United States Army Aviation Digest January-February 1992: Iss 1

67 Pages·20.8 MB·English

UNITED STATES ARMY
PrAofessionval Bullevtin 1-92i-1 AtDiistributioon restrictnion. Thi s publicaDtion apprioved for pGublic releEase. DistrSibution isT unlimited
Aviation Digest
PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN
1-92-1 = JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1992
Let’s Exchange Ideas, MG Dave Robinson Cover: An AH-I stylized sight
Risk—iIts Assessment and Management, MG Dave Robinson reticie is focused for the
Cobra to do immediate
Views From Readers
damage to a Soviet 152mm,
Deep Attack and the Counterartillery Battle, COL Kief S. Tackaberry, SP howitzer. Aviation
LTC James A. Kelley, and CPT Thomas M. Muir Brigade, 7th Infantry Division,
Design for Tempo, Part 4, Army Aviation and the Counterfire Mission, Scouts made such “fixes”
COL Patrick J. Bodelson, CPT Kevin B. Smith, and CPT Pete Vozzo while engaging enemy
artillery in Warfighter 91, the
20 Gunfighters, LTC Gerard Hart and SPC Derrick Crawford
lead article, starting on page
23 Fort Rucker Holds the First Air Assault Challenge, SPC Tonya L. Riley 6. On page 2, MG Robinson
25 Army Aviation—A Branch Founded by Dreamers and Doers, recommends education to
BG Robert A. Goodbary reduce Class A, B, and C
aircraft accident rates. Army
30 Superintendent of Documents Subscriptions Order Form
Aviation adds substantial
31 Aviation Digest 1991 Subject Index warfighting capability to the
35 The Tactical Army Computer, CPT Douglas D. Sena combined arms team in
38 Apache Armed Reconnaissance Operations, LTC William H. Bryan and “Army Aviation and the
Counterfire Mission,” on
CPT Michael A. Albaneze
page 1/4.
42 Cope Thunder, 1LT Frank W. Tate
45 USAASA Sez: Military Training Routes, Mr. John McKeeman
46 TEXCOM: Heavy Equipment Transporters, CPT Horace E. Williams and
Mr. Larry E. Wollenberg Major General Dave Robinson
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center
48 Aviation Medicine Report: A Diet for Enhanced Aviator Performance,
MAJ Charles A. Salter Lieutenant Colonel Gerard Hart
Executive Editor
51. Aviation Personnel Notes: The Army Aviation Personnel Plan; Revisions
for MOSs 93C and 93D; Green Tabs Patricia S. Kitchell
53 ATC Focus: ATNAVICS is on the Way!, SGM James Wilson er
54 PEARL’S: Survival Tip: Dry Feet; Western Region Survival School By order of the Secretary of the Army
Gordon R. Sullivan
55 Aviation Logistics: Flight Line Maintenance, MW4 Jesse H. Dize General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff
59 AVSCOM: Human Factors in Aircraft Maintenance and Inspection,
Mr. Robert A. Feeler Official
65 Soldiers’ Spotlight—Safety, CSM Fredy Finch Jr. Patricia R.P. Hickerson
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Back Cover: Aviation Digest Author Guide The Adjutant General
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Major General Dave Robinson
Warfighter 6
Let’s Exchange Ideas
The winds of change are America’s full potential for con- vision and the courage to trans-
blowing throughout the Army tingency and mobilized forces. form dreams to reality.
and the entire Defense structure. Our doctrine is being tuned in Specialist Tonya Riley’s article
For the past 40 years, military the areas of deploying and sus- on the air assault challenge is a
forces and arsenals have been taining the force; very shortly, a superb treatment on a new com-
shaped by Cold War demands in definitive "How to Fight" avia- petition in Army Aviation.
a North Atlantic Treaty Or- tion piece will be coordinated More than ever before, we must
ganization environment. Recent among our field leadership. share our ideas, dreams, and ex-
changes in Europe and else- Training, organization, materiel periences.
where now demand a contingen- development, and leader In the months and years
cy-focused Total Army able to development matters are being ahead, I want the Aviation
respond rapidly to regional adjusted and updated now Digest to become a forum to ex-
demands anywhere in the world. against future security needs. change ideas and dialogue on
As the Army restructures, the You can and must be a part of meaningful issues that affect our
new strategic environment will the change process; your profession across the Branch. I
provide challenges and oppor- perspective and sensings, con- have asked the Digest staff to
tunities for Army Aviation. The sidered in combination with find creative and visionary
deployable, lethal, and versatile others across the Branch, will be thinkers, wherever they may be,
attributes of aviation forces are a powerful voice in maintaining for thoughtful input on matters
becoming increasingly impor- the edge for our current forces that will make our Army better.
tant to the combined arms team. and in developing a vision for Minority opinions are en-
Reconnaissance, security, at- the future. couraged; reader feedback will
tack, assault, special electronic The Aviation Digest is an im- help all of us to gain a broadened
mission aircraft, medium lift, portant forum for idea exchange. perspective.
and air medical evacuation are I have stated my views on risk I urge you to get your ideas,
significant capabilities afforded assessment in this issue to start experiences, and successes
by aviation in contingency the idea exchange. Colonel Kief before Aviation Digest readers.
deployments. S. Tackaberry’s article high- All submissions will receive
During this time of change, a lights the ability of a Light careful attention—there is no
frank and open dialogue among Infantry Division (LID) to over- better time than this moment to
all areas in the Branch is essen- come range limits of organic start working on your letter or
tial. Discussion is healthy, artillery using attack helicopters article. We will study the issues,
especially as new organizational in the counterartillery battle. meet any challenge, and
concepts are explored that har- Such techniques will allow the together, shape the future.
ness emerging technologies LID to seize the initiative and
applied to a smaller, restructured "unhinge the enemy’s center of
force. We must draw upon the gravity"—his artillery assets.
combined strength oft he Active, Brigadier General Al
National Guard, and U.S.Army Goodbary’s speech entitled "A
Reserve components and find Branch Founded by Dreamers
imaginative ways to harness and Doers” focuses on men with
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Risk—its Assessment and Management
by Major General Dave Robinson equipped not only with the right
thought processes, but the
ability to instill these processes
Secttietias is tough, To deal with the dangers of in the minds of soldiers.
demanding, and risky our profession, we espouse a
Human Error
work latent with high potential "crawl, walk, run" training
for danger; it is not for the faint philosophy; however, all too Every mission we execute is a
of heart. Soldiering attracts men often we find ourselves running fight against two enemies. One
and women witha "can do" spirit when we should crawl or walk. is the declared enemy—the
and a zeal for warfighting. By The decision to crawl, walk, or threat to national security. We
nature, we are not risk averse, run does not simply happen, it do not know the exact nature of
nor do we shrink from respon- requires the involvement of en- the next declared enemy, but
sibility. lightened leadership—leaders generally this enemy should be
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1992
revealed before battle. The other read on because it will be worth the U.S. Army Safety Center
enemy knows us well. It watches your time. folks have been keeping a book
us, and it waits. It singles out Risk management is a /eader- on us for a long time—the statis-
individual soldiers, an aircraft— ship process. It involves iden- tics are condemning. Our equip-
perhaps a tank, an artillery crew, tifying and assessing hazards, ment is reliable; people cause
or a truck driver. Then it strikes making risk decisions, im- most accidents.
with nearly inescapable certain- plementing controls, and super- If we are excessively safe in
ty and brings terrible effects. It vising at all levels. This process peacetime, must we defer tough,
sneaks up on us in subtle ways, begins with an evaluation of realistic training? Of course not,
plays on our complacency, and hazards, in short, a risk assess- but we must decide when it is
attacks often without warning. ment, which is much like the in- prudent to crawl as opposed to
This enemy is called human telligence preparation oft he bat- walking or running in our train-
error. tlefield. Both techniques deal ing regimes. As the Army be-
The threat of the human error with definition of the threat, its comes leaner and relies more on
accident targets all battlefield capabilities, its methods, and fewer high technology systems,
operating systems. For this dis- where it may strike. The overall each system is a significant na-
cussion, I will focus on aviation- process of managing risk is tional fighting asset. If we crash
related activities. During Viet- analyzing your environment, a helicopter, it is gone from the
nam, nearly 50 percent of and then calculating the best fighting force forever and will
aircraft losses was due to human way to defeat an enemy. It also not be replaced—to say nothing
error accidents. In Operation is related closely, if not identi- of the agony and heartbreak of
Desert Storm, this figure was cally, to the process we use to losing a soldier needlessly. Risk
closer to 75 percent. formulate the operations es- management is not risk elimina-
While combat operations timate. Leaders need a risk tion. The only way to eliminate
often mask the cause of acci- management mind-set, a process risk is to stop training. We must
dents, investigations confirm through which we must teach perceive potential risk, assess its
human error as the culprit most people how to think, not what to impact on operations, decide
of the time. Accidents kill or in- do. where and when it is prudent,
jure our valuable personnel and There are hazards involved in and then take action to reduce or
destroy our fighting assets; the nearly everything we do in the eliminate it. There is a simple
byproduct is an erosion of our Army—in peacetime and war. way to get at this matter. At
warfighting capability. So then, Over the years, we have strug- every level in an organization,
what is our doctrine to fight this gled with hazard elimination and we need to ask these three ques-
insidious threat? How do we reduction in a variety of ways. tions:
train our leaders and soldiers to Some of you may recall the a Who will have the next ac-
defeat human error accidents? "zero defect" days. In marked cident in my unit or section?
contrast, some leaders accept ac- a What kind ofa ccident will it
Risk Management
cidents as a "cost of doing busi- be?
The process used to defeat ness." After all, they say, a little a What am I doing about it
this threat is called risk manage- blade strike does not hurt right now?
ment. You say, “Hold it, | am a anyone. One tank bumping into When we ask this last ques-
warfighter; some things are just another is no sweat. After all, tion, the answers are surprising.
the price of doing business, and tanks are made for tough action. "Well, I really do not know--I
all this assessment stuff is for Some view risk analysis as have not really looked at it this
wimps!" I hope you do not think "incompatible with the warrior way before;" "We are not going
this way! Whether you do or not, spirit." The truth of the matter is to have any accidents;" or "Well,
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
I am going to work real hard with ceptable, it does not necessarily difficult. We have tough, young,
the maintenance folks to be cer- mean that the crew is golden. We mission-oriented aviators and
tain they do their work to stand- spend hours in premission plan- leaders who are adverse to refus-
ard." Each of these replies tells ning to defeat the declared ing a mission—few desire to
me the respondent does not un- threat. Now, let us start a "risk shrink from mission ac-
derstand risk assessment, since preparation of the battlefield" to complishment. No amount of
none mentioned the culprit— fight the other, more elusive proper risk management by the
human error. enemy. Brief the soldier on the chain of command can over-
We have not done a good job most likely threat that will kill come a careless operator, but it
of teaching leaders how to deal him—whether a poor scan tech- can put them in the spotlight
with risks. Current risk manage- nique, the ZSU-23/4, excessive before they screw up something.
ment techniques often "boil speed, or landing at night in Hold your people accountable
down" to checking the blocks; dusty conditions. for their thought processes.
adding up the numbers to deter- A leader may use, or fail to Over recent years, we have
mine low, medium, or high risk; use, proper risk management made incredible strides in
and, then, regardless of the find- techniques and never have an ac- safety. We have to capitalize on
ing, moving out to accomplish cident. A pilot or driver may get what we know. We must study
the mission. The process is short into the habit of using the same risk management, assess techni-
on reduction or control. Too poor technique, or shortcut, and ques, and teach young leaders
often leaders do not get in- may use it a hundred times and soldiers how to think about
volved. without that final, irreversible, risk—not merely hand out
Risk management education negative feedback. Often, others "school solutions.” We must
focuses on the explicit and im- have noticed a future fatal be- question regulatory require-
plicit dangers in our profession. havior, and failed to take correc- ments that could lead to unsafe
We must have leaders who are tive action. Risk management is practices.
willing to nurture subordinates not a spectator sport. It is a con- We want to reduce the Class
to take intelligent risks and dis- tact sport that requires total par- A aircraft accident rate to below
courage the "gamblers," even if ticipation. While experience, one per 100,000 hours and Clas-
it looks like a gamble might pay one source of feedback, is a ses B and C rates by one half the
off. Concentrate on the decision great teacher, our experience current rate. We can do it and
processes that take place before base is shrinking. As veterans of more, but only with your help!
and during each mission and more recent conflicts replace the There are no gimmicks nor com-
each exercise. We are not on the last "bubble" of Vietnam-ex- plicated formulas—just com-
horns of a "risk versus realism" perienced aviators, risk assess- mon sense and answers to these
dilemma, but we are asking ment and management initia- three simple questions:
leaders to look at their organiza- tives become paramount. s Who will have the next ac-
tions in a new way. When we We must get to the point cident in your unit?
assess who will have the next where legitimate risk manage- What kind of accident will
accident and resolve to do some- ment techniques are performed it be?
thing about it, we will have made consistently by every leader and What are you doing about
a giant step in really under- every soldier in every job. The it?
standing our organizations. best risk assessment questions
The risk management process are asked by the crews themsel-
must include a tailored form of ves, but there are psychological Major General Robinson is the
the "mission briefing.” When dimensions that make self- Commanding General, U. S. Army
risk is assessed and found ac- evaluations and peer evaluations Aviation Center and Fort Rucker .
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1992
Views FRom READERS
Editor: Editor: -
The article “An Aviation Brigade The Computer Science School at the
Goes to War” in the September-October U.S. Army Signal Center, Fort Gordon, HOTLINES
1991 issue of the U.S. Army Aviation GA, is developing a new course to sup-
Digest was right on the mark. I was the port FA 53 (systems automation) offi- Aviation Center - The Aviation
Fire Support Officer for the 4th Brigade Center Hotline is here to assist you.
cers. The Systems Automation Course
at the time, and was able to observe the The line is monitored 24 hours a
(SAC) II is being developed to prepare
actions of the Brigade first hand. day. The Aviation Center will pro-
FA 53 officers who are currently serving
In my opinion, the key ingredient in vide feedback within 72 hours on
in branch-related assignments for up-
the success of the Brigade was the high such topics as: Aviation training
coming FA 53 assignments. This course
level of training it maintained. This is and doctrine; aircraft systems; air-
best illustrated by the actions following will quickly bring an officer up-to-date craft survivability; tactics, tech-
the 8 November 1990 announcement that with current automation technology and niques, and procedures; or any
the Ist Armored Division would be de- Army automation issues. It also will pro- other aviation-related subject. The
ployed to Operation Desert Shield. vide the officer with the critical skills that Hotline number is DSN 558-6487
When the word came, there was no will be required in his next assignment. or commercial 205-255-6487.
rush to do any “catch-up” work. That is, SAC II is 4 weeks, 4 days long and
no one had to go out and fix anything. No should be scheduled en route to an Infantry Center - The Army
one had to rush out and update their officer’s next FA 53 assignment. The first relies heavily on field input to mod-
standing operating procedures. No one course is scheduled for January 1993 ernize doctrine, equipment, and
had to go to the simulator and practice. with courses being conducted on a quar- support for the soldier. Thus, the
No one had to assemble their crew or staff terly basis thereafter. The requirements U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
and rehearse. In short, the Brigade was to attend the course are to: be on orders Command Systems Manager-Sol-
ready on the day it was called. to a FA 53 assignment; be a Major (MAJ) dier, Fort Benning, GA, now has a
The unit readiness can be attributed to or Colonel (COL); and have served out- 24-hour Hotline. This Hotline gives
the exemplary command climate created side of FA 53 for at least the last 3 years. soldiers and commanders a voice in
by Colonel (COL) Patrick J. Bodelson, For more information on this new deciding what a soldier wears, car-
the previous commander, and nurtured course, please contact Captain Prantl at ries, or consumes in a tactical envi-
by COL Daniel J. Petrosky, the com- DSN 780-3236 or through DDN as ronment.
mander during Operation Desert Storm. “prantl@ gordon-emh2.army.mil”. To re- The Infantry Center seeks your
They recognized that they had quality quest seats or other FA 53 assignment recommendations to improve bat-
soldiers and leaders in the Brigade. They information please contact MAJ Welch at tlefield capabilities of leathality,
gave those people the guidance, time, and DSN 221-2759 or through DDN as command and control, survivabil-
resources to train safely and thoroughly. “welchd0@hoffman-emh | army.mil” ity, sustainment, and mobility, and
They were successful! COL Archie D. Andrews, to lighten the soldier’s load. Call
Major Timothy J. Sweeney, Signal Corps the Hotline at DSN 835-1245 or
Field Artillery Director, Computer Science commercial 404-545-1245. Use
Nuclear Surety Officer School these numbers until a toll-free line
U.S. Army Nuclear and Fort Gordon, GA is established.
Chemical Agency
Springfield, VA 2 S
Readers can obtain copies of the material that is printed in any issue by writing to:
Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, ATZQ-PAO-AD, Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5042
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
a= Colonel Kief S. Tackaberry
Lieutenant Colonel James A. Kelley
Captain Thomas M. Muir
DEEP ee
7th Infantry Division (Light)
Aviation Brigade
Fort Ord, CA
ATTACK
Te article outlines the 7th Infantry
AND THE Division (Light) concept of deep
operations for a light infantry division.
It portrays decide-detect-deliver
C O U NT - R.- methodology, and command and
control structure. It highlights Battle
Command Training Program War-
fighter 9l—events leading to the
A ' ;| | a RY neutralization of enemy artillery and the
eventual destruction of more than five
enemy divisions in 4 days.
The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)
Warfighter Exercise was the training highlight of the
7th Infantry Division (Light) (7ID(L)) during Fiscal
Year 1991. The Division’s successful achievements
largely were due to the near flawless synchronization
of cross-forward line of own troops (FLOT) deep
attacks against the enemy’s overwhelming number of
artillery assets.
The scenario for the 7ID(L) Warfighter 91 was a
mid-intensity conflict fought in a contingency area.
The sheer numbers and ranging capabilities of enemy
artillery assets limited the commanding general (CG)
from maneuvering his forces. Success for the Light
Infantry Division (LID) lay in seizing the initiative
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1992
early by unhinging the enemy’s center of gravity—his The CG was relying on the Aviation Brigade te win
artillery assets. the counterartillery battke—in highly synchronized
Later, the Division would infiltrate the enemy’s deep operations with DIVARTY (Division artillery)
security zone; simultaneously attack across the breadth and USAF BAI assets—allowing for freedom of ma-
of the main defensive belt; secure key terrain; and neuver for close operations during phase II.
allow for the forward passage of friendly forces to He declared, “My intent is to focus on NVG [night
continue the fight. vision goggles] operations to maximize surprise and
Initially, two enemy divisions facing the 7ID(L) enhance our survivability. We will synchronize
defended in successive belts and had several days to JSEAD [joint suppression of enemy air defenses],
prepare their positions. The enemy had pushed his artillery fires, and USAF BAI to mass fires for the
divisional and corps artillery groups forward to provide deep attack.” He defined success for the Aviation
overwhelming long-range fires to support the conti- Brigade during phase I and phase II as the reduction
nuity of his defense. His artillery included regimental of enemy artillery to 25-percent strength before com-
artillery groups (RAGs), division artillery groups mitment of the Division’s other maneuver brigades.
(DAGs), and the corps artillery groups (CAGs). The concept for deep operations was to develop a
The enemy’s artillery assets were well integrated detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield
into the defensive plans and fires; they were protected (IPB) and use divisional and Corps assets available to
by air defense artillery (ADA) systems, ranging from support a decide-detect-deliver methodology. The
SA-7s/SA-14s to ZPU-4s and S-60s; they threatened deep attacks were a joint operation combining all of
the survival of the 7ID(L) since the enemy’s artillery the battlefield operating systems, 20 to 30 kilometers
could out-range ours. (km) beyond the FLOT, into a single offensive force.
Mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
(METT-T) analysis indicated the 7ID(L) must go Intelligence Preparation of
beyond current doctrine to win the counterartillery the Battlefield (IPB)
battle by conducting successful deep operations. The IPB for deep operations focused on developing
To win the counterartillery battle, the CG had to courses of action for deciding to attack deep. Named
successfully conduct deep operations. To establish the and targeted areas of interest (NAIs and TAIs) were
conditions to win the close battle, the process would forwarded as requests for information (RFIs) to Corps
be dispersion, concentration of forces, decisive en- to detect the locations of enemy artillery groups and
gagements, redispersion, and reconstitution. further refine the high-payoff target lists.
The CG decided the best course of action was to Finally, we identified trigger events and developed
mass artillery, USAF (U.S. Air Force) BAI (battlefield a decision support matrix. The matrix synchronized
air interdiction) assets, and attack helicopters forces at H-Hour (time of attack) to deliver over-
(ATKHs) in a synchronized deep attack; then to de- whelming combat forces deep; the purpose, destroy
stroy the enemy’s artillery assets before the light enemy regiments and artillery RAGs and DAGs during
infantry forces began their infiltration attacks. the dark of the night and amid the confusion of the
initial artillery general preparation of the battlefield.
Concept of the Operation Intelligence assets used to support our IPB came
The mission was simple and concise in nature, yet not only from divisional units, but from corps and
complex in execution: “Aviation Brigade attacks echelons above corps. These additional assets, to in-
042100 Aug 91 to reduce enemy RAGs and DAGs vic clude national technical means, could range deep
EA [engagement area] DUKE.” beyond the FLOT and accurately target the enemy’s
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
OH-58Ds AH-1s_ arrive at
confirm targets; hoiding area FOX; AH-1s second AH-1s and
AH-is_ begin Scouts reconnoiter engagement Scouts use
deep attac battle positions forward arming
OH-58Ds AH-1s AH-1s first begin andp orienftuse ling
cross-FLOT cross-FLOT engagement egress
proactive division suppression of point suppression
of enemy air
artilllery strike enemy air
(1 hour) defense fired defense for battle egress suppres-
air interdiction sion of enemy air
corps deep attack on arresetar iicnt eedf ffeicrte hporledpianrga tairoena FanOdX replanned battle. tfense begins
corps and division battle position eld_air interdiction
artillery groups complete (Forward Air
Controller )
The sequence of events illustrate
FIGURE 1: Deep Attack, Phase 1
artillery groups. We developed a battlefield calculus the scheme of maneuver and fire support for the deep
to estimate combat power ratios, which the CG used attack.
during his decision process. The G2, through his ability to manage the intelli-
gence collection effort, enabled the joint targeting cell
Command and Control (Cc?) to accurately fix enemy artillery groups—especially
The C2 for the deep attack was centralized at the long-range, 170mm (millimeter) howitzers.
Division main (DMAIN) command post (CP). The From coordinated IPB products, we established
Aviation Brigade commander decided early to co-lo- CCIRs (commander’s critical information require-
cate the Brigade tactical air command (TAC) CP with ments). This enabled the CG to make time-sensitive
the DMAIN CP during the deep attacks. decisions to engage high-risk, high-payoff targets.
This allowed for interface with the joint targeting Warfighter 91 challenged the CG to fight a numer-
cell, Division FSE (fire support element), ALO (air ically superior enemy across the entire width and
liaison officer), ATC” (Army airspace command and breadth of the battlefield. This bridged the gap between
control element), and G2 (intelligence). The CG com- current and future doctrine to synchronize deep oper-
manded the Division’s deep attack from the DMAIN. ations at division level.
The Aviation Brigade commander planned to com-
mand from a UH-60A Black Hawk going cross-FLOT Synchronization
during the deliver phase of the deep operations. The joint targeting cell met in the DMAIN at 1400
From planning through execution, detailed coordi- and 0200 daily. The cell projected operations 36 hours
nation of the employment of all the battlefield operat- into the future to synchronize attacks with the nomi-
ing systems (BOSs) was fundamental to the mission. nation of targets for the ATO (air tasking order) cycle.
The Division joint targeting cell served as the focal The first priority for the joint targeting cell was to
point for gathering all BOS managers. This cell was develop high-payoff target lists based on the IPB and
key to coordinating and integrating all systems into current and future operational requirements according
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1992