US Army Infantry Divisions 1944–45

100 Pages·2007·13.8 MB·English

by  John Sayen

US Army Infantry
Divisions 1944-45
. ..
. I I
JOHNSAYENretiredin
August2002from30years'
activeandreserveservice
withtheUnitedStatesMarine
Corps.Duringthattimehe
servedwithartillery,armor,
andmilitaryintelligence.
Heispresentlyengagedas
acontractciviliananalyst
fortheMarineCorps.He
graduatedfromtheCitadel
in1974.Hehaspreviously
publishedamilitary-historical
magazine,The Tactical
Notebook,andforOsprey
haswri«enBa«leOrders17:
USArmyInfantryDivisions
1942-43.
Battle Orders • 24
US ArTIlY Infantry
Divisions 1944-45
John Sayen
Consultont Ed,torDrDuncanAnderson· Senes editors Marcus Cowperand Nikolai Bogdanovlc
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Unlessotherwiseindicated.thephotographicimagesthatappear
IseN918I8160J 1199
inthisworkarefrom the USArmySignal Corpscollection.Inthe
E<l~"",1b7u.,.1'l;l)I;.........O><lotd.UK(www.;I;oopubli......s.com) treediagramsand mapsinthisvolume,theunitsandmovements
0Wp>:8ounIord.<om ofnatiOllalforces aredepictedin thefollowingcolors:
Ir><Ie."I'AlIoonWof"<hin&ton USArmyuniu OliveDrab
0nIi""ed"I'U"'tC'dGnphi<.PteLtd.Si"la!'O'C German uniu Grey
Tn-<'''Mono<TPeGil\.>no..-.lITeStoneSoril BritishfCanadianuniu ElI"own
Japanese units Red
08 09 10 II 12 II 10 , 8 1 • S 4 J 2
Key to military symbols ,
xxx xxx xx x '" " •••
D D D D D D D D
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x"" C""" D"iSic.o Bng.de R.egiment ElatuHon Com~nyl
•• • b.ttery/troop
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Section Squ.d Inf.ntry C.v.lry Artillery Aotiunk Anti;oi",...ft Ammunition
rn
I I I I
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ADMIN CDMM CHAP CMND
Admioi"...tion Airborne "'"d CombatEngineer Communi<ations C>~ Cho.plain Command
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RADIO STAFF
Quartermaner R<odio Recon""i«.nce Sign.1 Supply Service So, So"",
00 [}] I I I I
WPNS I7H5OMWM I 110H5OMWMI 15H5OMWM Key to unit identification
Motor Telephone.nd We.pons 75mm 105mm IS5mm Unlt~pafent
t...nsport ,elegnph Howiuer Howitzer Howitzer IlIenliller unl!
When~rC'I.re""",_below""nc;>rtto""".ymboI$..tI>~boo!<.<henumbersreIeo-'0<hepenenncI'lref!¢' Commandef
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Contents
Introduction 4
Combat mission and preparation for war 5
Unit organization 10
Theriflesquad•Theinbntry~wlion•Thedivisionartillery
Thecot'l'lbatengineerbuulion•Othet'divisioNl uniu
Tactics 28
Inbntryactial6oc:trine •WuponspbtoonliandcOlTlpMlies•Inbntryrepmentannonandantiw*c~
Thedivisionartillery'Combatengineers•Tank$andantialnkwpport
Command, control, communications, and intelligence 38
Cornnundandconuol •Communiationequipment
CommuniationuchitKwre•Inte4literKe
Logistics 47
Infantrylogistics·ArtiUeryIogistiu•Medial u-e:llmentandevKuaDon
Quv-terrnaster,orOrnonc:i!.;ln<!engineerIopstic:al(unctions
Combat operations 54
IstInfantryDivision(Reinfon:ed).Omaha8e...ch,June6. 19+4
28th InbnuyDivision intheArdennes,DKember 16-19.19+4
6thand 25th Infantrydivisions in thePhilippine".February 1-6.1945
Lessons learned 74
Bibliography 75
Publishedbook$•Articleli In periodicals'Websites
Appendix 77
Tablesof0'lan,ution •USinbnrrydivisions.compositionandcombatrecords
Index 95
Introduction
Thi book, the second of two volume on the Army' 66 World War II
infantry divisions,I cover their history and development from the beginning
of1944 until the end ofthe war. It was during this period, and especiallyafter
the ormandy landings, that most divisionsentered combat. Bytheend of
1943 the defeatof theAxi powers had becomealmost inevitable,even though
the toughest fighting still layahead. In combat, the infantrydivi ion proved,
as before, to be the 010 t u eful and versatile fighting arm. Airborne and
Partofamortarplatoon equipped armored divisionswerede igned for use inonlya limited numberofsituation,
with the standard MI81mm mOrtar
but infantry divisions, when appropriately reinforced, could give an excellent
firingon the outskirtsofStolberg.
a count of themselves against any foe, in any terrain, and in any part of the
Germany.September 19. 1944.
Judgingfrom thenumberofempty world. The 19 infantry divi ion that deploy d to th tropi al i land of the
ammunition cylindersthis platoon Pa ifi Theater w re a effective and us ful a th 42 that fought in the plain
seems to have doneagood deal of and fore ts of France or the eight (of which three later went to France) that
shootingalready.Alicensed version erved in the mountains of Italy.
ofaFrench design.the MImortar
everthele , the infantry divisions were heavy on um rs of scarce
weighed 136lb..could becarried by
manpower, rubber, gasoline, and other preciou re our e .
three men.and couldfire its6.87 lb.
high-explosive projectilesoutto
3,300yards. IThefirstvolumeisBattleOrders17.USArmy'ttramryDivisions1942-43.
4
• •
Combat mission and preparation
for war
Thestoryofthe wartimedevelopmentofthe infantrydivi ions in the US Army
really began in March 1942, when Lieutenant eneral Leslie J. Mc air took
command of the newly created Army Ground For e (AGF). The AGF owed it
existence to the influence ofthe Army ir Corps (AAC), whi h had au ed the
War Departmentto pia eall Army units notdeployed incombattheaters under
separate commands for ground (AGF), air (AAF), and rvi for e ( SF). The
new commandsassum d all the responsibilitie ofthe existing er ice branches
fortraining, organization, and doctrine. Bygroupingallairunit underthe F,
the AA would bring itselfastep closer to becomingan independent ervice.
Mc air had been involved in organizational matters since World War I. A a
colonel, he had b en th hiefofstaffofthe 2d Infantry Divi ion when it fi Id
tested the prototype triangular divi ion in 1936-37. Based on the xp ri nce
gained from the e test, in March 1938 Mc air propo ed that th War
Department ad pt a very au tere division of 10,275 troops. Although the War
Department largely accepted his recommendations it permitted a eri of
individually small but cumulatively large manpower increases, which byJune
of 194] raised the strength of an infantry divi ion to 15,245. The organization
table fortheApril 1, 1942division (di cu ed indetail in BattleOrders17)added
elf-propelled artillery, more and heavier trucks, and 49 moreantitankguns, but
only 269 more men. Mc air had taken over the A Fonlya month before this,
too late to affect the War Departmentdeci ion to adopt the new tables.
McNairwasoneofthefew seniorAmericanofficer in 1942who understo d
the need to economize on both manpower (de pite the draft) and equipment
(despite indu trial mobilization). In World War Ithe War Departmentdesigned
Japanese-American troopsof
the IOOth Infantry Battalion,then
servingas IstBattalion,442nd
Infantry,attached tothe 34th
Infantry Division,line up on both
sidesofastreetincentralLivorno.
Italy.July 19.1944. 5
USAInfantryDivision,March I,1943
693-47-12,672
II
xx HQ& xx
HQCo
33-8-01 3-0-158' 7-4-215 6-0-147 37-2-430
9tJucks,14Jeeps 34tJucks,22jeeps 13M8armo<edcars 31trucks
IS-passengersedan 4.50-calMGsM2 3M3Alh-trackswfarm 30ambulances
4.SOocalMGsM2,10bazookas 5bazookas,55SMGs 12'fz-1ootrucI<,241eeps 9jeeps
9GOmmmortars
6.5O-calMGsM2
6.3O-caILMGs
I-;p-l 6bazookas,22SMGs
Ord11 a
Mol
0·2-56 9-0-143 9-1·137 3-0-70 II
56caltllnes 52tJucks(482'/2-100 19tJucks,7Jeeps 3'f.·1ootJucks m
truckswith1-100trailers 3wreckers 15jeeps III
torsupplyoperations) 5bazookas ~
29-3-632 134·9-1,861
6jeeps,4bazookas 4.50-ca1MGsM2
3tractorswfangledozers
12.50-calMGsM2 12SMGs
67tJucks,16jeeps
141-6-2,941 12.SOocalMGs
18.30-calHMGs
29baZOOkas
13SMGs
I
12-1-98
3.so-calMGsM2
6bazookas
2liaisonaircraft
HQ&
HOCo III SVC CHAP 16lrucks,4leeps
16-2-176 10-4-98 7-0-110> 12-0-103
Inc/udlnllth,.., 291'1,-lontJucks CompanyHOand 32-0-818 1truck,7Jeeps II
6lOcSamnnmonMp3lahloowonitszers w2no'f.1·-I1o0n0ttJruacilkesrs fou1r4a'nf.t-/tIaonnktpJulactkosons CHAP ~~
101'I2-IOntJucks 6jeeps 6leeps
wf41-lontrailers 8.50-calMGsM2 1237mmATguns 8-0-47
1'f.-Iootruck 10bazookas 1.SOocalMGM2 5'f.-tontrucks 29-2-429
12M2AllOSmm
24leeps 4.30-caILMG
howitters
4.50-calMGsM2
19.50-calMGsM2
11bazookas
40bazookas
2liaisonaircraft
62trucks
Notes HO&F==t 21jeeps
Sources:TO2·27.5·15,6'10,7-11.S·15,9-S,10·17and11-7(al/ HQCo~ WPNS
Marct1'.1943)piUStableinGreenfielde1atTheOrganizalion01Ground
CombatTroops(Washington,DC1947),pp274-5. 9-103 5-157
Altunitstrengtl1sincJlIdeanachedmedicatandchaptains. 21'/2-100truckswflI-Iontrailer 6-186 71'f,-lontJucks
1Thecorrectpersonnelandequtpmentstrengtl1s01thedivisionHO 4'f.·1ootrucks,7jeeps 11'/2-100truck 1'f.-tontruck
andHOcompanyarenotknow.TIleliguresS/IOwrlarees~'mates 337mmATguns 360mmmortars 5JeePS
basedonthebestavailabledata.EnlistedpersonnetWOffdngat 1.so-calMGsM2 1.SOocalMGM2 681mmmortars
divisionHOareincludedinthedivisionHOcompany. 3.30-callMGs 2.30-caILMGs 3.50-calMGsM2
2Anewantilsnkcompanywithnine57mmguns(inthreeplatoons) 8bazookas 3bazookas 8.30-calHMGs
wasautl10rizedinMay1943. 9BARs 7bazookas
its divisions as if there would be no limit on the manpower and material
available to them. Con equently it could send only 42 divi ions to France
beforetheArmistice, and itstill had tostripsomeofthese ofmo toftheirmen
in order to fill out the others. For the new war the War Departmente timated
that it would need at least 100 divi ion by the end of 1943, de pite the
likelihood ofmuch largerdiver ionsof manpower into naval and air force.
lthough the United tate wa to become the "Arsenal of Democracy" it
needed time before the output of its indu try could match the needs of the
troops.The United tateswa al 0 exportinglargeamount ofequipmentto its
allie. hortages of trategic material, e pecially teel, rubber, and gasoline,
placed further constraint on the equipment available. The bigge t constraint
ofall, however, wa that no U division would beofanyvalueto the wareffort
unle s it could be shipped overseas- but to do that required cargo ship, and
6 there were never enough of them. Mo t divisions waited year for their
USAInfantryDivision,July IS,1943 xx
~
737-44-13,4n
I
I I o1 I
E8
Special
Troops
38-8-{l' 38-7-890 5-{l-149 35-2-429
... 13M8armoredcars 31trucks
I I I I 3M3A1h-trackswloarm 30ambulances
1='1 OI.F=I=l o ~ 12'/92-610omnmtrumcko,rt2a3rsjeeps 9jeeps
HOCoL-.j 3.50-calMGsM2
13.30-caILMGs
2-0-]2 4-0-209' 3-{l-70 7-4-215 5bazool<as,30SMGs
13/.-tontruck(C&R) 14trucks,16jeeps 331.-10ntrucks 36trucks,19jeeps
1jeepwltraiier 1s-passengersedan ISleeps 6.50-calMGsM2 I I
8carbines 357mmATguns Sbazookas G
1pistol 3.50-oalMGs 32SMGs
6bazooka.
I I 1 1 138-9-2,072 29-3-&2
Irr1ol Ordl1rr:1"l EE 3162MM21A11515llm5mmmtolwOeWdedhohwoiwtzlelzresrs 3tr6a7ctlorursckws/,a1n6gljeedeopzsers
MnlL.::..J 10liaisonaircran 12.50-calMGs
360trucks,86jeeps 18.:JO.calHMGs
560c-a2r-b5i6nes 5130-t0ru-1c8k3s 19tru9c-k1s-1,377jeeps 1313.--lo{ln-1t3ru'ck ~III 8916.56Ob-caazloMokGassM2 29bazookas,16SMGs
(482'/>-lontrucks 3wreckers
wltll1-tontrailers Sbazookas
,..supplyoperabons) 5.50-calMGsM2
6jeeps.5bazookas 12SMGs 139-5-2.974
13.50-calMGsM2 6105mmM3howitzers
75trucks,139jeeps
18S7mmATguns
1881mm&2760mmmortars
35.50-calMGsM2
24.30-ea1HMGs
18.:JO.calLMGs
Nares 81BARs
Source:TO1(July15,1943).AllunllstrenglhsInciurJeanachedmedicalandchaplains.
I IncllJllBs""IisledmembersaldMsiMHO.
2 1LTC(CCr,SpecIalTroopsandHOCQmmandan~, ICPT(AssislantHOCommandanQ,IMSGT(chiefcIerI<),1SSgI(I)()Iirallons),ISgl(duty),4Pvts(1(T-5)e/lap/3in'SassIslant2(IT-5)drivers.
Iorderly).
3IILT(c/llJpl.in).
4 IMAI(medicaQ.ICPT/ILT(1IonIal).,TSgI(medical),1Sgl(med;caQ.13Pvts(1(IT-3,IH 3T-5Jsurgicallechs(inciuding3airim""for/heReconTroop.ndIforIheSignalCompanyJ.
I(T-5Jdentalrech,2(IT-5Jmedical/echs.Ibasic).
shipping. Therefore, Mc air reasoned that an infantry division had to u e as
few men and strategic materialsas possibleand minimize the numberofcubic
feet itcould fit into. In the lightoftheseconsiderationsMcNairfound theApril
1942infantrydivision inex u ably extravagant.
McNair concluded that the only long-term solution wa to rewrite the
infantry division organization tables to make them as "lean" as possible. To
do this, he established the A F Reduction Board. The "no-men," as the Table I:Infantry division
member of the board came to be called, r viewed and modified all ground officerrank abbreviations
force tables oforganization to achieve reductions of lS percent in personnel (1942-43)
and 20 percent in motor vehicle, but without cutting combat effectiveness. Rank Abbr.
McNair personally participated in the work of the board and became the
Majorgeneral MG
biggest "no-man" of all, often saying "no" to his own "no-men." The "no
Brigadiergeneral BG
men" slashed the proportion oforderlies to officers, gaveas many light truck
drivers as possible additional duties such as working in the kitchens, and Colonel COL
eliminated "luxury" items. Company headquarters lost their tents and were Lieutenantcolonel LTC
allowed only one portable typewriter each. 0 chairs, safes, or tables were Major MAJ
allowed in any headquarter below division level. The "no-men" assigned all
Captain CPT
per onnel and equipment to pecific vehicles and permitted no "reserve ."
They also increased the use of trailers since these considerably extended Firstlieutenant ILT
the payload of the available trucks. Though leaVing all "offensive" weapons Second lieutenant 2LT
in place, they sla hed anything who e main function was to increase
Warrantofficer WO
elf-sufficiency in ecurity or supply. 7
In particular, Me air tried to di courage what he called "empire bUilding"
or the tendency of every arm and ervice to augment it elf a if it had to win
the war alone. An example wa the persistent demands by many divi ion
commander for their own tank, tank destroyer, antiaircraft, reconnaissan e,
and military police battalion 0 they could handleeverycontingency, not just
the ones most likely to occur. Ther was also the tendency, deeply rooted
in merican society, to encumber th military with omforts, onvenience,
gadget, t hni ian, "experts,"sp cial ervi e ,and mplexcommand-control
ystem. aturally, on e the e addition got tarted, they multiplied
exponentially. Forexample, ifonewanted to increa e the numberofdentists in
a divi ion one would al 0 have to increa e the number of dental technicians.
Denti t and t chnicians had to be fed and required more cooks. oaks,
denti t, and technician ne ded. truck and their driver and mechanics.
Cook, denti t , technicians, driver, and mechanic needed medical care and
that meant doctor, nur e, and medical technician. The cooks, dentists,
technicians, driver, mechanic, doctors, nurses, and so forth need d lothing
and that meantmorequarterma ter - andofcoursetheyall neededdental care,
which again in r a d the r quirement for denti t. cNair wa determined to
nipsu h xpansion in the bud.
The "no-men" uniformly ob erved certain principle. Fir t, for local air
d fense they replaced all Browning Automatic Rifle (6 Rs) out ide the rifle
quad with mailer numbers of much more effective M2 .SO-caliber machine
guns.Second, they repla edabout40 percentoftheantitankgunsin adivision
with large number' of the new 2.36in. antitank rocket launcher Ml or
"bazooka." eitherthebazooka nor mostofthe .SO-caliber machineguns had
Infantrymen crossablown-up
as igned gunner. ompany commander were expected to train a sufficient
bridgeover the MarneatMareuil
numb rofth ir men to operate the eweaponsasan additional duty. Third, in
sur-AyonAugust30. 1944.German
troops dynamited the bridge before addition to cutting the numb r of motor vehicles the "no-men" r placed
abandoningthe town. heaviervehicleswith lighterones. In the infantry regiments they used 1J/Hon
8