitsuited both theAmericans andJapanese as it The US Navy easily accepted the Washington Naval Treaty's 10,000-ton,
permitted the construction oflargercruisers, bettersuited for operations in thevast 8-inch-gun limit for its new cruisers. By 1920 the US Navy had already adopted
expanses ofthe Pacific. The unforeseen effect ofthe conference was to start a race designs for larger cruisers with 8-inch guns. The General Board, responsible for
to build more cruisers. With the construction of capital ships (battleships and approving the designs ofUS Navy ships, foresaw several basic design requirements.
battlecruisers)mostlyeliminated,allmajornaviesembarkedonaprogramofbuilding As already mentioned, large cruisers would possess better range and seakeeping
largecruisers.The treatyplaced no limiton the numberoftheseships thatcould be characteristics essential for Pacific operations. The primary mission of the Treaty
built and the 10,000-ton cruiser quickly became the smallest ofthe future heavy cruisers remained scouring. In the era before radar, their range, speed, and
cruiserdesigns beingcontemplatedbyboth theAmericans andJapanese. comparativelyheavyarmament(usefulforbrushingasideenemyscreeningunits) made
After a failed attempt to place limitations on the overall tonnage ofcruiser fleets themexcellentscoutingplatforms.At thesametime theirheavyarmamentalsomade
10 during theGenevaNaval Conferenceof1927, the major naval powers reconvened in themsuitablefor missions that the morescarcebattleshipscould not be risked for. 1
Preliminarydesigns for thefirstUSNavyTreacycruiserclearlyshowedapreference
for fir power over protection. The ship was originally designed in 1923 ro have 12
8-inch guns, a 35-knot maximum speed and only light protection (0.75 inches of
armoroverthe magazinesand 1.25 inchesover rheconningrowerandsteeringgear).
Concern over rhe lack ofprotection prompted the General Board ro select adesign
in March 1925 thatboastedonlyten 8-inchgunsandaspeedof32knots, butwhich
mounredsome 1,090 ronsofarmor.
Designworkfor the Northamptonclass wasalready underwaybeforethe firstship
ofthePensacolaclasshadevenbeenlaiddown. Byreducingthenumberofmainguns
from ten ro nine (mounred in three runets instead offour), protection could be
slighrlyenhancedandseagoingcharacteristicsimproved. Conrraryro theexpectations
of their designers, the first rwo classes of US Navy Treacy cruisers came in well
underweighr. The Washingron NavalTreacy defined limits in "standard" ronnage.
This did not include the fuel and reserve feedwater, but did include srores. This
complicated designers' efforrs ro work up a balanced design within the 10,000-ron
limir. In the caseofthe US Navy, fear ofexceedingthelimitled ro excessiveweight
savingmeasures,asevidencedbythefinal displacemenrofthefirstrwocruiserdesigns.
The Pensacolaacrually displaced 9,138 rons and the Northampton only 8,997 rons.
Thenatureofthesedesignsgavethemexcessivemetacenrricheightthatresulted in bad
rolling in any kind ofsea. Due roweight-saving measures, their constructionwasso 'xrremewith thesecond-generationTreacycruiserdesign. Noneofthe New Orleans A1940viewofOuincyshows
light that the firing ofall three runets at onceoften causedstructural damage. Llassshipsweredesignedwith rorpedo rubes, unlikeearlierTreacycruiserclasses.The thelayoutoftheUSNavy's
ThePensacolaandNorthamptonclasseswerequicklyseenasinferiordesigns, largely New Orleansclass also inrroduced armored turrets rather than the gunhouses ofthe lastTreatyheavycruiser
design.Asopposedtoearlier
for their relative lack ofprotection. Critics labeled them as "eggshells armed with earlierships.
classes,thisNewOrleons·
hammers." As soon as it was realized how much ronnage had been unused in these The London Treacy forced a new direction for American cruiser design. The
classcruiserhasimproved
earlydesigns, theUS Navy was determined ro do berrerwith asecondgeneration of construction of8-inch cruisers was capped after the completion of the last New 8·inchturrets,areworked
Treacycruiser. Orleans-class ship and the final 8-inch cruiser, the unique Wichita. The new 6-inch bridge,polemastsinplaceof
theprevioustripodmastsand
After the completion of the first eight Treacy cruisers, In 1929 the US Navy gun cruisers, known as the Brooklyn class, inrroduced several new fearures. The
adifferentplacementofthe
proposedanother 15ships ro be built in groups offive. The first group was ordered aviation supporr facilities were moved aft, unlike on every otherTreacy cruiser class
ship'saviationfacilitiesand
as an improved version ofthe Northampton class. The principal difference in these where theywere placedamidships.The new6-inchgun usedsemifixed ammunition 5·inchsecondarybattery.The
ships was a higher standard ofarmored protection; for example, the side armor that permirred a high rate offire. American designers hoped that the volume of markingsonherturrettops
protecting the magazines was ro be increased from 4.25 inches ro 5.75 inches. One fire possible~ith the6-inchgun wouldcompensatefor the heaviershell used by the areforaerialidentification.
[USNavalHistoricalCenter)
ship was ro be fitted ouras an alternate fleet flagship. 8-inch cruisers. Originally the Brooklyn class was ro carry 12 6-inch guns in rriple
Design workfor the secondgroup offive cruisers was also well underway. Itwas rurrets, but when the Japanese announced in January 1933 that the new Mogami
obvious that this wassuperior ro the improved Northamptondesign, so the US Navy class lightcruiserswould carry 15 6.1-inchguns, theearlyBroo/elyndesignwas recast
decided ro retroactivelyusethesuperiordesign on thefirstgroupofcruisers. However ro match theJapanese.Thedesign oftheseshipswaspredicated upon providingspeed
rwo ships had already been awarded ro private yards and the cost ofchanging the and radius equal ro that ofthe 8-inch-gun cruisers. It was intended that these ships
designs would have been roo high. These rwo ships became the Portlandclass. The wouldalso possesssufficienrarmorrowithstand8-inchgunfire. In 1934thefirstthree
otherthreeshipsofthefirstgroup (New Orleans,Astoria,and Minneapolis) werebuilt 10,000-ron light cruisers were authorized by Congress, after much deliberation on
ro the improveddesign, becomingknown as the New Orleansclass. the merits ofasmallerdesign that would permitmoreships ro be builtwith the US
Completion oftheenriresecondgroup offive ships was currailed by the London Navy'sremainingcruiserronnage. In theenditwasdecidednotroacceptthefirepower
NavalConference,andonlyfourwerecompleted- Tuscaloosa, SanFrancisco, Quincy, andprotectionlimitationsofasmaller(8,000-ron)design.Sevenshipswereevenrually
and Vincennes. All thesewere modified ro someextenr. Mostmodifications involved built ro the Brooklyndesign.
slightredesigns ro incorporateweight-savingmeasures,sinceaftertheearliertendency The last rwo ships of the Brooklyn class were completed ro a modified design
12 ofAmericandesigners roproduceunderweightdesigns, theynowtended ro theother and became the St Louisclass. The principal difference was the desire ro replace the
5-inch/25 gun with the demonsttably supetior 5-inch/38 gun. Instead ofthe single
mounrson the Brooklyns, thelasttwoshipsfeatured thefirst twin dual-purpose5-inch
gun mounrs placed on a cruiser. Four were fitted, providing the same secondary
armamentas theeightsingle5-inchmountsfoundonthe Brooklyns.The StLouisclass
also featured superior internal arrangements, with the separation ofthe two engine
roomsfrom thetwoboilerroomsprovidingabetterabilitytowithstandbattledamage.
The last oftheTreatycruisers was a Brooklyn-class ship modified to carry 8-inch
guns.TheLondon NavalTreatyof1930allowed theUS Navytolaydown an8-inch
cruiserin 1934and 1935.Thefirstshipwas thelastunitoftheNewOrleansclass, but
the last heavy cruiser laid down was a hybrid. By using the hull ofthe Brooklyns,
steaming radius would be increased and the superior arrangement for the aviation
facilities and secondary armament could be adopted. Wichita became the design
departurepointfor theverysuccessful Baltimoreclassofwar-builtheavycruisers.
US NAVY CRUISER DOCTRINE procedureshadbeenstreamlinedin theinterwarperiod. Duringnightcombatitwould FourunitsofthePacific
beevenmorecriticaltoscorehitsquicklyasactionswouldbefoughtatshorterranges. Fleet'sScoutingForceshown
in1933maneuveringtogether
Betweenthewars, theUSNavyworkedintensivelytodevelopadoctrinethatcombined Toachieve this, theUS Navydeveloped the tacticofopeningfire quickly,even before
tolandfloatplanes.Scouting
aggression with effective control and coordination ofall types offleet weapons to adequate illumination, and then using the splashes ofthe shells to determine range.
wasviewedasaprimary
quickly overwhelm and defeat an enemy. The view commonly held by the Navy's Once the range had been established, a tacticof"rocking" salvos backand forth over heavycruisermissionduring
leadership was that the comingwarwould beagainstJapan and that adecisive battle the target addressed the unsolvable problem ofascertaining how many shells were amajorengagementwiththe
with theJapanese fleet would be fought somewhere in the western Pacific. This was actuallyhittingatargetatnight. Forhighlytrainedcrews,thisprovedaneffectivetactic. Japanesefleet. (USNaval
HistoricalCenterJ
driven bythe US Navy'sadherence to theMahanianviewofdecisivevictory. CruisersoftheBrooklynclasZwiththeirfaster-firing6-inchguns,wereabletosmother
In this great set-piece naval engagement, the cruiser force had important roles to atargetusingthis tactic.With theadventofradarwithsufficientaccuracy toallowfor
play. Cruisers were charged with screening more vulnerable units ofthe American radar-guidedgunnery, the rangewas found even earlierand gunfirewas moredeadly.
fleet as the two navies advanced into action. More importantly, cruisers were ideal
platforms for performingthescoutingmission. They possessedsufficientendurance
tooperateindependentlyandhadthefirepower tobrushasideenemyscreeningunits
IMPERIAL NAVY TREATY CRUISERS
to determine the enemy'sstrength and movement. During the decisive action, most
cruisers would operate in the vanguard of the fleet. Destroyers would be used
aggressivelytoattacktheenemyfleet, andcruiserswouldprovidefiresupporttoclear The design ofthe first Japanese heavy cruisers actually pre-dated the Washington
a path for the destroyers, but they would keep their distance from enemy units to NavalTreaty. However, theyweredestined to play prominentroles in thePacificWar
avoidtorpedoattack. Duringtheinevitableexchangeofgunfirebetweenthetwomain and influenced subsequent classes ofJapanese cruisers. Theirgenesis was a desire to
fleets, cruiserswould also engageenemy battleshipsand battlecruisers. produceashipsuperiorto theUS Navy's Omahaclassand theRoyal Navy's Hawkins
While these efforts may have been useful in a major fleet engagement that never class.Todo this, theJapanesesettledona7,500-tondesign withsix7.9-inch/50guns
happened, they proved utterly inadequate at Guadalcanal. The focus on so-called and a 35-knot speed. Because these ships were under the 10,000-tonWashington
"majortactics"attheexpenseof"minortactics" (engagements betweensingleshipsor Naval Treaty limit, their design was not affected when the treaty was signed in
small groupsofships) wouldproveverycostly. February 1922.
Nightwarfarewas notignored by the US Navy, butitwas notseenas thedecisive The Imperial Navyactually completed four heavy cruisers to pre-Treaty designs.
phaseofcombat.GoingintothePacificWar, theUSNavyassumed thatnightcombat TheseincludedtwoshipsoftheFurutakaclassand twoAoba-classunits. Furuta/?aset
would be decided by the swift application ofaccurate gunfire. Torpedo tactics were the tone for future Japanese cruiser construction, with the design featuring a heavy
stressed, but were not applicable to thesituation that emergedat Guadalcanal. Every armament on a fairly small hull and, importantly, the provision ofa large torpedo
14 exercise stressed the importance of quickly finding the range, and fire-control battery. Protectionwas clearlysecondaryto firepower. Speed was also emphasized. 15
Kakashawnshortlyafterher AssoonastheWashingtonNavalTreacyhadbeensigned, theImperialNavybegan particularlyaround the magazines. Otherimprovementsincludedfitting twocatapults
Myakaintheconfiguration
completionin1925.Theship design work on its first true class ofTreacycruisers. Like the US Navy, theJapanese and theexchangeofthefixed torpedo mounts for trainable triple mounts.Thesewere inwhichshewouldgotowar.
isinheroriginalconfiguration quickly decided that it made no sense not to build to the full 10,000-ton limit and mounted on outboard sponsons with the idea that ifthey everexploded, the loss of Hermainbatteryisnow
withsingle?9·inch
give the ship 8-inch guns. The original design specifications ofthe class called for the entireshipcould be prevented. 8-inchgunsandthe4.?-inch
gunhousesandfixedtorpedo
gunshavebeenreplaced
tubes.Thethreesetsoffixed eight8-inchgunsfitted infour turrets(threeforwardandoneaft), four4.7-inchguns, The Takao-c1ass cruisers shared asimilar hull line with their predecessors, but their
bytwin5·inchguns.Aftofthe
starboardtorpedotubescan and eight61Omm torpedoes fitted in four twin mountings. Speedwas to 35.5 knots appearancewasdramaticallyalteredwiththeinclusionofalargeforward superstructure. secondstack.shehasbeen
bemadeoutjustforwardof andrangewas 10,000nmat 13.5 knots.Armorwas not neglectedandwas to provide This large bridgestructure reflected the requirement that Takao-c1ass ships be fitted as fittedwitharaisedflight
thebridgeandaftofthe
protection from indirect fire from 8-inch guns and for critical areas from direct flagships; theirsuperstructureshad threetimestheinternalvolumeofthoseoftheMyoko deckwithtwocatapults.
secondstack.(Yamato
Museum) 6-inchfire.As thedesignwasapprovedinAugust 1923,itincludedan increaseto ten class. They also increased speculation that theJapanese were exceeding cruiserTreacy Theheavytorpedobattery
offourquadruplemountsis
8-inchguns,deletionofthetorpedo tubes, andareducedcruisingrange. Ofnote, the
fittedundertheflightdeck.
approved design met the 10,000limitofthe Washington NavalTreacy.
(YamatoMuseuml
However, as built, the Imperial Navy's MyokoclassofTreacycruiserwas different.
The NavyGeneral Staffwas persuaded to bring back torpedo tubes on theship and
change the twin tubes to triple tubes. Anotheraddition brought the numberof4.7
inch guns up to six. These changes and others would clearly bring the ship to over
10,000tons;when thefirstship ran trials, itsstandarddisplacementwas 11,250tons.
Thisviolation oftheTreacylimits waswillful on the partoftheJapaneseand was, of
course, not reported. AfinestudyofAshigara
Tokeeppacewith theUSNavy,fouradditionalheavycruiserswereapprovedunder followingher1935
the 1927Reinforcement Program.Thiswas to become the Takaoclassandwould be modernization.Notethe
positionofthetwoquadruple
theImperialNavy'smostpowerfulclassofTreacyheavycruisers. Originallythesewere
torpedotubesintheir
to be follow-on Myoko units, but the Imperial Navy decided it could improve the port·sidesponsons.This
design. Principalimprovementsincludedincreasingtheelevationofthe8-inchbattery placementwasanattempt
to over 70 degrees to allow their use in an antiaircraft role. This would permit the tomitigatedamageifthe
torpedoesexploded.
16 numberof4.7-inchguns tobe reduced to fout.Armorprotectionwasalso increased,
(YamatoMuseum) 17