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University of the Witwatersrand School of Social Sciences African Centre for Migration & Society Migration, Governance and Violent Exclusion: Exploring the Determinants of Xenophobic Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa Jean Pierre MISAGO Student Number: 0404030D Dissertation in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Migration and Displacement Studies, School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand April 2016 Declaration I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted for any other degree or examination in any other university. Jean Pierre Misago 11 April 2016 ii Dedication To family members and all other victims of violent discrimination. iii Acknowledgements I would like to express my most heartfelt gratitude to Prof. Loren Landau, my supervisor, for the generous support throughout all my years of study and work at the University of the Witwatersrand and for the guidance and patience that went far beyond supervision duties. I am deeply indebted to the African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS) for providing an enabling and supportive environment. I am also thankful for financial support received from the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. iv Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 SETTING THE SCENE.............................................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE: GLOBAL DIMENSIONS AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES ............................................. 9 1.3 STRUCTURE OF THESIS ....................................................................................................................................... 21 II. METHODS AND METHODOLOY: RESEARCHING THE DETEMINANTS OF XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE .................... 30 2.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................. 30 2.2 XENOPHOBIA AND XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE: CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS AND CAUSAL LINKAGES ................ 31 2.3 THE NEED FOR A QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND A MICRO-ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ..... 40 2.4 DATA SOURCES AND THE USE OF SECONDARY ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 45 2.5 BASELINE STUDY: RESEARCH METHODS AND DESIGN ........................................................................................ 50 2.6 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................................... 61 III. XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA: HISTORY, MORPHOLOGY AND POPULAR EXPLANATIONS .............................................................................................................................................. 62 3.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................ 62 3.2 HISTORY AND NATURE OF XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA .................................. 63 3.3 POPULAR EXPLANATIONS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS .......................................................................................... 98 3.4 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................... 118 IV. MICRO-POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE VIOLENCE: LOCAL DYNAMICS, ROLES AND MOTIVATIONS OF VIOLENCE ENTREPRENEURS ............................................................................................ 121 4.1 INTRDODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 121 4.2 LOCAL DYNAMICS AND THEIR IMPACT ON XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE ................................................................ 122 4.3 VIOLENCE ENTREPRENEURS’ ROLES AND MOTIVATIONS FOR VIOLENCE ......................................................... 146 4.4 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................... 167 V. MOBILIZATION AS A TRIGGER OF XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE ........................................................................... 170 5.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................. 170 5.2 PERSPECTIVES ON MOBILIZATION AS A KEY DETERMINANT OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE ................................. 172 5.3 MOBILIZATION TECHNIQUES AND PROCESSES FOR THE MAY 2006 XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE ........................ 183 5.4 CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A ‘MOBILIZATION OF DISCONTENT’ MODEL .......................................................... 199 VI. LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA ........................................................ 203 6.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................. 203 6.2 LOCAL GOVERNANCE: A POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA ........................................................................................................................................................................ 204 6.3 ON SOCIAL CONTROLS AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: THE STATUS QUO QUESTIONED.................................... 223 6.4 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................. 234 VII. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS A GOVERNANCE MODEL OF XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE ......................................... 237 7.1 XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE AS ‘POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS’ .............................................................................. 238 7.2 THE TRIGGER EFFECT OF MOBILIZATION ........................................................................................................ 239 7.3 GOVERNANCE AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHIP .......................................... 242 7.4 A MULTIVARIATE MODEL OF XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE ................................................................................... 245 7.5 FROM MULTIVARIATE TO THE GOVERNANCE MODEL OF XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE ........................................ 251 7.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS ................................................................................................................................. 256 VIII. REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................. 258 IX. ANNEX I: BASELINE STUDY RESEARCH THEMES ............................................................................................ 271 v Abstract Responding to inadequacies and limitations of current causal explanations for xenophobic violence which has become a long standing feature in post-Apartheid South Africa, this study proposes a Governance Model of Xenophobic Violence that provides a comprehensive empirically-based and theoretically informed causal explanation. It is a multivariate empirical and integrated theoretical explanatory model that identifies and explains the roles of - and the complex interplays between - the key determinants of xenophobic violence consisting of underlying causes, proximate factors and triggers. The six key determinants the model identifies are: deprivation, xenophobic beliefs, collective discontent, political economy, mobilization and governance. This study argues that these determinants and their interconnections in a value-added process constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of xenophobic violence. I call it the governance model because of the predominant role governance plays in the occurrence of xenophobic violence. With underlying causes (deprivation, xenophobia and collective discontent) already established, the study pays particular attention to the often missed proximate factors and triggers (the political economy of the violence, mobilization and governance). It is through the findings on these new factors that the study introduces new empirical and theoretical insights and innovations to the understanding of, not only, xenophobic violence in South Africa but also collective violence generally. First, this study argues that xenophobic violence in South Africa is just ‘politics by other means and by doing so brings to the fore the often missed centrality of micro-politics and localised political economy factors as key drivers of collective violence particularly communal violence. Second, the study argues that that the triggers of xenophobic violence and of collective violence generally lie in the mobilization processes and not in the grievances and ensuing discontent as argued by many theoretical approaches to collective violence. The study suggests a new theoretical model, the Mobilization of Discontent Model, which captures the increasingly recognised centrality of mobilization as a trigger of collective violence. Third, the study argues that governance is a key determinant of xenophobic and collective violence but not necessary in ways often assumed or prescribed by time-honoured and widely accepted theoretical predictions, particularly those contending that collective violence and other forms of contentious collective action tend to occur in societies where mechanisms of social control have lost their restraining power. By demonstrating that local governance deliberately facilitated the occurrence of xenophobic violence in areas where it occurred by providing what I term micro-political opportunity structures, the study calls into question the common understating of the relationship between governance and collective violence and reveals some aspects of this relationship that are either misunderstood or undetected until now. The Governance Model of Xenophobic Violence this study proposes is an innovation that clearly illustrates the poverty of most explanatory models of collective violence, which makes it an appropriate tool for integrating empirical and theoretical knowledge from different disciplines and for identifying gaps in existing scholarship. vi I. INTRODUCTION XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE: RETHINKING METHODOLOGICAL, THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS 1.1 SETTING THE SCENE Xenophobic violence has become a longstanding feature in post-Apartheid South Africa. Since 1994, tens of thousands of people have been harassed, attacked, or killed because of their status as outsiders or foreign nationals. The violence was most intense and widely scrutinised in May 2008. Indeed, the May 2008 violence, that started in Alexandra Township on 11 May 2008 and quickly spread to other townships and informal settlements in the country, was unprecedented in its intensity, ferocity and rapid geographic spread (Misago et al, 2009). Graphic images of violent attacks on foreign nationals (e.g. scenes of knife- and stick- wielding aggressors, wounded victims, burning houses, and even a burning man) were seen around the world. These scenes “were soon replaced by images of people who had fled in fear of their lives to seek refuge in churches and police stations, eventually to be re-housed in tent settlements like those housing famine or war refugees” (Dodson, 2010:3). In less than a month, 135 separate violence incidents (Bekker et al, 2008) resulted in at least 62 people dead; 670 wounded; dozens raped; more than 100 000 displaced; and millions of Rand worth of property looted, destroyed or appropriated by local residents (CoRMSA, 2008). Most victims were African foreign nationals but a ‘third were South Africans who had married foreigners, refused to participate in the violent orgy, or had the misfortune of belonging to 1 groups that were evidently not South African enough to claim their patch of urban space” (Landau, 2011:1). After initially denying the crisis and offering unheeded appeals for calm, the government deployed the army forces to contain the violence in June 2008 (Ibid). However, while the violence subsided with the deployment of the army, it did not end there. Indeed, despite government’s claims to the contrary (Black Sash, 2009), violence against foreigners continued post-May 2008 and was increasingly reaching ‘disturbing proportions’ (DAC, 2012). Attacks on non-nationals continue to be regularly reported resulting in rising cases of murder, injuries, threats of mob violence, looting and the destruction of residential property and businesses, as 1 well as mass displacement (CoRMSA, 2011; UNHCR ROSA, 2013 ; UNHCR ROSA, 2015) . Perhaps not surprisingly, t he unprecedented nature of the May 2008 violence triggered a frenzy of analyses and commentary as scholars , policy analysts and government officials attempted to make sense of what was happening in the mu ltiracial ‘rainbow’ nation (Fauvelle- Aymar et al., 2011; see also Nieftagodien, 2011). The initial official denialism and apparent public surprise (despite many and clear warning signs) were immediately followed by reactionary attempts to explain the causes of the violence. Initial reactions were understandably speculative and based on inaccurate or outdated information, political rationales and ideological stances rather than empirical evidence (Fauvelle-Aymar et al, 2011). As such, these explanations (that included ‘afrophobia’, ‘third force’, poor border control, poor service delivery, poverty, unemployment, corruption - see for example HSRC, 2008; Landau and Misago, 2009) failed to take into account many underlying historical and socio-political causes as well as specific factors that triggered violence in some areas and not in others. 1 Unpublished UNHCR stats on data compiled from the UNHCR xenophobia hotline and Communique by UNHCR’s Munyaneza Alphonse at the Protection Working Group meeting of 22 January 2013. 2 Realising that initial reactions and explanations did not adequately explain the occurrence of violence, discussions and debates (among scholars, political actors and practitioners) continued over the root and immediate causes of the violence, the effectiveness of the responses provided and appropriate measures to be put in place to prevent future occurrences. Debates have led to several competing causal explanations that detail broad economic, political, historical, structural and attitudinal factors (see for example Crush et al, 2008; Neocosmos, 2008; Sharp, 2008; Pillay, 2008 and Dodson, 2010). While valuable in providing the historical, political and socio-economic context in which the violence occurred, these explanations similarly “falter when faced with empirical or logical interrogation” (Landau 2010:215) as they fail to account for i) the appearance of violence in some areas while others with similar socio-economic conditions remained calm; ii) the specific targeting of certain groups of foreign nationals and the murders of so many South African citizens and iii) the timing, location and diffusion of the violence. Indeed, as this study clearly demonstrates, existing explanations evidently maintain only a tenuous relationship with empirical reality (with regard to the occurrence of the violence) and actually reveal a methodological and analytical ‘laziness’ - or at least a lack of analytical rigour - characteristic of hurried analysts who impose a priori explanations to current phenomena without substantive or empirical backing (Horowitz, 2001). Disappointingly, these explanations rarely attempt to answer those ‘deceptively’ simple but critical questions that illuminate the occurrence of the violence: how, when and where; ‘why here and not there’; ‘why now and not then’? (See details on these questions in Horowitz, 2001). Analytically, this thesis argues that the poverty of existing explanatory models lies in a twofold repertoire of analytical blind spots: i) the lack of empirical backing as indicated above; and ii) incompleteness as most offer reductionist, one-factor explanations for such a complex social phenomenon and as such can be at best partial or incomplete. Perhaps most 3 importantly, they all suffer from blindness to their own shortcomings particularly with mono- causal explanations claiming to be all encompassing (i.e. identifying only one factor among many but invalidly claiming to explain the entire process leading to the occurrence of the violence thereby claiming to account for all the elements of the violence causal chain). Further, a review of the literature reveals that most of the existing research, by virtue of its focus on establishing (if unsuccessfully) ‘Why’ xenophobic violence occurred, has neglected those questions that are critical in understanding the occurrence of the violence. The ‘How’ question is particularly important if we want to identify and understand processes through which conditions and attitudes lead to or translate into mass violent attacks. Few attempts have been made to establish the link between those general structural factors or even the pervasive xenophobic sentiments and the outbreak of the violence. Only by answering the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions are we able to understand and identify all the key determinants (i.e. the underlying factors, and proximate causes and the triggers) of the violence. Similarly, even fewer efforts have been made to explore xenophobic violence and its determinants in relation to established conceptual and theoretical frameworks (Crawely, 2011). While acknowledging that, since 2008, the violence has received increasing scholarly attention, this limited nature of current explanatory models call for i) a reassessment of our current understanding of the phenomenon and the empirical, theoretical, and methodological assumptions on which it is based, and ii) further academic enquiries that move beyond generalisations, provide theoretically informed and empirically based explanations. There is indeed a recognition that “No one has yet fully explained either the prevalence of a culture of xenophobia in South Africa or the particular outbreak of that culture into specific acts of brutality in May 2008” (Dodson, 2010:11). 4

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