US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Truman to Kennedy: Responses to International Challenges

254 Pages·2014·1.358 MB·English

by  Alex Roberto Hybel (auth.)

US Foreign Policy Decision-Making
from Truman to Kennedy
US Foreign Policy Decision-Making
from Truman to Kennedy
Responses to International Challenges
Alex Roberto Hybel
us foreign policy decision-making from truman to kennedy
Copyright © Alex Roberto Hybel, 2014
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-1-137-29485-2
All rights reserved.
First published in 2014 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United
States— a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York,
NY 10010.
Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this
is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered
in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire
RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and
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United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN 978-1-349-45163-0 ISBN 978-1-137-29486-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137294869
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Hybel, Alex Roberto.
US foreign policy decision-making from Truman to Kennedy : responses to
international challenges / Alex Roberto Hybel.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. United States—Foreign relations—1945–1953—Case studies.
2. United States—Foreign relations—1953–1961—Case studies. 3. United
States—Foreign relations—1961–1963—Case studies. 4. Presidents—
United States—Decision making—Case studies. 5. Truman, Harry S., 1884–
1972. 6. Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890–1969. 7. Kennedy,
John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917–1963. I. Title.
E744.H94 2014
327.73009’04—dc23
2013036308
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Design by Amnet
First Edition: March 2014
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To
Jan, Sabrina, and Gabriela
Contents
Preface ix
Introduction: Alternative Theoretical Perspectives 1
Alex Roberto Hybel
1 Harry Truman, the Dropping of the Atomic Bombs on Japan,
and the End of the Second World War 19
Alex Roberto Hybel and Joanna Gillia
2 Harry Truman and the Decisions to Intervene in the Korean War
and to Cross the 38th Parallel 55
Alex Roberto Hybel and Caitlyn Turgeon
3 Dwight Eisenhower and the Decision to Intervene Covertly
in Guatemala 87
Alex Roberto Hybel
4 Dwight Eisenhower and the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 99
Alex Roberto Hybel and Marina Sachs
5 John F. Kennedy and the Decision to Intervene Covertly in Cuba 135
Alex Roberto Hybel
6 John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis 155
Alex Roberto Hybel and Benedikt Gottwald
7 Intuition, Rationality, Mindsets, and Foreign Policy
Decision-Making Models 183
Alex Roberto Hybel and Aditya Harnal
Notes 201
Bibiliography 229
Index 237
Preface
This book marks the convergence of two factors—one experiential, one
intellectual.
During the second half of 1969 and throughout much of 1970, I was
stationed in Pleiku, South Vietnam, where I served in the US Army as an
information specialist. My task during that period was to cover the mili-
tary activities of the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, throughout the
Central Highlands. Because of my responsibilities, I was exposed daily to a
wide range of military decisions made by low- to mid-level officers, ranging
from the first lieutenant to the lieutenant colonel. Their decisions were often
based on information gathered by the squadron’s intelligence section (S2).
From the first S2 meeting that I was authorized to attend, about a month
after I had arrived at my base camp, I became fascinated with the way mili-
tary officers derived conclusions and planned operations. Time and again,
before I accompanied one of the squadron’s troops to the field, I would ask a
lieutenant, a captain, a major, or a lieutenant colonel to tell me what it was
about the information he had been given that led him to the conclusions he
had inferred. I was frequently struck by the absence of a clear connection
between the available intelligence and the interpretations that the officers
derived from it. This fascination never left me.
When I started graduate school at Stanford, I was fortunate to have as my
advisor Alexander L. George, who helped me transform my interest into a
dissertation. Since then, I have written a number of books that deal with the
process of foreign policy decision-making.
My central academic curiosity has dictated aspects of my teaching inter-
ests. Through the years I have come to realize that to be an effective teacher in
a US foreign policy decision-making course, one must fulfill two broad goals.
One must first instill in students the principle that before they try to unravel
how a foreign policy was formulated, they must understand the history that
preceded it. With that knowledge as their foundation, students must then
decipher the mindsets that dominated the thinking processes of Washington’s
x ● Preface
leading political figures as the foreign policy was being designed; compre-
hend the cognitive system of the president; examine the manner in which he
(or she, in the future) interpreted intelligence; ascertain the type of advisory
system he relied on; and determine whether he considered a wide range of
options before making his final decision.
So after years of telling myself that one day I would write a book in which
I would apply multiple foreign policy decision-making theories to a series of
cases, I decided to take the plunge. Aware that I would face a monumental
task, I asked some of my best students in my US Foreign Policy Decision-
Making classes whether they would be willing to engage in a collaborative
project with me. Every student whom I asked agreed enthusiastically. My
collaborators in this book are Joanna Gillia, Caitlyn Turgeon, Marina Sachs,
Benedikt Gottwald, and Aditya Harnal.
At the end of every single acknowledgment that I have written through
the years, I have expressed my gratitude to Barbara Peurifoy, my mother-
in-law. Once again, I must thank her. Her strict grammatical standards and
demand for clarity have helped me immensely, both in the classroom and in
my struggles to put my thoughts on paper. No son-in-law could ever expect
to have a kinder and more supportive mother-in-law than Barbara. However,
final responsibility for the structure and content of every chapter throughout
this book and for whatever errors that may remain is mine alone.
InTroDUCTIon
Alternative Theoretical Perspectives
Introduction
The analysis of the foreign policies of the United States since the start of the
Second World War reveals the behavior of a powerful but fallible international
actor. It exposes an entity that, despite its extraordinary material capabilities,
often failed to comprehend the nature of the forces besetting the international
system or to anticipate the actions of rivals. It shows an actor that too often
allowed a rigid mindset to dictate its interpretations of the international chal-
lenges it faced and that from time to time reacted to crises without thoroughly
assessing the information at its disposal. It reveals a state that sometimes chose
a response without systematically comparing it with other possible alternatives
and without considering carefully the consequences such a response might gen-
erate. However, the analysis also unveils an international player that, in quite a
few instances, paused long enough to define the problems it faced, to unravel
the mixed signals emitted by the incomplete information generated by its intel-
ligence agencies, to weigh a range of options, and to select the policy that, in
addition to having the greatest chance of maximizing its most wanted goals,
would generate the fewest number of unwanted consequences.
The circumstances that led the United States to act in such varied ways have
been studied extensively. Foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) analysts
have long argued that the interests of the United States, whether strategic,
political, or economic, do not automatically impose themselves as objective
data upon foreign policy decision-makers who, as suggested by Hans Mor-
genthau, use their rational faculties to design foreign policy. US foreign policy
decision-makers facing the same international challenge sometimes disagree
as to how the problem should be defined and how the available information
should be interpreted. They do not always concur as to what objectives they
think the United States ought to strive for or how different values should be
ranked. And lastly, US foreign policy decision-makers quite often are at odds
with one another as to which alternatives they should evaluate and which
2 ● US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Truman to Kennedy
option they should select. In short, US FPDM is a complicated process com-
posed of several interrelated but distinct stages. Each stage demands scrutiny.
Throughout this book we attempt to fulfill multiple objectives. Our first
goal is to describe the different FPDM processes generated by various presi-
dents. Our second objective is to gauge the explanatory value and theoretical
applicability of some of the leading FPDM models presently being proposed
and used by analysts. Our third aim is to incorporate into the models, when-
ever applicable, two factors that in our estimation will improve measurably
their explanatory value: the first component is the president’s cognitive sys-
tem; the second component is the mindsets that dominate the thought pro-
cess of the president and of Washington’s leading political figures at the time
a foreign policy is being designed. Our fourth objective is to assess the quality
of the FPDM processes designed by the different presidents. Our last goal is
to introduce, or in some cases merely reacquaint readers with, some of the
core foreign policies that have placed the United States at the forefront of
world affairs.
In this volume we analyze three presidents and their handling of two cases
each. They include the following:
1. Harry Truman’s July 1945 decision to authorize the use of a nuclear
bomb against Japan.
2. Harry Truman’s 1950 decisions to aid South Korea militarily after it
had been attacked by North Korea, and then to authorize General
Douglas MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel to unify both Koreas
under the leadership of a regime friendly to the United States.
3. Dwight Eisenhower’s 1954 decision to authorize the CIA to attempt to
topple the Guatemalan government covertly.
4. Dwight Eisenhower’s decisions during the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis.
5. John F. Kennedy’s 1961 decision to authorize the CIA to attempt to
topple the Cuban government covertly.
6. John F. Kennedy’s decisions during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
The Study of Foreign Policy Decision-Making
The assumption that presidents and their advisors behave rationally domi-
nated the early attempts to infuse explanations of US FPDM with a theo-
retical perspective. The paths analysts took differed. Under the realist rubric,
scholars claimed that political leaders have as their most valued objective the
protection or augmentation of the power of the state. Hans Morgenthau
referred to the connection between power and rationality when he noted that
to give meaning to the raw material of foreign policy (i.e., power), political