Unity of Science

199 Pages·1977·7.838 MB·English

by  Robert L. Causey (auth.)

UNITY OF SCIENCE
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
MONOGRAPHS ON EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE,
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND OF KNOWLEDGE,
AND ON THE MATHEMATICAL METHODS OF
SOCIAL AND BEHA VIORAL SCIENCES
M anaging Editor:
J AAKKO HINTIKKA, Academy of Finland and Stanford University
Editors:
ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University
DONALD DAVIDSON, University of Chicago
GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden
WESLEY C. SALMON, University of Arizona
VOLUME 109
ROBERT L. CAUSEY
UNITY OF SCIENCE
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
DORDRECHT-HOLLANDjBOSTON-U.S.A.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Causey, Robert L
U nity of science.
(Synthese library; 109)
Bibliography: p.
Includes indexes.
1. Science-Philosophy. 2. Identity. 3. Knowledge,
Theoryof. 4. Theory (Philosophy)
1. TitJe.
B67.C33 501 76-57970
ISBN-13: 978-94-010-1190-7 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-1188-4
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-1188-4
Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company,
P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland
Sold and distributed in the U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico
by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Inc.
Lincoln Building, 160 Old Derby Street, Hingham,
Mass. 02043, U.S.A.
AII Rights Reserved
Copyright © 1977 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 1977
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or .
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any informational storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
. CHAPTER 1/INTRODUCTION 1
A. General Plan of the Book 1
B. Sets and Notation 7
C. Kinds and Attributes 8
D. Laws and Law-Sentences 13
CHAPTER 2/EXPLANATIONS, IDENTITIES, AND THEORIES 17
A. Scientific Explanations 17
B. Identities 27
Q Thoo~ M
CHAPTER 3/THEORIES WITH STRUCTURED WHOLES 48
A. Introduction 48
B. An Example from Chemistry 51
C. The Languages of the Theories 54
D. Structures and Homogeneity 58
E. Laws of T 1 65
CHAPTER 4/MICROREDUCTIONS: SET THEORETICAL FORM 69
A. Thing-Identities 69
B. Explanations of the Law Sentences of T 2 72
Q Attribute-Correlations 74
CHAPTER 5/MICROREDUCTIONS WITH IDENTITIES 80
ATh~~~ 00
B. Attribute-Identities 83
Q Summary of the Reduction Conditions 89
D. Some Possible Objections and Problems 93
E. Reasonable Modifications 99
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 6/UNIFIED THEORIES AND UNIFIED SCIENCE 106
A. Microreductions and Unified Science 106
B. Unified Theories 111
C. Unification by Microreduction 121
CHAPTER 7/COMPLICATIONS AND OBSTACLES 132
A. Variety of Structures and Theories 133
B. Hierarchical Structures 138
C. Tokenism 142
D. Social Theories and Social Structures 151
CHAPTER 8/SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND UNITY OF SCIENCE 160
A. General Aspects of Scientific Progress 160
B. Development and Evolution 168
C. Problems and Prospects 172
BIBLIOGRAPHY 178
INDEX OF NAMES 181
INDEX OF SUBJECTS 182
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book is based on investigations which have spanned several years.
A major part of this research was supported by National Science Founda
tion Grant GS-39664. This support made possible a leave from teaching
and is greatly appreciated. 1 also appreciate useful supplemental funds
provided by the University of Texas Research Institute.
Parts of this book are based on material from some of my previous
publications. I wish to thank the editors and publishers for permission
to reprint, in considerably revised form, parts of: 'Uniform Microreduc
tions', Synthese 25 (1972); 'Attribute-Identities in Microreductions', The
Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972); 'Unified Theories and Unified Science',
in A. C. Michalos and R. S. Cohen (eds.), PSA 1974, D. Reidel,
Dordrecht (1976); 'Laws, Identities, and Reduction', in M. Przel~cki, K.
Szaniawski, R. W6jcicki (eds.), Formal Methods in the Methodology of
Empirical Sciences: Proceedings of Coriference for F armal M ethads,
Warsaw, 1974, Ossolineum and D. Reidel, Wroclaw and Dordrecht,
forthcoming.
Many persons have commented, both privately and in published
articles, on my previous publications. These comments have been helpful
in the writing of this book, and 1 thank collectively alI who have
contributed their comments. I also wish to thank Professor Jaakko
Hintikka for his interest in this project, and to acknowledge his referee's
useful comments on the first draft of the manuscript.
My wife, Sandy, has typed most of the final draft, and has assisted
with the proofreading and the preparation of the figures. She has
provided useful editorial comments, and 1 am extremely grateful for her
constant encouragement.
The research reported in this book is, of course, my own responsibility.
The analyses and methodological principles defended herein are not
necessarily endorsed by any of the individuals or institutions mentioned
above.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The first section of this chapter describes the major goals of this investiga
tion and the general strategy of my presentation. The remaining three
sections review some requisite background material and introduce some
terminology and notation used in the book. Section B contains a brief
review of some of the ideas and notation of elementary logic and set
theory. Section C contains an introductory discussion of kinds and at
tributes. Section D presents some basic ideas about laws and law
sentences.
A. GENERAL PLAN OF THE BOOK
Basic scientific research is directed towards the goals of increasing our
knowledge of the wor1d and our understanding of the wor1d. Knowledge
increases through the discovery and confirmation of facts and laws.
Understanding results from the explanation of known facts and laws, and
through the formulation of general, systematic theories. Other things
being equal, we tend to feeI that our understanding of a c1ass of
phenomena increases as we develop increasingly general and intuitively
unified theories of that c1ass of phenomena. It is therefore natural to
consider the possibility of one very general, unified theory which, at least
in principle, governs all known phenomena. The dream of obtaining such
a theory, and the understanding that it would provide, has motivated an
enormous amount of research by both scientists and philosophers.
Of course, such a unified theory is a very remote ideal at the present
time, and it was an even more remote goal in the past. Nevertheless, there
has long been interest in the possibility of a unified science which would
provide a general understanding of the various c1asses of natural and
social phenomena. Some important scientific advances have involved
partial unifications of previously independent areas of scientific research.
These advances have usually been accomplished by the reduction of one
scientific theory to another. Philosophers have examined the prospects of
2 CHAPTER 1
a unified science in a number of ways. The Logical Positivists were con
cerned to defend a certain kind of very general program for the unifica
tion of science as presented in Neurath et al. (1938). In more recent years
research in this field has become more specialized, involving studies of
reduction, of functional and teleological theories, and of explanation in
the various branches of science. One general study of the unity of science
in recent years is that of Oppenheim and Putnam (1958). They discuss
the possibility of the unification of science by means of successive micro
reductions of various theories to a basic theory about fundamental par
ticles. This kind of reductionistic program faces many difficulties that
have been widely discussed by a number of investigators, includ ing the
present writer in Causey (1968a). Nevertheless, it seems to me that a
properly characterized reductionistic program offers the best overall plan
for the unification of science. This book is devoted to a very detailed
formulat ion and defense of a certain kind of reductionistic program for
the unification of science. During the past few years there have been
important scientific advances towards increased unificat ion of the
sciences. In addition, there have been significant developments in our
understanding of scientific methodology. For these reasons I believe that
the present time is especially appropriate for the formulation and defense
of a detailed program for the unification of science.
It is convenient to make a rough division of scientific theories in
either the natural or social sciences into three general types: (i) dynamic
theories, which state and explain (as far as possible) the general laws
governing the attributes and behavior of the various kinds of things in a
specified domain; (ii) developmental theories, which describe and explain
the general types of changes which take place over time in certain kinds
of things under certain conditions; and (iii) evolutionary theories, which
describe and explain actual changes which take place over time in some
particular thing or class of things.
This is obviously a very rough classification of theories; yet, even from
these very brief descriptions, it is dear that the structure of science is
quite complex. Consequently, the unification of science will be a complex
endeavor. The major part of this endeavor is the unification of the various
dynamic theories; this book is primarily devoted to the development and
defense of a program for the unification of these dynamic theories. In
addition, a total unification program must take into account the develop
mental and evolutionary theories. I will therefore also include some
limited discussion of these kinds of theories.
INTRODUCTION 3
My principal discussions and arguments begin in Chapter 2, the first
section of which contains a discussion of the logic of explanation. How
ever, the primary aim of this chapter is to argue that a purely set
theoreticallanguage is inadequate for many important scientific purposes.
In particular, it is argued that a purely set theoretical language does not
provide an unequivocal linguistic representation of laws and explana
tions. For this and other reasons, it is proposed that the predicates in
laws should normally be interpreted as denoting kinds or as denoting
attributes. I do not attempt, in Chapter 2, to provide conclusive reasons
for this mode of interpretation. Additional reasons for favoring this
particular mode of interpretation are provided in later chapters. How
ever, Chapter 2 does discuss certain consequences and applications of
this interpretation of the predicates in laws. I state a criterion which
determines whether or not two sentences stating laws state the same law.
A somewhat similar criterion is also presented for the derivations which
represent causal explanations. This chapter also introduces the important
concept of a noncausal sentence, and it contains discussions of identities
of kinds and of attributes. These types of identities play a fundamental
role in the program for the unification of science. Chapter 2 therefore
introduces much ofthe basic conceptual apparatus which is subsequentIy
used in the formulation and defense of the unification program. This con
ceptual apparatus is novel and, I believe, intrinsically interesting. It
provides new insights into the ontology of scientific theories. Among
other things, the unificat ion program involves the unificat ion of the
ontologies of various scientific theories. Chapter 2 concludes with a brief
description of some very general features of dynamic theories. The
specific conditions for explanations and theories which are presented in
this chapter are quite skeletal. They are augmented with additional
conditions in later chapters.
Chapters 3,4, and 5 are concerned with the conditions for the reduc
tion of one theory to another. Roughly speaking, a reduction of a theory
T 2 to a theory T 1 involves explanations of the laws of T 2 in terms of the
laws of T However, many complex and subtIe conditions must be
l'
satisfied in order to have an adequate reduction. In particular, I focus
attention on the detailed conditions for microreductions. In these reduc
tions the kinds of things in the domain of T 2 are generally considered to
be structured wholes composed of parts which are elements of the dom ain
ofT1•
Chapter 3 begins with a careful examination of the basic logical and