U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001-2002: From the Sea

428 Pages·2011·37.567 MB·English

by  Nathan S. Lowrey

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U.S. MARINES IN AFGHANISTAN, 2001–2002
FROM THE SEA
U.S. Marines in the
Global War on Terrorism
by
Colonel Nathan S. Lowrey
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
History Division
United States Marine Corps
Washington, D.C.
2011
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Other Publications in the Series
U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism
U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography
U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond
Det One: U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Special Operations Command Detachment,
2003–2006
U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2005: Into the Fray
U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography
PCN 106 0000 2500
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free [phone]; DC area [phone]
Fax: [phone] Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001
ISBN 978-0-16-089557-9
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Foreword
This monograph is more than the story of Marine expeditionary operations in Afghanistan. It
describes who our nation’s enemies are; how America became involved in the Global War on
Terrorism; and how the Marine Corps struggled to acquire a major role in Operation Enduring
Freedom, as well as the actions of Marines and sailors who helped prosecute the air and ground
campaigns against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. In the latter regard, we see the 15th Marine
Expeditionary Unit, already forward deployed on 11 September 2001, ready to conduct a
noncombatant evacuation operation, secure a forward operating base, or provide a quick reaction
force for joint special operating forces conducting the initial offensive action of the war. The 15th
Marine Expeditionary Unit then combined with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and quickly
maneuvered from the Mediterranean to form a provisional Marine expeditionary brigade known as
Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58. Working simultaneously under the direction of U.S. Central
Command’s land and maritime component commanders and in association with joint special
operations forces, Brigadier General James N. Mattis and his force embarked on a sequence of
operations in southern Afghanistan. These included, but were not limited to, establishing Forward
Operating Base Rhino, interdicting enemy lines of communications along Highway 1, occupying
Kandahar International Airport, securing the American embassy in Kabul, detaining several hundred
prisoners of war, and supporting special operations forces during numerous sensitive site
exploitation and special reconnaissance missions. The monograph also describes the 13th Marine
Expeditionary Unit’s rapid reinforcement of Coalition forces during Operation Anaconda, only
days after Task Force 58’s disbandment.
Although events did not afford the Marines an opportunity to engage the enemy in heavy
combat, their contribution in southern Afghanistan was nonetheless significant. From a strategic
perspective, the arrival of a sizable conventional force demonstrated America’s resolve to confront
the sponsors of terrorism directly and signaled an end to Taliban rule. From an operational
perspective, Task Force 58 successfully blocked the western escape route from Kandahar and
threatened the enemy’s last remaining urban stronghold. As Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold,
former director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, later observed:
The insertion of Task Force 58 had a deep psychological impact on the Taliban and al-Qaeda—they
were confronted with a military situation which now unhinged any hope they had for a gradual
pullback from the north and a chance to hold from their area of greatest strength. . . . The insertion
of Task Force 58 fundamentally changed the equation for the enemy from one of grim hope to
hopelessness.1
The strategic agility and operational reach showcased by the Navy amphibious squadrons and
Marine expeditionary units validated the utility of task-organized expeditionary forces, particularly
in respect to the effectiveness of long-range, ship-to-objective maneuver. These combined
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achievements contributed directly to the subsequent deployment of expeditionary strike groups in
2003. As a result, today’s naval services are now in a better position to address emerging crises
around the globe, regardless of whether they occur in littoral or landlocked regions of the world.
Colonel Nathan S. Lowrey began his military career as an infantry officer, serving first as a rifle
platoon commander in Panama during Operation Just Cause and then as a recruiting officer in
Portland, Oregon. After transferring to the Reserves to attend graduate school, he joined the History
Division’s Field Operations Branch in 1998 and subsequently deployed to document operations in
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He joined the Histories Branch as a civilian writer in 2005 and later
served as head of the Field and Oral History Branch from 2008 to 2010. He holds a bachelor’s
degree in history from the University of Maine, a master’s degree in cultural anthropology from the
University of Wisconsin, and a doctorate in archaeology from American University.
Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer
Director of Marine Corps History
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Preface
This project began almost 10 years ago, a month after the terrorist attacks on 11 September
2001. Drawn from a variety of sources, the account reflects the combined efforts of three related,
yet independent, endeavors to document Marine operations in Afghanistan during the opening days
of Operation Enduring Freedom. In November 2001, after it became apparent that a sizable Marine
force was about to be committed to the ongoing campaign, History and Museums Division began
to assemble a small field documentation team to accompany the operating forces as official
observers. The team—consisting of two field historians, a combat photographer, and a combat
artist—intended to collect documents, capture images, conduct interviews, and gather artifacts that
would help to preserve, present, and promote Marine Corps history.
In early December, shortly after Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58 seized Objective Rhino
in southern Afghanistan, Headquarters Marine Corps directed that the field history detachment join
a provisional Combat Assessment Team then forming in Quantico, Virginia. Modeled on the Battle
Assessment Team deployed during the Gulf War, the platoon-sized organization was a Marine
Corps Combat Development Center initiative to evaluate and improve the Marine Corps’
warfighting capabilities. After several iterations, this effort evolved into today’s Marine Corps Center
for Lessons Learned.
The assessment team deployed to Bahrain in early January 2002, where it made contact with U.S.
Naval Forces, Central Command; Marine Forces, Central Command (Forward); and Task Force 58
(Rear). During the next three months, Staff Sergeant Michael D. Fay and Major Christopher J.
Warnke accompanied assessment personnel during short trips to Camp Doha, Kuwait; Jacobabad,
Pakistan; and Bagram and Kandahar, Afghanistan, where they spoke with Marines, sailors, and
soldiers involved in Operation Swift Freedom (the initial label for the Marine contribution to the
campaign). While in Bahrain, Warnke also interviewed pilots from Marine Fighter Attack Squadrons
251 and 314, while Fay captured images of the Marine Security Forces Company and facilities at
Shaikh Isa Air Base. Although I spent most of my time in Bahrain collecting historical information
from the Task Force 58 staff and helping them chronicle their experiences during the operation, I
also made a short trip to Kuwait to speak with members of Task Force Consequence Management
and visited the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit at sea following Operation Anaconda. Two other
researchers also contributed to the History and Museums Division’s documentation effort that
spring, accompanying units during their return voyages to the West Coast. Major Theodore R.
McKeldin collected data from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit on board the USS Peleliu(LHA
5), and Dr. Fred H. Allison interviewed pilots and aircrews from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron
251 on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt(CVN 71).
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Following the operation, Task Force 58 produced a detailed multimedia account of its
experiences in Afghanistan. This chronicle, principally written by Majors Michael P. Mahaney and
Daniel B. Conley (the unit’s assistant operations and logistics officers), eventually became the
narrative portion of the organization’s command chronology and the foundation for my own history
of the operation. Captain Charles G. Grow, combat cameramen from the assessment team, and
both the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units collated Task Force 58’s impressive photo
collection, which became the main source of imagery for this volume. After its return to the United
States, the assessment team analyzed the wide range of data it had collected and published a
comprehensive report of its findings in 2003, which contributed greatly to this project.
During the spring of 2006, after History Division had relocated to Quantico and joined Marine
Corps University, Colonel Richard D. Camp, the acting director, asked that I begin work on a Task
Force 58 history. I originally intended to produce a short operational monograph based heavily on
the detailed narrative summary contained in Task Force 58’s command chronology. Once I began
my research, however, I quickly realized that a complete history would necessarily include a more
robust accounting of the three Marine expeditionary units who had fought in Afghanistan before,
during, and after Task Force 58’s tenure in theater. Several months later, after speaking with retired
Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold, who had helped shape the battle as a member of the Joint
Staff at the Pentagon, I learned that it would also be necessary to investigate the circumstances
surrounding U.S. Central Command’s delayed decision to employ Marines in Afghanistan. Not only
was Marine Corps participation in the joint operation intentionally limited from the earliest planning
stages onward, the rationale for assigning them a larger role at the final hour of the campaign
remained ambiguous. This prologue to the operational portion of the account speaks forcefully to
the doctrinal and institutional significance of Task Force 58’s achievement, which links directly to
the development of expeditionary maneuver warfare following the end of the Cold War in 1991 and
the establishment of expeditionary strike groups in 2003.
The research, writing, and publication of an official history is a collaborative affair. Behind the
author stand a cadre of individuals without whose support I would have been unable to bring this
project to completion. During the research phase, I was assisted by Mr. John Q. Smith at the U.S.
Central Command History Office, Dr. David B. Crist of the Joint History Office, Drs. Randy
Papadopoulos and Robert J. Schneller at the U.S. Naval Historical Center, Dr. Bradford Lee of the
Naval War College, Mr. Frank E. Jordan of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Dr. James A.
Ginther at the Marine Corps Archives, staff at both the Marine Corps Library and Marine Corps
Center for Lessons Learned, Dr. Fred Allison and Mr. Anthony R. Taglianetti of our Oral History
Branch, and Ms. Annette D. Amerman of our Reference Branch.
Several veterans of Operation Enduring Freedom provided additional information in the form
of documentary evidence or oral history interviews. These include General James N. Mattis;
Lieutenant General Thomas D. Waldhauser; retired Lieutenant Generals John G. Castellaw and
Gregory S. Newbold; Colonels Christopher M. Bourne, John J. Broadmeadow, John Jansen, Clark
R. Lethin, Jerome M. Lynes, James L. Stalnaker, and Michael D. Fitzgerald, USA; Lieutenant Colonel
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John B. Barranco; and Majors David R. Berke, Jack G. Bolton, Michael D. Bryan, Jay M. Holtermann,
Richard B. Lawson, Kevin M. McDonald, Jonathan R. Ohman, Joshua A. Riggs, Chad A. Vaughn,
and Richard W. Whitmer.
During the writing phase, Mr. Paul W. Westermeyer of our Histories Branch and Lieutenant
Colonel David A. Benhoff of our Field History Branch frequently served as sounding boards,
listening to my speculations and providing wise counsel in return. Mr. Charles R. Smith, senior
historian of the Histories Branch, and Mr. Charles D. Melson, chief historian of the Marine Corps,
reviewed several draft manuscripts, offering valuable advice on the style, organization, and content
of the developing history. After I produced a polished version of the manuscript, several veterans
of Operation Enduring Freedom reviewed my narrative and provided critical commentary that
enhanced both the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the account. These veterans include
Lieutenant General Thomas D. Waldhauser; retired Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold;
Brigadier Generals William M. Faulkner and Gregg A. Sturdevant; Colonels Christopher M. Bourne,
Robert J. Charette Jr., Christopher J. Gunther, Jerome M. Lynes, Michael P. Mahaney, and Carl D.
Matter; Lieutenant Colonels David B. Crist, Kevin M. DeVore, and Thomas J. Impellitteri; and
Master Sergeant John A. Dailey.
Our Editing and Design Branch, capably led by Mr. Kenneth H. Williams, was instrumental in
transforming the manuscript into a published product. Ms. Jeannie L. Riffe coordinated the
distribution and receipt of review drafts, Ms. Wanda J. Renfrow proofread the text, and Ms. Andrea
L. Connell and Mr. Shawn H. Vreeland edited the manuscript. Layout and design was provided by
Mr. Vincent J. Martinez. With so many individuals assisting in the development of this history, there
is always a danger of forgetting to note someone’s important contribution. If I have done so, please
accept my sincere apology and grateful thanks for your help.
As a final note to readers, please be aware that I have used both informational footnotes, identified
by symbols (*, **, etc.), and reference endnotes, identified by Arabic numerals. Also, geographic names
have been standardized according to the U.S. Board of Geographic Names (http://geonames
.usgs.gov), and Afghan military and political figures’ names have been standardized according to the
U.S. Department of State website (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm).
Nathan S. Lowrey
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
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