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US Army Special Warfare. Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952 PDF

227 Pages·2012·12.86 MB·English
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ed . PdocJr ~Af [ Tis obcueenn thoap roeE I~ ~ ~ ~ t ~p u1c9.e~e 82n4~s l; E 1o disdobuet is nappedd 82 08 27 004 US ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE Its Origins ,I. US ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE Its Origins Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952 by Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. Accession For NTIS GRA&I DTIC TAB 1 Unannounced E Just ifi cat jo 1982By- Di st ri.but ion/_ Availability Codes Avail andjor S Dist spocial DI r#6 4 National Defense University Press Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other Government agency or private organization. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. The final manuscript of this book was copyedited under contract by SSR, Inc., Washington, DC. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 82-600513 This book is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US Govern- ment Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402. Facsimile copies may be purchased from the following agencies: Registered users should contact the Defense Technical Information Center, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Vir- ginia 22314. The general public should contact the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia, 22161. p-------------------- CONTENTS' FOREW ORD .............................................. ix PREFACE ................................................ xi THE AUTHOR ........................................... xiii CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION .............................. 1 11. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR ................................. 5 The Coordinator of Information ................. 5 OSS and OW l ............................... 7 The Army's Psychological Warfare Branch ....... 8 Dissolution of the Psychological Warfare Branch .................................... 10 Theater Psychological Warfare .................. 12 The Propaganda Branch, G-2 ................... 15 A ppraisal .................................... 19 M. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD W AR II : . .............................. .. 23 OSS and Unconventional Warfare ............... 24 OSS and the Army........................ 25 Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines ............ 29 Attitudes Toward Unconventional Warfare ....... 30 Dissolution of OSS ............................ 34 Appraisal .................................... 34 Vl ii CONTENTS IV. THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART I: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. ................ 59 Creation of the CIA ........................... 40 Army Demobilization .......................... 42 Psywar to Plans and Operations Division ......... 44 Eisenhower and McClure ...................... 46 The Army's Reaction to NSC-4 ................. 52 The Carroll Report ............................ 60 Gordon Gray-Revival of Interest ............... 62 "Only a Start": Prelude to Korea ................ 66 I V. THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART II: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ............... 69 The Airborne Reconnaissance Units ............. 69 JCS and NSC Activities ....................... 72 The Office of Policy Coordination ............... 75 Army Assistance to OPC. ...................... 77 The Joint Subsidiary Plans Division .............. 78 The Army and Uno-ventional Warfare Prior to Korea ..................................... 79 VI. XOREA AND THE QFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ;................ 83 Impetus for a Psywar Division at Department of the Arm y .................................. 83 Creation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare ....................... 88 OCPW and Psychological Warfare in Korea ...... 90 OCPW and Unconventional Warfare in Korea .... 100 VII. THE ROAD TO FORT BRAGGr. ............... II1 Psywar in Europe ........................ 111 Psychological Warfare Activities in the United States ..................................... 1 15 The Special Forces Ranger Regiment ............ 118 The Road to Fort Bragg ....................... 129 / I CONTENTS Yi VIII. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CENTER AND THE ORIGINS OF SPECIAL W ARFARE t.... ................................ 143 Organization of the Center ..................... 144 The 10th Special Forces Group ................. 147 IX. SUMMING UP ................................ 155 NOTES ................................................... 161 SOURCES ................................................ 203 GLOSSARY. ...................................... 211 IN D EX ................................................... 213 I I FOREWORD It has been said that the future can only be approached clearly and wisely if the path leading to the present is known. In assessing national security policy choices, decisionmakers often do not have available the clarifying perspective provided by history. Recognizing this problem, the National Defense University has encouraged selected history-oriented re- search to complement our other topical publications on national security issues. This first volume in our new Military History Series is by Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USA, on the origins of the US Army's special warfare capability. As the most senior of our military services, the Army has undergone many organizational and doctrinal changes since its inception as a small militia force in 1775. But the year 1945 marked the beginning of an era of dramatic change. The new global realities of the post-World War II period suggested the need for an Army able to respond to a spectrum of conflicts. This led to the building of a "special warfare" capability encompassing psychological and unconventional warfare as a response to military chal- lenges at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Colonel Paddock traces the origins of Army special warfare from 1941 to 1952, the year the Army's special warfare center was established. While the Army had experience in psychological warfare, the major recent US experience in unconventional warfare had been in the Office of Strategic Services, a civilian agency, during World War II. Many Army leaders, trained and experienced in conventional warfare, hesitantly accepted psy- chological warfare as a legitimate weapon in the Army's wartime arsenal, but questioned the validity and appropriateness of the Army's adoption of unconventional operations. The continuing tensions of the cold war and hostilities in Korea resolved the ambivalence in favor of coordinating in a single operation the techniques of both types of warfare. k PRIi,,G FAC _ L_ _ x FOREWORD Colonel Paddock's extensively documented work traces a portion of a brief episode in our Nation's military history, but an instructive one. For the historian and military scholar, it provides the necessary backdrop for understanding the subsequent evolution of the Army's special warfare capability. For the national security policymaker, it suggests the value of the innovative impulse and the need for receptivity to new ideas and adapt- ability to change. Thus, this new NDU Press Military History Series will aid us look forward to effect change by reminding us of the lessons of past military efforts. JOHN S. PUSTAY Liaeteat General, USAF PM.t | ,i~ I'I PREFACE The original intent of this study was to analyze how the US Army, which was developed to fight conventional wars, attempted to cope with the demands of low-intensity warfare after World War II. The primary focus for the investigation was to be the evolution of the Army's John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from its inception in the early 1950's through the Vietnam years. I still intend, as a future project, to accomplish that original goal. My preliminary research, however, revealed that the story of how and why the Army decided to undertake such a quest in the first place has not been adequately told. This study is intended to fill that void in our military history. Specifically, it examines the Army's activities in psychological and unconventional war- fare during and after World War II to determine the impetus for, and origins of, the formal "special warfare" capability created in 1952 with the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center (later the Center for Military Assistance). An understanding of these historical roots should provide a more enlightened perspective from which to assess the sub- sequent evolution of "special warfare" in the Army. I am indebted to Professor I. B. Holley of Duke University for first suggesting this topic and for his constructive advice. The comments and insights provided on the outline and manuscript by my mentor, Professor Theodore Ropp of Duke, were invaluable. The long talks with Professor John K. Mahon, University of Florida, during his year with the US Army Military History Institute, were most appreciated, as were the comments on the manuscript by Professor Harold Deutsch of the Army War College faculty. For their expert, willing assistance during my research, I am particularly indebted to William Cunliffe and Ed Reese of the National Archives, Miss Hannah Zeidlik of the US Army Center of Military His- tory, Miss Joyce Eakin and Dr. Richard Sommers of the Military History Institute, and Mrs. Beverly Lindsey of the John F. Kennedy Center for Militaiy Assistance. My sincere gratitude goes to my wife, Theresa, for her Ao lX

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Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USA, on the origins of the US Army's special warfare capability. psychological and unconventional warfare as a response to military chal- lenges at the lower end of the conflict forced Roosevelt to tell Donovan that he "would wait out the storm and submit the proposal at a
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