usaid support for kenya's 2013 elections: rapid assessment review

31 Pages·2013·5.12 MB·English

USAID/Kenya USAID/RiccardoGangale
USAID/NicholeSobecki USAID/RiccardoGangale
USAID SUPPORT FOR KENYA’S 2013
ELECTIONS:
RAPID ASSESSMENT REVIEW
USAID SUPPORT
FOR KENYA’S 2013
ELECTIONS:
RAPID
ASSESSMENT
REVIEW
NOVEMBER 2013
3
ACRONYMS USAIDWATERAND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 2013-2018
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AAR –AfterAction Review
BVR – BiometricVoter Registration
CCC – Canadian Commercial Corporation
CDCS – Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CFF – Complex Crisis Fund
CMM – Bureau of Conflict Management & Mitigation
CSO – Civil Society Organizations
DCM – Deputy Chief of Mission
DfID – UK Department for International Development
DPG – Donor Partners Group
DRG – Democracy,Human Rights and Governance
EDG – Elections Donor Group
ELOG – Election Observation Group
EVID – ElectronicVoter Identification System
EMB – Election Management Body
EPP – Elections and Political Processes
ERTF – Elections and ReformTask Force
EWER – EarlyWarning-Early Response
IDLO – International Development Law Organization
IEBC – Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IFES – International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IIEC – Interim Independent Electoral Commission
IRI – International Republican Institute
KCSSP – Kenyan Civil Society Strengthening Program
KIRA – Kenya Initial RapidAssessment
Kriegler Commission – Independent Review Committee
Mission – Kenya Mission
NDI – National Democratic Institute for InternationalAffairs
NSC – National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
OFDA – Office of Foreign DisasterAssistance
OMR – Optical Mark Recognition
OTI – Office ofTransition Initiatives
POL – Embassy Political Office
PVT – ParallelVoterTabulation
RTS – ResultsTransmission System
S/CSO – State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
TDY –Temporary Duty
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
USG – U.S.Government
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USAID SUPPORT FOR KENYA;S 2013 ELECTIONS:RAPIDASSESSMENT REVIEW TABLE OF CONTENTS
CONTENTS
ExecutiveSummary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ContextforthisReport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.ProvidingResources:PrioritizingDevelopmentandDemocracyAssistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.Making the Commitment:Engaging over the LongTerm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.CollaboratingAcross the Mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.Conflict EarlyWarning,Peace Messaging and Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.Making the Hard Choices:Decisions on Programming Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.Allowing the Host Country toTake the Lead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.CoordinationisKing:WorkingwithPartners,theInteragencyandotherDonors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.Beware of MagicWands and Silver Bullets:NewTechnology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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USAID SUPPORT FOR KENYA;S 2013 ELECTIONS:RAPIDASSESSMENT REVIEW EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
T
hisRapidAssessmentReviewReportappraisestheassis- Specifically,theRapidAssessmentrecommendsthatthefollowing
tanceprovidedbyUSAID/KenyaMission(Mission)over factorsshouldbeconsideredbyUSAIDmissionsinfuturecases
severalyearsinsupportoftheMarch4,2013elections. involvingelectionsupport:
Despitetheconsiderableconcernsregardinganoutbreakofeth-
nicviolence,particularlywhentheresultsofthepresidential 1.Promoteelectionsthatarebothpeacefulandcredible,
electionwerecontestedbyoppositionpartyleadersandcivil andavoidoperatingasiftheseobjectivesareinherentlyin
societyorganizations(CSOs),Kenyaninstitutionssuccessfully conflict.TheKenyaelectiondemonstratesthatspecificassis-
managedtheprocessinamannerthatminimizedviolenceand tanceactivitiescansuccessfullyaddresstheseobjectives
ledtotheoppositionacceptingtheSupremeCourtdecision independentlyandjointly.Ultimatelythough,domesticactorswill
upholdingtheannouncedoutcome.Thisreportisdesignedboth determinewhetheranelectoraleventremainspeacefulorleads
todocumenttheMission’sexperienceandtoofferlessonsfor toviolence,andwhethertheresults,afterdueadjudication,are
otherUSAIDmissionsseekingtopromoteacredibleelectoral acceptedorrejected.
exercisewhilesimultaneouslypreventingviolenceormassatroci-
tiesincircumstanceswhereelectionshavepreviouslycaused 2.Startearly–Anelectionisaprocess,notanevent.Plan-
suchoutbreaks. ningshouldstartpreferablyasmuchasthreeyearsinadvanceof
theelectiondate,withmultiplestakeholders,fromacrosstheUS
Acustomizeddatabasereceivesobservertextmessagesandchecksthetextmessagesentbyobserversinthefield. Credit:JefKarang’ae
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY KENYA 2013 ELECTIONS REVIEW REPORT
Government(USG)andthehostcountry,includedintheplan- 6.Ensureeffectivecoordinationwithcounterpartsinthe
ningprocess.Aninitial,broadassessmentoftheoperating internationalcommunity.InKenya,donorgovernments,led
environmentshouldbereinforcedbyiterativeandtargeted bytheU.S.Ambassador,workedcloselytogethertoamplifykey
reviewsduringtheperiodprecedingtheelections.Fundingfor messagesandtostretchscarceresourcesfurtherbeginningsev-
electoralsupportshouldbeprovidedinthebilateralbudgetat eralyearsinadvanceoftheelections.Successwasgreatestwith
leasttwoyearsinadvance,withfundinglevelsanticipatedto theestablishmentofanElectionsDonorGroup(EDG),co-
increaseastheelectionsapproach.Moreover,deploymentof chairedbyUSAIDandtheUK’sDepartmentforInternational
additionalstaff,whethercontractedorontemporaryduty(TDY), Development(DfID),andwithmulti-donorcontributionstothe
shouldbeplannedintherun-uptoanelection. basketfundmanagedbytheUnitedNationsDevelopmentPro-
gram(UNDP).USAID’scontributiontotheUNDPbasketfund
3.Seekopportunitiestotestapproaches,buildrelation- gavetheUSGavoiceinavenuewhereimportantdecisions
shipsandoperateholistically.InKenya,supporttothe weremade.
reformprocessandtheconstitutionalreferendum,including
workonreconciliationandpeacemessaging,laidtheground- 7.Beflexibleandinnovative–withapproaches,partners
workforconstructiveworkingrelationshipsamongKenyans andmechanisms.Internalmechanismsshouldbeinplacethat
movingintothe2013electionperiod.By-electionsandespecially allowforrapidadaptation.Linkagesamongimplementingpart-
thereferendumwereusedtotestsystemsintendedforimple- nersprovideforaforumtoexchangeofideasandcollaboration.
mentationduringthegeneralelections.Applyingaholistic Non-traditionalpartners,suchasthepoliceandthejudiciary,
approachtotheKenyanelectoralprocessinvolvedreaching shouldbeengagedearlysoastosecuretheircontributiontoa
acrossdevelopmentsectorsandutilizingtheuniquecapabilities holisticapproachtowardviolenceprevention.
withintheMission(andthecountryteammorebroadly);for
example,USAID/Kenya’sabilitytoleveragepartnernetworks 8.Identifyeffectivemessages,messengersandmeans
fromacrossthedemocracy,youth,health,agricultureandhuman- ofcommunicationthroughfocusgroupsandsurveysif
itariansectorswasinstrumentalinincreasingtheoutreachfor feasible.Thiseffortisparticularlyimportantwhentryingto
civicandvotereducationandforexpandingearlywarning/early promotemessagesofpeaceinaconflict-proneenvironment.
responsesystems.
9.Strikeanappropriatebalancebetweenfunding
4.PrioritizeDemocracy,HumanRightsandGovernance implementingpartnerstoconductspecificactivitiesfor
(DRG)programmingwithintheMission,especiallyas theElectionManagementBody(EMB)andbuildingthe
electionsapproach.Forexample,inKenya,theDRGOffice EMB’scapacitytodotheworkthemselves.HelptheEMB
receivedpreferentialtreatmentfromtheregionalcontracting monitorandadheretotheelectoralcalendar.Bepreparedto
office.TheDRGOfficewasalsoallowedtoaddstaffbetween providetechnicalassistanceandtrainingaspartofelections
theAugust2010ReferendumandtheMarch2013elections. administrationsupportwellbeforeprocurementsareneeded.
5.PromoteactivecollaborationwithUSAID/Washington, 10.Understandtechnology’sbenefitsandlimits–
colleaguesandinteragencyactors.VariousUSGagencies technologyisatool,notapanacea.Seriouscost-benefitand
andofficescontributeddiverseandcomplementaryskillsets, feasibilityanalysesshouldbeundertakenbeforecommittingto
includingclosecoordinationwithkeyinternationalalliesinKenya supportnewtechnology;local,low-techsolutionsmayoftenbe
atthehighestlevels.Pro-activecommunicationbetweentheMis- themostappropriateoption.Moreover,ifsupportingtheuseof
sionandvariousstakeholdersinWashingtononaregularbasis newtechnology,workwithstakeholderstodevelopaplanwith
informedallinteragencyactorsinterestedinandinvolvedwith milestonesthatensureitisreadyandoperationalwellinadvance
theKenyanelectoralprocess.TheU.S.EmbassyinKenya,mean- ofelections,andthatthereisampleopportunitytotestthesys-
while,dividedresponsibilityforseveralcriticaloperationsamong temandtrainstaff.
threemajoractors:theEmbassyPoliticalOffice(POL),ateam
fromtheStateDepartment’sBureauofConflictandStabilization 11.Structuresupportfortheperiodaftertheelectionsto
Operations(S/CSO),andUSAID.Astheelectionsapproached, ensurecontinuityofoperations.Toooften,theinternational
theAmbassadorconvenedabi-weeklyElectionsandReform communitydeclaresanelectionasuccessandthenquicklypivots
TaskForce(ERTF)tobetterensureongoingcoordinationand andprioritizesotherpressingdevelopmentanddemocracy
informationsharing,andorganizedanumberofdeep-diveses- needs.Electionprocessesmustbeinstitutionalizedwithinacoun-
sionsforstock-takingandscenarioplanning. try,andachievingthisoutcomeusuallyrequiresseveralsuccessive
elections.
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KENYA 2013 ELECTIONS REVIEW REPORT BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
E
thnicdivisionshavedefinedKenyanpoliticssinceinde-
pendence,andelectionshaveoftenignitedoutbreaksof
inter-ethnicviolencesincetheresumptionofmulti-party
politicsin1992.Mostseriously,Kenyaeruptedinviolentclashes
followingthedisputedelectionofDecember2007inwhich
incumbentMwaiKibakiwasdeclaredthewinneroverchallenger
RailaOdingaandrushedintoofficethesameday.Morethan
1,100peoplewerekilledand600,000weredisplacedfromtheir
homesduringatwo-monthperiodthatmanyfearedwould
resultinafull-scalecivilwar.
ThecrisisendedonFebruary28,2008,whenamediationeffort
ledbyformerUNSecretary-GeneralKofiAnnansuccessfully
brokeredtheformationofacoalitiongovernmentwithKibaki
remainingasPresident,OdingaappointedasPrimeMinisterand
theCabinetexpandedtoincludemembersofOdinga’spolitical
party,theOrangeDemocraticMovement.Theagreementalso
resultedinadoptionofamega-reformagendathatwas
designedtoaddresslong-standinggrievancesunderlyingethnic
tensionsinKenya.
Atrainerdemonstrateshoweveryvotershouldmarktheirballotpapersandwhatnotto
markwhenvoting. Credit:USAID/Kenya
Thereformagendamandatedthedevelopmentofanew,more
inclusiveconstitutionthatcouldbegintoaddressproblemsthat
hadlongplaguedKenya;anattempttoapproveanewconstitu- Thegeneralelections,originallyscheduledforAugustof2012,
tionin2005hadfailed.Foremostamongthereformswasthe wereviewedasamajortestforKenyatodemonstratethe
establishmentoflawstodecentralizepowerandresources, democraticprogressthathadbeenachievedsince2007.Forvar-
reformthejudiciaryandpolice,establishanewelectoralframe- iousreasons,includingdelaysinformingtheIEBC,theelections
work,strengthenhumanrightsandsubstantivelytacklethe werepostponedseveraltimes;theywereultimatelyheldon
contentiousissueoflandreform.Kenyansapprovedtheirnew March4,2013.
constitutioninapeacefulreferendumonAugust4,2010,with
TheseelectionswerethemostcomplicatedeverheldinKenya.
69percentvotinginfavor,thusprovidingthisnewframingdocu-
OnElectionDay,Kenyanswerepresentedballotsforsixdiffer-
mentwithconsiderablelegitimacy.
entpositions:President;Governor;Senator;Memberof
TheconstitutionbroughtaboutsignificantchangesinKenyan Parliament;Women’sRepresentative(womenmembersofpar-
politics,includingdecentralizingthepoweroftheexecutive liament);andCountyAssemblyRepresentative.Fourofthese
branchanddevolvingpowerto47newly-constitutedcounty positionswerecompletelynew:theConstitutionestablisheda
governments.Additionally,theconstitutioncalledfortheforma- bicameralparliamentwithaSenate,inadditiontotheNational
tionofanIndependentElectoralandBoundariesCommission Assembly;countygovernorsandassemblieswerepartofthe
(IEBC)todelimitconstituentboundariesandmanageelections. newdevolvedstructureofgovernment;andspecificparliamen-
TheIEBCwasofficiallyformedinlate2011,butevolvedfrom taryseatswerecreatedforwomentofulfillthemandate
theInterimIndependentElectoralCommission(IIEC),whichhad establishedbytheConstitutionthatnomorethantwo-thirdsof
successfullyorganizedthereferendum. themembersofanyelectedorappointedgovernmentbodybe
ofthesamegender.
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BACKGROUND KENYA 2013 ELECTIONS REVIEW REPORT
Aswasthecasein2007,thepresidentialracewashighlycon- inginter-ethnicviolence,notwithstandingthecloseresultand
tested.Eightpresidentialcandidateswerelistedontheballot, theunderlyingethnicdivisionsinthecountry.
buttheraceultimatelycamedowntotwomen:UhuruKeny-
atta,sonofKenya’sfirstpresident,oneoftherichestmeninthe Theinternationalgroupsthatobservedtheelectionsfoundthat
countryandthecandidatewhohadlosttoMwaiKibakiin2002; theelectionsweregenerallycredible,whilehighlightingmany
andRailaOdinga,theincumbentPrimeMinister,whowas areastoimproveadministration.Forexample,inanApril4
declaredtohavefinishedsecondinthemuch-disputed2007 statement,TheCarterCenterobserverdelegation,which
election.ComplicatingmatterswasthefactthattheInterna- USAIDfunded,stated:“TheCarterCenterfindsthatinspiteof
tionalCriminalCourt(ICC)hadindictedKenyattaonchargesof seriousshortcomingsintheIEBCmanagementoftechnology
crimesagainsthumanity,arisingfromhisallegedroleinpromot- andtabulationoffinalelectionresults,thepaper-basedproce-
ingthepost-electionviolencein2007and2008.TheICChad dureforcountingandtallyingpresentedenoughguaranteesto
similarlychargedWilliamRuto,whoinasurprisemovejoined preservetheexpressionofthewillofKenyanvoters.”2Inits
forceswithKenyattainDecember2012toformtheJubilee draftfinalreport,TheCarterCenterfound: “Inpractice,the
CoalitionandwasdesignatedtorunasKenyatta’srunning-mate. 2013electionswereadramaticimprovementcomparedto
TheformationoftheJubileeCoalitionticketbroughttogether 2007butthereformprocessisfarfromcomplete.Theelections
theKikuyuandKalenjinethnicgroups,whichhadbeenthetwo werelargelypeacefulandforthatallKenyansdeservetobe
ethnicitiesmostinvolvedinthe2007/2008electionviolence. congratulated,especiallythepresidentialandothercandidates
EspeciallyintheRiftValley,theJubileeticketlikelyplayedakey whofailedtowinseatsbutacceptedtheresults.”3 TheCarter
roleinmitigatingviolence. Centerlistsmanyareasforimprovementgroupedunderthe
categoriesoflegalreforms,politicalpartypracticesandelection
FivedaysafterKenyanscasttheirballots,KenyattaandRuto management.Similarly,initsfinalreport,theEUobserverdele-
wereannouncedasthevictorsinthe2013presidentialelection, gationconcludedthat:“Whileseveralseriousviolentincidents
with50.07percentofthevote,or8,000votesmorethan occurredinsomepartsofthecountry,overalltheatmosphere
requiredtoavoidarun-offelection(outofmorethan12.3mil- wascalmandthedemocraticspiritofKenyansprevailed.”4A
lioncast).1Odinga’scoalitionandagroupofCSOschallenged thirdinternationalobservergroupwaslesssanguine,concluding:
theannouncedresultsbeforetheKenyanSupremeCourt,citing “LookingatthepervasiveproblemswiththeIEBCmanualand
theslimmargin,serioustechnicalproblemswithelectionadmin- automatedproceduresleadsustotheconclusionthatfraudon
istrationandthefailureoftheelectronictransmissionsystemfor awidescalecouldeasilyhavehappenedandmostlikelydid.”5
reportingprovisionalresults.TheCourtrejectedthechallenges,
therebyupholdingtheresultsasannouncedbytheIEBC;forhis Despitethemanypositiveaspectsoftheprocess,theelections
part,Odingaurgedhisfollowerstoacceptthecourtdecision alsoreinforceddivisionswithintheKenyanpopulationthatwill
andnotresorttoviolence,evenashecontinuestoraiseques- notbeeasilyerased.Accordingtoapost-electionpoll,29per-
tionsaboutthefairnessoftheElectionDayprocess. centofthepopulationbelievesthattheresultswereinvaliddue
toproblemsassociatedwiththeelections.6TheSupremeCourt
Theelectionwasasuccessonmanylevels.Despitetechnical decisiondoesnotnecessarilylegitimizetheelectionintheireyes;
problemsatthepollingstations,Kenyanspatientlywaitedto manyseethewrittendecisionashighlyflawed,filledwitherrors
vote.Turnoutwasthelargestinhistory–86percentofregis- andlightonlogic.7
teredvoterscastballots.Whilesporadicviolenceoccurredon
theCoastonMarch3,theeveningbeforetheelection,andin
theNortheastonElectionDay,calmprevailedthroughoutmost
ofthecountry.Domesticobservationefforts,whichincluded
thousandsofmonitorsandtheuseofinformationtechnology,
wereconductedprofessionallyandefficiently.Mostimportant,
Odinga’suseoftheprescribedadjudicationprocessandhis
acceptanceoftheSupremeCourtrulingwerecriticalinavert-
1Afirstroundwinrequiredmorethan50%ofthetotalvotesand25%ofallvotescastinhalfthecounties.
2TheCarterCenterFindsKenyaElectionResultsReflectsWilloftheVoters(April4,2013),p.1,www.cartercenter.org/resources,/pdfs/news/pr/kenya-tally-040413.
3TheCarterCenter,Pre-DistributionDraftFinalReportofTheCarterCenterInternationalElectionObservationMissiontoKenya’sMarch4,2013Elections.(June2013),p.68.
4EuropeanUnionElectionObservationMissiontoKenya:GeneralElections2013(May2013),p.1www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/eu-eom-kenya-2013-final-report_en.pdf.
5AfricanGreatLakesInitiativeElectionObserverReport(April2013),p.1.
6Longetal,“ChoosingPeaceOverDemocracy,”24JournalofDemocracy151(2013)relyingonapost-electionsurvey.Another49percentbelievedtherehadbeenproblems,butacceptedtheresultsasvalid.
7SeeW.Maina,“VerdictonKenyas’sPresidentialElectionPetition:FiveReasonstheJudgmentFailstheTest,”April20,2013,TheEastAfrican.
4
KENYA 2013 ELECTIONS REVIEW REPORT CONTEXT
CONTEXT FOR THIS REPORT
T
heUSGhasworkedtofosterKenya’sdevelopmentsince Inresponsetoachallengingelectoralenvironmentandsignificant
thecountrybecameindependentin1963.Formuchof need,theUSGgraduallyincreasedsupportinmultiplesectors
thepast50years,theU.S.hasinvestedtensandoften during2012-2013,includingdomesticandinternationalelection
hundredsofmillionsofdollarsannuallyinKenya,withtheaimof observation,electionadministration,civicandvotereducation,
assistingKenyanstobuildastableandprosperousnation.Follow- andconflictmitigationandpeace-building.Theseeffortswere
ingthe2007/2008crisis,theUSGdirectedsignificantresources coordinatedwithintheUSGinteragencyprocessthrougha
toassistthecountrytorestoreorderandforgeaheadwiththe strategicplanningexerciseandwithotherdonorsthroughthe
reformagenda.Specifically,theUSGprovidedmorethan$150 DonorPartnersGroup.
millioninsupportofDRGprogrammingduringthefive-year
periodprecedingthe2013elections,includingsupporttothe Giventhismassiveinvestmentandthepotentiallessonsemerging
constitutionaldraftingprocessandthereferendum.8 Theassis- fromtheKenyaexperienceforUSAIDsupportelsewherefor
tance,however,wentfarbeyondtraditionalelectoralsupport, elections,conflictmitigationandatrocityprevention,USAIDiniti-
anddeliberatelyincludedamulti-dimensionalefforttomitigate atedthisRapidAssessmentReviewofprogramsthatsupported
theriskthatviolentconflictwouldagainbeassociatedwiththe boththepost-2008reformprocessandthe2013elections,with
electoralprocess. afocusbothonwhatworkedwellandwhatwaslesssuccessful.9
Morethan150KiberayouthturnedouttohearhowthenewConstitutionwillbringchangesthatpromoteyouthdevelopment. Credit:USAID/RiccardoGangale
8FormoreinformationonUSAID/Kenya’sDemocracyandGovernanceprograms,pleaseseehttp://kenya.usaid.gov/programs/democracy-and-governance/programs
5