United States. Supreme Court. United States Reports. Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court 2006: Vol 547 Index & Table of Contents

2006·2.6 MB·English

ACTUAL INNOCENCE. See Habeas Corpus, 2.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. See Immigration and Nationality Act.
ADMIRALTY. See Constitutional Law, VI.
ALCOHOL TESTS. See Federal Employer and Employees.
ALIENS. See Immigration and Nationality Act.
“ANTICIPATORY” SEARCH WARRANTS. See Constitutional Law,
V, 5.
ANTI-LIEN PROVISION OF MEDICAID LAW. See Social Security.
ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF
1996. See Habeas Corpus, 1.
ANTITRUST ACTS.
Sherman Act—Price setting—Per se illegality.—It is not per se illegal
under §1 of Act for a lawful, economically integrated joint venture to set
prices at which it sells its products. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, p. 1.
ARKANSAS. See Social Security.
ASYLUM CLAIMS. See Immigration and Nationality Act.
BANKRUPTCY. See also Jurisdiction, 1.
Priorities—Unpaid workers’ compensation premiums.—Insurance car-
riers’ claims for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums owed by an em-
ployer fall outside priority, among unsecured creditors’ claims, that Bank-
ruptey Code allows for unpaid contributions to “an employee benefit plan,”
11 U.S.C. §507(a)(5).. Howard Delivery Service, Inc. v. Zurich American
Ins. Co., p. 651.
BIVENS ACTIONS.
Retaliatory prosecution—Pleading and proof requirements.—A plain-
tiff in a retaliatory-prosecution action filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Un-
known Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, must plead and show absence
of probable cause for pressing underlying criminal charges. Hartman v.
Moore, p. 250.
1289
1290 INDEX
BURDEN OF PROOF. See Bivens Actions.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871.
Section 1988—Cruel and unusual punishments claim.—Because Hill’s
action claiming lethal injection procedure that Florida likely would use on
him could violate Eighth Amendment’s crue! and unusual punishments
prohibition is comparable in its essentials to a 42 U.S. C. § 1983 action this
Court allowed to proceed in Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, it does not
have to be brought in habeas corpus, but may proceed under § 1983. Hill
v. McDonough, p. 573.
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978. See Federal Employer
and Employees.
CLASS-ACTION SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS. See Securities
Law.
CLEAN WATER ACT.
1. Hydroelectric dam—State certification.—Because a hydroelectric
dam raises a potential for a “discharge into the navigable water|s]” of
United States under §401 of Act, federal license to operate petitioner’s
dams requires state certification that water protection laws will not be
violated. S. D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Environmental Protection,
p. 370.
2. Wetlands—Navigable waters.—Sixth Circuit’s judgments that peti-
tioners’ wetlands were adjacent to navigable waters and thus covered by
Act are vacated, and cases are remanded. Rapanos v. United States,
p. 715.
COLLEGES. See Constitutional Law, III, 1.
COMPUTATION OF TIME. See Habeas Corpus, 1.
CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES. See Constitutional Law, I.
CONSPIRACY. See Hobbs Act.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
I. Confrontation of Witnesses.
Testimonial versus nontestimonial statements.—For Confrontation
Clause purposes, statements made during police interrogation under cir-
cumstances objectively indicating that interrogation’s primary purpose
is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency are nontes-
timonial; they are testimonial when circumstances objectively indicate
that there is no such emergency, and that interrogation’s primary pur-
pose is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution. Thus, statements identifying petitioner Davis as
assailant during a 911 call were not testimonial, but statements made by
INDEX 1291
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued.
petitioner Hammon’s wife to police after he allegedly battered her were
testimonial and properly excluded because he did not have opportunity
to cross-examine her, unless he coerced her failure to testify. Davis v.
Washington, p. 813.
II. Due Process.
1. Brady claim—Suppression of favorable evidence.—Judgment is re-
versed and case is remanded for views of full Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia on petitioner’s claim that State’s suppression of evidence
favorable to defense violated his federal constitutional rights under Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 88. Youngblood v. West Virginia, p. 867.
2. Tax sale—Unclaimed notice-—When mailed notice of a tax sale is
returned unclaimed, a State must take additional reasonable steps to at-
tempt to provide notice to property owner before selling his property, if
it is practicable to do so; because additional steps were available here,
State’s effort to provide notice to petitioner did not satisfy due process.
Jones v. Flowers, p. 220.
III. Freedoms of Speech and Association.
1. Federal funding—Solomon Amendment—Military recruiters on
college campuses.—Because Congress could require law schools to provide
equal access to military recruiters without violating schools’ freedoms of
speech and association, Third Circuit erred in holding that Solomon
Amendment—which denies federal funds to educational institutions that
fail to give military recruiters access equal to that provided other recruit-
ers—likely violates First Amendment. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights, Inc., p. 47.
2. Public employees—Statements pursuant official duties—When
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they
are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and Constitu-
tion does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, p. 410.
IV. Right to Fair Trial.
State evidence rule—Proof of third-party guilt—A criminal defend-
ant’s federal constitutional rights are violated by an evidence rule prevent-
ing a defendant from introducing proof of third-party guilt if prosecution
has introduced forensic evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a
guilty verdict. Holmes v. South Carolina, p. 319.
V. Searches and Seizures.
1. Knock-and-announce violation—Suppression of evidence.—Viola-
tion of knock-and-announce rule does not require suppression of evidence
found in a search. Hudson v. Michigan, p. 586.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued.
2. Parolees—Suspicionless searches.—Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.
Samson v. California, p. 843.
3. Warrantless entry—Reasonableness.—Police may enter a home
without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for
believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened
with injury. Brigham City v. Stuart, p. 398.
4. Warrantless entry and search—Co-occupant’s refusal to permit
entry.—In circumstances at issue, a physically present co-occupant’s
stated refusal to permit entry to a home renders warrantless entry and
search unreasonable under Fourth Amendment and invalid as to him.
Georgia v. Randolph, p. 103.
5. Warrants—Probable cawse.—“Anticipatory” search warrants based
on an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not
presently) certain evidence of a crime will be located at a specified
place are not categorically unconstitutional under Fourth Amendment’s
probable-cause provision; anticipatory warrant at issue did not violate
Amendment’s particularity requirement, which does not include conditions
precedent to execution of such a warrant. United States v. Grubbs, p. 90.
VI. States’ Immunity from Suit.
Admiralty—“Arm of the State."—A governmental entity that does not
qualify as an “arm of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes cannot
assert sovereign immunity as a defense to an admiralty suit. Northern
Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Chatham County, p. 189.
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. See Criminal Law, 1.
CO-OCCUPANTS’ RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, V, 4.
CREDITOR AND DEBTOR. See Bankruptcy.
CRIMINAL LAW. See also Civil Rights Act of 1871; Constitutional
Law, I; II, 1; V.
1. Federal Sentencing Guidelines—Prior convictions.—Fifth Circuit
erred in treating petitioner’s prior conviction for simple possession of a
controlled substance as a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of
Guidelines. Salinas v. United States, p. 188.
2. Speedy Trial Act of 1974—Waiver—Estoppel—Standard of re-
view.—A defendant may not prospectively waive application of Act, which
generally requires criminal trials to start within 70 days of indictment;
petitioner is not estopped from challenging exclusion of a 91-day delay
from 70-day period; District Court’s decision to exclude that delay is not
subject to harmless-error review; Act was violated because 91-day delay
exceeded 70 days permitted by Act. Zedner v. United States, p. 489.
INDEX 12938
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. See Constitutional
Law, I.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. See Civil Rights Act of
1871.
DAMS. See Clean Water Act, 1.
DEATH SENTENCE. See Civil Rights Act of 1871.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Bankruptcy.
DELAY IN START OF CRIMINAL TRIAL. See Criminal Law, 2.
DELINQUENT TAXES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. See Constitutional Law, I.
DRUG TESTS. See Federal Employer and Employees.
DUE PROCESS. See Constitutional Law, II.
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. See Constitutional Law, III, 1.
EIGHTH AMENDMENT. See Civil Rights Act of 1871.
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, VI.
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS. See Bankruptcy; Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974.
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974.
“Equitable relief”—Medical expense reimbursement.—Action filed by
respondent, a fiduciary under ERISA, for reimbursement of medical ex-
penses that petitioner beneficiaries had recovered for their injuries from
a third party properly sought “equitable relief” under ERISA §502(a)(8).
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., p. 356.
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Bankruptcy; Constitutional
Law, III, 2; Federal Employer and Employees.
ENHANCED SENTENCES. See Criminal Law, 1.
ENTRY AND SEARCH OF HOME. See Constitutional Law, V, 1,
3, 4.
EQUITABLE RELIEF. See Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974; Injunctions.
ESTOPPEL. See Criminal Law, 2.
EVIDENCE SUPPRESSION. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; V.
EXTORTION. See Hobbs Act.
1294 INDEX
FEAR OF PERSECUTION. See Immigration and Nationality Act.
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959. See
Jurisdiction, 3.
FEDERAL EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES.
Drug and alcohol tests—Preclusion.—Case is remanded for Ninth Cir-
cuit to address whether Federal Aviation Administration’s actions against
an employee—who claimed that his constitutional rights were violated by
a nonrandom drug and alcohol test—constitute a “prohibited personnel
practice,” see 5 U.S. C. §2302(b); 49 U.S. C. $40122(g)(2)(A), as well as
other issues raised in this Court but not decided below, resolution of which
may obviate need to decide ultimate issue whether 5 U.S. C. §7121 pre-
cludes employees from pursuing a remedy beyond those set out in Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978. Whitman v. Department of Transportation,
p. 512.
FEDERAL FUNDING FOR EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. See
Constitutional Law, III, 1.
FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Amendments to Rules, p. 1221.
FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE.
_
Amendments to Rules, p. 1227.
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Amendments to Rules, p. 1233.
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
Amendments to Rules, p. 1269.
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE.
Amendments to Rules, p. 1281.
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES. See Criminal Law, 1.
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See Clean Water Act, 1; Constitu-
tional Law, V1; Jurisdiction, 1; Securities Law; Social Security.
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES. See Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974.
FIRST AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, Iil.
FLORIDA. See Civil Rights Act of 1871.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, II; IV.
FOURTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, V.
INDEX
FRANCHISE TAX CREDIT. See Taxes.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. See Constitutional Law, III, 1.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH. See Constitutional Law, III.
HABEAS CORPUS. See also Civil Rights Act of 1871.
1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996—Erroneous
time computation.—In circumstances at issue, District Court had discre-
tion to correct State’s erroneous time computation and, accordingly, to
dismiss Day’s federal habeas petition as untimely under AEDPA’s 1-year
limitation period. Day v. McDonough, p. 198.
2. State procedural default rule—Actual-innocence exception.—Be-
cause House has made stringent showing required by actual-innocence ex-
ception to state procedural default rule, his federal habeas corpus action
may proceed. House v. Bell, p. 518.
HARMLESS-ERROR REVIEW. See Criminal Law, 2.
HEALTH-CARE BENEFITS. See Jurisdiction, 3.
HOBBS ACT.
Physical violence—Relationship to robbery or extortion.—Congress in-
tended only to forbid acts or threats of physical violence in furtherance
of a plan to engage in robbery or extortion (and related attempts or con-
spiracies) when it prohibited “obstruct{ing], delay[ing], or affect{ing]
commerce ... by ... robbery or extortion . . . or commit[ting] or threaten-
[ing] physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan
or purpose to do anything in violation of this section,” 18 U.S. C. §1951(a),
not to create a freestanding physical violence offense unrelated to robbery
or extortion. Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., p. 9.
HYDROELECTRIC DAMS. See Clean Water Act, 1.
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT.
Asylum claim—Fear of persecution—“Particular social group.”—In
this asylum claim based on fear of persecution, Ninth Circuit erred in
finding in first instance, rather than remanding to appropriate administra-
tive agency, question whether family members constitute a “particular so-
cial group” within Act’s meaning. Gonzales v. Thomas, p. 183.
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. See Constitutional Law, VI.
INJUNCTIONS.
Award of permanent relief—Four-factor test—Patent Act dispute.—
Traditional four-factor test applied by courts of equity when considering
whether to award permanent injunctive relief to a prevailing plaintiff ap-
plies to disputes arising under Patent Act. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L. L. C., p. 388.
1296 INDEX
JOINT VENTURES. See Antitrust Acts.
JURISDICTION.
1. Bankruptcy proceeding—Probate exception.—Ninth Circuit had no
warrant from Congress or this Court for its sweeping extension of “pro-
bate exception” to federal-court jurisdiction; because this case does not
fall within exception’s scope, District Court properly asserted jurisdiction
over petitioner’s tort counterclaim against respondent, despite ongoing
proceedings in a Texas Probate Court. Marshall v. Marshall, p. 293.
2. Court of Appeals—Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998—Removal—Remand to state court.—Federal district-court orders
remanding removed securities class actions to state court for want of pre-
clusion under Act are subject to 28 U.S. C. §1447(d), which makes remand
orders unreviewable on appeal. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, p. 633.
3. Health-care plan provider’s suit—Reimbursement of benefits
paid.—Title 28 U.S. C. §1331—which authorizes federal jurisdiction over
“civil actions arising under the... laws... of the United States”—does
not encompass a federal suit by a health-care plan providing benefits under
Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 for reimbursement of med-
ical bills plan paid on behalf of a plan beneficiary who, injured in an acci-
dent, recovered damages (unaided by plan administrator) in a state-court
tort action against a third party alleged to have caused accident. Empire
HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, p. 677.
KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE. See Constitutional Law, V, 1.
LAW SCHOOLS. See Constitutional Law, III, 1.
LETHAL INJECTION. See Civil Rights Act of 1871.
LIMITATIONS PERIODS. See Habeas Corpus, 1.
MARKET POWER. See Patents.
MEDICAID. See Social Security.
MEDICAL BENEFITS. See Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974; Jurisdiction, 3.
MILITARY RECRUITERS. See Constitutional Law, III, 1.
NAVIGABLE WATERS. See Clean Water Act.
NONTESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS TO POLICE. See Constitu-
tional Law, I.
NOTICE OF TAX SALE. See Constitutional Law, II, 2.
PAROLEE SEARCHES. See Constitutional Law, V, 2.
INDEX
PATENTS. See also Injunctions.
Market power—Tying arrangements.—Because a patent does not nec-
essarily confer market power upon patentee, in cases involving a tying
arrangement, a plaintiff must prove that defendant has market power in
tying product. [Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., p. 28.
PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. See Injunctions.
PERSECUTION FEARS. See Immigration and Nationality Act.
PER SE ILLEGALITY. See Antitrust Acts.
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE. See Hobbs Act.
POLICE STATEMENTS. See Constitutional Law, I.
PRECLUSION. See Federal Employer and Employees; Jurisdic-
tion, 2.
PRE-EMPTION. See Securities Law.
PRICE SETTING. See Antitrust Acts.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS. See Criminal Law, 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE. See Bivens Actions; Constitutional Law, V, 5.
PROBATE EXCEPTION. See Jurisdiction, 1.
PROCEDURAL DEFAULT. See Habeas Corpus, 2.
PROPERTY SALE. See Constitutional Law, II, 2.
PROXIMATE CAUSE. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.
PUBLIC EMPLOYER AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES. See Constitu-
tional Law, III, 2; Federal Employers and Employees.
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
ACT.
Proximate cause requirement.—Respondent cannot maintain a RICO
claim against petitioners under 18 U.S.C. §1962(¢)—which forbids con-
ducting or participating in conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity—because it has not shown proximate
cause between injury asserted and injurious conduct alleged, petitioner’s
failure to pay state sales taxes; Second Circuit must on remand determine
whether proximate cause requirement is met with respect to respondent’s
claim under § 1962(a), which makes it unlawful to “use or invest” income
derived from a pattern of racketeering activity. Anza v. Ideal Steel Sup-
ply Corp., p. 451.
1298 INDEX
REMOVAL. See Jurisdiction, 2.
RETALIATORY PROSECUTION. See Bivens Actions.
RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION. See Constitutional Law, I.
RIVERS AND DAMS. See Clean Water Act, 1.
ROBBERY. See Hobbs Act.
SALES TAXES. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. See Constitutional Law, V.
SECTION 1983. See Civil Rights Act of 1871.
SECURITIES LAW.
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1988—Pre-emption
of state-law fraud claims.—Background, text, and purpose of Act’s pre-
emption provision demonstrate that Act pre-empts state-law holder class-
action securities fraud claims of kind alleged here. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, p. 71.
SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT OF 1988.
See Jurisdiction, 2; Securities Law.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES. See Criminal Law, 1.
SHERMAN ACT. See Antitrust Acts.
SIXTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, I; IV.
SOCIAL SECURITY.
Medicaid—State’s lien on tort settlement.—Federal Medicaid law does
not authorize Arkansas to assert a lien on Ahlborn’s tort settlement in an
amount exceeding that portion of settlement that represented Medicaid
payments for Ahlborn’s medical care, and federal anti-lien provision af-
firmatively prohibits State from doing so. Arkansas Dept. of Health and
Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, p. 268.
SOLOMON AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, III, 1.
SOUTH CAROLINA. See Constitutional Law, IV.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. See Constitutional Law, VI.
SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974. See Criminal Law, 2.
STANDING. See Taxes.
STATE SALES TAXES. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.