US Army in the aftermath of conflict, 1953-2000.

159 Pages·2008·0.49 MB·English

The Challenge of

Adaptation: The US

Army in the Aftermath

OP 27
of Confl ict, 1953-2000

Robert T. Davis II

The Long War Series

Occasional Paper 27

Combat Studies Institute Press
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The Challenge of

Adaptation: The US

Army in the Aftermath

OP 27
of Confl ict, 1953-2000

Robert T. Davis II

Combat Studies Institute Press
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Davis, Robert T., 1976­
The Challenge of adaptation : the US Army in the aftermath of conflict, 1953­
2000 / Robert T. Davis, II.
p. cm. -- (The long war series occasional paper ; 27)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-0-9801236-3-0

1. United States. Army--Reorganization--History--20th century. 2. United
States. Army--History--20th century. I. Title.
UA25.D34 2008

355.3--dc22

2008007068

First Printing: March 2008
CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics.
The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the
author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army,
or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications,
many of them available for downloading, can be found at:http://
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The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an
offi cial publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s offi cial seal on any
republication of this material without the expressed written permission of the
Director of CSI.
Foreword
The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present Long War Oc­
casional Paper 27, The Challenge of Adaptation: The US Army in the After­
math of Conflict, 1953-2000, by CSI historian Mr. Robert Davis. Using three
case studies from the late twentieth century, Davis examines the processes by
which the US Army sought to prepare itself for the future after the conclusion
of a major conflict. It is essentially a study of how, in the wake of major con­
flict, the Army “learned its lessons.” In each of these periods—post Korean
War, post Vietnam War, and post Cold War—the Army examined its existing
institutional structures and processes, force structure, training and educational
systems, and doctrine to prepare for an uncertain future.
Following the Korean War, the nation struggled to define the role of
ground forces in a Cold War era seemingly dominated by airpower and nucle­
ar weapons. The Army also wrestled with the conceptual problem of creating
a “dual-capable” force which could fight on both nuclear and conventional
battlefields. President Kennedy’s “Flexible Response” defense strategy and
the Vietnam War abruptly ended the Army’s unsatisfactory Pentomic Era.
By contrast, after the Vietnam War the nation and the Army re-emphasized a
“threat based” approach to developing and measuring its capabilities against
the clearly defined military threats posed by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.
During the seventeen years between 1973 and 1990, the Army implemented
wide-ranging institutional, doctrinal, training, educational and force structure
changes which yielded an Army of unprecedented capability by the first Gulf
War in 1991. After the end of the Cold War, however, the nation and the Army
faced a very uncertain national security situation without a clearly definable
threat. Like the advent of the nuclear era some fifty years prior, the infor­
mation age seemed to call into question the role of ground forces in future
military operations. Following a decade of unconventional operations in the
1990s, the Army launched another wide-ranging transformation effort in 1999
using a new “capabilities based” model to prepare itself for uncertain future
military threats. The events of 9/11 and the declaration of the war on terror in
2001 again refocused the nation and the Army on the role of ground forces in
the 21st century.
This study provides insights into how the US Army sought to prepare for
the future at the end of major conflicts, and suggests approaches which Army
leaders may wish to keep in mind as they continues to adapt to evolving cir­
cumstances and realities. CSI – The Past is Prologue!
Timothy R. Reese
Colonel, Armor
Director, Combat Studies Institute
iii

Acknowledgements
There are a number of people who I would like to thank for their as­
sistance on this project. LTC George Sarabia did a good deal to get me
settled in here at CSI and proved very patient dealing with my numerous
queries as I got my bearings. LTC (ret.) Mike Burke of the Combined
Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) generously discussed his experiences
on the FM 100-5 writing team in the late 1990s and provided me with ac­
cess to his office files. Kelvin Crow provided me with access to the CSI
Historian’s Working Files, which I greatly appreciate. Dr. Christopher Ga­
bel provided me with useful insights into the Louisiana Maneuvers. The
staffs of the Combined Arms Research Library and the Combat Studies
Institute have also aided the preparation of this study in any number of
ways. Tom Branigar and the rest of the staff of the Eisenhower Library
have, as always, provided a helpful and conducive research environment
during my visits to Abilene. Dr. William M. Donnelly at the US Army
Center of Military History provided me with useful advice in the early
stages of this project’s development. My colleagues Matt Matthews, John
McGrath, Bob Ramsey, and Jennifer Lindsey have all provided useful ad­
vice and contributed to the collegial working environment here at CSI.
My friends Dr. Tom Bruscino and Ren Lessard patiently allowed me to
describe this project as it developed, pointed out numerous helpful re­
sources, and have provided good companionship throughout. Thanks to all
my family members for their encouragement during the writing process.
Colonel Timothy R. Reese, Director, Combat Studies Institute, Dr. Glenn
Robertson, Deputy Director, CSI and CAC Command Historian, and Mr.
Kendall D. Gott, Supervisory Historian, Research and Publication Team,
and my editor Mike Brooks have all been instrumental in shepherding this
project along and helping me see it through to completion.
v
Abbreviations
Used in the Text
AFF
Army Field Forces
AWC
Army War College
BG
Brigadier General
CAC
Combined Arms Center
CONARC
Continental Army Command
CGSC
Command and General Staff College
CSA
Chief of Staff of the Army
CSI
Combat Studies Institute
DOD
Department of Defense
FORSCOM
Force Command
GEN
General
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
LAM
Louisiana Maneuvers
LIC
Low-Intensity Conflict
LTG
Lieutenant General
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC
National Security Council
QDR
Quadrennial Defense Review
SACEUR
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SAMS
School of Advanced Military Studies
SSI
Strategic Studies Institute
TRADOC
Training and Doctrine Command
VCSA
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
Used in the Notes
DDEL Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

DDEP Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower

OSA for NSA Office of the Special Assistant for

National Security Affairs
WHO
White House Office
DDRS
Declassified Documents Retrieval System
HJCS
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
HOSD
History of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense
NARA National Archives and Records
Administration, College Park

NSC
National Security Council

RG
Record Group (at NARA)

vi
Contents
Foreword .................................................................................................. iii

Acknowledgements................................................................................... v

Abbreviations........................................................................................... vi

Introduction............................................................................................... 1

The Post World War II Army ................................................... 3

Overview ................................................................................. 6

Chapter 1. The Pentomic Era ...................................................................11

The US Army and the Conceptual

Challenge of the Nuclear Age ........................................... 12

The Army and the “New Look” ............................................. 16

The Dual-Capability Conundrum.......................................... 29

The Kennedy Administration ................................................ 30

Summary................................................................................ 31

Chapter 2. Reorienting the Army–After Vietnam ................................... 45

The Nixon Administration and Defense ................................45

The STEADFAST Reorganization ........................................ 50

Doctrinal Ferment.................................................................. 55

Meeting the Army’s Educational Needs ................................ 57

Towards Army 86 .................................................................. 62

Operational Art and AirLand Battle ...................................... 63

Summary................................................................................ 65

Chapter 3. A Strange New World–The Army after the Cold War ...........81

The Impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act ............................ 83

The Army of the 1990s ..........................................................84

Doctrinal Revision................................................................. 86

The New Louisiana Maneuvers............................................. 89

The Debate Intensifies........................................................... 90

Force XXI Campaign ............................................................ 91

Doctrine as an Engine of Change? ........................................ 92

From Quadrennial Review to Quadrennial Review .............. 96

Summary.............................................................................. 100

vii
Contents (cont’d)
Conclusion .............................................................................................111

Appendix................................................................................................119

Bibliography ......................................................................................... 129

About the Author ................................................................................... 147

viii