US Infantryman in World War II

66 Pages·2002·2.867 MB·English

by  Robert Rush, Elizabeth Sharp

O
SPREY
Warrior
PUBLISHING
US Infantryman
in World War II (1)
Pacific Area of Operations 1941– 45
Robert S Rush Illustrated by Elizabeth Sharp & Ian Palmer
•
Warrior • 45
US Infantryman
in World War II (1)
Pacific Area of Operations 1941–45
Robert S Rush Illustrated by Elizabeth Sharp & Ian Palmer
•
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 4
CHRONOLOGY 15
ENLISTMENT: PREWAR AND
PEARL HARBOR 16
DEFENSE OF HAWAII AND PREPARATION
FOR COMBAT 1942–43 25
MAKIN: FIRST BLOOD 28
SAIPAN 42
CASUALTIES AND MEDICS 49
REST AND RECUPERATION 50
THE LAST BATTLE: OKINAWA 53
MUSEUMS 61
RE-ENACTMENT AND COLLECTING 61
BIBLIOGRAPHY 61
COLOR PLATE COMMENTARY 62
GLOSSARY 63
INDEX 64
US INFANTRYMAN IN
WORLD WAR II (I)
PACIFIC AREA OF
OPERATIONS 1941–45
INTRODUCTION
“His name and fame are the birthright of every American citizen. In his
youth and strength, his love and loyalty, he gave all that mortality can
give. He needs no eulogy from me or from any other man. He has written
his own history and written it in red on his enemy’s breast.”
General Douglas MacArthur
T
his book is the first of a sequence that examines the U.S.
infantryman in World War II. It provides a general overview of
how American infantrymen in the Pacific were organized,
equipped, trained and cared for, and deals particularly with the
problems these soldiers faced fighting the Japanese, and the specific
nature of the Pacific combat environment.
Rather than fill this book and the others to follow with just the dry
details of soldiering, I focus on a composite built on actual events to
examine the lives of soldiers in a National Guard regiment during the
period 1938–45, analyzing their lives, the regulations they followed,
and the environment in which they lived. From the common soldier’s
viewpoint, a different perspective of the U.S. Army in the Pacific
emerges.
The Pacific war zone was a huge expanse that was subdivided for
administrative purposes into the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) of North,
Central, and South Pacific, comprising small island groups as well as the
Japanese islands. The Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) included most of
the major island land masses, and the China-Burma-India (CBI)
encompassed areas on the Asian continental land mass. Combat, as an
infantryman was markedly different in each area. The CBI was primarily
a British-Indian theater with only one American infantry regiment, the
5307th (later renamed the 475th and commonly referred to as “Merrill’s
Marauders”) experiencing combat, and is not covered here. Soldiers in
the SWPA fought through the jungles of New Guinea, New Britain and
the Solomon Islands in vicious hand-to-hand fighting, with little support
from armor, artillery or air power. In the POA, Army infantrymen fought
alongside Marines in sharply contested, high-casualty battles, taking one
island at a time as they fought north up through the Japanese Mandates.
Much more has been written of the GI in the SWPA fighting under
General Douglas MacArthur than of the Army infantryman fighting
alongside the Marine in the Pacific area of operations.
The narrative follows our hypothetical Guardsman from his
enlistment into the 165th Infantry Regiment (New York National
Guard) in 1938, training, and first combat at Makin Atoll through his
4 final battle on Okinawa. His experience reflects the everyday experience
of many soldiers in the POA theater of operations. This composite
soldier has been drawn by examining the social and demographic
environment of a National Guard regiment, the U.S. army regulations
under which the soldiers operated, the uniforms they wore and the
weapons they carried, company diaries and official reports of the
actions. While the focus is on one hypothetical soldier, the generalities
and experiences of the majority are also examined and carefully woven
into the individual narrative thread. This is the story of one man in one
infantry regiment whose experience represents the life of many infantry
soldiers in the Pacific from their initial entry to the end of the war.
Between 1940 and 1943 the infantry arm of the U.S. Army increased
from 42 to 317 infantry regiments on active duty, as well as an additional
99 separate battalions which included rifle, armored, mountain, glider and
parachute. The vast majority, 204, were standard rifle regiments and
included 57 Regular Army (including Philippine Scouts and the four
dismounted cavalry regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division), 79 National
Guard and 125 regiments of the Army of the United States (AUS).
The Tables of Organization and Equipment for infantry units changed
several times between 1938 and 1945. These changes, however, were always
based upon the mobility and firepower of the units at the lowest level. A
platoon’s mobility was focused on the three men carrying the Browning
Automatic Rifles (BAR), and there was no weapon seen as a focus for
enemy fire. All weapons in a company were capable of being hand-carried;
all those in a battalion could be hand-carried for a short distance, and
weapons needing prime movers were in regimental companies. Although
equipment and personnel strength changed, the duties and
responsibilities of the infantry leaders in a rifle company did not.
7 Oct 20 1 Nov 40 1 Aug 42 15 Jul 43 24 Jan 45 Infantry Rifle Regiment Table of
Organization and Equipment
Total Strength 3,041 3,449 3,333 3,118 3,068
1920–45.
Hq & Hq Co 119 210 132 108 104
Band 29
Service Co 225 152 132 114 111
Anti-Tank Co 185 169 165 159
Cannon Co 104 123 118 114
Rifle Battalion (3) 831 932 916 871 860
Hq & Hq Co 70 52 139 126 121
Rifle Co (3) 205 223 198 193 193
Machine Gun Co 146
Heavy Weapons Co 211 183 166 160
Medical Detachment 100 106 136 135 136
Organization and Personnel, Rifle Company
Between 1941 and 1945 the rifle company consisted of three rifle
platoons, a weapons platoon and a headquarters section split between a
command and an administrative group. The commanding officer (CO),
executive officer (XO), first sergeant (1SG), and communications
sergeant made up the command group.
The company commander (captain) was responsible for the
discipline, administration, supply, training, tactical employment, and
control of his company. Although he decided how best to employ his
company, he did so in conformity with orders from higherheadquarters. 5
He could accept advice and suggestion, but he alone was responsible for
his organization’s success or failure. On the battlefield, the commander
was located where he could most decisively influence the situation. The
XO (lieutenant) was second-in-command. In combat he remained at the
company command post maintaining contact between battalion and
company, keeping abreast of the tactical situation and was prepared to
assume command if the company commander was injured. He was in
charge of the command post until called forward to assume either
company command or command of one of the platoons. The XO
frequently coordinated resupply of ammunition and rations to the
platoons. The 1SG (pay grade 2, until 1944 when it became pay grade 1)
assisted the company commander and XO in controlling the company.
During combat, his duties varied from handling administrative and
supply matters to commanding a platoon. Ordinarily, he took over the
communication and administrative duties when the XO was absent.
The admin group consisted of those headquarters elements not
directly involved in the fighting, such as the supply sergeant, company
clerk, and mess team, all of whom (except the supply sergeant) were
normally back in the battalion trains area.
The platoon was composed of three rifle squads and a command
group. The platoon leader (lieutenant) was responsible for the training,
discipline, control and tactical employment of his platoon. In combat, he
was located where he could most decisively influence the situation. The
platoon sergeant (PSG, technical sergeant) was second-in-command. He
assisted the platoon leader in controlling the platoon and acted as
platoon leader when there was no officer present. In combat, the PSG
was normally located at the second most decisive point. The platoon
guide (staff sergeant) enforced the orders concerning cover,
concealment, and discipline. He was normally located behind the
platoon, where he could observe the flanks and rear. He managed the
platoon’s ammunition resupply.
The rifle squad was made up of a squad leader, an assistant squad
leader, an automatic rifleman, an assistant automatic rifleman, and eight
riflemen, two of whom acted as scouts. The squad leader (a corporal
prewar, a sergeant 1941–43, and a staff sergeant 1944–45) was always
with his squad and was responsible for their employment, training, and
sustenance. In combat, he ensured they fought. The assistant squad
leader (private first class prewar, corporal 1941–43, sergeant 1944–45)
assisted the squad leader in carrying out the squad’s mission. In combat,
he normally led a portion of the squad and acted as squad leader when
the squad leader became a casualty. He might also ensure squad
members remained resupplied with ammunition.
Weapons
Soldiers in rifle companies carried the same type weapons whether they
fought in the Pacific or European theaters. In 1940, the company’s
primary weapon was the M1 Garand rifle, carried by all rifleman except
snipers. The one sniper in each squad wielded an M1903 Springfield.
The Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) was the principal automatic
weapon with three in each platoon’s weapons squad, and officers carried
.45 cal. pistols. Company heavy weapons consisted of two M1919A3
6 .30 caliber light machine guns, one .50 cal. heavy machine gun and three
60 mm mortars. However, most organizations lacked the machine gun
and mortars until production increased in late 1941.
By 1943, officers were carrying M1 carbines instead of pistols, leaving
the pistols to be carried only by gunners and assistant gunners. The
weapons squad disappeared and the BAR again became an integral part
of the rifle squad. Other weapons systems remained the same. Additional
weapons available to the company on a mission-by-mission basis from
the battalion weapon’s pool were Thompson submachine guns and
flame throwers. Many squad leaders in the Pacific carried the Thompson
instead of an M1, giving squads two automatic weapons. By 1943 the
2.36 in. bazooka was added to the armory, and in many organizations
the M3 submachine “grease” gun replaced the Thompson. A detailed
description of each weapon is in Men-at-Arms 342 The US Army in World
War II (I) The Pacific.
The onset of World War II
In summer 1940, France and the Low Countries had fallen, the Battle of
Britain was raging, and the United States had placed its first embargo on
war trade against Japan. By the fall of 1940, President Roosevelt had
signed the Selective Service Act, which provided for the registration of
male citizens and aliens between the ages of 21 to 36 and authorized the
induction of up to 900,000 men for a period of 12 consecutive months
of training and service; National Guard organizations were federalized.
The draft and mobilization were to last for only one year, but in August
1941, Congress extended the term of service for draftees and mobilized
guardsmen for up to 18 months.
This prewar army formed in 1940 and 1941 from the standing army,
of 296,437 regulars, 241,612 guardsmen, and 106,000 Reserve officers,
was the tool that fought the United States’ first battles of World War II.
There were three types of enlisted soldier within the U.S. Army. The
regular who enlisted for adventure, patriotism or need; the guardsman,
who had signed up for the same reasons as the regular, and was
part-time until his unit federalized and he laid down the wrench to pick
up the rifle; and the draftee or inductee, who after November 1940 was
selected by his county draft board.
During 1940 and 1941, the average age of the soldier was 26; more
soldiers were over 40 than under 21, and most had not finished high
school, although this was typical of the rest of the white male
population. Regular Army officers were commissioned either through
the United States Military Academy, the Reserve Officers Training Corps
(ROTC, a university military training program), or for a select few,
through a direct commissioning process for enlisted men and warrant
officers. National Guard officers were much less likely to have had
formal military training, and were appointed as officers by their state
governor.
With war clouds looming, and the realization that the regular army
was too small to provide enough proficient trainers to build the
expanding army, masses of new manuals appeared in 1940–41 that
addressed every aspect of army organization and operations from the
individual soldier through corps and army operations. From 1940 every
soldier received FM 21–100, The Soldier’s Handbook, and the farther in
rank a soldier progressed the more manuals he accumulated. A good 7
sergeant might have FM 7–20, Rifle Company; FM 21–20, Physical Training;
FM 21–25, Map and Aerial Photograph Reading; FM 22–5, Infantry Drill
Regulations; FM 23–5, US Rifle Caliber .30, and FM 23–15, Browning
Automatic Rifle with Bipod Cal. 30. If something was to be done, there was
a manual demonstrating how to do it. Not only were countless millions
of manuals printed, but as the war wore on, and new lessons were
learned, updates and appendices were added.
December 7, 1941, the day Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, ended any
discussion as to whether the United States should enter the war. At the
time there were 80 National Guard infantry regiments, 44 regular army
regiments (16 of which were overseas in Alaska, Panama, Iceland,
Hawaii and the Philippine Islands), and six regiments of the Army of the
United States on active duty.
The Pacific Theaters of Operation
US Army strength in the Pacific never reached the level of the build-up
in Europe, and did not break the million-soldier mark until July 1944.
This was due in large part to the emphasis on European operations and
the shortage of shipping. A large number of soldiers remained in the
United States until July 1943 because of shipping shortages, and it was
only from August 1944 that there were more soldiers overseas than there
were in the United States. Because of the vast distances covered in the
Pacific, every move from one island to another required shipping, and
U.S. Army strength in the Pacific
Theaters of Operation, 1942–45. resources were tightly stretched.
8
Sixty-seven regiments served in the Pacific Theaters of Operation
(SWPA and POA) accumulating 1,961 months in theater and 708 combat
months between Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and September 2,
1945, the day Japan signed the surrender document aboard the USS
Missouri. Although there were 30 rifle regiments in the Pacific by October
1942, and over 60 by July 1944, it was only from April 1944 that more
than 18 regiments were fighting in any month. This much higher
overhead was due primarily to the need to garrison outposts and the
Hawaiian Islands as well as the cyclical nature of combat in this theater.
Short, high-intensity fighting resulted in high casualties over a short
period, and combined with large numbers of non-battle casualties,
primitive infrastructure, constrained shipping resources and the slow
arrival of replacements to produce long delays between military actions.
Only in late 1944 was the shipping logjam overcome, allowing major
U.S. infantry regiments in combat,
Pacific Theaters of Operation. campaigns to be conducted in the Philippines and on Okinawa.
Organizations traveling overseas in early 1942 were at the correct
personnel strengths, but lacked advanced training and some vital
modern equipment; some units had not yet reorganized under the
correct tables of organization and equipment. Since all but two Regular
Army divisions had been heavily levied for soldiers to form new units, and
14 regiments were already overseas in December, it was the untouched
federalized National Guard divisions and their regiments that first
shipped overseas. Although some regiments entered combat as early as
1942, they were untrained in jungle warfare and had to learn how to
combat the Japanese by the most brutal on-the-job training – simply
fighting them. In much of the combat during 1942 and 1943, platoon
and company operations were vital to the grand scheme, unlike later
periods when divisions and corps maneuvering became more important.
It was not until the land battles in the Philippines and on Okinawa that
the traditional European style of warfare with corps, boundaries, rear
areas and heavy use of land-based artillery on both sides came into play. 9
Just as the war in the Pacific was broken up into two major combat areas
for Americans, one commanded by a general, the other by an admiral,
both areas had their own methods of combat. The SWPA encompassed
large island land masses that were jungle-covered, infested with malaria,
and where the high temperatures and humidity along with the muck,
filth, and debilitating diseases combined to send a great many more
soldiers to hospital as non-battle casualties than did battle wounds. The
POA consisted of heavily defended islands, many of which were under
Japanese mandate during the 1920s and 1930s. The incidence of disease
on these tropical islands was not high and malaria was rare – dengue
fever and dysentery were the most noteworthy diseases. For every soldier
felled through combat in the SWPA, five others were stricken with
disease or non-battle injuries. In the POA, for every soldier wounded or
killed, 6.3 were lost to disease or other injuries. The average daily
casualty rate for the U.S. Army was one battle casualty for every four and
one half rendered ineffective through disease or non-battle injury.
Disease Non-battle Battle injury Total daily Daily average noneffective rate
injury or wound admissions (per 1,000 strength).
per 1,000
Pacific Ocean Areas 33.89 5.85 6.31 46.05
Southwest Pacific 46.25 7.23 10.39 63.87
Continental U.S. 27.06 4.24 .01 31.31 BELOW Campaigns in the
Pacific.
10