U.S. capability to monitor compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention : report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, together with additional views.

146 Pages·1994·4.4 MB·English

by  United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence.

103dCongress Report
SENATE
2dSession 103-390
U.S. CAPABILITY TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH
THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
September 30 (legislative day, September 12), 1994.—Ordered to be
printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-010 WASHINGTON : 1994
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
DENNIS DeCONCINI, Arizona, Chairman
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, Ohio ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, NewYork
JOHN GLENN, Ohio JOHN C. DANFORTH, Missouri
J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska SLADE GORTON, Washington
RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
BOB GRAHAM, Florida TED STEVENS, Alaska
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
MAX BAUCUS, Montana MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, Louisiana
GEORGE J. MITCHELL, Maine, Ex Officio
BOB DOLE, Kansas, Ex Officio
Norman K. Bradley, Jr., StaffDirector
Judith A. Ansley, Minority StaffDirector
L. Britt Snider, General Counsel
Kathleen P. McGhee, ChiefClerk
(ID
CONTENTS
Page
Introduction 1
A. Background 1
B. Thescopeofthe Committee'seffort 2
C. Thenatureofthisreport 3
I. Implicationsofthe CWC textformonitoringandverification 4
A. Basicprovisions 4
B. CWC provisions thatcouldleadtoverificationorcompliance problems 5
C. TheCWC amendmentprocess 12
II. U.S. Monitoringcapabilities 13
A. Overallmonitoringevaluations 13
B. Verifying data declarations and monitoring CW destruction and con-
versionrequirements 15
CW
C. Detectingprohibited production or acquisition of agents orprecur-
sors 18
D. Theroleofon-siteinspections 19
E. Monitoring compliance withthebanon CWuse 23
F. Theroleofenforcement 24
G. The specialcaseofrussiancompliance 26
III. APotIenmtpiraolvifonrgiUm.pSr.ovainndgOUP.SC.WmomnointiotroirnignganodfCveWriCficcaotmipolniance 3300
B. Supportingthe OPCWon-siteinspection process 34
TV. Issues Left to the Preparatory Commission and U.S.-Russian Negotia-
tions 35
A. Issueslefttothe PreparatoryCommission 35
B. IssueslefttoU.S.-RussianNegotiations 41
V. AIssuesofCWC implementation, securityandconfidentiality 46
Intrusivenessvs. secrecy 47
B. Provisionstoprotectclassifiedorproprietary information 48
C. Disclosureofclassifiedorproprietaryinformationin data declarations 51
D. Counterintelligence and securityconcernsinU.S.-RussianBDAinspec-
tions 53
E. Theadequacyofaccesslimitations 53
F. TheadequacyofU.S. Government assistance 56
G. Lesser protections: Rejecting proposed inspectors or frivolous inspec-
tionrequests 59
H. U.S. willingnessto deny accesstoinspectors 59
JI..RFeuanddiinnegssCoWfCU.Si.mpilnedmuesnttraytfioorntheCWC 6604
K. Thepotential securitycosts ofinspections 66
L. Indemnityforlosses 67
M. Forcedaccess toU.S. facilities andtheuse ofinformationso acquired . 67
Summary: Findings andrecommendations 71
AdditionalviewsofU.S. SenatorJohnGlenn 76
AdditionalviewsofSenatorJohnF. Kerry 79
Additionalviews ofSenatorMalcolmWallop 83
AppendixA. Keyprovisions ofthe ChemicalWeaponsConvention 85
AppendixB. Selectedquestions and answersfortherecord 87
(III)

103d Congress Report
| SENATE J
2d Session j 103-390
U.S. CAPABILITY TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
—
September30 (legislative day, September 12), 1994. Orderedtobeprinted
Mr. DeConcini, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
REPORT
INTRODUCTION
A. Background
On September 3, 1992, after some twenty-five years of negotia-
tions, members of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva con-
cluded the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro-
duction, Sto—ckpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction more commonly known as the Chemical Weapons
Convention, or CWC. This convention was endorsed by the United
Nations on November 30, 1992, and was opened for signature in
Paris on January 13, 1993. The United States and 129 other coun-
tries signed the CWC in that month, and a total of 157 countries
have signed it to date.
The conclusion and signing ofthe CWC were achieved during the
administration of President George Bush. On November 23, 1993,
President Clinton endorsed the Convention and formally submitted
it to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The delay
in submitting the CWC to the Senate was consistent with the in-
tent of the drafters, who built into the Convention a minimum 2-
year delay between its opening for signature and its entry into
force. This period is to be used by States Parties to prepare for im-
plementation of the verification regime and to pass implementing
legislation to facilitate that regime and criminalize violations ofthe
Convention. It is also being used by the Preparatory Commission
in the Hague to prepare for initial implementation and to reach
agreement on many technical provisions that were left to it by the
Conference on Disarmament. The CWC will enter into force 180
days after the 65th instrument of ratification is deposited at The
Hague. To date, 14 countries have ratified the Convention, another
34 have indicated that they will ratify it by January, and 29 others
are actively pursuing ratification. Additional countries are report-
edly waiting for the United States to ratify the Convention before
they take action.
The CWC is accompanied by an Annex on Chemicals, a lengthy
Annex on Implementation and Verification (known as the "Verifica-
tion Annex"), an Annex on the Protection of Confidential Informa-
tion, a Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the
Organization for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons (OPCW) and
a Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission. Article
CWC
XVII of the states that "[t]he Annexes form an integral part
of this Convention. Any reference to this Convention includes the
Annexes." The Annexes, as well as the Convention itself, are thus
before the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The Pre-
paratory Commission documents, by contrast, were adopted by the
Conference on Disarmament and do not require ratification.
B. The scope ofthe Committee's effort
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has formal responsibil-
ity for reviewing all treaties before they are acted upon by the full
Senate. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has prepared
this Report, in both classified and public versions, to support the
ratification process by providing both the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee and the Senate as a whole the Intelligence Committee's as-
sessment ofthe monitoring and counterintelligence issues raised by
this Convention.
This Report is the culmination of the Committee's work over
many years ofmonitoring the progress ofthe CWC negotiations. In
its annual Intelligence Authorization Acts, the Committee has also
addressed and supported CWC monitoring capabilities, as well as
the broader U.S. capability to monitor other countries' development
and use ofchemical weapons. The Committee has been particularly
supportive of interagency coordination and cooperation to develop
new monitoring technologies and to generate effective U.S. policy
and action to halt the proliferation of all weapons ofmass destruc-
tion.
In preparation of Senate consideration of the CWC, Committee
staff held two on-the-record staffbriefings (and several less formal
sessions) and reviewed numerous documents, including a National
Intelligence Estimate on U.S. monitoring capabilities, written
statements from several Executive branch agencies, and the Execu-
tive branch responses to over 130 questions for the record. Commit-
tee staff also visited U.S. Government and industry facilities and
attended conferences to gain a more detailed knowledge of how in-
formation bearing upon other countries' compliance with CWC can
be obtained, especially through on-site inspections.
On May 17, 1994, the Committee held a closed hearing on the
CWC, focused on issues relating to monitoring and verification of
compliance, the implications of any successful evasion of CWC pro-
visions by States Parties, CWC implementation, and the Conven-
tion's counterintelligence and security implications. Testimony was.
taken at this hearing from the Honorable John D. Holum, Director
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Ambassador
Stephen J. Ledogar, U.S. Representative to the Conference on Dis-
armament; Major General David Mcllvoy, Deputy 1-5 (Director for
Strategic Plans and Policy) for International Negotiations, the
Joint Staff; Mr. John Lauder, Special Assistant to the Director of
Central Intelligence for Arms Control; Major General John Landry,
USA, National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces; Dr.
Theodore M. Prociv, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Atomic Energy) (Chemical/Biological Matters); and the Honorable
William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Ad-
ministration. A written statement was submitted by Brigadier Gen-
eral Gregory G. Govan, USA, Director of the Department of De-
fense On-Site Inspection Agency.
C. The nature ofthis Report
Part I of this Report is structural and legal, dealing with the
CWC text and its implications for verification and possible compli-
ance disputes. Part II examines U.S. capabilities to monitor the
various CWC provisions, and some cheating scenarios that might,
in fact, be feasible. Parts III and IV deal with two elements of un-
certainty: improvements in U.S. monitoring and verification that
could be achieved through new technological developments or U.S.
cooperation with the OPCW in on-site inspections; and CWC provi-
sions that are subject to technical elaboration by the Preparatory
Commission of the OPCW or to bilateral U.S.-Russian agreement.
Part V deals with U.S. preparedness to implement the verification
provisions ofthe CWC (primarily the on-site inspection regime) and
the legal and security challenges posed by international inspection
not only of U.S. Government sites, but also of both defense and
non-defense industry.
Throughout the Committee's efforts, experts in the U.S. Govern-
ment have been generous with their time and insight. In addition,
the Henry L. Stimson Center and other organizations have made
available to the staff of several Senate committees an impressive
array of experts from the U.S. Government, the Provisional Tech-
nical Secretariat of the OPCW, U.S. industry and the academic
community. These have all made a valuable contribution to the
Committee's work.
The Report of the Committee draws heavily on three works that
deserve recognition. The Intelligence Community's National Intel-
ligence Estimate was a straightforward analysis of the strengths
and limitations ofU.S. monitoring capabilities. The U.S. Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), in accordance with Section
37 ofthe Arms Control and Disarmament Act, submitted an inter-
agency report of March 18, 1994, on "Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion Verification," a similarly straightforward analysis that did not
quarrel with the findings of the Intelligence Community. ACDA
also attached to that report a "Chemical Weapons Convention Ver-
iflability Assessment" of January 18, 1994, prepared for it by the
EAI Corporation and written by people with many years ofrelevant
experience in ACDA, the Department of the Army, academe and
U.S. industry. These studies and various internal Executive branch
documents were of invaluable assistance to the Committee in un-
derstanding complex CWC issues and evaluating the promise and
risk inherent in ratification ofthe Convention.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CWC TEXT FOR MONITORING AND
I.
VERIFICATION
Like most recent arms control agreements, the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention (CWC) is lengthy and complex. Counting its three
annexes, the document runs to 186 pages. A novel complication is
that, pursuant to Articles XV and XXII, the 48-page Convention
text may be amended only by consensus and is not subject to res-
ervations. (The CWC's annexes will be subject to both amendments
and technical changes, as well as to reservations not "incompatible
with its object and purpose.")
A. Basicprovisions
CWC
Most of the obligations incurred by States Parties to the
are listed in Article I of the Convention, entitled General Obliga-
tions:
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes
never under any circumstances:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire,
stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer,
directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to
use chemical weapons; and
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way,
anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a
State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical
weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in
any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accord-
ance with the provisions ofthis Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemi-
cal weapons it abandoned on the territory of another
State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention.
4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any
chemical weapons production facilities it owns or pos-
sesses, or that are located in any place under its juris-
diction or control, in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention.
5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot con-
trol agents as a method ofwarfare.
Aside from these general obligations, each State Party
undertakes:
to submit declarations regarding its chemical weap-
ons and CW-related facilities (pursuant to Article III);
to permit on-site inspection ofits chemical weapons,
CW
facilities (including destruction facilities) and sus-
pect facilities (pursuant to paragraphs 3-5 of Article
IV and various provisions in Articles V and IX);
to enact legislation penalizing "any activity prohib-
ited to a State Party under this Convention" (pursuant
to paragraph 1 ofArticle VII); and