US Army Infantry Divisions 1944-45

100 Pages·2016·36.26 MB·English

US Army Infantry
Divisions 1944-45
JOHNSAYENretired in
August2002from30years'
activeandreserveservice
withtheUnitedStatesMarine
Corps.Duringthattimehe
servedwithartillery,armor,
andmilitaryintelligence.
Heispresentlyengagedas
acontractciviliananalyst
fortheMarineCorps.He
graduatedfromtheCitadel
in1974.Hehaspreviously
publishedamilitary-historical
magazine,The Tactical
Notebook,andforOsprey
haswrittenBattleOrders17:
USArmyInfantryDivisions
1942-43.
Battle Orders • 24
US ArlllY Infantry
Divisions 1944-45
John Sayen
Consultant Editor Dr Duncan Anderson • Series editors Marcus Cowperand Nikolai Bogdanovic
FirstpublishedinGreatBritainin2007byOspreyPublishing, ACIPcatalogrecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.
MidlandHouse,WestWay,Botley,OxfordOX2OHPUnitedKingdom
443ParkAvenueSouth,NewYork,NY 10016,USA ForacatalogofallbookspublishedbyOspreyMilitaryandAviationpleasecontact:
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©2007OspreyPublishingLtd. E-mail:[email protected]
Allrightsreserved.Apartfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofprivatestudy, OspreyDirectUK,P.O.Box140,Wellingborough,Northants,NN82FA,UK
research,criticismorreview,aspermittedundertheCopyright,DesignsandPatents E-mail:[email protected]
Act,1988,nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem, www.ospreypublishing.com
ortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,electrical,chemical,mechanical,
optical,photocopying,recordingorotherwise,withoutthepriorwrittenpermission Image credits and author's note
ofthecopyrightowner.InquiriesshouldbeaddressedtothePublishers.
Unlessotherwiseindicated,thephotographicimagesthatappear
ISBN978 I84603 I199
inthisworkarefrom the USArmySignal Corpscollection.Inthe
EditorialbylliosPublishing,Oxford,UK(www.iliospublishing.com) treediagramsand maps inthisvolume,the unitsand movements
Design:Bounford.com ofnationalforces aredepicted inthefollowingcolors:
IndexbyAlisonWorthington USArmyunits Olive Drab
OriginatedbyUnitedGraphicsPteLtd,Singapore German units Grey
TypesetinMonotypeGillSansandITCStoneSerif British/Canadian units Brown
Japanese units Red
08 09 I0 II I2 II I0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Keyto militarysymbols
xxx xxx xx X III II I •••
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Army Corps Division Brigade Regiment Battalion Company/ Platoon
•• • battery/troop
0 0 [Z] ~ 8 [ZS] 0 [Q]
Section Squad Infantry Cavalry Artillery Antitank Antiaircraft Ammunition
rn
U G 0 I I
IADMIN1 ICOMM 1 CHAP ICMND 1
Administration Airborne Band CombatEngineer Communications Canon Chaplain Command
[!J [BJ G [E] EJ ~ D
1DEMO 1
Construction Chemical Demolition Engineer Gliderinfantry Headquarters Headquarters Heavy
andService
~ ~ 0 8 EE 0 EJ
liNTEL 1
Heavymachine InfantryCannon Intelligence Liaison Lightmachine Medical MilitaryPolice Maintenance
gun gun
OJ @] EJ G 0 [5J ~
0
1 1
Mortar Mine Ordnance Operations Pioneer Personnel Paymaster Post
Ilral I I 0 LSJ Cd G I I I/KI
RADIO STAFF
Quartermaster Radio Reconnaissance Signal Supply Service Staff Survey
I
00 []] I
I WPNS 1 7H5OMWM 110H5OMWM1 I15H5OMWM1 Keyto unitidentification
Motor Telephoneand Weapons 7Smm IOSmm ISSmm ~
Unit Parent
transport telegraph Howitzer Howitzer Howitzer identifier unit
Wherefiguresareprovidedbelowornexttounitsymbolsinthisbook,thenumbersrefertothepersonnelstrength Commander
ofeachunit.Forexample,994-10--21,060 indicatestherewere994officers,10warrantofficersand21,060enlisted
men.Whereonlytwofiguresareprovided,forexample 72-1,608, theyindicatethenumberofofficersandenlisted (+)withaddedelements(-)lesselements
menonly(theunithadnowarrantofficers.)
Contents
Introduction 4
Combat mission and preparation for war 5
Unit organization 10
The riflesquad •The infantrybattalion •The divisionartillery
Thecombatengineerbattalion •Otherdivisional units
Tactics 28
Infantrytactical doctrine•Weapons platoonsand companies • Infantryregimentcannon andantitankcompanies
The division artillery•Combatengineers•Tanksandantitanksupport
Command, control, communications, and intelligence 38
Commandand control •Communication equipment
Communicationarchitecture• Intelligence
Logistics 47
Infantrylogistics•Artillerylogistics• Medicaltreatmentand evacuation
Quartermaster,ordnance,and engineerlogisticalfunctions
Combat operations 54
IstInfantryDivision (Reinforced),OmahaBeach,June6, 1944
28th InfantryDivision intheArdennes,December 16-19,1944
6thand 25th Infantrydivisionsinthe Philippines,February 1-6,1945
Lessons learned 74
Bibliography 75
Published books•Articles inperiodicals•Websites
Appendix 77
Tablesoforganization •USinfantrydivisions,composition and combatrecords
Index 95
Introduction
This book, the second of two volumes on the US Army's 66 World War II
infantry divisions,l covers their history and development from the beginning
of 1944until the end ofthe war. Itwas duringthisperiod, and especiallyafter
the Normandylandings, thatmostUS divisions enteredcombat. Bythe endof
1943thedefeatoftheAxispowershadbecomealmostinevitable, eventhough
the toughestfighting still layahead. In combat, the infantrydivisions proved,
as before, to be the most useful and versatile fighting arm. Airborne and
Partofamortarplatoon equipped armoreddivisionsweredesignedforuseinonlyalimitednumberofsituations,
withthe standard MI81mm mortar
but infantry divisions, when appropriately reinforced, could give an excellent
firing on the outskirtsofStolberg,
account of themselves against any foe, in any terrain, and in any part of the
Germany,September 19, 1944.
world. The 19 infantry divisions that deployed to the tropical islands of the
Judgingfrom the numberofempty
ammunition cylindersthis platoon PacificTheaterwere as effective and useful as the 42 that fought in the plains
seemsto have doneagood deal of and forests of France or the eight (of which three later went to France) that
shootingalready.A licensed version servedin the mountains ofItaly.
ofa French design,the M1mortar Nevertheless, the infantry divisions were heavy consumers of scarce
weighed 136lb.,could becarried by
manpower, rubber, gasoline, and other precious resources.
three men,and couldfire its 6.87lb.
high-explosive projectilesoutto
3,300yards. IThefirstvolumeisBattleOrders 17,USArmyInfantryDivisions1942-43.
4
• •
Combat mission and preparation
for war
Thestoryofthewartimedevelopmentoftheinfantrydivisionsin the USArmy
really began in March 1942, when Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair took
command ofthe newly created Army Ground Forces (AGF). The AGF owed its
existence to the influence ofthe ArmyAir Corps (AAC), which had caused the
WarDepartmenttoplaceallArmyunitsnotdeployedincombattheatersunder
separate commands for ground (AGF), air (AAF), and service forces (ASF). The
newcommandsassumedalltheresponsibilitiesofthe existingservicebranches
fortraining, organization, anddoctrine. BygroupingallairunitsundertheAAF,
the AACwouldbringitselfastep closerto becomingan independentservice.
McNair hadbeen involvedin organizational matters since World War I. As a
colonel, he hadbeenthe chiefofstaffofthe 2dInfantryDivisionwhen itfield
tested the prototype triangular division in 1936-37. Based on the experience
gained from these tests, in March 1938 McNair proposed that the War
Department adopt a very austere division of 10,275 troops. Although the War
Department largely accepted his recommendations it permitted a series of
individually small but cumulatively large manpower increases, which byJune
of 1941 raised the strength of an infantry division to 15,245. The organization
tablesfortheApril I, 1942division(discussedindetailinBattleOrders17)added
self-propelledartillery, moreandheaviertrucks, and 49 moreantitankguns, but
only269 more men. McNair had taken overthe AGF onlya monthbefore this,
toolateto affecttheWarDepartmentdecisionto adoptthe newtables.
McNairwasoneofthefewseniorAmericanofficersin 1942whounderstood
the need to economize on both manpower (despite the draft) and equipment
(despiteindustrialmobilization). InWorldWarItheWarDepartmentdesigned
Japanese-Americantroops of
the IOOth Infantry Battalion,then
servingas IstBattalion,442nd
Infantry,attachedtothe 34th
Infantry Division,line up on both
sidesofastreetin central Livorno,
Italy,July 19, 1944. 5
USAInfantryDivision,March I,1943
693-47-12,672
II
33-8-01 3-0-1581 7-4-215 6-0-147 37-2-430
9trucks,14jeeps 34trucks,22jeeps 13M8armoredcars 31trucks
15-passengersedan 4.50-calMGsM2 3M3A1h-tracksw/arm 30ambulances
4.50-calMGsM2,10bazookas 5bazookas,55SMGs 12112-tontruck,24jeeps 9jeeps
960mmmortars
6.50-calMGsM2
6.30-calLMGs
1·;p·1 6bazookas,22SMGs
rro OrdLt
Mnt
0-2-56 9-0-143 9-1-137 3-0-70 II
56carbines 52trucks(482112-ton 19trucks,7jeeps 33/4-tontrucks m •
truckswith1-tontrailers 3wreckers 15jeeps III
forsupplyoperations) 5bazookas
29-3-632 134-9-1,861
6jeeps,4bazookas 4.50-calMGsM2
3tractorsw/angledozers
12.50-calMGsM2 12SMGs
67trucks,16jeeps
141-6-2,941 12.50-calMGs
18.30-calHMGs
29bazookas
13SMGs
I 12-1-98 27-2-429
3.50-calMGsM2 12Ml155mmhowitzers
[svIc] II 2li6aibsaoznoaokiracsraft 194.500b-caazloMokGassM2
HQ&
HQCo III CHAP 16trucks,4jeeps 2liaisonaircraft
63trucks,15jeeps
16-2-176 10-4-98 7-0-1102 12-0-103
Includingthree 291112-tontrucks CompanyHQand 32-0-818 1truck,7jeeps
cannonplatoons w/281-tontrailers fourantitankplatoons
6105mmM3howitzers 23/4-tontrucks 143/4-tontrucks
1011/2-tontrucks 6jeeps 6jeeps
w/41-tontrailers 8.50-calMGsM2 1237mmATguns
29-2-429
13/4-tontruck 10bazookas 1.50-calMGM2
12M2A1105mm
24jeeps 4.30-calLMG
howitzers
4.50-calMGsM2
19.50-calMGsM2
11bazookas
40bazookas
2liaisonaircraft
62trucks
Notes 21jeeps
HQ&!F=I
Sources:TO2-27,5-15,6-10,7-11,8-15,9-8,10-17and11-7(all HQCoL!!-J WPNS
March1,1943)plustableinGreenfieldetal,TheOrganizationofGround
CombatTroops(Washington,DC1947),pp274-5. 9-103 5-157
Allunitstrengthsincludeattachedmedicalandchaplains. 211/2-tontrucksw/11-tontrailer 6-186 71112-tontrucks
1ThecorrectpersonnelandequipmentstrengthsofthedivisionHQ 43/4-tontrucks,7jeeps 11112-tontruck 13/4-tontruck
andHQcompanyarenotknown.Thefiguresshownareestimates 337mmATguns 360mmmortars 5jeeps
basedonthebestavailabledata.Enlistedpersonnelworkingat 1.50-calMGsM2 1.50-calMGM2 681mmmortars
divisionHQareincludedinthedivisionHQcompany 3.30-calLMGs 2.30-calLMGs 3.50-calMGsM2
2Anewantitankcompanywithnine57mmguns(inthreeplatoons) 8bazookas 3bazookas 8.30-calHMGs
wasauthorizedinMay1943. 9BARs 7bazookas
its divisions as if there would be no limit on the manpower and material
available to them. Consequently it could send only 42 divisions to France
beforetheArmistice, anditstillhadtostripsomeoftheseofmostoftheirmen
in orderto fill out the others. For the newwar the War Departmentestimated
that it would need at least 100 divisions by the end of 1943, despite the
likelihood ofmuch largerdiversions ofmanpowerinto naval and air forces.
Although the United States was to become the "Arsenal of Democracy" it
needed time before the output of its industry could match the needs of the
troops. TheUnitedStateswasalso exportinglargeamountsofequipmenttoits
allies. Shortages of strategic materials, especially steel, rubber, and gasoline,
placed further constraints on the equipment available. The biggest constraint
ofall, however, wasthatnoUS divisionwouldbeofanyvaluetothewareffort
unless it could be shipped overseas - but to do that required cargo ships, and
6 there were never enough of them. Most divisions waited years for their
USAInfantryDivision,July15,1943
737-44-13,472
xx Special
Troops
38-8-01 38-7-890 6-0-149 35-2-429
... 13M8armoredcars 31trucks
3M3A1h-trackswloarm 30ambulances
12112-tontruck,23jeeps 9jeeps
Special Div G 960mmmortars
Troops HOCo 3.50-calMGsM2
13.30-calLMGs
2-0-72 4-0-2091 3-0-70 7-4-215 5bazookas,30SMGs
13/4-tontruck(C&R) 14trucks,16jeeps 33/4-tontrucks 36trucks,19jeeps
1jeepwltrailer 15-passengersedan 15jeeps 6.50-calMGsM2
8carbines 357mmATguns 5bazookas II
1pistol 3.50-calMGs 32SMGs • m
6bazookas
138-9-2,072 29-3-632
12M1155mmtowedhowitzers 3tractorsw/angledozers
rro OrdLt n 36M2A1105mmtowedhowitzers 67trucks,16jeeps
Mnt 10liaisonaircraft 12.50-calMGs
360trucks,86jeeps 18.30-calHMGs
560c-a2r-b5i6nes 5130-t0ru-1c8k3s 19tru9c-k1s-1,377jeeps 13/43--t0on-13tr4uck III 8916.560b-caazloMokGassM2 29bazookas,16SMGs
(482112-tontrucks 3wreckers
with1-tontrailers 5bazookas
forsupplyoperations) 5.50-calMGsM2
6jeeps,5bazookas 12SMGs 139-5-2,974
13.50-calMGsM2 6105mmM3howitzers
75trucks,139jeeps
1857mmATguns
CHAP 1881mm&2760mmmortars
35.50-calMGsM2
1-0-03 24.30-calHMGs
18.30-calLMGs
Notes 81BARs
Source:TO7(July15,1943).Allunitstrengthsincludeattachedmedicalandchaplains.
1IncludesenlistedmembersofdivisionHQ.
2 1LTC(Cdr,SpecialTroopsandHQCommandant),1CPT(AssistantHQCommandant),1MSGT(chiefclerk),1SSgt(operations),1Sgt(duty),4Pvts(1[T-5]chaplain'sassistant,2[1T-5]drivers,
1orderly).
3 11LT(chaplain).
4 1MAJ(medica!),1CPT/1LT(dental),1TSgt(medical),1Sgt(medical),13Pvts(7[1T-3,1T-4,3T-5]surgicaltechs[including3aidmenfortheReconTroopand1fortheSignalCompany],
1[T-5]dentaltech,2[1T-5]medicaltechs,1basic).
shipping. Therefore, McNair reasoned that an infantry division had to use as
few menand strategicmaterials as possible andminimize the numberofcubic
feetitcouldfitinto.InthelightoftheseconsiderationsMcNairfoundtheApril
1942infantrydivision inexcusablyextravagant.
McNair concluded that the only long-term solution was to rewrite the
infantry division organization tables to make them as "lean" as possible. To
do this, he established the AGF Reduction Board. The "no-men," as the Table I:Infantrydivision
members of the board came to be called, reviewed and modified all ground officerrankabbreviations
force tables oforganization to achieve reductions of 15 percent in personnel (1942-43)
and 20 percent in motor vehicles, but without cutting combat effectiveness. Rank Abbr.
McNair personally participated in the work of the board and became the
Majorgeneral MG
biggest "no-man" of all, often saying "no" to his own "no-men." The "no
Brigadiergeneral BG
men" slashedthe proportionoforderliesto officers, gave as manylighttruck
drivers as possible additional duties such as working in the kitchens, and Colonel COL
eliminated "luxury" items. Company headquarters lost their tents and were Lieutenantcolonel LTC
allowed only one portable typewriter each. No chairs, safes, or tables were
Major MAJ
allowed in any headquarters belowdivision level. The "no-men" assigned all
personnel and equipment to specific vehicles and permitted no "reserves." Captain CPT
They also increased the use of trailers since these considerably extended Firstlieutenant ILT
the payload of the available trucks. Though leaving all "offensive" weapons
Second lieutenant 2LT
in place, they slashed anything whose main function was to increase
Warrantofficer WO
self-sufficiencyin security or supply. 7
In particular, McNair tried to discourage what he called "empire building"
or the tendency of every arm and service to augment itself as if it had to win
the war alone. An example was the persistent demands by many division
commanders for their own tank, tank destroyer, antiaircraft, reconnaissance,
and militarypolicebattalions so theycouldhandle everycontingency, not just
the ones most likely to occur. There was also the tendency, deeply rooted
in American society, to encumber the military with comforts, conveniences,
gadgets,technicians, "experts,"specialservices,andcomplexcommand-control
systems. Naturally, once these additions got started, they multiplied
exponentially. Forexample, ifonewantedtoincreasethenumberofdentistsin
a division one would also have to increase the number of dental technicians.
Dentists and technicians had to be fed and required more cooks. Cooks,
dentists, and technicians needed. trucks and their drivers and mechanics.
Cooks, dentists, technicians, drivers, and mechanics needed medical care and
that meant doctors, nurses, and medical technicians. The cooks, dentists,
technicians, drivers, mechanics, doctors, nurses, and so forth needed clothing
andthatmeantmorequartermasters- andofcoursetheyallneededdentalcare,
which again increasedthe requirementfor dentists. McNairwas determined to
nip such expansionin thebud.
The "no-men" uniformly observed certain principles. First, for local air
defense they replaced all Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs) outside the rifle
squads with smaller numbers of much more effective M2 .50-caliber machine
guns. Second, theyreplacedabout40percentoftheantitankgunsinadivision
with large numbers-of the new 2.36in. antitank rocket launcher Ml or
"bazooka."Neitherthebazookasnormostofthe .50-calibermachinegunshad
Infantrymen crossa blown-up
assigned gunners. Company commanders were expected to train a sufficient
bridgeoverthe Marneat Mareuil
numberoftheirmento operatetheseweaponsas an additionalduty. Third, in
sur-AyonAugust30, 1944.German
troops dynamited the bridge before addition to cutting the number of motor vehicles the "no-men" replaced
abandoningthetown. heaviervehicleswithlighterones. Intheinfantryregimentstheyused 11/z-ton
8